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Preface 
In the early years of the twentieth century the Russian Empire was in 
revolutionary turmoil. In Russia itself groups such as the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, the Social Democrats and the constitutionalist Union 
of Liberation, on the background of continual diverse and intense 
popular unrest, accelerated their struggle for the transformation and 
overthrow of the tsarist regime. Throughout the Empire as well, from 
Poland and the Baltic provinces to Asia, sundry minority, nationalist 
and socialist opposition and revolutionary movements helped under-
mine imperial power and create the conditions for the Revolution of 
1905. On the western border of the Empire, in the Grand Duchy of 
Finland, the regime's efforts to defend and bolster imperial integrity 
through the destruction of local autonomy and constitutionalist 
assertion was met with a distinct and sophisticated form of primarily 
nonmilitary struggle and warfare. 
To call the Finnish Constitutionalists' struggle against the imperial 
Russian regime a type of warfare may seem unusual, or even 
exaggerated. Yet "warfare," when used to designate a form of action 
functionally differing from conventional warfare, is an appropriately 
inclusive term for designating the scope of the Finnish fight ranging 
from the constitutionalist mobilization and so-called Legal Battle, 
which accelerated in the later half of the nineteenth century, to the 
insurgent noncooperation movement and the schemes for violent 
rebellion within the context of the Russian Revolution in the period 
leading up to 1905. Besides, Finnish resistance thinkers themselves 
explicitly came to understand their struggle as having escalated into a 
type of war, with both sides employing special means for waging 
nonmilitary warfare. There exist, moreover, within the body of post-
Clausewitzean conflict research a whole variety of ways of distin-
guishing a spectrum of non-routine conflict or warfare between 
conventional warfare and peaceful politics. For one apt example, in 
1985 the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff defined low-intensity 
warfare as 
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limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, 
or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from 
diplomatic, economic and psycho-social pressures through terrorism 
and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a 
geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the 
weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.' 
The Finns' particular way of low-intensity, constitutionalist and 
deliberately violence-avoiding conflict was called "passive resistance." 
This study is the result of reciprocally examining passive resistance as 
a unique form of struggle, at a given place and limited time in Finland, 
and as a case of a more general type of European conflict. Thus it was 
interest in nonmilitary struggle in general which led to the study of 
the Finnish case. In turn, familiarity with the Finnish case gave rise to 
new questions concerning passive resistance and constitutionalist 
insurgency in general in western history. Accordingly, focus on passive 
resistance provides a vehicle for contributing to the critical conceptual 
and historical examination of ideologies and methodologies of violence-
avoiding contention and warfare. Likewise, it provides a tool for 
understanding Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency within the political 
culture of which it was an expression. 
In Finland passive resistance was part of a deeply rooted repertoire 
or tradition of means of relating to Russia ranging from nonconfronta-
tional national development and constitutionalist assertion with the 
intention of creating an inviolable society to radical disobedience and 
violent struggle. Only as part of this tradition can passive resistance 
be satisfactorily understood. Likewise, only through a comprehension 
of this cultural context can more general concepts of nonmilitary 
struggle be applied to Finland without distortion. Moreover, this 
approach will aid those seeking to grasp the historical conditions of 
Finnish national defense in general. 
The study begins by introducing the Finnish concept of passive 
resistance, the movement of which it was a part and the circumstances 
which spawned it in 1899. Then through the description and construc-
tive criticism of the influential Finnish national (historiographical and 
political) and "nonviolent action" perspectives on the subject the 
work's conceptual framework is established and its scope and limits 
are clearly defined. This perspective is elaborated in the final section 
of chapter I. outlining a more comprehensive historical model of 
resistance and contention. This is done by examining certain central 
principles of Finnish political culture of relevance to this study (as 
1
 Quoted in Klare 1988, p. 53. 
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articulated in the nineteenth century by Finland's most influential 
political philosopher and active statesman, leader of the Finnish 
national movement, J.V. Snellman) in relation to general European 
thinking on violence and sociopolitical change. In particular William 
Godwin and Snellman are used to represent two distinct approaches 
to social power and mass action within the vast field of conflict types 
which can be distinguished as making (from the actor's viewpoint) no 
use of direct physical violence or the materials and organization 
involved with its use. This section also seeks to emphasize the intricate 
reciprocal relation between justice and injustice in European (including 
Finnish) constitutionalism and that disproportionate focus on 
emancipatory "nonviolent" action may tend to underrate, among other 
things, the extent of collective or class domination involved in nonmili-
tary struggles. 
The purpose of chapter II. is to historically define European passive 
resistance and to determine just how unique it is as a distinct form of 
struggle requiring the deliberate avoidance of violence. By so doing, 
moreover, the culture of constitutionalist resistance to which the Finns 
were heir is portrayed. In section 1. this is done through the comparison 
and contrast of passive resistance and civil disobedience and by 
dispelling some of the influential popular misconceptions of passive 
resistance perpetuated by the later M.K. Gandhi and his followers 
while determining what insights the earlier Gandhi had into the nature 
and history of it. In the second section it is claimed that many defining 
statements on passive resistance have failed to account for the actual 
history of the term itself and consequently arbitrarily postulate relations 
between it and forms of action with which it was not actually associated. 
Therefore an effort is made to sketch the history of "passive resist-
ance," leading to the conclusion that what Europeans signified by it 
was a secular way of struggle, the principles and techniques of which 
became widely known at the time of the Revolution of 1848; and it is 
certainly not to be identified with Christian "resist not evil," or pacifist 
types of opposition. From 1848 to World War One passive resistance 
was employed in constitutionalist, anti-absolutist and other types of 
disobedience struggles against authorities. In Finland passive resistance 
was the weapon of a highly organized assertive and insurgent elite-led 
Constitutionalist movement. 
Thus strictly speaking passive resistance does not predate the nine-
teenth century. It is, however, an expression of a culture of resistance 
and rebellion having roots in the early modern era of European history. 
The Finns were clearly heirs to this constitutionalist tradition and to 
the contradictions and ambiguity of resistance and obedience in 
ix 
Protestant culture. Although the constitutionalist ideology of just 
struggle took shape in the early modern period, apparently resisters 
from the era of the first revolutionary Protestants until the nineteenth 
century had no significant articulated concept of a form of effective 
struggle between violent resistance and passive obedience to be used 
as an alternative to violence against military warfare. 
Chapters III. and IV. form the core of the book. In the former the 
task, as introduced in the beginning of the study, of explaining the 
origin and development of Finnish passive resistance is carried out. 
Following the Finno-Russian constitutional conflict of 1861 a tradition 
of associating passive resistance with unnationalistic liberal extremism 
was initiated. In various forms this tradition has given rise to misconcep-
tions about Finnish resistance which are presently still perpetuated. In 
contrast to these views it is shown here that in the course of the latter 
half of the nineteenth century conditions made for the fertile unification 
of nationalist, or "Fennomanian," cultural defense and assertive 
constitutionalism. Finnish nationalism could never be guided solely 
according to the ideals of the most vocal conservative Fenno-
nationalists, and it was the Finnish national mobilization in general 
(including the workers' movement) which provided the strong 
foundation for the ideology and organization of resistance after 1898. 
Although the study focuses on nonmilitary cultural defense and 
passive resistance, it is the aim of a subsection in the last part of chapter 
III. to provide an insight into the role of armed force in Finnish society. 
One of the central tenets of Finnish national thought was that armed 
force is not necessary for national survival. Nevertheless, paradoxically 
enough, Finnish political leaders agreed that Finland should have its 
own autonomous army. Moreover, the military question played an 
important role in triggering the Finno-Russian crisis beginning in 1899. 
Another special feature of chapter III. is the section dealing with 
the Hungarian passive resistance movement. This is an aspect of the 
Finnish resistance heritage which has been altogether neglected by 
researchers, in spite of the fact that it was the most prominent channel 
for the diffusion of resistance culture into Finland and represented for 
Finns an outstanding historical model for their own struggle. Moreover, 
contrary to the claims of those who see the Hungarian model as 
perpetuated by extremist Constitutionalists, it was, beginning in the 
1860s, prominent figures in the Fennomanian movement who propa-
gated knowledge of the Hungarian struggle and its relevance for the 
Finns. 
The aim of chapter IV. is to define the inextricably interlinked 
ideology and methodology of passive resistance following 1898, ex- 
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amining the central issues which it involved in practice. The first task 
is to describe the Russification program and the initial mobilization 
and organization of resistance. Generally speaking, as the Russian 
administrators well recognized, Finnish society provided the resisters 
with highly favorable circumstances, with certain serious drawbacks, 
for disobedience. Moreover, the initiation of resistance involved what 
was seen as a unique mass activation of learned European opinion. 
At this time the Finnish resistance tradition was redefined and 
radicalized. Passive resistance came to include a sophisticated variety 
of strikingly effective means for a "new way of waging warfare," based 
on systematic non-cooperation. The Constitutionalism which fueled 
the mass movement beginning in 1899 was above all geared for action, 
providing its adherents with a common creed while giving each one 
leeway concerning personal motives Finnish resistance leaders had 
internalized modern constitutionalism and the current European 
political morality of the struggle for Justice and the duty of rebellion. 
Nevertheless, the dilemma involved in the question of resistance or 
submission, which gave rise to extreme controversy, was in its 
profundity impossible to deal with entirely on a secular level. The 
religious aspect of the struggle was very prominent, and the resisters 
had to invoke an early-modern form of religiopolitical discourse in the 
effort to overcome Finns' Lutheran obedience to authority and the 
harnessing of God to the "realistic" arguments of the compliants. The 
Finns' predicament also inspired the creation of a distinct Tolstoyan-
Christian type of passive resistance which involved the rejection of 
fundamental constitutionalist principles. 
Another outstanding dilemma faced by the Constitutionalists, who 
represented the upper strata of society, lay in their relation to what 
they called the rank and file of the nation. In the effort to mobilize a 
mass following, in spite of brief and significant successes, they were 
forced to acknowledge their illusions concerning the masses and 
recognize the lack of national consciousness and unity in Finland. 
Through the analysis of this dilemma passive resistance can be seen 
not only as a way of struggle against Russia, but also as a bid for 
national power during the death throes of the old status society. 
Nevertheless, in regard to insurgence against the long-established 
Russian regime, the propagation of the untoward spirit of disobedience 
throughout the nation and association with disaffected elements in 
Russia, the Constitutionalist front was certainly the most radical agent 
in Finnish society prior to the Great Strike. Section 6. of this chapter 
seeks to determine the scope and limits of Constitutionalist insurgency 
and its relation to armed force and Empire-wide revolution. The fourth 
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chapter concludes with a detailed evaluation of the accomplishments, 
failures and outcome of Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency. 
Chapter V. brings the work to an end by examining what an under-
standing of the Finnish case might have to offer to the study of nonmili-
tary struggle in general. 
This study got under way with the aid of grants by the Finnish 
Cultural Fund, the Tampere Peace Research Institute and the Finnish 
Metal Workers' Fund. The main research was accomplished under a 
Fellowship granted by the Einstein Institution of Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, an organization which supports work on the strategic uses of 
nonviolent sanctions in relation to problems of political violence. The 
final stages of the work were supported by my own financial endeavors 
and by a grant from Helsinki University. 
I would like to thank Risto Alapuro, Yrjö Blomstedt, Rolf Büchi, 
Dudley Duncan, Antti Kujala, Tuomo Polvinen, Charles Tilly, and 
Anthony F. Upton, for commenting on the manuscript. Their criticism 
led to important alterations in the text, including the further clarifica-
tion of central points. I was not, however, able to act upon all of their 
valuable comments. Moreover, there are several points over which I 
remain in certain degrees of disagreement with some of them. 
Therefore it is only appropriate to stress that none of these reviewers 
bear responsibility for the work as it stands. 
I am very grateful to the people at the various archives, libraries 
and other institutions who facilitated this study. In particular I would 
like to thank the staff of the Helsinki University Library whose kind 
and decisive help made it a memorable pleasure to deal with them. 
Special thanks are also due to all those at the History Department of 
Helsinki University, the Finnish State Archives and the Finnish Litera-
ture Society Archives who provided me with assistance and advice. 
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the Finnish Historical 
Society, and especially to Rauno Endén, for bringing this work into 
its final published form. 
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I. Perspectives on Resistance 
1. Studying the Finnish Resistance Tradition 
The redefinition of key terms can be a fundamental act of insurgency.1  
When, in August of 1900, a Finn by the name of Arvid Verner Neovius 
published a fresh definition of a controversial term within the Finnish 
political vocabulary the tsarist authorities found it so dangerous as to 
order its confiscation throughout Finland.2 In this tract Neovius 
observes that there are certain concepts and words which are borne 
upon the tongue with such frequency that their meaning seems entirely 
obvious to everyone. However, with the intervention of events which 
make it necessary to put them into action such concepts, apparently 
once so clear, become like a clanging bell with everyone interpreting 
them according to their own inclination.3 Passive resistance (passivt 
motstånd),  one of the central topics in the storm of current Finnish 
debate, was just such a concept, subject, according to Neovius, to much 
use, abuse and misunderstanding. He felt compelled to undertake the 
clarification of "the word and concept passive resistance."4 
Neovius was no mere layman in matters of defense and military 
strategy. Born in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1861 he received a military 
1  "Insurgency" throughout this study signifies a condition of revolt against a long-
established government that is less than organized revolution and that is not 
recognized as conventional warfare. 
2  Neoyius 1900a. I came upon the notification of the confiscation of Neovius' work 
in the K.F. Ignatius Collection, Finnish State Archives. Someone pasted the 
notification on the inside front cover of the copy of  Lösa blad contained therein; 
see Lösa blad. Lösa blad was one of the few domestic works to be included on the 
list of forbidden printed matter issued by the Russian regime's Board of Censors in 
Finland; see Uppgift ...  förbjudna icke periodiska tryckalster,  1891-1901. 
3 Neoyius 1900a, pp. 10-11. 
4 Ibid.,  p. 11. "Passive resistance" will never be used in this study as a trans-historical 
term, but only in reference to situations in which it was actually employed by the 
actors involved. All translations throughout this book are my own unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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education under the direct guidance of his lieutenant-general Finnish 
nationalist father, who was an instructor at the St. Petersburg Military 
Academy and later director of Finland's Cadet Academy. In addition 
to completing a doctorate in natural science, Neovius served as an 
officer in the Finnish Guard and was one of the chief editors of the  
Finsk Militär Tidskrift (Finnish Military Journal) in the 1880s.5 It was 
not as a militarily naive pacifist that Neovius was to be one of Finland's 
most articulate and persistent advocates of passive resistance. 
Neovius explained that when a superior power violates the rights of 
a weaker then passive resistance is legally and morally the fully justified 
defensive weapon (försvarsvapen) of the wronged party.6 However, if 
the defender is to wield this weapon effectively it is essential to have 
a thorough knowledge of it: 
If you cannot stretch the bow it is not yours. Only he, who knows his 
weapon precisely, can make use thereof with success. This weapon is 
not what everyone will have it. It has its own definite essence.' 
He insisted that passive resistance was no mere general term which 
could be subject to arbitrary interpretations.8 
Neovius sought to correct the "misconception" put forth by some 
that passive resistance is something which can be "practiced with the 
tongue"; it cannot be entirely equated with mere "verbal protest," he 
emphasized. Verbal protest is an important basic element of the 
concept of passive resistance, but does not compose the whole content 
of it.9 According to Neovius' view, passive resistance is not action as 
ordinarily conceived, rather it is systematic "refusal to act," refusal to 
submit to, or cooperate in any manner with, violence (våld; for Neovius 
and his contemporaries the concept of violence was not confined to 
direct damage or harm caused to persons or things, but emphatically 
included injustice as well): To merely protest against injustice while 
at the same time submitting to the aggressor's will is not, Neovius held, 
passive resistance; it is at best compliancy and, not rarely, treachery. 
Raw aggression by a predominant violent power, Neovius empha- 
5 Neovius is a forgotten figure in Finnish history. The only biography of him is a short 
article by Tekla Hultin who was one of his fellow resisters and perhaps the foremost 
pioneer at the time of women's participation in academic and political life. She was 
convinced that one day his role in the events of "the years of oppression" following 
1898 would prove to be much greater than appears in contemporary accounts; Hultin 
1923. 
6 Neovius 1900a, p. 11. 7 
 Ibid., p. 11. 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 Ibid., p. 11. 
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sized, can be overcome by the defender's persistent withdrawal of all 
cooperation, through passive resistance, which he described as a 
powerful weapon drawing strength from the unity, solidarity and 
staying power of the violated society.10  
Neovius' essay is an expression of the attempt by Finnish resistance 
thinkers to meet the challenge of the deepening crisis in Finno-Russian 
relations.11  In 1898 the extreme Russian nationalist N.I. Bobrikov was 
appointed governor-general of the Grand Duchy of Finland. Bobrikov 
brought with him to his new post a detailed program for the administra-
tive and, to a lesser extent, cultural Russification of Finland. The 
dramatic commencement of this program came with the manifesto on 
imperial legislation of February 1899 — experienced by many Finns as 
the initiation of a political coup d'etat — in which Tsar Nicholas II 
made it clear that Finnish constitutional law was not to interfere with 
the policies of imperial integration or with any other matters affecting 
the interests of the Russian Empire as a whole. 
With the promulgation of the February Manifesto and the further 
oppressive measures of the Bobrikov administration almost all politi-
cally aware Finns agreed that some form of cultural and political resist-
ance was necessary. Disagreement, however, concerning resistance 
methods coupled with internal political and social discord made for a 
very intense and multifaceted debate on how such defense should be 
carried out. The Finnish party, and the national "Fennomania" 
movement as a whole, was seriously split on the issue.12 The Young 
Ibid., pp. 11-14; a couple of years later Neovius was able to reassert, now on the 
basis of experience, that "passiye resistance, as based on the principle of unity, is a 
mighty weapon in the hands of the weak against material predominance"; see Neovius 
1902. 
At the beginning of his tract Neoyius rhetorically complained in the romantic style 
of his times of how unnatural it was to bridle his thoughts and engage in such serious 
philosophizing. Neovius' complaint is incomprehensible unless it is seen as 
symbolically referring to a task which was unnatural for the whole upper or educated 
strata of Finnish society. Neovius' "Summer Thoughts" (as the work was titled) are 
symbolic of the end of the upper strata's "summer"; according to his metaphors, its 
eagle was forced to ground and its sun was obscured. Neovius' philosophizing 
represents a new radical moment in Finnish political culture. The romantic terms 
of the discourse of the time should not allow the significance of its content to be 
obscured. 
Before mid—nineteenth century advocacy of Finnish nationalism came to be called 
"Fennomania." In English an adherent of Fennomania has usually been called a 
"Fennoman," with the plural as "Fennomans" or "Fennomen." This may be a 
convenient solution, but it loses the original reference to mania. I have chosen 
therefore to translate the term as "Fennomanian." To speak of "Fennomaniacs," 
although some might think it most appropriate (and even closer to the original), is 
perhaps too extreme. Later Fennomanians and Svecomanians also came to be 
designated by the more neutral terms "Finnish-minded" and "Swedish-minded." 
3 
10 
11 
12  
Finns, along with many members of the Fennomanian old guard, 
formed a Constitutionalist block with the liberal and Swedish-minded 
parties. This alliance, which was joined by certain workers' groups, 
advocated passive resistance while a wing of the Old Finn party 
(including many of the most prominent Fennomanian patriarchs) 
argued for various degrees of compliancy. Organized passive resistance 
was put into action right away and was to take a wide variety of forms. 
On the ideological level Neovius' work was followed by a profusion 
of others elaborating, evaluating and criticizing the concept and 
practice of passive resistance. 
As part of a small polity faced by a predominant power (which, to 
be sure, was its legitimate ruler) the Finnish resisters were forced by 
circumstances to resort to, and develop, nonmilitary means of defense. 
Nevertheless, such immediate material and political conditions by no 
means automatically lead to the exclusion of military, or other violent, 
types of struggle, as countless historical examples demonstrate. To 
more fully explain the choice of means of contention one must study 
political culture. 
From a National Point of View 
The aim of this study is to examine Finnish passive resistance against 
Russification as a case of European constitutionalist insurgency and 
nonmilitary struggle. Before laying out framework for this task it is 
important for the reader to gain an idea as to how the anti-Russification 
struggle has come to be interpreted in Finnish political culture, 
including historiography, today. 
In general the main era of the passive resistance movement, 1899-
1905, remains obscure to most Finns, strongly overshadowed as it is 
by popular national focus on the more traumatic crises of the World 
War One period resulting in revolution and civil war and by the all 
out military confrontations with the Soviet Union during the Second 
World War. It is not commonly recognized how radical the passive 
resistance movement really was. It was hitherto the most militant 
movement, and the closest thing to a rebellion, in the history of Russian 
rule over Finland. In spite of the profound effect it had on Finnish 
life, passive resistance has been the subject of relatively little major 
scholarly research.13 Perhaps this is because fresh approaches to the 
13 I qualify this statement below. 
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subject have been lacking. This lack, in turn, can be partially explained 
by the changes in Finnish politics which began around the time of the 
1905 "Great Strike" in Finland and Russia. With these changes passive 
resistance gradually disappeared from Finnish political culture. 
Furthermore, no historian has hitherto ventured to look beyond the 
Finnish national framework for a deeper understanding of passive 
resistance in its European cultural context. 
On 31 December 1917 Finnish independence was officially 
recognized by the Bolshevik government in Petrograd. This act finally 
terminated Finland's one hundred and eight year old history as an 
autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire. The Civil War 
of 1918 — which resulted in the victory of the German-supported 
"White" or "bourgeois" forces — left Finnish society deeply wounded, 
making the foundation for internal political cooperation and national 
unity extremely unstable. Finland's search during the following two 
decades for security and a practical foreign policy can be characterized 
as a process of groping which bore little fruit. An irradicable sentiment 
of mutual mistrust and hostility was to prevail on the background of 
Finno-Soviet relations during the coming years. 
Following the Civil War the memory of the Constitutionalist passive 
resistance movement was romantically preserved in certain quarters, 
but usually in subordination to the "liberation" struggle of 1918; it 
became part of the folklore of independence. Nevertheless, Finland 
of the inter-war years was not a conducive place for the innovative 
cultivation of the passive resistance tradition or, with very few 
exceptions, for the critical scholarly study of it. On the one hand, in 
the prevailing militaristic spirit of the time it obviously could not have 
been widely considered as a stance in relation to Russia; it was not 
developed into a kind of nonmilitary defense system. On the other 
hand, the passive resistance tradition of radical civilian action or civil 
disobedience against authority in the name of justice was not cultivated 
as a living part of domestic politics. 
During this period the Finnish government explored a variety of 
security policy alternatives, such as possible alliances with the Baltic 
states and Poland (all sharing fear of Russia), dependence upon League 
of Nations security and disarmament solutions and military alliance 
with Sweden and the Northern countries. All these efforts ended in 
failure. The two wars with Russia — from November 1939 to the peace 
treaty of March 1940, and from the alliance in the German offensive 
of June 1941 to final defeat and the armistice agreement of September 
1944 — inspired a new extensive national solidarity. The price of unity, 
however, was severe. The armistice agreement and the Paris Peace 
2 Studia Historica 38 	 5 
Treaty of 1947 burdened Finland with a variety of penalties, reparations 
and stringent requirements and restrictions. 
What is of relevance here for the present study is that at that time 
the overwhelming force of circumstance demanded a profound shift 
in Finnish politics, which in turn affected ways of writing history and 
interpreting political tradition. Now the passive resistance movement, 
in a manipulated and caricatured form, became a convenient scapegoat 
for the new politics. 
In his famous Independence Day speech of 1944 Finland's new post-
war prime minister, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, called upon the Finns to face 
the facts: The primary political problem for Finland, upon which its 
survival depends, was the Soviet Union. Policies of containment and 
confrontation as the primary means of foreign policy had gone 
bankrupt. As Urho K. Kekkonen (later president of Finland from 
1956-1981) put it at the time, "Finland's national interests do not 
permit a commitment to an anti-Russian policy nor the seeking of such 
a policy.i14 Nowadays on the surface of Finnish political life there 
exists a broad consensus concerning the appropriateness of what has 
come to be called the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen line" which is founded on 
neutrality and the primacy of active foreign policy and peace politics 
for the attainment of the aims of national security. 
It has been observed that the architects of present day Finnish foreign 
policy, such as Paasikivi and Kekkonen, did not develop a wholly new 
policy, but returned to a political tradition of over one hundred years 
old15. Regardless of whether they actually returned to an old policy 
or not, the writings of both men do indeed display a significant concern 
for historical understanding. Both cultivate their arguments with 
careful reference to the nineteenth and early twentieth century Finnish 
doctrines of accommodation and compliance in Finno-Russian rela-
tions. Paasikivi and Kekkonen (along with the political scholars behind 
them), like Neovius earlier, were innovating ideologists who drew upon 
and manipulated Finnish political culture in order to legitimize new, 
untoward, political behavior.16 
Of particular importance in the ideological struggle for the 
reevaluation of the Finnish political heritage were the "memoirs" of 
the eminent conservative statesman, financier and gifted diplomat 
Paasikivi from the "years of oppression" (1899-1915), published in 
14 Ibid., p. 260; Kekkonen 1982, pp. 42-43; Jansson 1986. p. 30. 
15  Apunen 1984, pp. 19-30; Jansson 1986, pp. 25-34. 
16  On ideological innovation see Skinner 1974, pp. 277-303. 
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Finnish and Swedish in 1957.17 The young doctor of law Paasikivi was 
initiated into political life in the early years of the century through 
intimate cooperation with the leading Old Finn figures of the time. It 
is thus no mere coincidence that in portraying the historical foundation 
for the development of his own politics (the "Paasikivi line") Paasikivi 
devoted considerable attention to analyzing and criticizing passive 
resistance; his own doctrine takes shape on the background of this 
criticism.18 
A common view among the patriarchs of today's Finnish histori-
ography is, in the words of  Eino Jutikkala, that "the Constitutional 
outlook on the events of the Russification period dominated the Finnish 
interpretation of history with unchallenged authority between the two 
world wars."19 It is held that just as Paasikivi's presidency (1946-1956) 
marked a sharp break with the past — he was the first non-
Constitutionalist and former member of the compliance faction to hold 
that office — so his memoirs marked the end of the predominance of 
the Constitutionalist resistance interpretation of Finno-Russian 
relations in Finnish historiography. 
For some this signified the possibility for scholars to liberate history 
from what they saw as the domination of the pro-passive resistance 
viewpoint.20 They maintain that the establishment of the Paasikivi line 
has been one of the main factors making for the more objective study 
of Finno-Russian relations.21 In other quarters this has been seen as 
the beginning of a period of the prevalence of the "neo-compliance" 
perspective in Finnish historical writing.22 On the one hand it meant 
a beneficial break with the more narrow-minded forms of Finnish 
romantic nationalist historiography and the triumph of Finnish neo-
political realism accompanied by new vitally important research into 
the "Russian point of view" in Finnish history. On the other hand, 
however, perhaps what might be called the "Paasikivi paradigm" has 
been too influential in determining how certain periods — in particular 
the era of passive resistance — are conceived of, or ignored, at present.  
Paasikivi, it should be added, was no mere amateur historian. In 
addition to law he studied history at Helsinki University and his 
77 The historian and political columnist Jukka Tarkka writes that the publication of 
Paasikiyi's memoirs represents a major transformation in Finnish political thought;  
Tarkka 1990, p. 111. 
18 Paasikivi 1957a, pp. 1-84. 
19 Jutikkala 1984, p. 208; Polvinen 1989, p. 536; Tommila 1989, p. 241. Jutikkala, to be 
sure, displays a certain sympathy for the "Constitutional outlook." 
2O Rommi 1964, p. 15. 
21  Tommila 1989, p. 241. 
22 Klami 1981, pp. 70-71. 
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doctoral dissertation and other research from the time were on legal 
history; moreover, he was a close disciple and associate of Finland's 
most prominent Fennomanian historians.23 Given Paasikivi's passion 
for history, which he maintained throughout his life, it is no wonder 
that post-war political historians have found his interpretations 
attractive, allowing them to inform their own viewpoints. The 
prominent historian and long-time Helsinki University professor Yrjö 
Blomstedt even holds that Paasikivi's memoirs, "especially the parts 
dealing with the years of oppression," are actually historical studies in 
the strict sense of being grounded on a professional and scientifically 
critical examination of sources and that they are manifestations of 
Paasikivi's "scientific exactitude."24 
It must be realized that Paasikivi's memoirs from the "era of 
oppression" were adroitly tailored for the post-World War Two period. 
They can be seen as a political act in which the master diplomat carves 
out his own line in distinct contrast to what he persuasively, with the 
deadly empathy of  Realpolitik paternalism, depicts as the ruins of 
idealistic and unpragmatic Constitutionalist resistance politics.25 
Having said this, however, it should be emphasized that Paasikivi's 
memoirs, when used critically, are indeed a very valuable source — as 
are the works of the Constitutionalist school — on the ideas and 
controversies of "the era of oppression." 
In Finnish historiography the resistance and accommodation tradi-
tions are often placed in sharp contrast to one another. Is there a way 
to approach the study of these traditions without committing oneself 
to the biases of the extremes of either side? Paasikivi's own reflections 
seem to provide a clue as to how this might be done. Discussing the 
development of his political thought he wrote: 
even a small nation may be forced into a situation in which it can do 
nothing but say: we can go no further. There exists a border which 
cannot be crossed, although there can emerge ... disagreements 
concerning where this border must be. But before a step is taken towards 
the final battle an extreme effort must be made to achieve reconciliation; 
one must go as far as possible in this effort. Only if agreement is not 
attained is it necessary to say, like Luther: "Here I stand, I cannot 
budge. God help me." This was the viewpoint of the Old Finns and it 
has been my program later as well 26 
23  Blomstedt 1970, pp. 133-136. 
24 Ibid., pp. 136-137. 
25   Tuomo Polvinen writes that the main purpose of Paasikivi's memoirs from the "years 
of oppression" was to vindicate the Old Finn line; Polvinen 1989, p. 536. 
26 Paasikivi 1957a, p. 2. 
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As Paasikivi's comments indicate, it is very difficult to objectively 
determine the border where all possibilities for negotiated agreement 
break off and negative coercion — be it nonmilitary, military, or both 
— must be resorted to. Likewise, it is a perplexing task to decide how, 
and to what extent, confrontation should be planned for in advance. 
This expresses one of the basic recurrent dilemmas in the history of 
Finno-Russian and Finno-Soviet relations. At the turn of the century 
this dilemma was particularly intense; for the Constitutionalist resisters 
at the time it was clear that Paasikivi's border had been crossed and 
that the compliants, failing to invoke Luther's words, had fallen into 
disastrous submission?' For many others there existed a grave 
ambivalence concerning the appropriate approach. For them both 
resistance and accommodation were necessary. Paasikivi himself chose 
to defend the compliant side for posterity, but he does admit that 
another view exists. He observed that already in 1902 the prominent 
historian, Helsinki University professor and statesman Ernst Gustav 
Palmén expressed the view that in the defense of Finland both 
resistance and conciliation were necessary. He then noted that in the 
1950s Professor of General History (Helsinki) Arvi Korhonen had 
come to the same conclusion.28 
More recently there are signs that this view is consciously being 
revived, as seen for example in the work of the latest successor to 
Korhonen's office Tuomo Polvinen.29 Polvinen was one of the main 
contributors to a short book, published in 1960, which can be seen as 
one of the fledgling expressions of this point of view, sketching the 
framework for a more comprehensive understanding of the so-called 
"era of Russian oppression."30 In particular Lauri Hyvämäki's brief 
article therein on what he calls Finnish "Constitutionalist ideology," 
outlining some of the central problems involved in the analysis of 
Finnish resistance thought, can in certain very limited respects be seen 
as a predecessor of the present study.31  
Polvinen's view, as expressed in the most advanced study of the 
Bobrikov regime, is that Finnish conciliation counter-balanced radical 
disobedience and thus prevented a hopeless confrontation with the 
27 A famous Constitutionalist tract by the statesman Lennart Gripenberg from 1903, 
entitled Stand or Yield? (Seistako vai väistyä?),  concluded with the very words of 
Luther quoted above by Paasikivi.  
28  Ibid. pp. 52, 67. 
29 Polvinen 1984, p. 345. 
3°  Venäläinen sortokausi suomessa 1960. 
31 Hyvämäki 1960, passim. 
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Russian regime.32 Ultimately, Polvinen claims, it was thanks to the 
flexibility of the compliant Finnish ministerial-level officials that 
Finnish political institutions were successfully preserved. He concludes 
that both resistance and compliance proved necessary in the defense 
of Finland's autonomy.33  
Polvinen's view as here stated is an authoritative re-statement of 
the classical mainstream compliant Old Finn interpretation of the 
Finno-Russian conflict. It no doubt represents the predominant 
interpretation of that conflict today. According to the mainstream 
compliant line, as formulated in 1901-1902, resistance was indeed held 
to be necessary, but only in a restricted sense and in practice only for 
a short period of time 3  Looking back upon that time in 1907 Johan 
R. Danielson-Kalmari (the prominent politician-historian and Helsinki 
University history professor who had formulated the program around 
which the compliants rallied) said that he and his confederates became 
convinced then that the resistance being carried out by the Constitu-
tionalist front, which he acknowledged as including a significant amount 
of the country's officials and private citizens, would lead to the thorough 
devastation of Finland's political and social order.35  
It is not among the tasks of this study to challenge the validity of 
the Paasikivian view concerning the ultimate consequences of 
resistance, but only point out that it is problematic. After all, to issue 
such a challenge would be to engage in Finnish politics, because the 
compliant interpretation is based on counter-factual speculation about 
what might have been and cannot be confirmed through reference to 
facts. This is not to say that such speculation is useless, unnecessary 
or even unconvincing, but that the task at hand requires non-
commitment to competing political interpretations. Consequently, the 
basic widely internalized and often tacit postulate that the Paasikivian 
lineage represents realism while the Constitutionalist view, however 
right or acceptable in principle, represents unpragmatic extremism in 
need of modification by Old Finn-style "wisdom" should not be allowed 
here to bias research. 
32  As a statement of alleged fact this view is highly problematic; see below, chapter 
IV., section 9. 
33  Polvinen 1984, p. 345. 
34 Torvinen 1965, pp. 268-307. 
35  Danielson-Kalman 1907, p. 17; Danielson-Kalmari was Paasikivi's most significant 
mentor. In an anti-passive resistance article of 1878 Agathon Meurman, Danielson-
Kalmari's close associate and another important mentor of  Paasikivi, claimed that 
the grand old man of the Fennomanian movement, Johan Vilhelm Snellman, had 
earlier asserted that the use of passive resistance would mean national suicide for 
the Finns; see below chapter III., sections 1. and 4. 
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It goes without saying that one of the fundamental constituting factors 
of Finnish national existence has been its relationship to imperial 
Russia, and later to the Soviet Union. This relationship, however, has 
been continuously complex, impossible to describe merely in terms of 
antagonism and contrast; Finland as an independent nation has arisen 
and developed its identity largely through an intricate on-going dialecti-
cal process of conflict and resistance and cooperation and accommoda-
tion with its mighty neighbor. The Finno-Russian (and Finno-Soviet) 
relationship when viewed from a broad historical perspective, appears 
in some ways as a continuous paradox, as exemplified by the ambiguity 
of the above mentioned Paasikivian border. This insight spurs the idea 
that for research purposes it is more fruitful to see resistance and 
compliance in a continuum relation, in which their differences can be 
contrasted — and by no means played down — on the background of a 
common political heritage, rather than seizing on either one as the 
extreme of a rigid dichotomy, as has often been done. 
My earlier statement that there has been little scholarly research 
concerning the passive resistance movement requires explanation. In 
terms of contention, sociopolitical mobilization and change Finno-
Russian relations during the years 1899-1905 form an outstandingly 
eventful period in Finnish history. This period in general is dealt with 
in a vast body of works consisting of memoirs, biographies, general 
histories and specific monographs. Yet, although many of these works 
touch upon the passive resistance movement in one way or another, 
only Julio N. Reuter's two volume study of the organization of passive 
resistance deals with it as a subject in itself in scholarly detail.36 
A new up-to-date book of the type which Reuter's represents, but 
more encompassing and critical, would of necessity have to be a broad 
work of historical synthesis. The time is ripe for such a work in English, 
because there is a great dearth of publications making for a deeper 
understanding of the era in which passive resistance took place in 
languages other than Swedish and Finnish.37 
The aim of the present project, however, is much more restrictive 
and specific: The endeavor here is simply to explain how the Finns 
36  Reuter 1928; Reuter 1930; cf. Parmanen 1936-1941. Noteworthy studies dealing with 
passive resistance in a subordinate manner are Blomstedt 1969, Copeland 1973 and 
Murtorinne 1964. The subject of passive resistance has been touched upon, for 
example, in works dealing with the liyes of famous individuals or dealing with the 
relation of Finns to Russian opposition and revolutionary activity. 
37 For a noteworthy Finnish effort to achieve a balanced synthesis on the time see 
Apunen, et al. 1988. 
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conceived of and practiced the way of nonmilitary struggle which they 
called passive resistance and to explore the place of this "weapon" 
within the Finnish and European culture of resistance and contention. 
This approach provides an effective way to make known hitherto 
insufficiently explored and altogether unknown aspects of European 
passive resistance and Finnish resistance culture within the framework 
of a selective historical synthesis, many of the details of which will be 
new to those who read no Finnish or Swedish.38 Given these 
deliberately strict limitations many doubtlessly noteworthy aspects of 
the Finno-Russian struggle cannot be dealt with in detail here. Thus 
this study does not claim to be exhaustive, but only to be a fresh 
contribution to a field many facets of which still await critical 
examination. 
Following this approach the Finno-Russian conflict will not be 
dealt with here as a rational legal debate; the intention is not to 
determine or elaborate upon the objective de jure status of Finland 
within the Russian Empire.39 Instead this conflict is studied as a 
political power struggle between increasingly incompatible interests: 
on the one hand there was Finnish state-building, beset by internal 
strife, with its continual effort for greater cultural and constitutional 
autonomy; on the other there was Russian autocracy struggling to 
defend and extend itself in relation to the revolutionary onslaught 
besetting it from many sides. Finnish passive resistance is thus seen 
as a unique and distinct part of an Empire-wide process of radical 
change and revolution. 
Naturally the most important sources for the study of resistance and 
contention in Finnish political culture are the original primary, 
unpublished and published, literary remains left by the actors involved 
in the period under consideration 1861-1918, and especially from 1899 
to 1905.40 Moreover, the nationalist Constitutionalists, especially the 
more dynamic participants in the passive resistance movement, must 
be credited with leaving behind a wealth of well organized primary 
Therefore the present study only minimally touches upon the main matters dealt 
with in Copeland 1973, Kujala 1989, and Polyinen 1984, using them to bolster primary 
research on passiye resistance; these and related works can thus be seen as defining 
this study's borders. Moreover, this work might be seen as a new contribution to 
the subject of "state and reyolution in Finland" as explored in Alapuro 1989. 
On this problem see Jussila 1969, 1987, 1989; Schweitzer 1978. 
The problems confronting the user of the memoirs and commentaries on these times 
by contemporary actors, notorious for their Finnish nationalist self-centeredness, 
are now widely recognized among Finnish historians; see Jussila 1979, pp. 15-16, 
256-264. 
38 
39 
40 
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source materials consisting of books, newspapers, memoirs and 
underground booklets, pamphlets and periodicals from the time.41  
A Conflict Research Approach 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s reflection on the Finnish passive 
resistance tradition briefly became relevant among certain groups of 
Finns. This was a period of intense debate concerning the foreign 
policy, security and defense of Finland. The Czechoslovakian resistance 
to the Soviet invasion of 1968 provided a particular catalyst among 
Finnish political and military experts and peace activists for initiating 
investigations into the nature and potential of what has variously been 
called social defense, civilian-based defense, nonviolent defense, 
nonmilitary resistance, and so forth 42 The discussion culminated in 
the reports of two consecutive expert sub-committees of the 
presidentially supervised Finnish Psychological Defense Planning 
Commission (renamed in 1975 as the Commission for Defense 
Information). 4i 
Finnish resistance to Russification 1898-1905 was one of the 
many historical cases examined in these reports, and in other contempo-
rary analyses, in the search for empirical data for the evaluation of the 
aforesaid types of defense. These considerations of the Finnish case, 
however, remained relatively superficial, dependent as they were solely 
on a few secondary sources. As will be seen in the next section, these 
were not the first works in which the Finnish movement of 1898-1905 
was classified as a special type of resistance action and warfare, 
comparable to other cases of the same type, and considered in its 
relevance to the problems of resistance and defense in general. 
It was from a similar point of departure that this study got underway. 
41 These materials are mainly housed in the national collections of the Helsinki 
University Library and the Finnish State Archives. For a bibliography, accompanied 
by useful annotations, of most of the "political literature from the era of oppression" 
see Estlander 1945. With some important exceptions, this study makes relatiyely 
little use of private letters. This is because initial exploration of letter eollections 
reyealed little material of direct bearing on the problems at hand. 
42 One of the first works to which the Finns turned in their exploration of this field 
was the pioneer study Roberts et al. 1967. 
43 For an overyiew of the debate on nonmilitary ciyilian-based defense and Finnish 
security, see Joenniemi 1982; the two reports (which I have translated into English, 
but not published) referred to are: Aseeton vastarinta [Weaponless Resistance] 1971 
and; Aseeton vastarinta ja sen toteuttamisedellytykset Suomessa [Weaponless 
Resistance and the Conditions for its Implementation in Finland] 1975. 
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It was conceived of as part of an effort to explore the ideologies and 
methods of various types of resistance, defense and contention paying 
particular attention to those not involving armed military or 
paramilitary action. Although the focus here is on resistance, it is 
recognized that resistance cannot be understood except in relation to 
contention in general. Resistance (always understood here in the sense 
of social or collective resistance) is rarely pure defense. The basic 
condition of resistance is the prior mobilization of ideological and 
material resources. Such mobilization, whether intended to be 
aggressive or not, may automatically lead to strategic competition and 
confrontation, as it did in the Finnish case here studied. Thus calling 
a type of conflict action "resistance" usually involves a subjective 
element. It is a matter of how values are interpreted. 
My inquiry concerning Finnish resistance thought and action gave 
rise to the hypothesis that the terms "passivt motstånd" and "passiivinen 
vastarinta" (the Swedish and Finnish equivalents of "passive resistance" 
used by the Finns), as well as the ideas and methods associated with 
them, have their origin outside of Finland, probably elsewhere in 
Europe. As is demonstrated by the works of Neovius and his fellow 
resisters "passive resistance" was not merely used as a vague generic 
term but also referred to a definable doctrine, tradition and range of 
means of action. It is obvious that such a sophisticated concept of 
struggle cannot entirely be the invention of one man, or group, over 
a short period of time. 
In principle a group wishing to mobilize for resistance can choose 
from a vast variety of means ranging from numberless forms of action 
not employing direct physical violence to direct physical violence and 
material destruction as employed, for example, in guerilla and 
conventional warfare. In practice, however, in spite of the wide range 
of resistance action conceivably available, access to such means is 
limited; the concepts and means of resistance available to, and 
developed by, a group is directly based upon, and defined by, its 
geopolitical and sociocultural circumstances. In their broad detailed 
studies of large scale structural change in Western countries, particular-
ly as regards statemaking and the development of capitalism, and the 
related changes in forms of conflict and collective action, Charles Tilly 
and his colleagues have observed that the development and 
transformation of repertoires of means of contention are conditioned 
by: 
1. the standards of rights and justice prevailing in the population; 
2. the daily routines of the people; 
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3. the population's internal organization; 
4. its accumulated experience with prior collective action; 
5. the pattern of repression in the world in which the population 
belongs as 
Recognizing that the choice of forms of resistance and assertion are 
historically and culturally conditioned the explanation for the wide 
distribution and acceptance of the idea and methods of violence-
avoiding passive resistance at the turn of the century is to be found in 
the development of the Finnish resistance tradition and the conditions 
for resistance in Finland. However, even though passive resistance, as 
it was adapted to specific Finnish circumstances, was to a large extent 
a domestic development, the Finns did additionally have access to a 
general European resistance heritage. 
Passive resistance was one of the new concepts and means of 
contention, of assertion and resistance, which became prevalent 
throughout Europe with the political and social struggles accompanying 
the broad structural changes of nation-building and industrial capital-
ism. The participants in the Finnish resistance movement beginning in 
1899 were not very concerned with writing the history of passive 
resistance, involved as they were in their immediate conflict. An 
exploration, however, of their references to similar struggles elsewhere 
reveals that by 1861 passive resistance was defined in Finland as a 
modern European form of contention. 
Passive resistance is largely a historically forgotten and unresearched 
nineteenth century European form of struggle. Moreover, within the 
branches of social science dealing with collective action, peace and 
conflict the concept of passive resistance has been problematic, 
misconceived and has not been adequately analyzed. The etymological 
study of "passive resistance" serves as an excellent heuristic tool for 
the study of the Finnish resistance tradition. This approach is grounded 
on the assumption that in studying general phenomena such as 
nonmilitary struggle the task is not only to establish the trans-cultural 
identity of types of social action, but rather to emphasize, as Max 
Weber put it, the "changes (Verschiebungen) that emerge in spite of 
all parallels," using the "similarities only to distinguish the 
distinctiveness" of them 45 It has become increasingly clear that one of 
the key ways for determining such distinctiveness is the careful analysis 
of the ideas, values, specific problems and modes of discourse of the 
44 Tilly 1978, pp. 143-171; Tilly, 1981, pp. xi, 46, and for the broader historical 
background; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975. 
45 Roth 1978, pp. xxxvi-xxxix, Weber quote, p. xxxyii. 
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historical agents. Only thus can abstract social theoretical constructions 
and concepts — like "nonviolent action" — be used without gross anach-
ronism. 
Thus when the Finnish resistance thinker Neovius claimed that 
passive resistance had a "definite essence" he was referring to history 
and not, or not merely, to a universal form of action whose definition 
could be derived from the analytical examination of terms. In defining 
passive resistance Neovius was engaged in the political act of selecting, 
and developing, those features of a historical form of action which he 
and his colleagues considered most suitable for the current circumstan-
ces. 
2. The "Nonviolent Action" Perspective: 
A Critique 
The Finnish resistance movement of 1899-1905 has long been one of 
the standard "cases" on lists, or one might say in the canon, of examples 
of "nonviolent" struggle. For instance in 1934 Barthelemy de Ligt listed 
the Finnish resistance as one of the "lessons" which history offers 
concerning "nonviolent struggle," writing that in 1902 
Finland refused to submit to the conscription imposed on her by the 
Tsar, and that august Power, Caesar and Pope in one, found himself 
forced to bow to the popular will.46 
In his work Ends and Means, first published in 1937, the famous English 
thinker Aldous Huxley invites his readers to consider "a few examples 
of non-violent revolution." His exposition is a classic example of what 
I have come to designate as the "Gandhian paradigm" approach: Of 
the historical cases of "nonviolent revolution" movements, says Aldous 
Huxley, 
best known to English-speaking readers are those organized by Gandhi 
in South Africa and later in India. The South African movement may 
be described as completely successful.... Among other non-violent 
movements crowned by partial or complete success we may mention 
the following. From 1901 to 1905 the Finns conducted a campaign of 
non-violent resistance to Russian oppression; this was completely 
successful and in 1905 the law imposing conscription on the Finns was 
repealed. The long campaign of non-violent resistance conducted by 
46 Ligt 1937, p. 141; for the original French edition of this work see Ligt 1934. 
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the Hungarians under Deák was crowned with complete success in 
1867.... In Germany two campaigns of non-violent resistance were 
successfully carried out against Bismarck - the Kulturkampf by the 
Catholics, and the working-class campaign, after 1871, for the 
recognition of the Social-Democratic Party. 
The Gandhian Paradigm 
This way of examining different resistance movements in relation to 
Gandhian struggles is wide spread and is exemplified in literally 
hundreds of writings in a wide variety of languages throughout the 
world. The two preceding quotes indicate an already well established 
way of classifying the Finnish resistance in relation to Gandhian 
"nonviolence." Another earlier example is that of the veteran Finnish 
resister, author and Tolstoyan, Arvid Järnefelt, who in the 1920s 
explicitly compared the Finnish resistance to Mohandas K. Gandhi's 
campaigns in India.48 A. Huxley and de Ligt do not tell what their 
sources are on the Finnish resistance. It is, however, clear that the very 
effective propaganda or intensive international image-building carried 
on for many decades by the Finnish Constitutionalists, which took root 
in Europe, lends itself very well to this type of view and is no doubt 
at least indirectly the source of their information. 
Since the 1920s the Finnish resistance has continued to be classified 
according to Gandhio-centric schemes of viewing history49 This 
approach can be characterized as seeing Gandhi as "the outstanding 
person in modern times" who developed "the theory of nonviolent 
resistance."50 It divides history into the "pre-Gandhian," Gandhian, 
and post-Gandhian history of a trans-historical something called the 
"technique of nonviolent action" with Gandhi being the one "who 
made the most significant personal contribution in the history of" this 
"technique."51 Thus in regard to both research and popular action 
Gandhian "nonviolence" has been paradigmatized or set forth and 
47 Huxley 1938, pp. 146-147. Around the same time as A. Huxley one of M.K. Gandhi's 
more well known followers also dealt with the Finnish resistance as a "case" of 
"non-violent direct action" along with the Hungarian, and other, "examples"; see 
Shridharani 1939, pp. 113-114. 
48  Järnefelt 1976, p. 497. 
49 For an influential example see "Finland" in the Index of Sharp 1973. Gandhio- 
centrism has also informed the approach of many official studies in Europe and 
elsewhere, see for example the two Finnish reports cited above. 
5° Gregg 1966, p. 42. 
51 Sharp 1973, pp. 75-78, 82. 
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both explicitly and implicitly assumed as a model through which 
similarly perceived events are classified and examined.52 
One may well question the validity of analyzing the Finnish resistance 
using the obviously anachronistic and foreign concept of "nonviolent 
action." After all, from an etymological perspective the term "nonvio-
lence" is a twentieth century invention which emerged well after 1906 
and before 1920 during the early Gandhian struggles in South Africa. 
The violence/"nonviolence" dichotomy, the conception of "nonvio-
lence" as an antonym of violence, in these terms, is a new development 
in the history of modern thought and is by no means universally 
recognized. The significance of the etymology and historical context 
of the term "nonviolence" and its derivatives is ignored by those who 
seek to use it as a trans-historical notion. It may also be deemed 
arbitrary and misleading to compare other so-called "cases" of 
"nonviolent" struggle to one another. Doubtlessly such comparisons 
may lead to an erroneous, or over-simplistic, association of historical 
events. 
Clearly it would be a breech of the rules of precise historical 
scholarship to impose a term which carries the weight of its own 
historical context on the thought and action of actors from other times. 
"Nonviolence" and related terms cannot serve to replace the 
terminology of the past. Yet, the concept of "nonviolent" struggle has 
provided a new and thought provoking perspective through which to 
analyze political conflict and social contention in general. It focuses 
attention on phenomena which have been neglected by historians 
concentrating on violent events. By drawing attention to the relation 
of certain methods of struggle and concepts of political power it 
provides tools for grouping these phenomena in a way which is by no 
means entirely arbitrary. However, the approach to analyzing 
resistance and contention in general in terms of a violent/"nonviolent" 
action dichotomy represents only one, highly problematic, perspective 
for studying conflict 53 As such the concept of "nonviolent" struggle 
52 It is very common to divide those working within what I call the "Gandhian paradigm" 
into two general groups. On the one hand there is the "tough" or "pragmatic" school 
holding that the superiority of "nonviolent" defense can be argued on "technical 
grounds alone." On the other hand is "idealistic" or "ethical" "nonyiolence." This 
diyision, although justified in certain respects, can be highly misleading (a parallel 
division into "Western" and "Eastern" "nonviolence" is entirely unfounded). I 
emphatically deny that the latter is any more "characterized by strong ethical, 
religious and/or ideological tendencies" than the former. A more appropriate division 
is obtained when one asks more explicitly "pragmatic for what?" References for 
this note: Boserup, Mack 1974, pp. 8-13, 21; Schmid 1985, p. 14. 
53 Cf. Galtung 1976, pp. 350-351. 
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is surely in need of refinement when used for the purposes of historical 
research. 
This examination of the concept of "nonviolence" is not necessary 
for methodological reasons only. In the early years of the twentieth 
century the conceptualization of "nonviolent" action had a strong 
influence on the way people came to think about the history of passive 
resistance. In fact one can say that the "nonviolent action" perspective 
became the major historical interpretation of passive resistance. It is 
an interpretation which is flawed. 
An Equivocal Concept 
"Nonviolent action" as distinguished by Gene Sharp, is an umbrella 
concept covering a broad range of active means of struggle. Its power 
is based on the capacity of actors' refusal to cooperate or submit, 
withdrawal of obedience and consent and open defiance without 
violence to cut off the opponent's control of essential resources or to 
destroy his access to sources of power.54 The scope of the means of 
"nonviolent action," as understood according to the preceding 
definition, is extensive and can be categorized into the following three 
broad groups, which can be further divided and subdivided into a 
multitude of specific methods: 1. nonviolent protest and persuasion, 
2. economic, social and political noncooperation and 3. nonviolent 
intervention.55 
Thus, analytically picking out the essentials of Sharp's argument, 
"nonviolent action" is understood to be identifiable by 1. a technique 
or repertoire of a range of means of struggle which excludes the use 
of physical violence against persons and things; 2. a distinctive type of 
social (including political and economic) power which is allegedly 
incompatible with violence; 3. group or mass action. 
Upon closer scrutiny the type of action distinguished by the criteria 
in the last two paragraphs turns out to be much broader than that 
actually described in Sharp's works and the other main works in the 
5a  Sharp 1973, pp. 63-64. Johan Galtung comments that Sharp's study is "by far the 
most eomprehensive and analytically useful work in the field"; Galtung 1976, p. 362. 
Sharp's book is widely known among researchers and, in particular, among activists 
in "nonviolent" movements in Europe, the USA and elsewhere as well. It has been 
very influential in determining how people conceive of the "theory" and past of 
"nonviolent action," as the Australian writer Brian Martin emphasizes; see Martin 
1989, p. 213, 219. 
55 Sharp 1973, p. 69 and Part Two, "The Methods of Nonviolent Action." 
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Gandhian paradigm. "Nonviolent action" turns out to be only a small 
part of the range of human action in conflicts which can be distinguished 
by the preceding criteria. Of course within the Gandhian paradigm 
itself there exist a range of conceptions of "nonviolence" which differ 
according to the scope of the concept of violence upon which they are 
based.56 
Thus in its most positive form "nonviolence" excludes all kinds of 
harm, injury, repressive coercion, injustice and related phenomena. 
Positive "nonviolence" places strict limitations on the types of 
instruments and sanctions which can be used in the struggle for freedom 
and justice. One way to characterize it is by stressing persuasion and 
conversion of the opponent over injurious coercion. The compulsion 
and coercion used would be required not to violate the social ideals 
being defended or fought for. Negative "nonviolence" is distinguished 
as a way of resistance aimed at imposing defeat on an enemy within 
a strategic contest using a range means of force and coercion which 
can be differentiated from violent means of resistance and revolution 
only in that they stop short of direct physical violence. 
The ambiguity and inclusiveness of the concept of "nonviolence" 
increase with the narrowness of the notion of violence upon which it 
is based. If "nonviolent action" is defined only in terms of technique, 
or of instruments which may somehow be objectively distinguished 
from the instruments of violence, then it will include all types of political 
and social contention short of violence in a narrow sense. 
All notions of "nonviolence" within the Gandhian paradigm clearly 
come under the concepts of just struggle, resistance and defense, as 
do forms of violent resistance when taken up for liberation against 
oppression or violation. In spite of his assertions to the contrary Sharp's 
work, like that of others working in the Gandhian paradigm, remains 
a study of "good" "nonviolence," in which only cases of struggle against 
oppression and injustice are examined. The Finnish "case" is an 
excellent example: The original Russian nationalist "attack" on the 
assertive Finnish nationalist mobilization can, from the Russian point 
of view, be seen as a kind of resistance to Finnish threats to imperial 
security. In spite of the fact that for many years this "resistance" 
included no physical violence those working in the Gandhian paradigm 
would never dream of calling it "nonviolent action." 
The concept of "nonviolent action" cannot be divorced from its 
relation to the basic social and political ideals of western society. It is 
56  For a typology of concepts of violence and "nonyiolence" ranging from narrow and 
medium to broad and total, see Galtung 1976, pp. 350-353. 
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to be understood as an integral part of the field of discourse on justice, 
just struggle, resistance, rebellion, sovereignty and law in modern 
politics. 
Violence Misconceived 
Fundamental to the overall Gandhian paradigm is a rigid and simplistic 
power/violence dichotomy. Accordingly the users of political violence 
are accused of adhering to a fallacious "monolithic theory" of power 
which "assumes that the power of government is ... a strong 
independent, durable (if not indestructible), self-reinforcing, and self-
perpetuating force.i57 Those who employ violence to control political 
power are likened to someone who seeks to use a lid to suppress steam 
from a boiling caldron while the fire below continues uncontrolled.58 
Although correct in the extreme, this analogy breaks down as a blatant 
half-truth, since violence, along with a host of other related types of 
action, can also play a significant role in controlling the blaze. 
This is not to underestimate the profusion and sway of ideas of 
power which have their roots in absolutist notions. Indeed there seems 
to no end of cases in modern history of the extreme identification of 
violence with power. However, to focus on extreme violent action in 
dichotomized relation to "nonviolent" action is to ignore the historical-
ly most significant forms of violence and conflict in general. For 
example, successful "power politics" (as in the case of the Russian 
domination of Finland) has never depended entirely either on extreme 
violence or on consensual "nonviolent" power. As Friedrich Meinecke 
observes, using "power" in the sense of "domination": 
unregulated rule of power in real life is a very exceptional occurrence. 
Power which gushes out blindly will end by destroying itself; it must 
follow certain purposive rules and standards, in order to preserve itself 
and grow. Cunning and force must therefore unite in the exercise of 
power. Thus is formed that utilitarian middle ground in the essence of 
raison d'etat.59 
One of the gross mistakes of those who claim special insight into 
consensual power and that such power is incompatible with violence 
is to misjudge the skill of those who have operated within the influential 
57 Sharp 1973, pp. 8-9. Ss  Ibid., p. 9. 
59 Meinecke 1962, p. 10. 
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tradition of western political thought which Niccolö Machiavelli gave 
expression to. In this tradition, which clearly includes the recognition 
of the significance of fundamental consensual power, violence is an 
essential, but always subordinate (and very rarely the only) instrument 
in the exercise of political power; violence is useful only if backed by 
significant, well ordered, social forces. Using Machiavelli's own 
analogy, the ferocious, yet stupid, raw violence of the lion must be 
combined with the craft of the fox.60 
Within the Gandhian paradigm the potential of people power or the 
belief that power depends on the consent of the ruled who, by 
withdrawing that consent, can control and even destroy the power of 
their opponent, is very strongly emphasized. Students of "nonviolent 
action" maintain that this type of power is somehow incompatible with 
the type of power employed by the users of violence. Thus when a 
group which has mobilized finds itself in a situation of critical 
confrontation with another group and is forced to turn to negative 
means of force and coercion its action can be classified as "nonviolent" 
not merely on the basis of instruments used but also according to the 
distinctive type of power employed. 
This is clearly a highly disputable, fallacious, claim — one which rests 
on a excessively simplistic view of the relation of political violence and 
power. Human cooperation, including its negative form of refusal to 
cooperate, is indeed the foundation of sociopolitical power. This is 
true for both power-to, or the capacity for collective action, and power-
over, or the collective capacity to control people and resources. While 
power-over as based on power-to cannot be created by violence it 
certainly can be used with, strengthened, manipulated and destroyed 
by violence. 
Hannah Arendt's insights here present a challenging implication for 
those working in the Gandhian paradigm with their emphasis on the 
power of consent: the effectiveness of "nonviolent" contention is based 
on the degree of mutual dependence between antagonists. As the 
distance separating them increases, in conjunction with the destructive 
effectiveness of the weapons of violence, the capacity of communicative 
power combined with the instruments of "nonviolent action" to prevail 
decreases 61 Expressed in Machiavellian terms, to rule successfully one 
requires the cooperation, and friendship, of the people; continual 
recourse to violence destroys one's base of power, the essential 
6° Machiavelli 1961, p. 90; Machiayelli 1970, p. 215. 
61  Arendt 1969, pp. 52-56. 
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relationship of interdependence between prince and people. However, 
if this interdependence, or social power, is not needed, then a city, a 
population, or a key group of influential citizens can be dealt with 
simply by "doing away with them" through destruction.62 
An interrelated problem also arises here, one which is perhaps less 
obvious but of more immediate relevance: Is all collective struggle 
which adheres to a concept of power excluding physical violence 
"nonviolent action"? The answer is "no," unless one would like, again, 
to increase the ambiguity of the concept by broadening its scope. Within 
the Gandhian paradigm collective action is both implicitly and explicitly 
made to be understood in terms of popular civilian, more or less 
democratic, action. A correlation to this seems to be that the action 
in which "nonviolent" power is employed is somehow automatically 
democratic. However, collective action based on physical violence-
excluding power includes much more than this. 
Roughly one can distinguish between popular mobilization and 
struggle on the part of self-motivated individuals and elite controlled 
collective action. The latter might be called "elite guided nonviolent 
action," but that would be rather dubious. The point here is that the 
concept of "nonviolent action" is loaded with connotations of popular 
action by "the people." It may well be that this ideological burden 
makes this concept a rather insensitive tool for studying the finer 
aspects of social and political conflict. It may be, moreover, that a lot 
of what has been called "nonviolent action" is really something else. - 
This is one reason why the "nonviolent action" paradigm is insufficient 
by itself as an approach to the study of resistance and contention. 
3. The Authoritarian Organization or 
Liberation of Opinion? 
At the turn of the century the members of the Finnish Constitutionalist 
front practiced a type of struggle which seems to lend itself to analysis 
under the Gandhian paradigm. Their domestic opponents, however, 
also practiced what might be conceived of as a kind of "nonviolent" 
contention or defense. Both of these approaches drew to a great extent 
(and with important differences, as explained further on) upon a 
common heritage of Finnish political culture. The principles of this 
62  Machiavelli 1961, pp. 48, 66: Machiayelli 1970, p. 156. 
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political culture of relevance here were perhaps most fluently 
articulated earlier in the century in the works of Finland's most 
influential political philosopher and active statesman, leader of the 
Finnish national movement, Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806-1881). An 
important point to be made here is that Finnish passive resistance 
cannot be thoroughly understood through the "nonviolent action" 
paradigm, but must also be studied within the broader framework of 
nonmilitary struggle for national survival in Finnish political culture.  
Snellman on Violence and Change  
Snellman spoke out vehemently against both violent revolution and 
reaction as thought of as viable ways of taking political control, 
initiating reform and establishing lasting political power and justice. 
While harboring no illusions concerning the significance of violent 
coercion and war in history, Snellman asserted that only the thoughtless 
could identify political power with violence:63 No thinking person could 
believe that power is the ruler or possession of the ruler, or that a few 
generals and their army could control the people of the nation solely 
through violent coercion. Indeed, Snellman did realize that the 
machinery of state could be taken over through violence, but unless 
it had other sources of power - the power of the nation - behind it, 
it would be forced to greater degrees of violence and continual 
oppression and finally fall.64 Snellman realized that social power is 
diffused throughout civil society and that mere coup d'etat could not 
in itself summon up the power to control society or overcome the deep 
rooted loci of power standing behind the state in society. 
Snellman's argument in itself, it may be observed, does not suffice 
for refuting the efficacy of revolutionary action. As Hanna Arendt has 
pointed out, in principle Karl Marx's view of revolution clearly 
relegates violence to a secondary role and cannot be identified with 
"power grows out of the barrel of a gun" concepts of revolution.65 As 
with his contemporary Marx, Snellman's political philosophy and action 
arose out of a creative critical study of G.W.F. Hegel, classical liberal 
economics and European thought in general. Both men clearly held 
that it is not violence but the contradictions inherent in the old society, 
63  Snellman 1894a, pp. 590-591. 
64 Ibid., pp. 590-591. 
65 Arendt 1969, p. 11. 
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the necessi_ty or force of history, which gives rise to the transformation 
of society. 
Revolutionary tradition, however, from the French Revolution 
through its most sophisticated formulations in Marx's writings well 
into the twentieth century has emphasized the essential role of violence 
in "the conquest of political power." Accordingly revolutionary ends 
were understood as achievable "only by the forcible overthrow of all 
existing social conditions" and, as Friedrich Engels put it, the victorious 
revolutionary party "must maintain its rule by means of the terror 
which its arms inspire in the reactionaries."67 Snellman arrived at a 
very different position. 
According to Snellman's political thinking the advocates of 
revolution had lost sight of the essential conditions for social change. 
Whereas Engels accused the anarchists (not entirely accurately) of 
demanding "that the political state be abolished at one stroke, even 
before the social relations that gave birth to it have been destroyed,"  
Snellman in effect accused all revolutionaries of seeking through 
violence to force change on social relations which are in reality highly 
impervious to violence .68 In other words he rejected the idea that 
revolutionary violence could be timed to coincide with the essential 
ripe conditions for social change. In 1861 he asserted that even the 
restored European state powers, based firmly as they were on a 
traditional foundation, could more easily carry out reform than the 
revolutionaries since they grant only what is "necessary" in each 
historical moment 69 
With the emphatic rejection of political violence and revolution what 
type of political struggle does Snellman then advocate — "nonviolent" 
struggle or revolution perhaps? At first glance Snellman's concepts of 
power and defense may seem to correspond exactly to those assumed 
in the paradigm of "nonviolent" contention. It would not be hard to 
portray Snellman as a theoretician and leader of "nonviolent action"; 
that is, if certain things were overlooked.  
Snellman held, as expressed in many of his writings, that state power 
is fundamentally derived from the people of the nation, from the folk, 
as expressed in his native Swedish. He believed in a kind of ultimate 
popular sovereignty as the basis for state sovereignty. One can find 
here and there in his works assertions that state power is rooted in 
66 For example see Snellman 1894a, pp. 589-597 and; Marx 1977. pp. 180-184. 
67 Marx. Engels 1975; Engels' quote from, Lenin 1975, p. 61. 
68 Engels quoted in Lenin 1975, p. 60. 
69  Snellman 1894a, pp. 591-592. 
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public opinion, in the recognition, confidence and consent of the 
people.7° From his concept of political power and rejection of political 
violence Snellman conceived of a concept of national defense or 
survival and domestic sociopolitical change holding that the capacity 
of a nation to withstand foreign aggression or undergo transformation 
is not dependent on its military strength or on revolutionary violence 
but on its degree of cultural power, development and unity. 
Varieties of Revolution 
Similar ideas elsewhere in Europe had already begun to give rise to 
various explicit concepts of violence-excluding change, resistance and 
revolution. For example, as early as 1793, at the very beginning of 
what Snellman described in 1861 as "the era of Revolution, as it is 
called, in which we still live,"71 the then famous writer William Godwin 
rejected violent revolution as an effective means of overthrowing 
oppression and instituting justice, deploring it as counter-productive, 
crude, and premature. He asserted that the revolutionaries "propose 
to give us something for which we are not prepared, and which we 
cannot effectively use ... however amiable may be the source of their 
error, the error itself is probably fraught with consequences pernicious 
to mankind."72 
Godwin was one of the first European thinkers of the revolutionary 
era to attempt an articulation of an alternative to violent revolution 
and military defense without submission to conservativism or reaction-
ism. Government, Godwin held (following David Hume), is founded 
on opinion. Both revolution and oppressive reactionary government 
"fetter" what he called "the unrestrained communication of 
opinions."73 A people, however, when enlightened concerning political 
power need have no recourse to violence, since through withdrawal 
of obedience oppressive institutions, rulers or foreign military forces 
cannot stand: "Destroy" the obedience upon which unjust government, 
encroachment on freedom and subjection are founded and "the fabric 
which it is built upon falls to the ground.i74 Godwin's work can be 
70 Teljo 1934, pp. 71-72. 
71 Snellman 1894a, p. 591. 
72 Godwin 1793, pp. 198-205. 
73 Godwin 1971, pp. 77, 130-131, 136. 
74 Ibid., pp. 77, 130-131, 136. 
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seen as the example par excellence of this strain of Enlightenment 
thought. 
As thus far presented the ideas of  Snellman, also born from the 
Enlightenment, coincide remarkably with Godwin's. Both men be-
lieved that cultural progress or civilization could make a nation 
highly inviolable or unsubjectable. When the comparison is taken a bit 
further, however, significant contrasts emerge. 
Godwin's view suggests that people can take positive action without 
violence to overthrow oppression, that a revolution without violence 
would lead to the "euthanasia of pernicious government."75 Godwin's 
political philosophy was initially widely acclaimed and influential, 
especially among English liberals. With post-revolutionary develop-
ments in France, however, and the growth of reactionary sentiment 
Godwin's apparently all too radical ideas were denounced by both 
conservatives and radicals alike.76 
Sixty-two years after Godwin put forth his alternative to violent 
revolution Snellman denounced similar principles, now known by the 
internationally recognized name of "passive resistance," on the same 
grounds as his rejection of revolution. Whereas revolutionaries branded 
any approach to struggle excluding violence as non-revolutionary and 
ineffective Snellman criticized it for leading to the same pernicious 
consequences as revolution. Godwin wanted to mobilize popular 
sovereignty to undermine repressive government, to enlighten the 
people as to how, without violence, to liberate themselves from their 
own ignorance and false confidence in government which allowed their 
"opinion" or their thinking to be controlled and constrained through 
the ideological and coercive hegemony of their rulers. 
In contrast, Snellman's politics might be characterized as "non-
violent" Realpolitik which, with raison d'etat as the guiding principle, 
can be described as an entirely "nonviolently" coercive way of national 
individuation, defense and survival demanding the complete subordina-
tion of the individual to the "spirit of the nation" and forbidding all 
direct confrontation with the opponent. Jussi Teljo has shown that 
Snellman did not really accept the ideas of popular sovereignty and 
power as such. He twisted them for his own purposes and they were 
actually in manifest contradiction to his philosophical and practical 
political views." 
75 Ibid., p. 125. 
76 Carter 1971, pp. xi—xii. 
77 Teljo 1934, pp. 71-72. 
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The Spirit: Authority of Passive Revolution 
Snellman's "spirit of the nation" - related to Rousseau's "general will" 
- when divested of its metaphysical garb meant in practice the subjec-
tion of the people to the patriarchal guidance of those in dominant 
social, economic and political positions. This is clearly revealed when 
Snellman calls the intellectuals or literati the spokesmen of the national 
spirit, who are to have the "freedom to define what the national spirit 
is and what it requires."78 According to this approach conflict resolution 
is to be achieved through reciprocal concessions and peaceful reform, 
i.e., through non-confrontation with Russia and the negatively peaceful 
prevention of class struggle domestically.79 
Snellman did indeed believe that power is ultimately derived from 
the people, but he certainly understood that power is highly malleable 
and controllable. His task was not like Godwin's, to liberate opinion, 
mobilize individuals and destroy confidence in rulers, but rather, 
without violence, to channel popular sovereignty, to organize, cultivate, 
guide and civilize opinion and confidence from above. Snellman, in 
fact, is one of the finest examples of a cultural and political intellectual 
leader and practical organizer of "revolution without revolution" or 
"passive revolution," just as nineteenth century Finland is perhaps 
Europe's purest instance of the process designated by these terms. 
It is no coincidence that the concept of passive revolution is, like 
Godwin's ideas, a product of the initial stage of the era of revolution. 
Antonio Gramsci found the idea of passive revolution articulated in 
the influential conservative thinker Vincenzo Cuoco's (1770-1823) 
essay of 1801 on the Neapolitan Republic of 1799. Following Edmund 
Burke and Joseph de Maistre in their condemnation of revolution, 
Cuoco argued in favor of passive revolution through preventative, 
counteractive, reform, under the leadership of the enlightened 
bourgeoisie. He rejected popular mobilization in general, and in 
particular the radical French Jacobin model of revolution.80 
Gramsci developed the concept of passive revolution for understand-
ing the Italian Risorgimento and the process of bourgeois revolution 
elsewhere. In the case of Finland it must be understood in a strict 
sense, excluding all of what Marx termed "critical revolutionary 
78 Snellman as quoted in Teljo 1934, p. 75. 
79  Snellman 1894a, p. 591; for Sneliman's thoughts on class and class struggle, see Teljo 
1934, pp. 115, 139. 
80 Gramsci 1977, pp. 99, 125f; see also editors' note in Gramsci 1971, p. 59, note 11. 
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activity" which, as Jürgen Habermas has pointed out, is the type of 
praxis characteristic of forms of struggle which have been termed 
"nonviolent action" as well as of violent types of revolutionary 
struggle.81 The leaders of the Finnish nationalist movement succeeded 
in an extraordinary degree in establishing hegemonic sway first over 
what was then called the "educated class" and finally over broader 
sections of the population without recourse to direct repressive force 
or violent coercion. By the end of the century, however, the weakness 
of this "nonviolent" hegemony among the Finnish people became 
apparent and as the traditional structure of law and order broke down 
violent confrontation and civil war emerged. 
The Gramscian concept of class hegemony can indeed be understood, 
in the words of Alain Joxe, as 
a nonviolent class power that was diffused throughout the whole of 
civil society and based on the acceptance by the dominated classes of 
their own domination. It was therefore the objective manifestation of 
certain common interests of the exploiters and the exploited within a 
framework determined by the dominant 82 
From the point of view of the Gandhian paradigm, however, what Joxe 
calls "nonviolent class power" might more appropriately be described 
as anti-"nonviolence." 
Godwin and Snellman were chosen to represent two distinct 
approaches to social power and mass action within the vast field of 
conflict types which can be distinguished as making (from the actor's 
viewpoint) no use of direct physical violence or the materials and 
organization involved with its use. Godwin's approach represents an 
extreme within that field with its emphasis on the ideal of minimization 
of domination through withdrawal of consent and dependence on the 
mobilizing power of unfettered communication. Snellman does not 
represent an extreme. He exemplifies par excellence the philosopher 
and politician of the rising national state with its elaborate institutions 
for channeling consensus and wielding power. 
81 Habermas, 1986, p. 81; Habermas does not use the term "nonviolent action" here 
but the type of action he cites coincides with that studied in the Gandhian paradigm. 
82 Joxe 1981, p. 19. 
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The Spectrum of Contention 
Godwin divided the world of social and political action into the realms 
of "action" or "force" and "speech," i.e., into strategic action and 
communicative action.83 Between the purest forms of communicative 
action and the extremely violent and destructive forms of strategic 
action there exist a vast range of types of sociopolitical conflict.84 
Because the world of conflict is highly amorphous, concepts, models 
and typologies of it cannot encompass the whole, but must be geared 
to focus attention on certain aspects of action. Godwin focused upon 
emancipatory action. Max Weber divided conflict into that which is 
physically violent and that which is "peaceful." "Peaceful conflict" can 
be interpreted as referring to the range of conflict action which is 
simply distinguishable from physical violence. It thus employs an 
entirely negative concept of "peace." "Peaceful conflict" is a vast realm 
of action which includes formally peaceful regulated routine 
competition for control as well as nonroutine contention.S5 The 
"means" of "peaceful conflict" which Weber refers to are by no means 
identical or coextensive to those of "nonviolent action." The "technique 
of nonviolent action" comprises only a subgroup within the field of 
nonroutine "peaceful conflict." In his studies of "peaceful conflict" 
Weber tended to focus broadly on domination whereas the "nonviolent 
action" perspective focuses primarily on acute emancipatory conflicts.86 
Those working within the Gandhian paradigm see modern European 
history as a very significant time of development of "the technique of 
nonviolent action."87 What is really referred to (with the term 
"nonviolent action" perhaps making only for ambiguity) is the basic 
mechanisms of collective action in the processes of modern nation 
building. Furthermore, it is most misleading and one-sided to see this 
increase in "nonviolent action" solely in terms of consensual power 
and emancipatory mass action through noncooperation against 
injustice and tyranny. 
83 Godwin 1793, p. 193, Godwin 1946, p. 299. 
s° For an elaboration of the concepts of communicative action and strategic action see 
Habermas 1984, pp. 85-86, 273-337; Habermas subdivides strategic action into openly 
and latently strategic action, with the latter including manipulation and systematically 
distorted communication. For Godwin violence was a very broad concept ranging 
from the distortion of communication and the manipulation of  mens' minds to direct 
physical violence. 
85 Weber holds that the "conceptual separation of peaceful (from violent) conflict is 
justified by the quality of the means normal to it and the peculiar sociological 
consequences of its occurrence;" Weber 1978, vol. 2, p. 38. 
86 Weber 1978, vol. 2, pp. 941, 946. 
87 Sharp 1973, pp. 76-78. 
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One cannot without distortion ignore the development of that other 
kind of "nonviolence" which was mentioned earlier in connection with  
Gramsci and Snellman and which has been explored in various ways 
by scholars such as Weber and Michel Foucault.88 Gramsci held that 
disproportionate fixation on the violent or military aspect of struggle 
and conflict in western society, is the "mark of a fool."89 In contrast, 
however, to those who concentrate on the history of emancipatory 
action Gramsci observed that with the French Revolution a new 
strategy for gaining political power emerged, called by Cuoco "passive 
revolution." Passive revolution, however, can be seen as merely one 
aspect of a broader strategy of domination and struggle in society 
which Gramsci began to explore under the concept of hegemony. 
From the time of the inception and conceptualization of the modern 
state in the sixteenth century, and especially the consolidation of the 
modern nation-state in the nineteenth century, physical, especially 
military, violence has only been one aspect of power struggles. Physical 
violence to be sure is a very prominent aspect of modern conflict. Yet 
it is this very prominence which makes for a certain insensitivity to 
the broad range of other means (Weber's "peaceful" means). 
Very rarely, it seems, have theorists or activists endeavoured to 
clearly articulate a vocabulary for the comprehensive exploration of 
the realm of action which Weber called "peaceful conflict" (especially 
in its nonroutine forms) either as such or in relationship to violent 
conflict. This, however, should not mislead one into thinking that just 
because something has not been articulated it has not been understood. 
Another stumbling block here is that various concepts and applications 
of power, sociopolitical action, and techniques or means — ranging from 
the most peaceful to the most violent — have been described in 
vocabularies which are often mutually incomprehensible. 
Throughout modern European history there have been countless 
approaches to social change and struggle (both for liberation and 
domination or simultaneously both) in which physical violence assumes 
a subordinate, although often essential, role. After the American, and 
88  Foucault's work can be seen as the antithesis to the Gandhian paradigm and other 
related efforts to focus on emancipatory power in history. Foucault finds a new 
strategy of domination taking shape in the eighteenth century. For Foucault the kind 
of power which stands in opposition to emancipatory types of power is not based 
on violence. On the contrary it is a type of power for which violence is explicitly 
relegated to a secondary role to be "superseded by a subtle, calculated technology 
of subjection." Foucault 1980, pp. 9596; Foucault 1979, pp. 23, 26, 81-82, 183, 218-
223. 
89  Gramsci 1971, p. 232. 
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especially after the French, Revolutions social and political groups of 
all persuasions adopted strategies in which physical violence was only 
one constituent, often to be purposely avoided for a variety of reasons. 
This holds true for the whole range of socialists, communists, anarchists, 
liberals, conservatives, and reactionaries, as well as for nationalists of 
all persuasions. This was a period of the triumph of the modern national 
state. The main lines of conflict centered around power struggles in 
relation (but not necessarily directly) to the state. All these groups, to 
be sure, contained violent extremists but this should not blind one to 
the fact that they all developed elaborate ways of waging conflict 
without physical violence. 
Through the careful study of thousands of violent events in western 
Europe since 1800 Charles Tilly and his colleagues have found that 
almost none of the varieties of ways in which people act collectively 
to wage conflict are essentially violent: most collective action arises 
from a broader base of collective action without physical violence9°  
The study of violence is an important endeavour in being an effective 
means for locating and achieving a deeper understanding of collective 
contention in general; violent, and otherwise acute, conflicts serve as 
indicators, or "tracers," of much broader forms of collective action 
and political confrontation.91 Tilly's work poses a serious challenge to 
any conceptualization of conflict in terms of a violent/"nonviolent" 
action dichotomy. Violent action is very rarely a separate form of 
action, but rather an epiphenomenon of forms of conflict which may 
or may not lead to violence. Critical nonroutine confrontations of 
whatever degree of violence are, from this point of view, only the tip 
of the iceberg of sociopolitical conflict and struggle. 
The structure of acute conflicts, which are often highly polarized, is 
conditioned by the broader constitution of society. Routine and 
nonroutine conflict therefore form a continuum; to understand the 
latter one must understand the former. 
For example, to focus research narrowly on the Finnish struggle 
against Russification, 1899-1905, as a case of "nonviolent" action tends 
to reinforce the custom of seeing this case from the perspective of 
popular emancipation. As indicated earlier, although the formal 
definition of "nonviolent" action aims to avoid subjective classification, 
the cases of struggle actually studied within the Gandhian paradigm 
are clearly classifiable within the historical category of just resistance 
9° Tilly, Tilly, Tilly 1975, pp. 13, 242, 282; Tilly 1978, pp. 176-177. 
91 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly 1975, pp. 248, 287, 290; Tilly 1978, p. 188. 
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against oppression.92 Whether a form of struggle can successfully be 
called "resistance" in this sense depends on whether the actors are 
able to invoke the basic principles of secular Christian society 
associated with liberty and justice to their side. Thus the description 
of resistance cannot be reduced to an account of the technical means 
of wielding power, but always fundamentally involves moral or 
ideological struggle as well. Passive resistance and "nonviolent" 
resistance are specific historical subtypes of just resistance. Their 
uniqueness cannot be specified merely in terms of the use of social 
power and techniques of noncooperation, since almost all forms of 
resistance and conflict, including many violent forms, do so in various 
ways. Their uniqueness or specific character is determined by the 
special way the actors involved combine methods of struggle and 
sociopolitical ideas and values. 
Focus on emancipatory struggles often involves the emphasis of the 
principle of voluntary servitude. This principle has figured centrally in 
certain Enlightenment streams of European thought from the sixteenth 
century to the present. Accordingly, the first step in liberation is 
understood to be the realization that servitude and subjection are 
essentially voluntary or in the realization of subjects that power-over 
them is derived from them and that through withdrawal of consent 
and noncooperation can reclaim and mobilize the power which 
inherently depends on them.93 In this tradition, to put it simply, people 
power is emphasized. In contrast, from perspectives which focus on 
domination as a key element of social action the withdrawal of consent 
as a way of wielding power is seen as highly restricted.94 Accordingly, 
the famous phrase "all government is based on consent" is only a half-
truth; under many conditions the freedom of social actors is highly 
controllable. Obedience may often be essentially voluntary, but it need 
not be more than minimally so. 
In studying the Finnish case it is important to understand that the 
historical development of the values upon which just resistance is based 
is closely connected with the development of constitutionalism, 
revolutionary natural law and principles such as those of justice and 
92 Just struggle is a subjectiye category, and the means which fall under it are legitimized 
through the prevailing concept of justice. 
93 Boétie 1975, passim; Geuss 1981, pp. 58, 60; for the Gandhian/Sharpian conception 
of voluntary servitude, see Sharp 1979, pp. 43-59. As will be discussed below, the 
Finnish Constitutionalists invoked the idea of voluntary servitude in their struggle. 
94 See for example Weber 1978, vol. 1, pp. 212-215, vol. 2. 941, 942, 943, 946, 1407. 
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liberty.95 According to constitutionalist tradition self-interest is 
ultimately the motive for the establishment of justice. Government, 
according to David Hume, is the human invention for securing justice, 
for the pursuit of mutual advantage and security.96 It is upon this notion 
that the doctrine of resistance, rebellion and revolution against 
injustice, developed by Hume's constitutionalist and social contract 
theorist predecessors, is based: When government ceases to serve the 
mutual interests of those involved, when it is undermined by the 
"irregularity of human nature," by injustice, wickedness, violence and 
"excesses of cruelty and ambition," then the bonds of allegiance and 
duty to obey are dissolved.97 
The moment, however, of resistance and rebellion to injustice is 
reserved for the most extreme situations only, when injustice becomes 
intolerable. Hume's account gives one to understand that normally 
people adhere to the principles of justice only in so far as necessary 
and that justice and injustice exist in a rather ambiguous relationship 
of interdependence. Like many constitutionalists, Hume was not 
concerned with examining the internal ideological and class-oriented 
aspects of justice.98 Men carry justice into practice only in so far as is 
necessary to secure the desired amount of "peace and order."99 
It follows from Hume's exposition, although it may not be what he 
was seeking to convey, that "politicians," "Princes," "nations" and 
certain social groups or classes which are contending for power have 
an interest in attaining only a certain minimal degree of justice. Such 
groups may adhere to the ideal of consensus as comprised of the 
consent of free individuals who are enlightened concerning their own 
self-interests to act together for the achievement of commonly agreed 
upon goals. But historically, as Gramsci observed, in practice consent 
or consensus has been something to be organized. Consequently, there 
is a basic ambiguity between force and consent; they form a dialectical 
unity incapable of polar isolation) 00 The organization of consent does 
9' Weber writes that natural law has been "the specific form of legitimacy of a 
reyolutionary order. The invocation of natural law has repeatedly been the method 
by which classes in reyolt against the existing order have legitimized their aspirations, 
in so far as they did not, or could not, base their claims upon positiye religious norms 
or revelations"; Weber 1978, yol. 2, p. 867. This should be kept in mind in the 
consideration of Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency. 
96 Hume 1969, pp. 551, 602, 614. 
97 Ibid., pp. 602-604. 
98 Ibid., p. 620. 
99  Ibid., p. 620. 
10° For an example of how the relationship between force and consent is conceptualized 
in the intellectual context referred to, see Croce 1945, pp. 1-31. 
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not necessarily occur through the self-organization of individuals, but 
through leadership. Accordingly Gramsci sees the basic element of 
collective action, and of politics in particular, the existence of rulers 
and ruled, leaders and led. The first stage of politics is thus the 
formation of effective rulers and the determination of the most 
systematic or "rational" means for securing the obedience of the 
ruled.to1  
From the point of view of the abstract liberal theories or ideals of 
consent (uncoerced, voluntary agreement), liberty and communicative 
action the Gramscian model of hegemony will indeed appear 
totalitarian. This would certainly be a correct interpretation. It would 
be a mistake, however, to confine the concept of authoritarianism or 
totalitarianism here solely to the now paradigmatic fascist and 
communist types. There are some very significant common elements 
shared by Gramsci's Jacobin-Machiavelli model of political action and 
the varying types of passive revolution in the thought and action of, 
for example, Cuoco or Snellman. Both see "the people," in Machiavel-
li's manner, as "material" to be shaped and organized by leaders.'o2 
Moreover, in much traditional liberal or constitutionalist practice too 
the emancipatory democratic outlook is highly restricted. The point 
of departure is rather the "natural" elite or leadership which struggles 
for the liberty of a certain group or groups in the name of universal 
principles. 
Therefore withdrawal of consent (noncooperation) as a fundamental 
way of struggle, and the defense of consent as the basis of government 
is most often the prerogative of those who really control significant 
sources of power in society and have usually controlled them for a 
decisive period before nonroutine or acute conflict breaks out.103 The 
capacity for resistance and struggle for liberation in nonroutine conflicts 
depends upon prior mobilization in routine conflicts and normal 
economic and social life. That is, a group or configuration of groups 
101 Gramsci 1971., p. 144. 
102 Throughout The Discourses Machiayelli speaks from the point of yiew of the leader. 
The "masses." "the people," the "multitude," the "populace" etc. are "material" to 
be governed and managed and made good by the leader. They are to be deluded 
through appearances, pacified through security or repressed through violence 
depending on the circumstances. All this in spite of the fact that he claims that 
"government by the populace is better than goyernment by princes"; Machiavelli 
1970, pp. 115, 159, 251, 256 and throughout. 
103 As James C. Scott puts it, "most subordinate classes throughout most of history 
have rarely been afforded the luxury of open, organized, political activity." His work 
is a study of the "everyday forms of peasant resistance," most forms of which "stop 
well short of outright collectiye defiance"; Scott 1985, pp. xv—xyi. 
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can undertake a resistance movement only if it already has significant 
control over human and material resources. In modern Europe the 
defense of consent or the demand for the liberty to choose, without 
being coerced, one's own economic and sociopolitical relationships and 
the right to say no to and fight coercion have above all been the 
prerogative of the various groups which have led the processes in 
modern Europe known as bourgeois revolution and emancipation. It 
is they who have developed the vocabulary and ideology of just 
resistance and struggle for liberty. As Hume's work makes clear, these 
increasingly powerful middle groups were willing to go far in toleration 
of tyranny and general injustice for the sake of maintaining social 
order. Only when injustice decisively impaired their endeavors were 
they ready to undertake just resistance in the name of the "people."1°4 
104 Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency is a case in point. 
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II. Passive Resistance in the 
European Resistance 
Tradition 
1. Civil Disobedience and Passive Resistance 
As it has come to be understood nowadays in dictionaries, passive 
resistance signifies a special type of refusal to obey unacceptable or 
illegitimate demands or legal requirements imposed by governments 
or other authorities.' Often such refusal is justified through appeal to 
shared extra-legal values or a common sense of justice. But it can also 
be motivated by the conflict between differing legal systems or 
conceptions of justice. Passive resistance connotes the deliberate 
exclusion of violence. As thus defined, passive resistance approaches 
synonymity with civil disobedience.2 Clearly the two concepts are 
historically interrelated and are grounded in a common resistance 
heritage. They can be understood as members of a family of forms of 
conscientious disobedience and resistance which is, in turn, a sub-group 
of the repertoire of interrelated forms of resistance in European 
culture. 
It must be kept in mind that in conceptually distinguishing between 
forms of resistance and contention one necessarily encounters points 
where the borders between them are fuzzy or porous. Such porosity 
is inevitable. This is one reason why it is fruitful to study resistance 
from a broad perspective without insisting upon a precision of demarca-
tion between forms of resistance which is impossible to attain. There 
are, after all, no eternal, unchanging, criteria by which forms of 
resistance can be demarcated and identified. It ultimately depends 
upon how the background field of values is interpreted, upon the 
intentions of the actors and upon the perspective of the researcher. 
Two antagonists, even when facing each other on a common back-
ground of values, may never be able to come to agreement concerning 
I See "Passive Resistance" 1986, p. 1651; "Passive Resistance" 1989, pp. 313-314. 
2 See "Civil Disobedience" 1985, pp. 337-338. 
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what, for example, an act of civil disobedience really is. What one calls 
conscientious disobedience in harmony with the highest moral laws 
the other may call hooliganism and violent immoral criminality. 
Nevertheless, given the common background of European values and 
the resistance heritage one can, with little difficulty, almost always 
intuitively differentiate between hooliganism, vandalism, criminal vio-
lence, conscientious forms of violence, intentionally violence avoiding 
forms of conflict and so forth. 
A wide variety of attempts have been made to define and clarify 
the concept of civil disobedience including challenges to the notion 
that "nonviolence" or the deliberate avoidance of violence is a neces-
sary defining condition of it. One of the purposes of abstract analyses 
and definitions of concepts of social action is to concisely state the 
"essentials" of the social phenomenon referred to as well as to draw 
attention to those aspects of the phenomenon which the author, for 
one reason or another, wishes the reader to focus on. The "essentials," 
of course, can only be determined through historical research, not 
merely through the logical analysis of ideas or the criticism of the 
theorizations of other thinkers. For example, to define concepts of 
resistance, to state what civil disobedience or passive resistance are, 
one must know their history and the history of the resistance tradition 
of which they are a part. The explanatory power and accuracy of such 
definitions depends upon the thoroughness of the historical knowl-
edge upon which they are based. Likewise, an "intuitive" understand-
ing of a concept, although not based on explicit historical research, 
must be ultimately grounded on historical knowledge if it is to be accu-
rate.3  
Using Hugo A. Bedea's definition as a point of departure, John 
Rawls defines civil disobedience in a relatively narrow manner.4 His 
definition has several drawbacks but its specific focus is useful for 
conceptually introducing the subject of passive resistance. Rawls seeks 
to distinguish civil disobedience from related forms of action such as 
other types of protest, "conscientious refusal" ("noncompliance with 
a more or less direct legal injunction or administrative order") and 
3 Brian Smart has attempted to provide a definition of civil disobedience which "has 
the double advantage of being broadly congruent with our intuitions and of supplying 
a theoretical underpinning for what it includes and excludes." In his final definition 
Smart concludes that civil disobedience can include certain types of violence. This 
is in sharp contradiction to the actual historical tradition of civil disobedience and 
related forms of resistance. One wonders what his "our intuition" refers to. Perhaps 
to some kind of a priori and ahistorical criteria by which a real "act of civil 
disobedience" can be identified? See Smart 1978, pp. 249, 255, 267. 
4 Rawls 1971, pp. 363-371. 
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more intensive forms of resistance and militant action.5 According to 
Rawls civil disobedience is an intentional "nonviolent" violation of 
law. It is communicative action done openly in public, with fair notice 
given, and is addressed to the sense of justice of the majority of the 
community. The agents of civil disobedience are aware of, and willing 
to accept, the legal consequences of their action .6 
Rawls is well aware that his definition of civil disobedience is more 
restrictive than other commonly cited ones. He also notes that in actual 
practice civil disobedience and conscientious refusal often cannot be 
distinguished from one another.' Historically, however, one can distin-
guish many cases of agents intentionally carrying out the type of action 
which Rawls calls civil disobedience. This in itself proves the usefulness 
and validity of the distinction of civil disobedience and conscientious 
refusal. The criteria according to which civil disobedience must be 
addressed to the majority's sense of justice is perhaps too restrictive, 
although it is no doubt a common characteristic of many cases. It would 
be more accurate to say that the civil disobedient actors appeal to and 
invoke principles from a field of values, of which justice is a central 
component, which they share with their opponents through a common 
cultural heritage. 
To assert that civil disobedience can include intended violence is to 
make a radical break with tradition and to destroy the utility of the 
concept. The type of action which has historically been called civil 
disobedience, as well as related forms of action, have been inextricably 
associated with the deliberate avoidance of violence. Rather than 
include communicative and conscientious types of violence under the 
concept of civil disobedience it would be more reasonable to designate 
them through other concepts. After all, all the forms of disobedience 
and resistance which were classified in chapter I. under the concept 
of just resistance are conscientious, even the most violent. These forms 
are more or less distinguishable from one another. Civil disobedience 
is one of those rare concepts through which people have endeavoured 
to articulate a type of struggle which intentionally avoids violence. 
Intuitively it is quite unacceptable to confuse civil disobedience with 
intentional violence. 
Having said this, however, it must be emphasized that the problem 
of the relationship between deliberately violence-avoiding forms of 
action and violence still remains. Rawls sees civil disobedience as one 
5 Ibid., pp. 367, 368. 
6 Ibid., pp. 364, 366, 367. 
7 Ibid., pp. 368, 371. 
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of the last resorts on a scale of ways of achieving redress against 
injustice. As he distinguishes it, it does not, because of its communica-
tive relationship to the community's sense of justice, involve threat, 
force or violence. If civil disobedience is ineffective, Rawls holds, then 
the use of more militant means, including violence, may be entertained .8  
Civil disobedience, according to this interpretation, is practically 
separate from, but does not involve a principled rejection of, 
conscientious violence when used when all else has failed. This 
interpretation clearly corresponds to one prominent stream within the 
European resistance tradition. 
According to another stream, however, civil disobedience is not to 
be part of a hierarchy of types of action which may culminate in 
violence. This is the case with Gandhian civil disobedience. It must be 
emphasized that it was Gandhi who brought the word "civil disobedien-
ce" into popular usage (not Henry David Thoreau).9 Gandhian action 
has been paradigmatic in structuring civil disobedience in the twentieth 
century, both in thought and practice. Within the overall framework 
of Gandhian "nonviolent action" (Satyagraha), civil disobedience can 
be a very radical means which in practice may be closely associated 
with ultimatums, threats and coercion. As Gandhi's student Krishnalal 
Shridharani put it, in Gandhi's hands civil disobedience became "a 
revolutionary weapon for destroying an undesirable political order."10 
Obviously there is a need to distinguish between different types of 
civil disobedience, as Gandhi himself did. Following Gandhi, Sharp 
marks out, among others, reformatory, defensive and revolutionary 
types of civil disobedience which may in practice be closely interrela-
ted.tt Rawls' definition can be seen as an example of the reformatory 
type which is conceived of as relevant in the hypothetical construct of 
a nearly perfect democracy. One may point out, as was indeed done 
earlier in the discussion of "nonviolence," that the more radical type 
of civil disobedience borders so closely on violence in the employment 
of threats and coercion that a logical distinction between the two cannot 
be maintained, in spite of the declared intentions of the agents. This 
observation offers the only path open to those who would argue on 
logical grounds for the inclusion of more direct forms of violence under 
the concept of civil disobedience. The only counter-argument here is 
to reiterate that to do so would be to weaken the analytic capacity to 
8  Ibid.. pp. 366, 373. 
9 Stern 1970, p. 452. 
1° Shridharani 1939, p. 33. 
11 Sharp 1973. pp. 315. 
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distinguish between various types of resistance and to ignore the fact 
of an old tradition of social and political struggle which purposely 
excludes violence. 
An abstract definition of the concept of civil disobedience is to a 
great extent also one of passive resistance, at least in one of the specific 
senses in which the later concept has traditionally been used. Of course, 
as words, "civil disobedience" and "passive resistance" have their own 
histories, but these histories overlap, and they often both refer to the 
same type of action. For example, the important resistance campaign 
in which Gandhi was involved in 1906 was known at the time as "passive 
resistance." Later, when Gandhi and his followers sought to forget the 
term "passive resistance," that event became known as a case of "civil 
disobedience."12 
In Finnish political culture during the period from 1861 to 1918, 
passive resistance was clearly understood in the specific sense in which 
it became known later as civil disobedience. It was, however, also 
understood in a much broader and generic way as a whole repertoire 
of means of disobedience and resistance. It is not surprising then to 
find that this was also true for the first Gandhian campaigns: what was 
once known as passive resistance later came to be called "nonviolent 
resistance." 
Why were Gandhi and his followers so concerned to do away with 
the term "passive resistance"? One obvious answer is that the Gand-
hians sought to disengage their way of action from any association 
with passivity. Another answer is that Gandhi sought to initiate a 
deliberate divorce from the old tradition with which "passive resist-
ance" was associated. Gandhi and the continuers of the Gandhian 
paradigm created a rich new folklore of "nonviolence," and in doing 
so came to underemphasize some of the basic factual historical 
constituting factors of passive resistance and thus of "nonviolent" 
resistance at its inception.13 This enticing and exotic folklore can also 
be a cause of misconception. 
To ignore the existence of passive resistance as a historical principle, 
associated with definite means of action, with all its various connota- 
12 Without mentioning the term "passive resistance" Shridharani writes of the participants 
in the 1906 campaign that: "They did not know it at the time, but their course of 
action later came to be known as civil disobedience." Shridharani 1939, p. 76. 
13 The sixth chapter of Shridharani 1939, is entitled "The Folklore of Non-Violence." 
Shridharani uses the word "folklore" in an innocent and unwittingly revealing 
manner. The chapter begins (p. 165): "The primeval rudiments of Gandhi's 
Satyagraha or nonviolent direct action were latent in the Indo-Aryan's ancient 
practice of sacrifice." A great deal of anachronism and folklore are associated with 
Gandhi. 
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tions, is to leave a hole in the history of resistance thought and action. 
The term "passive resistance" predates the term "nonviolence" in 
European languages by at least a century. Although "nonviolent 
action" (in the very broad sense of contention involving no physical 
violence) is as old as human action itself the term "nonviolence" is an 
entirely twentieth century invention. Throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries the term "passive resistance" was, and 
frequently nowadays still is, used as a general term signifying a wide 
range of violence-excluding forms of action in addition to its specific 
meaning as civil disobedience. 
Passive resistance must not be seen as a contradiction of "nonviolent 
action," but rather as a forerunner, as well as contemporary, of it. For 
the Europeans who first developed it, as well as for those who adopted 
it later in colonial liberation, and other, struggles elsewhere, passive 
resistance did not signify inaction. It was their way of saying "nonviolent 
action." As Arvid Neovius and his fellow Finns emphasized, it was not 
compatible with compliance, submission, or inaction. 
Gandhian Folklore 
What comes to mind when passive resistance is mentioned? "Gandhi," 
is inevitably the most frequent answer heard when this question is put 
to a group of people today. In one sense this is pungently ironic and 
highly misleading; it is an excellent example, moreover, of how one 
person, or a limited group of people, can have a significant effect on 
the way history is conceived. In another sense, however, the answer 
"Gandhi" displays a certain accuracy of historical intuition on the part 
of those giving it. 
This answer is ironic considering that Gandhi, his followers and the 
writers working within the Gandhian paradigm have made considerable 
effort to purge the word "passive resistance" from the vocabulary of 
collective action. This answer is misleading in the sense that it indicates 
a very narrow knowledge of the history of passive resistance and the 
whole resistance heritage of which it is a part. A glance through the 
encyclopedias and dictionaries of various European languages reveals 
how Gandhi's name dominates treatments of the history of passive 
resistance. This answer is accurate, however, in that Gandhi's thought 
and action can be understood within the European tradition of passive 
resistance. 
Gandhi played a central role in the shift from "passive resistance" 
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to "nonviolent resistance" and related terms. His early concept of 
resistance developed over a period of many years, beginning in the 
early 1890s, during the struggle of the Indian population of South 
Africa against the injustices of first the Boers and then the English.14 
In his book Satyagraha in South Africa, published many years after 
the events, in 1928, Gandhi himself became one of the active creators 
of Gandhian folklore.15 It would perhaps be going too far to accuse 
Gandhi of deliberate falsification, but his later self-centered account 
is certainly a distortion of what occurred in South Africa. In his book 
Gandhi relates that at the beginning of the Indian struggle the resisters 
were at a loss as to what to name their movement. He claims that he 
then applied the term "passive resistance." "As the struggle advanced," 
he writes, "the phrase `passive resistance' gave rise to confusion and 
it appeared shameful to permit this great struggle to be known only 
by an English name."16 
Gandhi states that he did not know when the phrase "passive 
resistance" was first used in English, but because it had always, to his 
knowledge, been associated with movements which either held an 
ambivalent view toward violence or had accepted the use of violence 
in some circumstances, he found it to be a misleading name for the 
completely "nonviolent" movement which he was leading.17 In many 
of his writings from the early 1920s onward Gandhi strongly criticized 
passive resistance and sought to disassociate his action from it. Passive 
resistance was often considered the way of the weak and seen as the 
preparation for the use of force, claims Gandhi; he declares that his 
version of "nonviolent" resistance could not be classified in that way. 
Gandhi emphasizes that passive resistance is as different from it as the 
North Pole from the South Pole, and that passive resistance is a 
misnomer for "nonviolent resistance." He asserts that he coined the 
term "Satyagraha" in "order to distinguish it from the movement then 
going on in the United Kingdom and South Africa under the name of 
Passive Resistance."18 
All this was written in hindsight, no doubt in response to new 
ideological requirements. 
When one goes beyond Gandhi's later commentaries and explores 
14 Gandhi 1950, pp. 28, 29, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52. 
15 The same holds true for his autobiography, first published in two volumes in 1927 
and 1929; see Gandhi 1959. 
16 Gandhi 1950, p. 109. 
17 Ibid.. pp. 111-115. 
18 Ibid., pp. 111-115; Gandhi 1942, p. 138; Gandhi 1963, pp. 87-88; Gandhi 1974, pp. 
3, 6, 34-35. 
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his writings from the first decade of the twentieth century it becomes 
clear that "passive resistance" was the common way to refer to the 
type of resistance which the Indians were carrying out at that time.19  
The use of the concept of passive resistance was so deeply rooted that 
it continued to be used in spite of the efforts of Gandhi and his followers 
to do away with it. The Gandhian folklore which began to take shape 
and spread throughout the world in the 1920s has tended to make 
people blind to the fact that many of the basic ideas and practical 
methods of "nonviolent resistance" came to Gandhi and his contempo-
raries through the concept of passive resistance and the resistance 
heritage of which it was a part. Christ's Sermon on the Mount and the 
works of John Ruskin, Count Leo Tolstoy, Henry David Thoreau as 
well as his immersion in the European constitutionalist tradition 
through his work as a British trained lawyer, gave Gandhi the 
background necessary to articulate and develop the western resistance 
tradition.20 Gandhi translated this tradition into Indian culture through 
languages such as Gujarati and Hindi. Special Concepts from India's 
rich civilization were given new meaning in the Gandhian struggles 
and "nonviolent resistance" began to take on an oriental color in the 
eyes of the world. Gandhi and his coworkers certainly enriched the 
European resistance heritage and helped make it part of the modern 
world civilization; but the uniqueness of the Gandhian contribution 
should not be exaggerated. The exotic words in the vocabulary of 
Gandhian action, like Ahimsa (noninjury, love) and Satyagraha have 
clear counterparts in European languages. Moreover, Gandhian 
Satyagraha does not provide any more of a solution to basic social and 
political dilemmas than its counterparts in the European tradition do. 
Gandhian Satyagraha is subject to the same limitations in practice, the 
same ambivalence in its environment and the same problematic 
relationship to violence as its corresponding types of resistance, and 
modern collective action in general, elsewhere. 
There seems to have been universal agreement among the resisters, 
their opponents and contemporary newspaper reporters to call the 
organized action undertaken by the Indians in 1906 "passive resist- 
19 In one of his most penetrating essays, Gene Sharp points out the discrepancy between 
Gandhi's early and later writings. Sharp successfully challenges old misconceptions 
concerning Gandhi's uniqueness. He shows that the type of resistance initiated in 
1906 was in no way new to the Indian minority in South Africa. Sharp, however, 
never mentions "passive resistance," and therefore misses one very important avenue 
for exploring the resistance tradition which Gandhi was drawing upon; see Sharp 
1979, pp. 24-26. 
20 Concerning this intellectual background see Gandhi 1959, pp. 48-49, 99, 220-221; 
Gandhi 1947, pp. 79, 225. 
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ance," and a "passive resistance movement."21 In a letter to the Rand 
Daily Mail of 6 July 1907 Gandhi sought to refute the notion that 
passive resistance was a new way to his fellow countrymen; he explained 
that it just had not been used on a large scale for a long time. It is 
apparent from the context that Gandhi used "passive resistance" here 
as a generic term for what was later to be called "nonviolent action." 
He then discussed some of the specific means which fall under it such 
as picketing and social ostracism.22 Elsewhere he called passive 
resistance a "policy of communal suffering," meaning the persistent 
refusal by the Indians to submit to the degradations of the 
government.23 This is a thought provoking idea since one of the 
connotations of the word "passive" as derived from Latin and found 
in various European languages is the capacity for suffering. 
The "policy of passive resistance" was initially described by the 
chairman of the British Indian Association, Abdool Gani, as "simply 
a resolve on the part of my countrymen to decline to submit to 
conditions that are quite unbearable." 24 In one his early comments on 
the subject in Indian Opinion (6 April 1907) Gandhi saw passive 
resistance as a recognized method for a loyal and law-abiding 
community to procure justice (note how close this comes to Rawls' 
definition of civil disobedience) 25 Six months later (9 September), 
writing "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience," he elaborated on this 
idea as follows: 
. passive resistance is one of the most approved methods of securing 
redress in given circumstance, and it is the only course law-abiding and 
peaceful men can adopt without doing violence to their conscience. 
Indeed, it would appear that it is a method they must adopt if they 
have a conscience, and it revolts against particular legislation.... It is 
possible to carry the doctrine of passive resistance too far, but it is 
equally so with reference to the doctrine of obedience to law.26 
It was here that Gandhi first drew the link between what he knew to 
be a valid and widely accepted form of European contention called 
passive resistance and the concept of civil disobedience as expressed 
by Henry David Thoreau (18174862).27 In a later discussion 
21  See "passive resistance" in the indexes of Gandhi 1958-1970, especially vols. 5-9. 
22  Ibid, vol. 7, pp. 86-87. 
23  Ibid., vol. 7, "Letter to the Rand Daily Mail," 1 July 1907, p. 67. 
24 Gani, "Letter to the Star," in Gandhi 1958-1970, vol. 5, p. 430. 
25  Ibid., yol. 6, pp. 391-392. 
26  Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 211-212. 
27 Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 211-212. Thoreau's essay "Resistance to Ciyil Government" was 
first published in 1859. It was later, after Thoreau's death, renamed "On the Duty 
of Civil Disobedience." It did not receiye wide attention until Leo Tolstoy and 
Gandhi rediscovered it. 
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concerning the acceptability of passive resistance, Gandhi states that 
in connection with the so-called passive resistance movement in 
England in 1902 against the Education Bill passed by the House of 
Commons, Winston Churchill affirmed that passive resistance is 
constitutionally an entirely valid means of action under British law. 
He adds that General Jan Smuts also made a similar pronouncement 
regarding the passive resistance of the Indians in South Africa.28  
All this serves to show how wide-spread and well understood the 
concept of passive resistance was in both its specific and general 
connotations. As Gandhi put it in a speech entitled "The Ethics of 
Passive Resistance" (7 June 1909), which he delivered after recognizing 
what he considered to be the contradiction within the term: "But the 
expression had been accepted as it was popular and had been for a 
long time used by those who carried out in practice the idea denoted 
by the term."29 
At the end of 1907, by the latest, Gandhi and his coworkers came 
to realize that there were no corresponding terms for "passive 
resistance" and "civil disobedience" in Gujarati and other Indian 
languages. Out of patriotic respect for their own language they initiated 
a contest, calling on the Indian community to come up with Gujarati, 
Sanskrit or Urdu equivalents for these terms.30 Needless to say, this 
event cannot be seen as mere verbal transfer; it is a clear example of 
how the European resistance tradition was translated and transferred 
into another culture. The Indians were forced to develop a whole new 
vocabulary for it. In an article entitled "Passive resistance" (January 
1908) Gandhi made a very innocent and revealing comment on the 
results of the contest: He said that Satyagraha ("firmness in a good 
cause") is not a satisfactory equivalent for "passive resistance," since 
it does not fully capture the connotations of the original English term. 
This is in strong contrast to what he later had to say about passive 
resistance and Satyagraha.37 
At that time Gandhi displayed remarkable intuitive insight into the 
meaning of "passive resistance" and the tradition of which it was a 
part. In a later commentary on the contest Gandhi emphasizes that 
the word "passive" in passive resistance does not mean that the resister 
remains passive to all that occurs and that to claim so is to betray 
28  Ibid., vol. 13, pp. 531-532; the 1902 passive resistance in England took the form of 
nonpayment of taxes and was lead by the liberal politician and nonconformist minister 
John Clifford (1836-1923). Gandhi first met Churchill in 1906 during a deputation 
to England. 
29 Ibid., vol. 9, p. 243. 
3°  Ibid., vol. 7, p. 455. 
31  Ibid., yol. 8, pp. 22-23; my italicization of the English words. 
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ignorance 32 Gandhi explicitly states that he understands passive 
resistance to be a clearly defined type of resistance, requiring the 
deliberate exclusion of "physical force" and the employment of "inner 
force" and "soul force" in the steadfast struggle for what is right and 
true. He adds that the word "civil" in "civil disobedience" includes the 
meaning of "passive," ie. the deliberate exclusion of violence and the 
adherence to what is right.33 
As will be seen Gandhi's concept of passive resistance at this early 
period of his career corresponds with remarkable exactitude to the 
European concept of passive resistance. The word "nonviolence" came 
into use only later, in the early 1920s; for the time being "Satyagraha" 
had to suffice as an equivalent for the well established "passive 
resistance." 
2. Towards a History of Passive Resistance 
In this section the history of passive resistance will be approached 
through the study of the history of "passive resistance." The danger 
of this etymological approach lies in becoming too concerned with a 
mere verbal expression at the expense of a more extensive under-
standing of the phenomena it is a label for. Keeping this problem in 
mind, however, the etymological approach proves to be an excellent 
heuristic device for tracing the history of an idea and a way of action. 
It provides firm guidelines for initial study, keeping the researcher 
from straying into arbitrary hypotheses. It furnishes a basis for stepping 
out of the narrow confines of etymology into a broader study of 
resistance action. 
Gandhi's later rejection of the "passive" part of "passive resistance" 
would not be so problematic if it had been merely a linguistic move 
retaining an understanding of the origin of Satyagraha and an 
appreciation for the historical meaning of "passive resistance." Instead 
Gandhi created a kind of a phobia toward "passive resistance" which 
left his followers with an unwillingness to make inquiries about it. 
Gandhian folklore prevailed, but not ubiquitously. 
The first western social scientist to publish a study of passive 
resistance under the influence of the early Gandhian paradigm was 
the American, Clarence Marsh Case. Already before World War One 
32  Ibid., vol. 8, p. 131, (under title, "Gujarati Equivalents for Passive Resistance, etc.").  
33  Ibid., vol. 8, p. 131, vol. 9, p. 243. 
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Case wrote a graduate thesis entitled "The Social Psychology of Passive 
Resistance."34  His main work, Non-violent Coercion: A Study in 
Methods of Social Pressure (1923), has in many ways remained 
unsurpassed in insight into the theory and practice of "nonviolent 
resistance" and has clearly, although with rather minimal acknowledge-
ment, served as a model for many later studies. Unlike others working 
in the Gandhian paradigm, Case clearly recognized the synonymity of 
"passive resistance" and "nonviolent resistance," using them explicitly 
and purposely throughout his work as interchangeable terms. Case 
knew that passive/"nonviolent" resistance was a principle of social 
action having deep roots in European civilization. One of his most 
remarkable insights, later entirely ignored by scholars and Gandhians 
is that passive resistance is an entirely modern type of action: 
The distinguishing feature of this modernism is its close connection 
with the state and with the surging forces of social and political 
revolution. Its modernity lies in its public character. Henceforth we 
shall see less of the monastic, ascetic, and life-denying tendency so 
characteristic of the Oriental, Stoic, and Christian anchorite philosophy, 
and more of an effort to translate negative non-resistance into a positive 
message of peace, and even of social reconstruction.36 
This is a promising hypothesis, yet Case failed to explore all its 
implications regarding the history of passive resistance within the 
European resistance tradition. Instead he focuses rather one-sidedly 
on the history of Christian peace sects. He neglected an etymological 
study of "passive resistance" and thus missed many of the key charac-
teristics of the phenomenon in European history. 
Case believed that the developers of passive resistance throughout 
modern history were "attempting to solve the most difficult problem 
of conduct to be met in human experience ... it involves what we may 
call a antinomy of practical judgement...."37 This is a very complex 
endeavour and for those who wish to act in this world the relationship 
between passive resistance and violence in social and political action 
remains necessarily problematic. Perhaps Gandhi and his followers did 
not want to admit this. This could be one reason they wanted so badly 
to disassociate themselves from passive resistance. They wanted to 
34 Case 1923, p. i.  
35 Ibid., p. 4. 
36  Ibid., p. 62. Case identified the beginning of modern passive resistance with the 
thought and action of John Wycliff and John Huss in the in the late fourteenth and 
early fifteenth centuries. This will be discussed below, in the next section. 
37 Ibid., p. 196. 
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convince people that they had solved the dilemma of violence in politics 
and taken Satyagraha far beyond passive resistance. 
The Dutch anarchist Barthélemy de Ligt is another important writer 
who was influenced by Gandhi, yet attained an unusual insight into 
the history of passive resistance. Ligt's book The Conquest of Violence: 
An Essay on War and Revolution (English version, 1937) — "that 
extraordinary manual of passive resistance" — was highly influential 
among pacifists in the 1930s.38 As Aldous Huxley observed in his 
praising introduction, Ligt's book was not meant to be a work of 
historical scholarship. Ligt did not weave his many excellent insights 
into a comprehensive or explicit theory of the history passive resistance. 
As with Case, Ligt did not employ the etymological method. They 
both employed "passive resistance" as a universal generic term. During 
the period when both men wrote the pacifist war-resister conception 
of passive resistance was quite prevalent. This no doubt limited the 
scope of their own conceptions, but did not always dominate them. 
Many of the scholars working within the Gandhian paradigm show 
a remarkable ignorance regarding passive resistance. For example, 
Shridharani is entirely under the sway of the later Gandhi and shows 
no knowledge of Gandhi's earlier insight into passive resistance. 
Shridharani identifies passive resistance with pacifism and with passive 
refusal to do things. He asserts that passive resistance lacks a technique 
of direct action: "William Penn, William Lloyd Garrison and, to a great 
extent, Count Leo Tolstoy," writes Shridharani, "sought in their own 
characteristic ways to mitigate this shortcoming by evolving a social 
practice of passive resistance out of the old theological doctrine of non-
resistance." 39  
He claims that these men failed in this effort, and that Gandhi was 
the first to solve the problem. Elsewhere in his book, ironically enough, 
Shridharani admits that there have been a "few" cases of "non-violent 
direct action" in the West "as well" (ie., "as well" as the action of the 
great Saint Gandhi in the East). Shridharani simply fails to mention 
that at least four of the cases he cites, all of which occurred in Europe 
between 1849 and 1923, were called "passive resistance" both by the 
participants and by international observers.40 In each case there existed 
a manifest repertoire of methods of direct action which was clearly 
understood by the people involved. 
38 The quote is from Woodcock 1986, p. 368. 
39 Shridharani 1939, pp. 264-266. 281. Shridharani's italics. 4°  Ibid. pp. 113-114. The cases referred to here are the Hungarian resistance 1849-
1867, the Finnish "nonviolent campaign from 1901 to 1905," the Kapp Putch in 1920 
and the Ruhrkampf of 1923. 
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In the late 1920s the well-known Finnish Tolstoyan Arvid Järnefelt 
wrote that the Finnish passive resistance struggle during the years 
1899-1905 was very similar to the liberation movement taking place 
in India against English domination under the leadership of M.K. 
Gandhi4' Järnefelt himself had been an activist during the years of 
the Finnish resistance, and had even more direct personal contact with 
Tolstoy than Gandhi did. Järnefelt claimed that Gandhi himself had 
noticed the similarity between the Finnish and Indian movements, that 
Gandhi considered Finland to be a forerunner of his own work and 
that he truly admired those Finns who had bravely joined the passive 
resistance.4 
Thus far there is no direct proof that Gandhi really thought this 
way, but it is not at all implausible. Among those working in the 
Gandhian paradigm two of the most frequently repeated "cases of pre-
Gandhian nonviolent resistance" are the Hungarian struggle of 1849-
1867 and the Finnish resistance of 1899-1905. These Gandhian scholars 
had a habit of uncritically repeating Gandhi. Gandhi did cite the 
Hungarian resistance, and it is very possible that he also became 
familiar with the Finnish case at the same time through several sources. 
As Gandhi repeatedly cited these movements they gradually became 
incorporated into the canon of "cases of nonviolent resistance" by 
Gandhi's followers. 
Järnefelt's comments are a clear indication that one should not look 
merely to Gandhi's own psychological or spiritual development as 
portrayed in his self-centered autobiographical works to explain the 
origin of Satyagraha. Under the sway of Gandhian folklore many have 
thought Gandhi the inventor of modern mass "nonviolent action." 
Sharp's essay on the origins of Gandhi's use of "nonviolent resistance" 
makes the first steps in deconstructing this myth. Sharp points out that 
Gandhi's early writings abound in references to contemporary more 
or less "nonviolent" struggles, such as those in China, India, Russia 
and South Africa, where systematic noncooperation and many other 
methods were employed.43 Another of the movements for national 
independence which Gandhi followed was that of the Irish. 
In an article in Indian Opinion in 1907, entitled "Benefits of Passive 
Resistance: Notable Instance," Gandhi described the current struggle 
of the Irish people for their rights against English domination. He 
noted that the Sinn Fein (Irish for "ourselves alone") movement and 
41 Järnefelt 1976, p. 497. 
42  Ibid., p. 497. 
43  Sharp 1979, pp. 23-41. 
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the Indian Swadeshi (Swadeshi refers to the principle of using 
goodsproduced locally or in one's own country) movement shared very 
similar goals: "In their struggle" he wrote, "passive resistance is one 
of their main weapons."" Gandhi told how through economic and 
cultural self-sufficiency and the withdrawal of cooperation with the 
British in key areas Sinn Fein sought, without violent struggle, to force 
the British to grant home rule or independence. Gandhi knew that the 
Sinn Fein movement had been inspired by the Hungarian passive 
resistance movement against Austrian absolutism and listed some of 
the methods used by the Hungarians in their struggle. He concluded 
that: "These instances deserve to be emulated by the Transvaal Indians. 
They clearly prove that what is known to have happened earlier in 
history must also happen in the case of the Indians in the Transvaal."45  
In 1904 the prominent Irish nationalist Arthur Griffith published a 
work which was to become very influential called The Resurrection of 
Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland. It was both a detailed study of mass 
passive resistance, i.e., of the culture and politics of violence-excluding 
national liberation and the proclamation of a policy of action for 
Ireland. Griffith was one of the main founders of the Sinn Fein party 
in 1905, the political program of which had already been formulated 
some years earlier. In all probability Griffith's book was Gandhi's main 
source of knowledge, whether directly or indirectly, on Sinn Fein and 
the Hungarian resistance. In the third edition of his work (1918) Griffith 
placed the national struggle of Finland alongside that of Hungary as 
an example for the Irish. One can surmise that probably many years 
before this the parallel between Finland and Hungary had been 
recognized by Europeans like Griffith. 
For their part, resistance thinkers and nationalist leaders in Finland 
had ever since the 1860s been deepening their knowledge of Hungary 
as a parallel for their own national development and defense. This 
aspect of Finnish history has been entirely neglected by scholars. 
Political activists such as M.K. Gandhi, Arthur Griffith, the Finn 
Arvid Neovius and their associates were not the only ones interested 
in the history, philosophical implications and the practical applications 
of passive resistance during the first years of the twentieth century. 
44 Gandhi 1958-1970, vol. 7, pp. 213-214. 
45  Ibid. pp. 213-214. 
46  Griffith 1918, pp. xii, 141, 163. 
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The Origin and Use of "Passive Resistance" 
In searching through the old dictionaries of various European countries 
for "passive resistance" I found that in Germany there had been a 
scholarly discussion among etymologists concerning the origin of 
passive resistance. This debate probably reflected a more general public 
interest in the subject. In 1906 Otto Ladendorf included "passiver 
Widerstand" in his Historisches Schlagwörterbuch. This was followed 
by an attempt on the part of the linguist Albert Gombert to trace the 
terms "passiver Widerstand" and "passive resistance" back still further 
in time than Ladendorf had 47 The work of these experts was later 
ignored in discussions of passive resistance. 
Gombert asserts that the English catchword "passive resistance" was 
the predecessor of the German schlagwort "passiver Widerstand." 
Moreover, he claims that it was a product of the American struggle 
for independence. Gombert, nevertheless, provides no proof for the 
American origin of this term. The word may have been used by the 
Americans of that time, but it seems clear that it was not a standard 
part of the vocabulary of resistance and contention in the English 
colonies in America.48 What Gombert does prove is that the word was 
used in both English and German at the latest by 1819. In December 
of that year the newspaper Morgenblatt reported a resistance campaign 
by the Radical-Reformers against the English government. Their 
method was described as "passive resistance" and was contrasted to 
"passive submission."49 Gombert concludes that the term "passiver 
Widerstand" was not yet commonplace in Germany, since the author 
of this article felt it necessary to explain it. Next Gombert identified 
what he thought was a more mature use of  "passiver Widerstand" in 
the Evang. Kirchenzeitung (28 July 1838) describing the resistance of 
French religious officials to the July government.50 
The above random pieces of evidence provided Gombert with the 
background for the most significant find in the research of his 
Ladendorf 1968 (originally published in 1906), pp. 236-237; Gombert 1906, pp. 226-
229. In general only among German scholars has the etymology of "passiye 
resistance" been traced in detail; see for example, "Widerstand" 1906. pp. 1268-
1269. 
For the wav Americans articulated their ideas of resistance see Maier 1972 and 
Conser 1986. 
Morgenblatt fär gebildete Stände 1819, p. 1195. The conscious contrast of passive 
submission and passive resistance is probably no mere isolated notion, and thus may 
prove to be one key for a better understanding of passive resistance. 
Gombert 1906, pp. 226-229. 
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etymologist colleagues: The modern concept of passive resistance 
emerged and caught on among Europeans at large, as expressed in the 
popular political catchword "passiver Widerstand," during the revolu-
tionary turmoil of 1848. The German Revolution of 1848 was largely 
a liberal-bourgeois confrontation, temporarily supported by the masses, 
with the system of absolutism. At this time the liberals became the 
spokesmen for a broad range of Germans, despite the vagueness of 
their constitutionalist political program 51 Throughout Germany, as 
well as elsewhere in Europe, liberal governments were formed. In May 
the German Constitutional National Assembly met in Frankfurt and 
the Prussian National Assembly convened in Berlin. Neither, however, 
had the power to withstand the reaction which soon set in. Gombert's 
fellow linguist, Otto Ladendorf, had claimed that it was in this situation 
that the President of the Prussian National Assembly, Hans Victor von 
Unruh, had coined the catchword "passiver Widerstand." 
When the new prime minister of Prussia proclaimed its dissolution, 
the Assembly sought means of opposition. In a speech before the 
Prussian Assembly on 10 November, Unruh stated that he was 
absolutely of the opinion that the situation could be met only with 
"passiver Widerstand," that against the violent measures of the crown 
only passive resistance was permissable.52 Although von Unruh was 
not the first person to use the term "passive resistance," both Gombert 
and Ladendorf are correct in stressing the significance of the public 
proclamation of what they considered as the constitutionalists' new 
form of struggle. 
There is no doubt that by 1848 passive resistance and related concepts 
of struggle for justice and freedom were well known among those — 
including socialists and liberals of all kinds — opposing absolutism each 
in their own way. For example, in a broad analysis of European politics 
completed in 1844 the radical republican socialist Karl Heinzen had a 
chapter on legitimate resistance ("uber erlaubten Widerstand") includ-
ing an exceptionally detailed analysis of the concept of passive 
resistance.53 As will be seen in the next section Heinzen was only one 
among many Europeans who were seeking to articulate ways of struggle 
excluding the use of violence. 
The work of the German etymologists indicates that the passive 
resistance of the years of revolution and reaction 1848-1849 was 
discussed and criticized by a wide variety of well-known figures. For 
51  Holborn 1969, pp. 17-18, 35, 39. 
52 Ladendorf 1968, pp. 236-237; "Widerstand" 1960, pp. 1268-1269. 
53 Heinzen 1845, pp. 143-172. 
5 Studia Historica 38 
	 53 
example, on the right, in a letter to his brother on 11 November 1848 
Otto von Bismarck commented that passive resistance was proving 
more and more to be the cloak of the weak.54 On the left, in an article 
in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung on 16 December 1848 Karl Marx, 
employing his notorious talent for sarcastically turning concepts upside 
down, described passive resistance as a means used by the bourgeoisie 
against the revolution.55 "Passiver Widerstand!?!", exclaimed Theodor 
Mögling, "what kind of expressions will they still invent to cover their 
cowardice with the dirty coat of legality."5°  
Ladendorf writes that nobody spoke out more eagerly, and with 
more flaming rhetoric, against passive resistance than the German 
socialist and disciple of Marx, Ferdinand Lassalle. In his famous 
Düsseldorf speech of 3 May 1849, written for the occasion of his trial 
on charges of revolutionary incitement, Lassalle furiously asserted that 
the passive resistance of the National Assembly was betrayal, and one 
of the most absurd inventions to see the light of day. He claimed that 
passive resistance was a contradiction, resistance which is no resistance, 
and is the product of the bourgeoisie's recognition that resistance is 
necessary coupled with its fear to act accordingly.57 
In their Communist Manifesto of 1848 Marx and Engels wrote that 
the modern bourgeois society, instead of doing away with class antago-
nisms, had established "new classes, new conditions of oppression, new 
forms of struggle in place of the old ones.58" Accordingly, passive 
resistance must be seen as one part of the modern "bourgeois" reper-
toire of contention. Marx was familiar with the ideas of those socialists 
and liberals who were aiming at revolution without violence, and even 
had close personal contact with some of them. Even among the commu-
nists themselves there developed an on-going struggle between those 
advocating revolution without violence and the Marxists. In 1847 the 
name of the communist "League of the Just," with its slogan "All Men 
are Brothers," was changed to "The Communist League" with the new 
slogan, "Proletarians of all Countries — Unite."59 The Swiss journalist 
and writer on passive resistance Heinzen had been a contributor to 
Marx's newspaper the Rheinische Zeitung in 1842, and in 1845 the two 
men spent much time in each other's company.6° Heinzen criticized 
5s Ladendorf 1968, pp. 236-237; Bismarck 1900, p. 70. 
"Widerstand" 1960, p. 1269. 
56 As quoted in ibid., p. 1269. 
57 Ladendorf 1968, pp. 236-237. 
58 Marx, Engels 1975, p. 9. 
59 McLellan 1976, pp. 167-172. 
60 Ibid., p. 172. 
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the Marxian communists for their propagation of class struggle, 
emphasizing instead the principle of united humanity. Marx responded 
with a refutation of Heinzen written in 1845.61  
Marx of course could not accept Heinzen's principle of humanity, 
because as he saw it people find themselves in relationships of mutual 
class antagonism which are based on economic conditions independent 
of their will.62 This basic conflict could not be resolved through 
"humanity," but only through the conquest of power from the 
bourgeoisie. Marx points out that to neglect class struggle is to play 
into the hands of the bourgeoisie who even go so far, as in the July 
Revolution in France, to make " 'the incitement of class against class', 
probably also out of `humanity', a criminal offence, to which imprison-
ment and fines were attached."63 Marx sees Heinzen as a propagator 
of "middle-class illusions."64 And Marx had no patience for the 
hypocritical idea — or illusion — of passive resistance as the weapon of 
"humanity." For Marx the Revolution of 1848 was a great 
disappointment. The German bourgeoisie failed to live up to the great 
model set by their predecessors in Marx's favorite model, the French 
Revolution. They finally set aside any pretense of solidarity with the 
people and compromised with the old regime. It is in these 
circumstances that Marx interpreted passive resistance as counter-
revolutionary and anti-proletarian.65 
A revealing and exceptionally explicit statement of the type of 
constitutionalist, or liberal bourgeois, concept of passive resistance 
which Marx mocked with such vigor is found in a private letter from 
the well known economist, organizer of working mens' societies and 
liberal deputy of the Prussian Assembly Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch 
to his parents on 8 November 1848. He wrote that on the following 
day he and his fellow resisters would fight a decisive battle, with the 
firm resolution to solely employ parliamentary means and avoid the 
dangerous possibility of street fighting. Their aim, he continued, was 
to tenaciously resist the violent measures of the crown, avoid violent 
confrontation and keep the masses tranquil. On the next day Schulze-
Delitzsch stated that the liberal center had succeeded in keeping the 
left within the limits of moderation.66 A further insight into the nature 
61 Marx 1977a, p. 216. 
62  Ibid. p. 216. 
63  Ibid., p. 216, 217. 
64 Ibid., p. 218. 
65 See Marx's articles on the bourgeoisie and the counterrevolution in the Neue 
Rheinische Zeitung during December 1848 in Marx 1977b, pp. 154-181. 
66 Deutsche Geschichte 1965, p. 311. 
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of bourgeois passive resistance, and the related concepts of "peaceful 
resistance," "resistance within the limits of the law," "parliamentary 
resistance" and resistance on a "legal basis" — phrases all of which 
became commonplace at that time — is given by the reaction of the 
Frankfurt Assembly members in January 1849. These representatives 
of property and law and order called for the use of "moral means" of 
resistance and avoided association with revolutionary activity 
threatening their own status.67 
The passive resistance of 1848 serves as a classic Marxian example 
of what high humanitarian bourgeois ideals prove to be in actual 
practice. Marx wrote with emphatic scorn for passive resistance and 
resistance on a "legal basis." Raving on, Marx accused the propagators 
of these ideas of having 
so often lost and recovered, punctured and mended that "legal basis," 
tossed it from Berlin to Frankfurt and from Frankfurt to Berlin, 
narrowed and widened it, turned the simple basis into an inlaid floor 
and the inlaid floor into a false bottom (which, as we know, is a principle 
device of performing conjurors), and the false bottom into a bottomless 
trapdoor.... The "legal basis" meant that the legal title of the people, 
revolution, did not exist in the contrat social between the Government 
and the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie deduced its claims from the old 
Prussian legislation, in order that the peple should not deduce any 
claims from the new Prussian revolution. 
Of course the scope of Marx's thesis here goes beyond the specific 
circumstances of 1848; it represents a point of view which must be 
seriously considered when studying resistance and contention 
throughout "modern bourgeois society" from its inception at the end 
of the middle ages, and especially from the sixteenth century onward. 
Moreover, it is a point of view which is of direct relevance in analyzing 
passive resistance in Finland, which drew heavily on legalist ideology 
and claims about the ancient constitution while trying to mobilize the 
masses for its cause. 
In an article analyzing European affairs in the beginning of 1861 the 
Finnish philosopher and statesman J.V. Snellman wrote that passive 
resistance had become an internationally well known approach to the 
struggle for liberty, and that anyone who kept up to date on current 
events would know exactly how it is used in practice.69 After 1848 in 
Germany passive resistance developed into a tradition of progressive 
67 Ibid., p. 311; Holborn 1969, p. 87. 
68  Marx 1977b, pp. 154, 166, 167. Marx's italics. 
69 See below, ehapter III, section 4. 
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liberal political struggle, including all kinds of constitutionalist resist-
ance to old regime policies, political and cultural mobilization, the 
writing of solidarity addresses, popular meetings, big demonstrative 
political celebrations and so forth. ° In Hungary, after the defeat of 
their violent liberation struggle in 1849, the Magyars and their allies 
gradually mobilized what they called a passive resistance movement 
against Austrian absolutism. The Hungarian resistance is dealt with in 
more detail below, in the discussion of the origins of the Finnish passive 
resistance tradition. 
The concept of passive resistance was also further developed in 
anarchist and socialist circles. This is not surprising considering the 
strong emphasis on enlightenment, self help and positive mobilization 
found in many of the main nineteenth century anarchist and "utopian" 
and "true" socialist doctrines. For example, the leading American 
individualist anarchist during the last decades of the century, Benjamin 
Tucker and his associates, considered passive resistance to be the most 
effective means for the people at large to struggle against violence and 
injustice. Tucker was an influential anarchist writer both in the USA 
and in Europe. He explicitly disassociated himself from the anarchist 
cult of violence 71 
Tucker's writings show that passive resistance was known to him as 
a widely recognized European form of struggle against arbitrary and 
invasive policies. Furthermore, he wrote that, "passive resistance and 
boycotting are now prominent features of every great national 
movement."72 In a letter written in 1888 Tucker wrote that the 
"champions" of passive resistance do not see this policy of struggle as 
a universal principle excluding the use of violence in all circumstances: 
"Believers in passive resistance consider it as generally more effective 
than active resistance, but think that there are certain cases in which 
the opposite is true.i73 It should be emphasized that "effective" here 
means effective for the achievement of Liberty. Furthermore, at that 
time "active resistance" still meant violent resistance and "passive 
resistance" did not mean nonactive or pacifist resistance, but rather 
resistance which does not use physical force. 
One of the main concrete models for Tucker's conception of passive 
resistance was the movement of the Irish Land League for Home Rule 
and Irish Catholic peasants against English landlords beginning in 1879. 
70 For German liberal passive resistance, see Parent 1982. 
71 Woodcock 1986, pp. 374, 392, 393. 
72 Tucker 1926, p. 80. 
73  Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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The methods which they used were the nonpayment of taxes and 
rents,refusal to cooperate with British government authorities and the 
boycott of those complying with the opponent. Even the repression 
by the authorities was met with passive resistance, with the resisters 
showing a willingness to go to prison en masse. Tucker believed there 
was much to be learned from the Irish resistance, although he felt that 
the movement was finally ruined by the politics of C.S. Parnell.74 
Tucker sought to refute Lassalle's 1849 Düsseldorf condemnation of 
passive resistance as "the resistance which does not resist": 
Never was there a greater mistake. It is the only resistance which in 
these days of military discipline resists with any result. There is not a 
tyrant in the civilized world to-day who would not rather do anything 
in his power to precipitate a bloody revolution rather than see himself 
confronted by a large fraction of his subjects determined not to obey.... 
Neither the ballot nor the bayonet is to play any great part in the 
coming struggle; passive resistance is the instrument by which the 
revolutionary force is destined to secure in the last great conflict of the 
people's rights forever.75  
The passive resistance of the Irish Home Rule and noncooperation 
movement cited by Tucker was succeeded by the passive resistance 
program of Arthur Griffith and his associates which was mentioned 
earlier. Ireland has long been notorious for its political violence; but, 
as has been observed, violent events often gain attention at the expense 
of an awareness of broader currents of collective action. Tucker's 
example was by no means the only example of passive resistance in 
Ireland: passive resistance was a well established part of the Irish 
repertoire of contention and had already been articulated as a doctrine 
in the early 1800s.76 
Griffith had grown up within the orthodox so-called "physical force" 
Irish republican tradition and was a member of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, the predecessor of the IRA. He came to place the highest 
value on national self-reliance and cultural development, and became 
convinced that the best means to achieve independence was passive 
resistance. In his early articles in the United Irishman in 1902 Griffith 
took up the example of Hungary, strongly criticized parliamentarianism 
and cultivated the idea of a bloodless independence struggle through 
passive resistance. Many of Griffith's colleagues in the IRB acknowl-
edged the importance of passive resistance, but were not willing to 
74  Ibid., pp. 244-247. 
75 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
76  On the background of the Irish passive resistance tradition see Davis 1974, pp. 95-97. 
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adopt its use totally to the exclusion of "physical-force." Griffith himself 
was not against violence in principle. During the intensive years of the 
Irish struggle against Great Britain, Griffith became home minister, 
as well as acting president, of Ireland in 1919. He did not, however, 
wield the authority to restrain the violence of the IRA and other 
militant nationalist groups." 
Throughout Europe in the nineteenth century passive resistance 
developed into an articulated doctrine and concrete practice of struggle 
for various groups and classes. For the rising bourgeoisie it was a 
suitable approach to the defense and achievement of their interests 
against both the old regime and the masses. For "the masses" it was 
a mode of struggle against oppression. For nationalists it was a weapon 
highly compatible with economic development and cultural self 
assertion; in other words, it was a way to independence. For socialists 
and anarchists it was the means of contention most in harmony with 
their ideals, as well as being the most suitable weapon for their struggle. 
The European tradition of passive resistance was usually developed 
and employed in circumstances of long term interrelation and various 
degre es of mutual dependence between antagonists, i.e., after 
relationships of domination and obedience had been well established. 
Apparently the idea of passive resistance as an approach to national 
defense to be implemented by the civilian population against an 
immediate military invasion was first conceived of during the First 
World War. It is a clear logical derivative from the passive resistance 
tradition. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly in August of 1915 the 
famous philosopher and political activist Bertrand Russell suggested 
that 
Passive resistance, if it were adopted deliberately by the whole nation, 
with the same measure of courage and discipline which is now displayed, 
might achieve a far more perfect protection for what is good in national 
life than armies and navies can ever achieve, without demanding the 
carnage and waste and welter of brutality involved in modern war.78 
Russell offered an elaborate scenario of how a German invasion could 
be met by social defense. Since that time the thesis which Russell gave 
expression to has been explored and debated in a wide variety of 
academic studies and political programs by military personnel, 
government officials, independent research institutes and within all 
77  Ibid., pp. ix. xiv, xv, xix, 18, 32, 91. 
78 Russell 1975, p.56. For the context of Russell's thought at this time, see Clark 1976, 
pp. 236-271. 
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kinds of popular organizations and movements. Generally, the term 
"passive resistance" has been abandoned, being replaced by a variety 
of others, such as "social defense," "nonviolent defense," "nonmilitary 
defense," "civilian-based defense," "weaponless defense" and so 
forth.79 That these, and related concepts and forms of action, have 
almost exclusively been studied in Europe and North America (or 
directly derived from them) is testimony to the fact that they have 
deep roots in the western culture of social action. 
Russell's writings serve as an excellent example of the continuation, 
development and change in resistance tradition. Russell grew up 
steeped in western liberal culture with a keen sense of social 
responsibility and devotion to the ideals of liberty and justice which 
led him to adopt a critical socialist position during the First World 
War. At that time he was an anti-war activist, but emphatically not a 
pacifist. He rejected the pacifists' idea of "non-resistance," and 
criticized them for seeking to stifle peoples' natural impulses rather 
than to channel them creatively. His concept of passive resistance had 
nothing to do with passivity, and it is clear that he understood the 
pacifists as representing only one stream within resistance tradition. 
To understand Russell's conception of passive resistance it is necessary 
to look to the culture which he was such a noteworthy, even notorious, 
manifestation of. 
At the age of twenty-four, in 1896, Russell published his first book. 
Its subject was German Social Democracy and was written from the 
point of view of an orthodox liberal. He dealt with both the intellectual 
(Marxist and liberal) background and the practical politics and struggles 
of German socialism from the revolutionary period of 1848 onward. 
Russell showed a particular understanding of the passive resistance 
struggle of the Social Democrats for their survival during the period 
when they were outlawed and repressed in Germany from 1878 until 
1890.8° Their approach was to avoid violent confrontation with the 
State while at the same time carrying out all kinds of positive 
mobilization. 
The Social Democrats did not, of course, reject the use of violence 
for their cause in principle. Their leaders (such as Lassalle and Karl 
Liebknecht), however, did draw a careful distinction between "power" 
(Macht) and "force" or "violence" (Gewalt). To use force, for example 
through terrorism or military action, without decisive social power was 
79 For current thinking and bibliographical references on these concepts of defense. 
see Schmid 1985, and; Sharp 1985. 
8° Russell 1965, pp. 92-115. 
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to their minds sheer folly, which would end in defeat. For them might 
was right, but only when might is power, not merely force or violence. 
A central component of Social Democratic doctrine dating from this 
period is that social revolution can be achieved solely through legal 
means and through a kind of struggle which excludes violence.81  
Russell always held that some wars are justified. With the coming 
of World War Two he did not advocate passive resistance, but 
supported open military struggle. He did not, however, abandon the 
idea that passive resistance could be effective on a national scale in 
certain circumstances. In the 1950s and 1960s Russell concentrated on 
cultivating the tradition of passive resistance in internal struggles within 
England and other countries as a pioneer and central leader of the 
peace movement. Russell also changed terminology (probably in the 
1950s, as evinced in his Autobiography) replacing "passive resistance" 
with "nonviolent resistance" and "nonviolent civil disobedience."82 
3. Passive Resistance and European 
Constitutionalist Resistance 
The preceding historical sketch, without any claim to be exhaustive, 
suffices for determining the basic features and views of passive 
resistance which were to appear again and again in various forms. 
From 1848 to World War One passive resistance was employed 
throughout Europe in constitutionalist, anti-absolutist, and other types 
of disobedience struggles against allegedly unjust authorities. Many 
words, of course, change meaning over time and at any given time 
may have multiple meanings. An event A called "passive resistance" 
at a certain time and place may have very little in common, ideologically 
or methodologically, with an event B called "passive resistance" at 
another. Moreover, an event C which is called by some other name 
81 Ibid., pp. 98, 99, 102, 102-107, 111, 113. 
82  In addition to the works cited above, my interpretation of Russell and passive 
resistance draws upon the following works: Vellacott 1980; Russell 1920. In the latter 
work (first published in 1916), on p. 95, Russell relates that his criticism of pacifism 
is partly indebted to the well-known American philosopher William James' speech 
of 1898 called "The Moral Equivalent of War." Perhaps James' speech also helped 
Russell to articulate the difference between passive resistance and pacifist non-
resistance. For Russell's later resistance vocabulary and practice, see Russell 1985, 
especially Chapters 16 and 17. 
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may have more in common with A than either C or A have in common 
with B. In his comments on the historiography of the famous historian 
of ideas A.O. Lovejoy, Maurice Mandelbaum sugests a distinction 
between "continuing ideas" and "recurrent ideas." In nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Europe passive resistance was for the most 
part a continuing idea: It was historically connected in its various forms 
through a common European culture of resistance. This idea, more-
over, belongs to an interconnected family of ideas and methods of 
resistance in secular European Christian society. 
One must, nevertheless, consider the possibility that some ideas may 
be "recurrent," i.e., that they may recur through independent invention 
and not through diffusion. For example, the circumstances of defense 
in different places and times may give rise to parallel but disconnected 
concepts of struggle. While it cannot be held that the Finnish concept 
and method of passive resistance is wholly recurrent in this sense, it 
might be observed that it contained recurrent aspects, meaning that 
some of the Finnish solutions, though perhaps similar to those used 
elsewhere, were devised independently. But that is to say nothing more 
than that in Finland the European resistance heritage, and passive 
resistance in particular, was employed in a unique way. 
Passive resistance (like its descendant "nonviolent action") is 
historically unique. But how unique is it? Is there any evidence that 
before the nineteenth century "era of revolution" people consciously 
developed types and doctrines of secular sociopolitical resistance and 
contention which required the conscious deliberate exclusion of what 
they understood as violence? Such evidence is scarce indeed, a fact 
which indicates that the conception of violent and not-violent forms 
of resistance in dichotomous relationship was rare. 
Clarence Marsh Case traces passive resistance back to the ideas of 
John Wycliff and John Huss and the collective resistance which they 
helped to inspire in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. 
Strictly speaking, Case is incorrect here, but there is an important point 
of relevance to be found in his observations. Neither Wycliff nor Huss 
used the term "passive resistance" or any comparable expression. While 
both men apparently abhorred the idea of violent rebellion and were 
outspoken opponents of Papal absolutism, their followers, the Lollards 
and the Hussites respectively, carried out violent resistance and 
rebellion in addition to a range of other forms of struggle. These 
83 Mandelbaum 1983, p. 202. 
86 Case 1923, pp. 62-67. 
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movements survived until, and became part of, the Protestant Reforma-
tion.85 After many years of violent struggle in the beginning of the 
fifteenth century an important group of Hussites, the Bohemian 
Brethren, withdrew to form a peaceful community. Although they 
passively had to face persecution, they formulated no doctrine of 
passive resistance in the nineteenth century sense of direct 
confrontation without violence. In fact they explicitly adhered to the 
famous Pauline doctrine of passive obedience to rulers.86 
Case was, intuitively on the right track in pinpointing the era of 
Wycliff and Huss as a significant background for his work. Both men 
adhered to and developed popular doctrines of opposition to Papal 
secular dominion and absolutism. Moreover, the ideas they held helped 
legitimize and inspire popular rebellion and, in general, refusal to 
cooperate with tyrannical Church power. Perhaps what Case was also 
trying to convey is that at the time of Wycliff and Huss the older type 
of simple turn-the-other-cheek Christian disobedience began to be 
combined with the newly emerging radical constitutional principle of 
resistance. 
It was, however, only in the sixteenth century that the late medieval 
streams of radical legal, conciliarist and Thomist political thought were 
developed in conjunction with the sociopolitical confrontations of the 
time to form the culture of resistance and contention which passive 
resistance was to be a later expression of. The Protestant Reformation 
was a key event in the formation of the political culture of resistance. 
Paradoxically the Reformation created ideological basis for both 
forceful condemnation and justification of resistance and rebellion. 
Evangelical Lutheran Finland of the era of passive resistance is a 
remarkably clear heir to the contradictions and ambiguity of resistance 
and obedience in Protestant culture. 
Lutheranism provided the many already long existing diverse reli-
gious and lay groups which united in the Protestant movement a highly 
effective ideology for defiance to Papal authority and Catholic 
domination. The fierce resistance and assault by the early Lutheran 
thinkers against authority and tyranny were, before the 1530s, strictly 
confined to the religious sphere. In fact they insisted on stringent 
compliance with the admonition of the Christian apostle Paul to: 
85 Skinner 1978, yol. 2, pp. 34, 35, 50. 
86 Case 1923, pp. 66-67. 
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Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power 
but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. 
Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of 
God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation 87 
Lutheranism, and the doctrine of passive obedience, became a pillar 
of the emerging secular absolutist monarchical governments in nort-
hern Europe. Nevertheless, early Lutherans did not preach absolutely 
unconditional obedience to tyrannical and ungodly rulers. They had a 
rather obscure concept of a kind of disobedience which excludes all 
active resistance. That is, subjects must refuse, when commanded by 
rulers, to do evil or comply with tyranny, but they must passively suffer 
and endure the consequences rather than fight. To resist actively is to 
resist the will of God, it is sin 88 Although obviously ideologically highly 
suitable for rulership and the maintenance of social order over subjects, 
the doctrine of strict nonresistance and passive obedience landed the 
Protestants in a dilemma. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries Reformation politics and religion were subject to fierce op-
position, including military and exterminationist action, on a diversity 
of fronts. The Protestants, including Luther himself, were forced from 
the 1530s onward to revise their ideology to accommodate for active 
resistance and defense against extremely hostile powers. Skinner's in-
sight here is apt: 
this more subversive strand of Lutheranism — though never dominant 
— subsequently came to exercise a powerful influence: it helped to 
inspire the radical theories of the later Calvinists, and in this way made 
a crucial contribution to the formation of the revolutionary political 
ideologies which emerged in the latter half of the sixteenth century.89 
The subversive Protestants' main solution to their ideological dilemma 
was the development of the constitutionalist theory of resistance 
declaring, according to a famous statement of 1550, that 
whenever a superior magistrate persecutes his subjects, then, by the 
law of nature, by divine law and by the true religion and worship of 
God, the inferior magistrate ought by God's mandate to resist him.90 
87 Quoted from the King James Bible, Romans, 13:1-2; Skinner writes that: "Luther's 
influence helped to make this the most cited of all texts on the foundations of 
political life throughout the age of the Reformation...." Skinner 1978, vol.2, p. 15. 
The Pauline/Lutheran doctrine of submissiye obedience was directly invoked over 
and oyer again in one of the main lines of attack against Constitutionalist passive 
resistance in Finland. 
88  Skinner 1978, vol. 2, pp. 16-18, 67-70. 
89  Ibid., p. 74. 
90 Quoted by Skinner, ibid., p. 208. 
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It must be emphasized that this is no doctrine of popular or democratic 
resistance and rebellion. It is the ideology of resistance of those 
privileged leading groups in society — authorities, inferior magistrates, 
nobles and so forth — who on the basis of de facto power claim to be 
operating by the ordinance of God against the intolerable injustice of 
superior magistrates and their allies. For the Protestant leading groups 
resistance to what they perceived as injustice, tyranny and ungodliness 
became an absolute duty and compliance the road to damnation. 
As is well known, in the course of coming confrontations (the 
Huguenot Revolution, the revolt of the Netherlands and the English 
Revolution) the early Protestant theory of constitutional resistance, 
including the religious duty to resist, became transformed, in Skinner's 
words, into a "fully political theory of revolution, founded on a 
recognizably modern, secularized thesis about natural rights and 
original sovereignty of the people."91  
It is pertinent to note here that the radical constitutionalist passive 
resisters of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Lutheran 
Finland bear striking ideological affinity to the early Protestant 
resistance thinkers. For these Finns, deified Justice and Law replaced 
God, and staunch resistance to all violation of them was an absolute 
duty. Compliance and submission were claimed to be the way to moral 
degeneration and individual and collective damnation. Moreover, 
constitutionalist passive resistance was the ideology of the radical 
Finnish elite. Of course there are many differences in the ideologies 
and methodologies of resistance of these two periods. One relevant 
difference is that the first revolutionary Protestants, as well as their 
contemporaries, had no significant concept of a form of effective active 
struggle between violent resistance and passive obedience. 
Some groups in those times did, however, possess the concept of 
individual and collective refusal to act and withdrawal of obedience 
as a way of indirectly, without confrontation, avoiding submission to 
iniquity. This was the way of the Christian peace sects such as the 
Bohemian Brethren, some strands of the Anabaptists and, later, the 
Quakers. This indirect way of resisting injustice is no doubt a relative 
of passive resistance in the family of types of conscientious and just 
resistance in European political culture. 
There are indications that the withdrawal of obedience without 
recourse to violence was at least conceived of as a potentially effective 
way of directly wielding power in sociopolitical struggles. For example 
in The Prince (published in 1514) Machiavelli discusses problems 
91 Ibid.. pp. 240, 338. 
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involved in managing the power of the people, the nobles and the 
magistrates (Machiavelli was an expert on the subject of control and 
manipulation of collective power): 
The worst that can happen to a prince when the people are hostile is 
for him to be deserted; but from the nobles, if hostile, he has to fear 
not only desertion but even active opposition.92 
This passage shows that Machiavelli was well aware that collective 
"desertion" on the part of those upon whom power is established is a 
conceivable technique of struggle distinguishable from "active opposi-
tion." Nevertheless, he gives no examples of this type of struggle as 
deliberately carried out by "the people." On the contrary, as mentioned 
earlier, he views people power as highly controllable. Machiavelli does 
mention one special situation in which collective disobedience on the 
part of magistrates may be particularly effective. This is when the 
transition is being made from a constitutional form of government 
based on "limited power" to "absolutism." Machiavelli sees this move 
as particularly dangerous when the prince aspiring to absolute rule 
must cooperate with magistrates already established in power. In such 
cases princes 
rely entirely on the will of those citizens who have been put in office; 
and these, especially in times of adversity, can very easily depose them 
either by positive action against them or by not obeying them. And 
when danger comes, the prince has no time to seize absolute authority, 
because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to taking orders from 
the magistrates, will not take them from him in a crisis. 93  
The texts of early modern political thinkers like Machiavelli and the 
Lutherans shows that there existed a conceptual distinction between 
"active," "positive," "forcible" and "violent" action and resistance on 
the one hand and simple disobedience like refusal to act or refusal to 
do evil and withdrawal of obedience as indirect resistance without 
"positive" action on the other hand. In fact for these latter forms of 
action the term "resistance" does not seem to have been applied. 
"Resistance" always meant violent resistance, whereas "disobedience" 
92 Machiayelli 1961, p. 68, my italics. 
93  Ibid., p.70; my italics. Coincidentally, Machiavelli's abstract case described in this 
quote comes very close to being a blueprint of the constellation of power at the 
time of the Finnish passive resistance movement. The prince is the tsar, grand duke 
of Finland, who is moying from constitutional monarchy to absolutism. The 
magistrates are Finnish officialdom systematically refusing to carry out the tsar's 
commands. 
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might be reduced to the pure act of refusal to act according to unjust 
commands. 
In the 1930s B. de Ligt and later Gene Sharp, both prominent 
Gandhian paradigm researchers, sought to draw special attention to 
the work of the early sixteenth century writer, Estienne de la Boétie 
(1530-1563), on "voluntary servitude."94 Boetie has been understood 
as having, in an apparently exceptional manner, articulated the idea 
that through mass withdrawal of obedience tyranny may conceivably 
be overthrown without recourse to violence. As quoted by Sharp, 
Boétie's idea is that if tyrants 
are given nothing, if they are not obeyed, without fighting, without 
striking a blow, they remain naked and undone, and do nothing further, 
just as the root, having no soil or food, the branch withers and dies.... 
Only be resolute not to be servile and there you are free. I don't want 
you to push him or shake him, but just don't support him, and you will 
see him like a great colossus whose base has been stolen, of his own 
weight sink to the ground and shatter.95 
Both Sharp and de Ligt fail to mention anything about the 
contemporary context of Boetie's Discours de la Servitude Voluntaire.96  
They fail to mention that the work is surrounded by obscurity and has 
through the centuries been subject to a multitude of uses and 
interpretations, of which theirs is only one - a superficial one at that. 
Apparently Boetie himself never considered publishing it; in fact he 
never completed the work, since it has no conclusion. Within the body 
of Boétie's mature oeuvres and in the context of his work as a statesman 
the Discours cannot but appear as a disregarded product of a talented 
youth.97 
Boétie's argument for the principle of voluntary servitude, put forth 
in the first part of his tract, is highly simplistic. It is based on a rigid 
One/Many or Ruler/People dichotomy: "He who domineers over you 
has only two eyes, only two hands, no more than is possessed by the 
least man ... you can deliver yourself if you try ... merely by willing to 
be free."98 Contrastingly, in the final section of his book Boétie provides 
a more complex description of the social relations of domination. The 
argument here clearly contradicts the simple volunteerist concept of 
94 Ligt 1937, pp. 104-105; Sharp 1980, p. 213; Sharp 1973, p. 34. 
95 Sharp 1980, p. 213. 
96 In fact it is typical of those working in the Gandhian paradigm to cite events and 
thought out of context. 
97 See Bonnefon 1892, pp. xxxyi-xxxvii. 
98 Bootie 1975, p. 52. 
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liberation of the first part. Boétie finally offers no more effective 
remedy than exhorting the reader to "learn to do good," reassuring 
him that God despises tyranny and has reserved "in a separate spot 
in Hell, some very special punishment for tyrants and their accom-
plices." Obviously Boétie's conviction would not be of much use for 
someone engaged in concrete struggle. However, the strengths and 
weaknesses of Boétie's argument are not what are of primary 
importance here. Rather it must be asked what kind of influence did 
his tract have. 
It seems clear that Boétie's youthful Discours was never interpreted 
in the sense of "nonviolent action" until much later. It was first 
published in 1574 in plagiarized, incomplete, mutilated and mangled 
form in Le Reveille-matin des Francois with no mention of its origin.'°°  
It was assimilated into the general European resistance heritage, 
invoked in the name of liberty and equality and employed as part of 
the ideological justification of resistance to tyranny; a resistance in 
which no fine distinctions were made between "nonviolence" and 
violence. 
Ligt and Sharp survey Boétie solely through the narrow perspective 
offered by Gandhian paradigm eyeglasses without regard for the mean-
ing of Boétie's work for his own time. Ligt notes that Leo Tolstoy was 
very impressed by Boetie; the "great Russian's" famous "Letter to a 
Hindu," highly influenced by Boétie, "was so to influence Gandhi and 
prepare the direct non-violent action of his countrymen in India."101  
Ligt also comments that Henry David Thoreau, another adored favorite 
in the Gandhian paradigm, was influenced by Boétie.'°2 
Ligt's observations have a special relevance for this study, however 
narrowly framed they may be. The Finnish resistance ideologists 
employed the idea of voluntary servitude in a variety of ways. One of 
these ways was through direct quotation of, and significant personal 
contact with, Tolstoy. Moreover, Boetie's work was at least known in 
Finland at that time; an edition of Discours de la Servitude Voluntaire 
was entered into the university collection in Helsinki in 1899, which 
shows that the book was at least known and available for use in the 
ideological mobilization in the following few years. The ideas of Boétie 
and Tolstoy formed one aspect of the European culture of resistance 
to which the Finns were heir, and which they adapted, even manipu- 
99  Ibid., p. 86. 
I(x) Ibid., p. xi., and editor's preface; Salmon, pp. 19, 162. 
101  Ligt 1937, pp.. 105-106. 1°2  Ibid. p. 104. 
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lated, for their own specific circumstances. When speaking of direct 
influences, however, the idea of voluntary servitude was much more 
accessible to the Finns through the words of the Hungarian Ferenc  
Deák than through Boétie, as will be seen. 
What was the significance of Boetie's thought in his own time? Is 
there any evidence that he was giving expression to a widely understood 
principle of resistance? It is most likely that Boétie's work was a 
relatively isolated flight of abstract logical speculation based on the 
then increasingly discussed concept of the de facto sociological origin 
of power in "the people." Speculation concerning both the de jure and 
de facto implications of popular sovereignty took a variety of forms. 
Apparently, however, there was as yet no widely held concept of active 
resistance based on withdrawal of support or disobedience combined 
with the deliberate strategic choice to refrain from "striking a blow" 
or "fighting" in Boetie's sense meaning organized violence. 
If there had existed at that time a significant collectively recognized 
and articulated principle of active resistance without violence, differing 
from simple Christian disobedience, it surely would have found 
expression in the multitude of writings on constitutional resistance 
which then abounded. To find out whether such a principle did exist 
I have examined some of the most representative original constitution-
alist resistance texts. Two of these texts will be cited here. They are 
Theodore Beza's Right of Magistrates (published in 1573) and Philippe 
du Plessis Mornay's Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (A Defence of Liberty 
against Tyrants, published in 1579) as translated and edited by Julian 
H. Franklin. Franklin calls these works "landmarks in the history of 
political thought because they constitute a clear and definite transition 
from medieval to modern constitutionalist ideas," with Beza's work 
being "the first major statement of Huguenot resistance doctrine ...," 
and Mornay's "an exhortation to rebel."103 Beza was spiritual leader 
of the French Protestants and the successor of Calvin at Geneva. 
Mornay was a learned nobleman. 
In examining these two texts I not only seek information on ways 
of conceiving resistance, but would also like to point out that it was 
during the time of Beza and Mornay that the vocabulary or discursive 
framework of constitutional resistance was created. Perhaps it is of 
much greater importance that the ideological vocabulary or basic 
political culture of resistance of this time is that inherited by the Finnish 
resisters than that there may have existed a technique similar to that 
of nineteenth century passive resistance. 
l03 Franklin 1969, pp. 11.30. 
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It should also be pointed out that from the sixteenth century onward 
one of the fundamental weapons in the repertoire of constitutionalist 
means of struggle was the written word. Ideologically the constitution-
alists went beyond sectarian pleading and began to express their aims 
in terms of universal principles, values and reason. Therefore reasoned 
argumentation, persuasion and propaganda through leaflets, pamphlets 
and books became central to their efforts. 
The works of both Beza and Mornay proceed through the examina-
tion of what were for them — on the background of fierce ideological 
conflict and bloody confrontation — basic political questions: 
Are subjects bound to obey princes if their orders contradict the Law 
of God? To what extent should a subject assume the justice of 
commands? Is it permissable to resist a prince who violates God's Law 
...? How far should disobedience extend? Who may resist, in what 
manner, and to what extent? ... by what principle of law? May a part 
of the Kingdom resist? May private persons resist by force of arms? 
Is resistance to a superior magistrate always illicit and seditious? Do 
subjects have any remedy against a legitimate sovereign who has 
become a notorious tyrant? May force be used in the cause of 
religion?l°4 
Beza begins by emphasizing that subjects should not be too keen on 
inquiring into the doings of their rulers. But if their consciences are 
significantly troubled they must begin enquiry "by modest and pacific 
means." If commanded to iniquity and injustice subjects must first 
simply "refuse to act." Whether one is justified in taking up more 
active forms of resistance depends on one's station, public or private, 
in society. In general all people are "bound to disobey" unjust 
commands and take up the range of active "lawful remedies," including 
"resort to arms," against "illegal" and "unlawful violence."1o5  Mornay 
states the imperative of resistance to tyranny with fervor: "if we do 
not resist, we are traitors to our country, deserters of human society, 
and contemners of the law."1o6 
Although all subjects have a duty to disobey injustice and never let 
themselves be made "the instrument of tyranny," a "private person," 
writes Beza, "may not, on his own initiative, answer force with force 
104 These questions are taken from the tables of contents of the two texts, ibid., pp. 
viii, ix. Words like "God" and "religion" were later often to be replaced by terms 
such as "Law," "Justice" and "Nation." The resemblance between the existential 
political questions posed by the Finns in their struggle against Russian absolutism 
and those of their constitutionalist insurgent ancestors is striking. 
1°5 Beza 1969, pp. 101-107. 
106 Mornay 1969, p. 188. 
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but must either go into exile or bear the yoke ..." or turn to "penitence 
and patience joined with prayers"; in order to act against tyranny a 
private person must be "authorized" by the lesser magistrates or by 
the "more sober part of the Estates....i107 From the very outset 
Protestant resistance culture required the strict subordination of the 
private law justification of individual self-defense to the magisterial 
theory of defense and resistance being under the control of legitimate 
public leaders; it is the leaders who have the "ordinance of God," not 
private people. It is not difficult to understand why Beza's work is 
called "Right of Magistrates." 
Basically Mornay follows the same line of argumentation as Beza. 
He does, however, seem to place more emphasis on the notion that 
de facto, as he expresses it, "a king is powerless if the people do not 
support him." It follows from this de facto situation, proved by countless 
historical examples which he and his colleagues cite, that de jure a 
king can rule "the people" only conditionally. If he violates these 
conditions then "the people are released, the compact voided ... the 
king is perjured if he rules unjustly."108 But who are "the people"? 
With remarkable straightforwardness Mornay writes: 
When we speak of the people collectively, we mean those who receive 
authority from the people, that is, the magistrates below the king who 
have been elected by the people or established in some other way. These 
take the lace of the people.... And we also mean the assembly of the 
Estates._  
What are then the "remedies," "manners," "methods" and "means" 
of resistance put forth by Beza and Mornay? Beza distinguishes 
between two basic categories of resistance, "spiritual resistance" and 
"worldly methods of resistance." "Spiritual resistance" is based on the 
paradigm of "Jesus Christ himself, who, although all authority, force 
and power belonged to Him, abstained from force completely, as did 
the ancient martyrs afterwards...."11°  He divides "worldly resistance" 
into two methods, "appeals to courts" using "the weapon of the law" 
and "resort to arms" through the "military arm" of the Church or 
society."" Beza seeks to emphasize, no doubt against many common 
views at the time, that these two categories of resistance are not 
107 Beza 1969, p.108, 129. 
1°8 Mornay 1969, pp. 161, 191. 1°9  Ibid., p.149, my italics; on the same page Mornay calls the people or the "multitude" 
a "manyheaded monster" and the "mob." 
10  Beza 1969, p. 133. 111  Ibid., p. 133. 
71 
mutually exclusive. This means that a Christian magistrate is allowed 
to "employ all the means that God has given him" for just resistance.12  
Neither Beza nor Mornay discuss any type of active or worldly 
resistance which involves the deliberate exclusion of physical violence 
except for legal and verbal resistance. It is clear that when the weapons 
of words and law are not sufficient then the "force" employed signifies 
violence, the recruiting of armies and the use of "force," "stratagems," 
"strategy," and "all the engines of warfare," to defeat the enemy in 
militarily organized "open warfare" if necessary.13 This, to be sure, 
is not to claim that these authors and their contemporaries had no 
knowledge of kinds of "stratagems," which might not necessitate the 
use of physical violence, between "open warfare" on the one hand and 
"spiritual resistance" and legal procedures on the other. Beza 
emphasizes that just because defense against tyranny by "force of arms" 
is legitimate it is not always the most "expedient" approach.114 
Nevertheless, the extreme violent destruction and genocide which 
the pre-Protestants and Protestants faced from the times of Wycliff to 
the St. Bartholomew's massacre in 1572 made it impossible for 
constitutionalist political culture to develop without the requirement 
for the organization of violent force for defense and survival. Beza's 
whole endeavour might be characterized as an effort to ideologically 
legitimize, in his words, "what is expedient" by broadening the scope 
of "what is permitted."115 It seems that martyrdom or flight from the 
world was the only alternative to the acceptance of organized violence 
as an essential part of the repertoire of means of just resistance. 
It would, of course, be naive to interpret the constitutionalist 
justification of violence as simply motivated by the imperative of 
defense. The Protestants and the secular powers which adopted their 
ideology were clearly on the offensive as well, and were not going to 
renounce the tool of organized violence. This, however, does not nullify 
the fact that basic to the constitutionalist world view was that violence 
is necessary for the defense of freedom and justice. The constitution-
alists did not arrive at this view through speculation, but through the 
bitter experience of Christian civilization. 
Writing somewhat over a hundred years after Beza and Mornay 
John Locke, in the most famous of constitutionalist tracts, rejected, 
with mockery and derision, the idea that resistance should exclude 
112 Ibid., p. 133. 
13  Mornay 1969, pp. 149, 191. 
14 Beza 1969, p. 135. 
13 Ibid., p. 130. 
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violence. As is well known, Locke saw the state of reason, liberty, 
cooperation and equality between people outside of organized political 
society as being extremely fragile and susceptible to violation.116  
Violation, or what Locke calls "war," begins with any intention or 
attempt to limit or take away the freedom of a person without his 
consent.117 One of the main functions of political society is thus security 
through the more effective collective defense of consent or freedom 
against any acts of "war." Defense means that when the body politic 
is threatened or attacked with unauthorized internal or external 
constraint, compulsion, force or violence (in Locke these form a 
continuum of ways of limiting freedom) these same means are 
collectively employed against the aggressor. The right and capacity for 
resistance and rebellion are the guarantees of freedom from injustice 
and oppression. Thus for Locke the power or strength or force of a 
community lies not only in its capacity for positive consensual action, 
but also in a fundamental and essential way in its capacity for collective 
violence. Locke speaks out against resistance as conceived without 
physical violence: 
How to resist Force without striking again, or how to strike with 
Reverence, will need some Skill to make intelligible. He that shall 
oppose an Assault only with a Shield to receive the Blows, or in any 
more Respectful Posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the 
Confidence and Force of the Assailant, will quickly be at an end of his 
Resistance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself 
the worse usage. This is as ridiculous.... This will always be the event 
of such an imaginary Resistance, where Men may not strike again. He 
therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike.178  
It follows logically from Locke's work that organized collective violence 
is the most essential of the means expedient for the defense of liberty. 
This idea is at the core of mainstream constitutionalist thought. It by 
no means signifies that organized violence is always seen as the most 
expedient way of struggle. Obviously Locke thought that there were 
many ways by which people's rights could be defended and the bonds 
or contract between people and their rulers dissolved. 
Constitutionalists have almost always maintained that in the majority 
of conflict situations collective violence is not the most expedient 
approach. In Beza, Locke and in the constitutionalist tradition in 
general, military violence was the last resort and the ultimate guarantee 
of other expedients. This is probably a reason why mainstream 
116 Locke 1967, p. 368. 
117 Ibid., pp. 296-297. 
118 Ibid., p. 439. Locke's italics. 
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constitutionalism does not emphasize a conceptual dichotomy between 
violent and "nonviolent" types of active resistance. Although the 
suitability of methods has always been recognized as relative to specific 
circumstances, it has not been generally deemed necessary to 
conceptually distinguish a special "nonviolent" category of resistance 
action and argue about its ultimate expediency in relation to violent 
resistance. The motive of those people in European history which have 
in various ways conceptually placed violent struggle in dichotomous 
relationship to some other form of action has been to question the 
ultimate expediency of violence. 
For some unknown reason, as discussed above, the German 
etymologist Albert Gombert thought that the word "passive resistance" 
had its origin in the struggle of the American colonists against British 
domination. Etymologically speaking this is false: the concept of passive 
resistance, in these terms, was not known to the colonists in any 
significant way, and probably not at all. It is likely that the term "passive 
resistance" entered the American vocabulary of contention after the 
mid-nineteenth century. Yet, when one looks back to the decade of 
struggle preceding the war which broke out in 1775, it is not difficult 
to understand the reasoning behind an association of the concept of 
passive resistance with American colonial resistance. 
The American colonists did not possess an articulated and universally 
employed general term, catchword or schlagwort — such as "passive 
resistance" as used by the Finns or "nonviolent action" as used in the 
Gandhian paradigm — to signify an umbrella concept covering a 
technique or repertoire of methods of struggle differing from or 
excluding those of organized armed physical violence. The colonial 
repertoire or culture of resistance and contention was highly multi-
farious. Before 1775 there were numerous uprisings against colonial 
governments, black rebellions, class confrontations, scores of diverse 
types of riots, conflict with Indians and the French and Indian War 
(or Seven Years' War ending in 1763). However, in the decade prior 
to 1775 in both minor acts and major campaigns of resistance the 
colonists employed a diversity of primarily nonmilitary means of protest 
and coercive noncooperation. As Pauline Maier describes it, just after 
the Stamp Act riots of 1765 colonial radicals developed a new strategy 
in which they "consciously retreated from mere ad hoc violence to an 
ordered opposition," and this strategy of "ordered resistance" then 
"shaped all subsequent colonial opposition to objectional imperial 
claims."119  Ordered resistance, however, was by no means antithetical 
119 Maier 1972, p. 53. 
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to violent or military action. It is clear that already from this period 
onward colonial resistance activists were ready, and convinced of 
the necessity, to meet British military violence with military 
violence.12° 
The intellectual or ideological framework and vocabulary of 
resistance, and finally violent rebellion, was always that of the radical 
Protestant Whig/constitutionalist tradition. The decade was above 
all a time of positive collective mobilization in conscious defiance 
of British restrictions. Significant progress was made toward 
economic autonomy, and a high degree of de facto governmental 
independence was achieved through collective disobedience to Brit-
ish authority and the establishment of autonomous political 
institutions. As John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1815: 
"The Revolution ... was effected, from 1760 to 1775, in the course 
of fifteen years before a drop of blood was shed at Lexington."121 
In response to the open defiance expressed by the Boston Tea 
Party of December 1773, the British Parliament passed a series of 
what came to be called "Coercive Acts" against the colonists in the 
latter part of 1774. In effect these Acts aimed to establish martial 
law in Massachusetts, dissolve Colonial government, close Boston 
harbor and increase the British military presence. The reaction to 
the Coercive Acts led to the first truly trans-colonially coordinated 
opposition movement. In September 1774 the First Continental 
Congress met in Philadelphia; among its aims was to find a way of 
bringing about the repeal of the Coercive Acts. They adopted the 
already familiar approach of the nonimmortation, nonconsumption 
and nonexportation of British goods.1 2 Within months England 
was involved in an all-out military mobilization for warfare against 
the colonies, which soon proved to be economically invigorating 
for the domestic English economy. 
There is no evidence that the colonists ever conceived of a 
"technique," based on their earlier political and commercial 
resistance, which could serve as a replacement for military struggle 
when faced by the actual implementation military repression. This 
is a crucial point since it has been claimed that scholars ignore the 
fact that the colonists employed 
120  Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
121 As quoted in Bailyn 1967, p. 1. 
122 Ammerman 1986, pp. 238, 243. 
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a kind of `weapons system' that operated without force of arms or 
violence ... As a technique of struggle, this weapons system is commonly 
known as nonviolent action.' 23  
The otherwise useful analogy of a "weapons system" here becomes 
problematic when accompanied by another claim: 
Based on evidence gathered in at least three areas — the development 
of economic autonomy, the growth of popular governmental 
institutions, and the development of a national consciousness — one 
could argue that nonviolent action was at least as effective as military 
warfare....124 
The evidence may show that military struggle would not have been an 
"effective" substitute for creative sociopolitical and cultural mobilizati-
on. It is, however, logically impossible to use this same evidence to 
show that the colonists' political and commercial means of resistance 
could have served as a more "effective" (or vice versa, less effective) 
"weapons system" than military force against actively implemented 
military force. This is a claim that cannot be tested; it can neither be 
verified nor falsified. The colonists manifestly never applied what has 
been called their "weapons system" in circumstances of military warfare 
as a substitute for military force. The colonists never conceived of a 
"technique of nonviolent action" as a "weapons system" for defeating 
an enemy in an extremely critical polar military confrontation. In fact 
they clearly adhered to the constitutionalist Whig doctrine that violence 
is the ultimate defensive sanction against violent tyranny. 
What the colonists did do was conceive of and apply sociopolitical 
and commercial mobilization and resistance as an alternative to 
violence against sociopolitical and commercial repression and injustice. 
No more than this can be validly claimed. One of the fundamental 
mistakes committed through the "nonviolent action" perspective is to 
misconstrue the means of modern national mobilization and 
sociopolitical and commercial resistance as a functional equivalent for 
military war in times when they were never conceived of or used as 
such. As has been shown above, the first time they were so conceived 
was in the twentieth century. 
American sociopolitical and commercial resistance was not identical 
to passive resistance as employed by the Finns. They were, however, 
123 Conser, Jr., McCarthy and Toscano 1986a, p. 4, original emphasis. This article is 
part of a work containing articles by nine authors, six of which conspicuously make 
no use of the terms "nonviolence" and "nonviolent action." 
124 Conser, Jr., McCarthy and Toscano 1986b, p. 418. 
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closely related in certain respects and can be understood as members 
of a family of resistance types. Both were expressions of the European 
culture of just resistance, justified in terms of Whig constitutionalist 
discourse and morality. Both were natural extensions from creative 
national mobilization expressly rejecting the employment of collective 
violence against nonmilitary repression and injustice. Neither was 
claimed to be, or actually used as, a functional equivalent of collective 
violence in conditions of military war. Yet just as family members share 
many common characteristics it must be remembered that in many 
respects they are radically different. 
Examination of the American resistance before 1775 brings over the 
necessity of carefully distinguishing between two types of struggle. 
Firstly there is sociopolitical and commercial resistance and contention 
as a way of combat without violence, as a functional equivalent to war, 
to be employed against all-out military attack. This first type is a 
product of the twentieth century imagination, an anachronistic 
projection onto the past. I do not believe that any explicit theoretical 
formulations or concrete applications of this type of struggle are to be 
found. Moreover, apparently there are no examples of theorists or 
political activists who argued that collective violence is absolutely less 
effective than "nonviolent" forms of contention in conditions of 
combating and defeating effective military aggression and destruction. 
Even William Godwin — who insisted that communicative action and 
refusal to obey without violence be strictly adhered to — held that in 
extreme cases violent defense is an absolute necessity. 
Secondly there is the vast range of sociopolitical, commercial and 
cultural means of resistance and contention which are the natural tools 
of modern nation-building and constitutionalist assertion and 
liberation. One might call this the foundation of the repertoire of 
contention of "modern bourgeois society." As was discussed above, 
modern society developed a vast array of ways of positive or creative 
development and mobilization which for obvious pragmatic reasons at 
times deliberately excluded collective violence and at others included 
it as the most effective tool for achieving and defending its interests. 
77 
III. The Development of 
Finnish Resistance 
Thought and Action 
1. Ideology and the Lineage of a Concept 
Finnish historians have thus far been content to trace the idea of passive 
resistance, as employed after 1898, back to the constitutional crisis in 
Finno-Russian relations of 1890-1891. It has, however, been recognized 
that the ideology of constitutional resistance was based on a constitu-
tionalist heritage going back to the first decades of the nineteenth 
century.1  Nevertheless, the history of this heritage has not been 
explored for any explicit formulations and applications of passive 
resistance which it hypothetically might contain. 
In contemporary commentaries on the events of the Bobrikov period 
one comes across hints regarding the history of passive resistance. For 
example, the Russian historian M.M. Borodkin (1852-1919) was 
interested in the history of Finnish resistance thought. Borodkin served 
as advisor to the Russian government on Finnish affairs. In his account 
of Governor-General Bobrikov's administration (1898-1904) Borodkin 
sought to prove that the origin of passive resistance was not to be 
found in the response of the Finns to Bobrikov's actions. Correspon-
dence confiscated by the Russian authorities showed that those whom 
he considered to be the originators of passive resistance were 
developing the idea already in the beginning of the 1880s. He explained 
it as their reaction to the measures for imperial integration being 
planned at the time of Tsar Alexander I1I.2 Having proved that Bobri-
kov was not the original instigator of passive resistance Borodkin no 
longer concerned himself with the history of that idea. 
1  Hyvämäki 1960, pp. 77-79. 
2 Borodkin 1905, pp. 21-22; for an elaboration in English of the pro-Russian view of 
passiye resistance as part of "the Finnish Reyolution in preparation 1889-1905," see 
Feodorov 1911, passim. 
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Through Malevolent Eyes 
Earlier it was noted that in the development of his own very influential 
political line J.K. Paasikivi was particularly concerned with condemning 
the passive resistance heritage. His efforts can be seen as the continua-
tion of a well established legacy of anti-resistance efforts. A close reading 
of the published and unpublished works of one of Paasikivi's most 
prominent Old Finn predecessors, Agathon Meurman (1826-1909), 
reveals a deep seated, fanatically inspired, long-standing hostility for 
the resistance tradition. Because of this long-term antipathetic, 
although at times equivocal, obsession Meurman's writings have turned 
out to be one of the best sources for tracing the genesis of the idea of 
passive resistance.  
Meurman was a member of the landed gentry and one of the central 
leaders of the Finnish nationalist — or "Fennomania" — movement. He 
rose to a position of dominance in the Peasants' Estate, of which he 
was a representative from 1872 to 1900. The analysis and criticism of 
passive resistance was one of Meurman's main endeavors from 1899 
until his death in 1909. Although his writings from that time are mainly 
concerned with the current conflict, they do indicate a manifest con-
sciousness of the historical continuity of the idea of passive resistance. 
A study of some of his earlier works shows that he was familiar with 
the tradition of passive resistance long before 1899.  
Meurman was a productive journalist and essayist, as well as an 
accomplished ideologist. In 1883 he published volume one of the first 
modern Finnish language encyclopedia of significant concepts and 
subjects for educated readers. In the preface to this work he states 
that the words included therein refer to concepts which any writer 
should be able to assume the Finnish public to be familiar with without 
further explanation! Significantly, Meurman included the term 
"passive resistance" (passiivinen vastarinta) among the concepts to be 
defined in his work .5 Meurman did not trace the etymology of "passive 
resistance" here, but the fact that he defined it indicates that it was 
current in the vocabulary of educated Finns (and Europeans) at that 
3 Meurman 1883-1890.  
Ibid., vol. I, author's intro., no page number. 
5 Ibid., vols. 7-8,1887, p. 630; the entry is as follows: "Passiivinen vastarinta: resistance 
which does not resort to positive [varsinaisiin] acts of opposition, but through its 
noncompliance [taipumattomuudeltaan] creates obstructions." Compare this to the 
Webster's definition: "Passive resistance: resistance (as to a government or an 
occupying power) that does not resort to violence or active measures of opposition 
but depends mainly on techniques and acts of noncooperation." See "Passive 
Resistance" 1986. 
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time. This shows that passive resistance was a meaningful concept, and 
therefore probably had a history in Finland. It gives strong support 
for the supposition that other sources dealing with passive resistance 
might exist. 
Guided by this supposition, an exploration of Meurman's earlier 
writings disclosed an article written in 1878, entitled "Our Liberals," 
in which express details on the history of passive resistance in Finland 
are given.6 It is a polemical article, part of a debate dealing with the 
development and significance of liberal politics in Finland. Delving 
into Finnish history, Meurman claims that the Finns of the early part 
of the century recognized that union with Russia gave them the status 
of a nation among nations. Despite the immediate benefits of their 
new political position, he continues, fear and anxiety spread among 
them in regard to the potential threat posed by Russia to the survival 
of "our holy nation."7 Meurman claims that during the early years of 
Russian rule the Finns placed all their hope in firm ` passive resistance" 
against all change which could lead to "Russification. " s Meurman 
quotes one of his contemporary opponents as saying that the passive 
resistance of those earlier times was very well suited in general to the 
prevailing condition of repression in Europe and in particular to the 
situation of the Finns.9 
Rival Spirits at their Ideological Roots 
Although Meurman expressed his understanding of the apprehension 
felt at that time, it is clear that his sympathy lay with the anti-resistance 
position which he claimed was first expressed by his predecessor, the 
romantic nationalist Adolf Iwar Arwidsson (1791-1858). Revealing the 
source of his own ideology, Meurman says that Arwidsson was ready 
to fully accept and build upon the foundation provided by Finland's 
new political status. However, Meurman attributes to J.V. Snellman 
the most significant role in completely rejecting the old way of passive 
resistance. Snellman thought, writes Meurman, that passive resistance 
meant death or national suicide.1° He goes on to indicate that it was 
6 Meurman 1878. 
7 Ibid., no. 47. 
8  Ibid., no. 47; note that Meurman actually employs the concept of "Russification" 
(venäläistyminen); he uses it, however, in the passive form which does not specify 
who is doing the Russification. My italics. 
9  Ibid., no. 47. 1°  Ibid., no. 48. 
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among Snellman's opponents that "passive resistance was a clear 
principled base of action," because it was they who continued the 
tradition of passive resistance and it was in their midst that Finnish 
liberalism and assertive constitutionalism developed.' ]  Meurman 
points out that there was a clash between these opposing approaches 
to Finnish politics in the early 1860s. His article itself is an expression 
of a similar clash in the late 1870s. Obviously he felt a need to go to 
the very roots of passive resistance in order to weed it out. He sought 
to associate it with an earlier approach to relations with Russia which 
he portrayed as outdated and pernicious. 
Meurman's article must not be read as history, but rather as the 
ideological manipulation of history. He sought to project far into the 
national past what he wanted people to believe was an irreconcilable 
dichotomy in Finnish politics. This dichotomy itself will be discussed 
further on, but it should be noted that Meurman's article indicates that 
the two rival currents in latter nineteenth century Finnish politics were 
both conceived of as ways of dealing with the Russian threat or, as  
Meurman put it, "Russification.i12 
Knowing the history of passive resistance in Europe, Meurman's 
claim that this method of contention goes hand in hand with liberalism 
and assertive constitutionalism can be accepted.13 Meurman's use of 
the term "passive resistance" is perhaps partially anachronistic, being 
an effort on his part to derive ammunition from the past for his own 
struggle against the advocates of passive resistance in 1878. Meurman 
does not give any proof that the Finns of the period following 
annexation to Russia actually consciously applied a method of struggle 
specifically called "passive resistance." They may have, but in the light 
of etymological studies of "passive resistance" in Europe it is doubtful 
whether they could have done so before the 1840s. Meurman and his 
contemporaries were probably using the concept of passive resistance 
in a generic way to describe the behavior and mental attitudes of Finns 
before the 1840s. Their observations show that there existed favorable 
circumstances in Finland for this concept of resistance to catch on. 
In Meurman's article Snellman's cultural and political activities in 
the 1840s are closely identified with the emergence of the Finnish 
"national spirit." It seems that the new "spirit" was concerned with 
11  Ibid., no. 49. 
12 In 1878 Meurman was seeking to exaggerate this dichotomy and stimulate polarity 
in Finnish politics in order to ward off the formation of a new political constellation. 
13 Concerning this matter Meurman's text can be yery misleading, since it was by no 
means just his "liberal" opponents who were interested in the European culture of 
resistance and contention as will be discussed further on. 
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doing away with the old spirit of stubborn resistance; but did Snellman 
actually seek to refute a concrete doctrine or policy of resistance 
specifically called "passive resistance"? Meurman offers no proof of 
this. Yet following Meurman's lead I found that Snellman did indeed 
address this matter directly. He did so vigorously and aggressively. 
However, before examining Snellman's views on passive resistance and 
the development of this concept of contention something must be said 
of the historical context in which they took place. 
2. The Ambiguity of Nationhood 
As mentioned earlier Finland as an independent nation has arisen and 
developed its identity largely through an intricate on-going dialectical 
process of conflict and resistance and cooperation and accommodation 
with Russia. Simply stated, this Finno-Russian dialectic began in 1808 
when "Finland" was conquered by Russia and, a year later, "Finland" 
was created by Russia. Russia at once subjected the inhabitants of the 
newly defined geographical unit called "Finland" by force of arms and 
simultaneously granted them a new type of freedom, or Pax Russica, 
under the shelter, and strict restrictions, of which they were encouraged 
to develop (away from Sweden). Anyone familiar with the complexity 
and severity of social struggle, political confrontation and nationalist 
assertion throughout Europe will no doubt find the relatively low-
intensity of such phenomena in Finland throughout the nineteenth 
century remarkable. The explanation for this low level can be found 
through mapping out the main lines of political contention and national 
development in Finland. 
Existing patterns of repression in the surrounding world form one 
of the basic factors conditioning the types of political action adopted 
by contending groups. From the time of annexation onward the treat-
ment of Finland by its Russian rulers was characterized by relative 
gentleness, restrained use of direct force and a will for accommodation 
within certain limits. Even when Finno-Russian conflicts reached their 
high points, Russian repression as seen from a general European 
perspective appears quite restrained. Originally, when Sweden-Finland 
refused to cease hostilities against the Napoleonic system and thus 
became a target for attack from Russia after the Tilsit meeting in 1807, 
it was not the intention of Tsar Alexander I to annex Finland. The 
primary motives for the occupation of Finland were not colonial or 
imperialistic in the economic sense, they were military. 
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At the 1809 convocation of the Finnish Diet, in the small town of  
Porvoo, Tsar Alexander I raised Finland to the status of a nation 
among nations, as he himself expressed it;14 but the meaning of this 
act, which was later cited countless times in a myriad of contexts, was 
by no means made clear for posterity. At a pompous ceremony designed 
to impress the Finns as well as outside observers, the tsar acknowledged 
the oath of allegiance sworn by the Finnish Estates by pledging to 
confirm and ratify the religion and fundamental laws of the land as 
well as the rights and privileges which each Estate of the said Grand 
Duchy, in particular, and all the inhabitants, in general, both low and 
high, have hitherto enjoyed according to the constitution: We promise 
to maintain all those privileges and laws strongly and inviolably in full 
force.15  
This is the single most controversial document in the history of Finno-
Russian relations. It has, along with the events surrounding it, up until 
the present day been the subject of a multitude of volumes and 
pamphlets of complicated exegesis and ideological polemics. One 
contemporary observer who was present at the ceremony called the 
tsar's pledge Finland's magna charta.16 Like many of history's "magna 
charta's" it has been subject to much anachronistic manipulation; it 
was later to be invoked in the cause of modern constitutionalist asser-
tion, an assertion which was — typical of the Whig protestant constitu-
tionalist interpretation of history throughout Europe — wrapped in the 
guise of defense of ancient and well established principles and agree-
ments. 
As Osmo Jussila has shown, the form of the Russian's clever 
diplomatic move to integrate Finland into the Empire through the use 
of appeasement and the avoidance of further conflict followed the 
pattern of earlier Russian incorporations of territory in which the laws 
and rights in force under former rulers were recognized in return for 
an oath of allegiance. Furthermore, Russia's Napoleonic period con-
quests, Finland, Poland and Bessarabia, unlike the Baltic provinces, 
were granted special "political existence," which included preservation 
of their own representative institutions.17 The tsar and his advisors 
14 The Finnish Diet was composed of four Estates, the Burghers, the (landed) Peasants, 
the Clergy and the Nobility. The Estates represented only a small fraction of the 
Finnish population, which was about one million in 1812. In 1870 the Estates 
represented only about 1.5% of the population of over 1,750,000 people. 
15 Välloflige Borgare Ståndets Protokoller vid Landtdagen i Borgå år 1809, pp. 21-22. 
16  Cited in Jussila 1987, p. 18. 
17 Jussila 1969, pp. 232, 233. 
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saw clearly that an administratively and religiously unified Finland 
would serve the interests of Russian security by pulling Finland out 
of the sphere of Swedish influence and create a significant defensive 
buffer. 
The specific content of the Finno-Russian agreement (to be under-
stood more like an old-fashioned "Herrschaftsvertrag, or an agreement 
to uphold existing laws and customs," than as a state agreement) was 
arrived at through negotiations with Finnish politicians with the result 
that the Swedish fundamental laws as expressed in the 1772 Form of 
Government and the Act of Security were found suitable as its basis.'8  
Russian State Secretary M.M. Speransky, whose influence in Russian 
politics was at its height, played a central role in the formation of the 
agreement. Speransky proceeded carefully with the Finns, not wanting 
to jeopardize the current phase of his struggle for constitutional reforms 
in Russia. He realized that there were parts of the Finnish fundamental 
laws which were not suitable to the new incorporation with Russia, 
but given the circumstances he resisted the pressure by Finns for the 
thorough revision of them.19 According to Jussila's interpretation, the 
special political status given to the western provinces by Russia should 
not be seen as "revolutionary liberalism so much as a seeming conces-
sion of absolutism (pseudo-constitutionalism) for the purpose of 
resisting revolution."2 
Following incorporation by Russia the structure of Finland's admini-
stration took the following form: A Senate (a ministry-type body later 
unofficially called the "domestic government"), composed of Finnish 
citizens, appointed by the tsar, was created as the head of the 
governmental organization. A Committee for Finnish Affairs, also 
composed of Finns, was set up in St. Petersburg. Later only the head 
of this body, the influential minister secretary of state, was kept. 
Russian authority was embodied in the governor-general of Finland, 
representative of the tsar's will and commander of the Russian armed 
forces in Finland. All foreign affairs were to be directed by the imperial 
government. In 1816 Alexander promised that all his successors would 
be bound to honor his special agreement with the Finns and to uphold 
their constitutional laws. 
After 1809 the force of international circumstances convinced many 
Finns that attempted reconquest by Sweden would only bring misfor- 
18 The Herrschaftsvertrag comparison is elaborated in Jussila 1989 with the description 
here quoted on p. 90. 
'y Halila 1962, pp. 478-479, 492. 
20 Jussila 1969. quoted from the English summary, p. 277. 
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tune; the Russians would no longer tolerate Swedish power to be 
established so close to their capital St. Petersburg. As a matter of fact, 
perceptive Finns had long been convinced that Finland would sooner 
or later fall under the power of Russia. Sweden had lost its status as 
a great power as a result of its failures in the Great Northern War of 
1700-1721., which had exposed Finland to a very destructive period of 
struggle with and occupation by Russia. As early as the 1780s a 
separatist movement or faction began to form, mostly among Finnish 
officers, whose plan was, through collaboration with Russia, to extract 
Finland from the ultimate doom perceived in being part of Sweden. 
Many Finns were not willing to go to this extreme, and it was recog-
nized that this solution was repulsive to the mass of the Finnish people, 
who harbored a deep fear of Russian rule. These conditions help 
explain the relative ease with which Finnish officialdom and the edu-
cated classes in general transferred their allegiance to the Russian state 
when annexation became a reality. The army and the people at large 
were not so easily won over. In general, however, after the military 
phase of the Russian take-over, the transfer of allegiance to the tsar 
took place with remarkable rapidity and minimal conflict, developing 
deep roots within Finnish society. 
The geopolitical unit created at Erfurt and the Diet of  Porvoo and 
arising out of the international conflicts of the Napoleonic period 
provided the foundation for what was to be molded into the modern 
Finnish nation. Before 1809 Finland was not a homogeneous state and 
had no center in the nation-state sense of the word. As Matti Klinge 
conceives it, prior to the political unit established in 1809-1811 called 
"Finland" there were two center-periphery axes, two Finlands. One 
ran along the Stockholm—Finland line, the other along the St. Peters-
burg—Finland line with strong connections to German Baltic culture?' 
Often the various provinces of Finland had more direct cultural-
economic relations with these center-capitals than with one another. 
For example, the burghers and officials of, say, Vaasa or Oulu in 
Ostrobothnia took care of their business directly with Stockholm 
without having to use Turku at all as an intermediary. Furthermore, 
there were other significant factors making for fragmentation, such as 
strong differences in dialect between the various Finnish speaking 
groups, the tradition of relatively decentralized administration and 
profound cultural divergences between East and West Finland `2 
21 Klinge 1982, pp. 12-15. 
22 Ibid., pp. 181-183. 
7 Studia Historica 38 
	 85 
A major point which I am aiming to emphasize here is that it would 
be misleading to employ a simple Finland/Russia dichotomy in the 
analysis of resistance and contention in Finnish society and politics. 
The notion of a Finnish nation-state developed only slowly and modern 
nationalism spread among the people at large only in the twentieth 
century. With the work of the major representative body, the Finnish 
Diet of four Estates, in complete abeyance from 1809 to 1861-1863, 
strict censorship and the undeveloped state of mediums for the formati-
on and conveyance of public opinion, the process of political constructi-
on which began in the years following annexation was necessarily 
confined to a very small group of citizens such as senators, university 
professors and leading nobles. Even among the educated people 
detailed understanding of the political and legal terms of the Diet of  
Porvoo was rare 23 Although political consciousness and active 
participation greatly increased with the economic and political reforms 
initiated under Alexander II in the 1860s, they were throughout the 
century strictly confined to, and controlled by, an elite fraction of the 
Finnish people. Moreover, in their internal power struggles the various 
contending groups of the Finnish elite often sought support against 
one another in Russian government circles, a tactic which came to be 
called "travelling the road to St. Petersburg."24 
The Pax Russica established with the political solution of 1809 
provided fertile ground for cultivation of the doctrines of nationality 
and nation-building which quickly spread throughout Europe stimula-
ted by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic challenge. The initial 
intellectual groundwork for the Finnish "national awakening" had been 
laid in the later part of the eighteenth century by the scholar Henrik 
Gabriel Porthan and his colleagues through pioneering studies 
concerning Finnish history, language and folklore. Their activities gave 
rise to the first newspapers and the first literary society in Finland and 
uplifted the level of scientific research at the University, then in Turku. 
The idea of a separate Finnish nation, however, was foreign and 
undesirable to those early students of Finnish culture. As Porthan saw 
it, Finland was populated by two very different cultural groups, the 
Western or lowland coastal Finns and the Eastern or upland Finns of 
the interior. According to this conception the Finnish speaking groups 
of the interior represented a lower culture which was bound to 
disappear in the course of the advance of civilization. It would be 
23 Jussila 1969, pp. 13, 124-125, 219. 
24  Jussila 1979, pp. 9, 17-19. 
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assimilated by the more advanced Swedish culture which had already 
integrated southern Finland within its sphere of influence.25 
The ideologues of Finnish national romanticism were to turn this 
conception upside down in the decades following the Russian conquest. 
Centered first in Turku, then in the new capital, administrative center 
and university city of Helsinki, they created the ideal image of the 
Finn largely based on their mythic vision of the upland or Eastern 
Finnish peasant as, described in the words of  Klinge,  
a magnificent introverted meditative-vegetative work of nature, whose 
great mental powers would come forth if he could be helped in liberation 
from the chains of privation 26 
The enduring significance of the literary works of the national romantic 
authors in creating the fundamental concepts of Finnish national identi-
ty cannot be over-emphasized. The Finnish national epic, the Kalevala,  
is perhaps the most appropriate symbol of the nationalist literary effort. 
This collection of Finnish folk poetry, selected and molded in a nation-
alist fashion by Elias Lönnröt, provided Finland with a mythical ancient 
past and a literary monument which could be used to prove the maturity 
and uniqueness of Finnish culture. The composition and form of 
Lönnrot's Kalevala was strongly determined by the conditions of 
"national awakening" within the shelter of Pax Russica and reflects 
the effort for peaceful or non-confrontational national assertion.27 The 
effort to build Finnish national identity through literary projects and 
ethnological-linguistic studies and the propagation of their results took 
on a systematic organizational form with the foundation of the Finnish 
Literature Society in Helsinki in 1831. 
The program developed by the initially small intellectual elite of 
nationalists, or "Fennomanians" as they came to be called, can be 
characterized by the endlessly quoted phrase, "Swedes we are no 
longer, Russians we cannot become; let us be Finns." Simply stated 
what this signifies is that from as early as the 1820s onward Finnish 
nationalists adopted, cultivated and systematically propagated the 
European concepts of national sovereignty, national character and 
national consciousness. From the very beginning Finnish nationalism 
was to be characterized by exclusion, anti-liberalism and authoritarian 
patriarchism. What this meant is that the people at large were to be 
discouraged from direct international contact and borrowing of ideas 
25  Klinge 1982, pp. 48, 73, 79, 106-108. 
26  Ibid., p.  116. 
27 Ibid., pp. 131,195; Niemi 1980, p.  61. 
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and practices of popular politics and culture. The people living in 
"Finland" were not to emulate the French or the Swedes or adopt 
universal concepts of political freedom; rather they were to be formed, 
civilized and educated by the nationalist elite whose aim it was to 
"awaken" the Finnish nation to the sovereign maturity and conscious-
ness of an individual whose security and power lies in being recognized 
as a national entity by other such entities. 
The paradoxical essence of nationalism is that its central concepts 
are directly and consciously borrowed while at the same time it discou-
rages individuals from direct cross-cultural contact through 
xenophobia. Nationalism can thus be defined as an elite way of 
structuring social order, it is cultural control on the part of national 
authorities. The early Finnish architects of nationalism maintained that 
with the cessation of Swedish political hegemony it was necessary to 
do away with Swedish cultural predominance in Finland as well. They 
called upon the educated class to convert from Swedish to Finnish 
culture by cultivating the use of the Finnish language in their private 
lives, in education and in the administration of the country. Here it 
must be strongly emphasized that in so converting they were not simply 
adopting something already in existence. The nationalists also created 
"Finland" and "Finnish culture." They made Finnish language into a 
language suitable for modern national education, national literature 
and the formation of national public opinion through the press. 
The main opposition to the nationalist movement in its early stages 
lay in the fear the old conservative bureaucracy had for provoking the 
Russian authorities and in the mere fact that the use of Swedish was 
so deeply woven into the fabric of administrative and cultural life. 
Thus, for example, the journal edited by the nationalist ideologist and 
critic A.I. Arwidsson was suppressed and he was dismissed from his 
post at the University in 1823. He went into exile in Sweden. Although 
an internationally recognized philosopher, the leader-to-be of the 
Fennomanian movement Johan Vilhelm Snellman was prevented from 
entering the university staff in the early 1840s. Instead of undertaking 
a promising academic career abroad Snellman chose to move to the 
interior where, while directing a secondary school in Kuopio, he 
developed and spread the principles of his nationalism throughout the 
whole educated class. His work was far from meeting universal 
sympathy, proof of which was the suppression of his Swedish language 
journal Saima in 1846. The peak of this initial phase of opposition to 
the Fennomanian project can be seen in the censorship act of 1850, 
the aim of which was to prevent the diffusion of revolutionary ideas 
in the Finnish language. 
88 
Snellman and his colleagues were soon destined to rise to positions 
of power within the Finnish administration from which they were able 
to engineer significant victories for the cause of Finnish language 
nationalism. Yet it is important to realize that one of the most significant 
hindrances to the Fennomanian cause was not the active opposition 
of enemies of the Finnish language, but lay in the inertia or deep 
entrenchment of the Swedish language in Finnish society; Snellman 
himself spoke, and published his works, in Swedish. Even at the end 
of the century many of the most ardent Fennomanians preferred to 
write and speak in Swedish. Well into the twentieth century the Swedish 
language remained a strong foundation for intellectual culture in 
Finland.28 
There is a deep-set myth in Finland that Fennomanian nationalism 
represented the Finnish masses against the elitist and repressive 
Swedish culture. The more fanatic Fennomanians vigorously cultivated 
this image for decades. Ironically enough, however, the early efforts 
of the nationalists were opposed not only by the conservative admini-
stration and entrenched Swedish culture. The Fennomanians collided 
with a powerful social-religious movement which was gaining strength 
among the people of interior Finland which they so idealized. With 
roots in the pre-Russian pre-nationalism period, various forms of 
religious revivalism had developed strong centers in northern and 
southern Savo, central Finland and in the west as well by the early 
nineteenth century. During this period influential laymen rose to the 
leadership of the revivalist groups. Whereas the early nationalists used 
their conceptions of the Finnish people and their culture in the attempt 
to win over the educated class to their cause, the revivalist leaders 
were much closer to the people in practice. Under the pressure of 
opposition by the nationalists, official Lutheran church leaders and the 
lay authorities the revivalist leaders were able to achieve a new degree 
of trans-provincial cohesion for their movement, mobilize a broad base 
of support among the Finnish peasantry and to win vocal advocates 
among certain intellectuals 29 
Finland's annexation to Russia brought a complete halt to the deve-
lopment of representative government until the 1860s and in certain 
respects hindered economic advancement as well. The requirements 
of rising social groups were not taken into consideration. Heikki Yli-
kangas has shown that revivalism was not merely an expression of 
28 Klinge 1982, pp. 211-212. 
29 Ylikangas 1979, pp. 22-23, 232-233, 285. 
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religious will, but that it also served as a means of mobilization for 
those discontented people who could not tolerate the social and 
economic restrictions and stagnation resulting from the rigid and non-
representative administrative system. He sees revivalism as an alliance 
of socioeconomically significant, but politically powerless, groups 
whose main support consisted of the most economically active peasants. 
Revivalism cannot be interpreted as a fully self-conscious political 
movement, but it can be seen as a bid for power, as a challenge to the 
restrictions of the prevailing system.30 The revivalist protest was 
symbolized by the körttipuku or simple pietist clothes which were worn 
to express independence from, and rejection of, the privileged upper 
and educated classes and their symbols.31  
The conflict between the revivalists and the nationalists indicates 
how sensitive the nationalists were to ideological rivalry. In their effort 
to create a guiding archetype of Finnishness the literary ideologists 
could not tolerate the alternative views of Finnish identity emerging 
among the pietists. The pietists denied the whole value of, for example, 
Lönnröt's collection of folk poetry. The literary nationalists authored 
a series of sharp attacks on revivalism, thus attacking the very "people" 
whose image they sought to manipulate. The revivalists maintained a 
completely different view of the values and aims of human life.32 The 
nationalist attack against the revivalists, which went so far as to 
influence the authorities in St. Petersburg to initiate a series of mass 
legal proceedings, ultimately failed. The revivalists infiltrated the 
Finnish Evangelical Lutheran church, setting in motion a process of 
reform from within. As Ylikangas has pointed out, they loosened the 
bonds between church and state, thus helping to undermine the ideolo-
gical power with which ruling powers controlled the people.33 
The revivalist movement provides an insight into the extreme 
difficulty or impossibility of broad-based political mobilization in a 
situation in which the institutional machinery needed for such a process 
was non-existent and counter to the will of the Russian authorities. 
Indeed, before the end of the century, with the exception of the bour-
geois protest and political mobilization described in the next section, 
there were no significant radical or violent sociopolitical confrontations 
in Finland. There were no peasant rebellions, no urban or rural riots, 
no military rebellions or revolutionary conspiracies and no collective 
violent engagements. 
3°  Ibid., pp. 280-284. 
31 Ibid., pp. 233, 284. 
32  Ibid., pp. 219-231. 
33  Ibid., pp. 292. 
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The ethnocentric nationalism of Fennomanians like Snellman and 
his follower Meurman represents perhaps the most prominent, but by 
no means the only current. of Finnish nationalism. Throughout the 
decades men like Meurman fought hard to label their opponents as 
anti-Finnish and anti-national. Yet of necessity there had to exist a 
variety of approaches to nationalism. The liberal current which was 
developing in Finnish politics at the time came to be not anti-national, 
but rather a rival form of Finnish nationalism. Before 1861, however, 
the ideological and institutional foundation for modern Finnish liberal 
constitutionalist nationalism was very restricted. 
3. Constitutional Confrontation, 1861 
"At the beginning of the year," wrote J.V. Snellman, "the human 
imagination could not have conceived of what was to happen in Finland 
in 1861."34 The year 1861 has long been recognized as an outstanding 
period in the development of Finnish political thought. Snellman's 
contemporary and political opponent, the liberal politician Josef A.  
Schauman, noted in 1861 that the time immediately preceding this year 
was one of light and hope, with exceptional cultural, economic and 
political advancement accompanied by a notable awakening of national 
consciousness.35 
Schauman, no doubt like his liberal colleagues, was enthused by the 
political and social movements and upheavals taking place in connec-
tion with nationalist struggles throughout Europe in countries such as 
Poland, Hungary and Italy.36 Although not aware of what the coming 
year had in store for Finland, Snellman also commented at the begin-
ning of 1861 that the current period of world history was of 
extraordinary importance. He believed that throughout Europe a new 
stage had been reached in the formation of nations and that the idea 
of the right of national self-determination was beginning to receive 
broad popular expression beyond the limits of philosophical specula-
tion. He saw "the doctrine of the right of nationalities" agitating all 
of Europe.37 Snellman observed here that Finland was one of the 
considerable beneficiaries of the idea of the right to nationhood. As 
34 Snellman 1895, p. 16. 
35 Schauman 1925, p. 265. 
36 Ibid., p. 266. 
37 Snellman 1929c, pp. 485-489; Klinge 1967, pp. 128-129. 
91 
shall be shown in detail below, Snellman did not, however, share the 
same type of optimism or approach in regard to free and peaceful 
political development as some of his fellow countrymen. Shortly after 
expressing the preceding thoughts he wrote: "But reality betrays these 
dreams, and the fates of nations are created through blood and tears."38 
An Opportune "Coup d'Etat" 
On 10 April 1861 "Alexander II, by the grace of God, Tsar and Autocrat 
of all Russia, Tsar of Poland and Grand Duke of Finland etc., etc." 
issued an imperial Manifesto which, as Snellman described it, struck 
the Finnish people like lightening, triggering off an unprecedented 
storm of public debate and political action. 39 Alexander began the 
Manifesto by recognizing that the future spiritual and material progress 
of Finland was greatly dependent on critically needed legislative reform 
which had been put off since the annexation of the country to Russia.4°  
Alexander's dilemma, as clearly shown in the Manifesto, was that 
according to an influential interpretation of the Finnish fundamental 
laws the needed legislative changes could only be validly put into force 
by approval of the Diet, which had not been convoked since 1809.41  
After the Crimean War (1854-1856) budding Finnish political and 
cultural self-assertion coupled with the need for thorough legislative 
reform, particularly for economic reasons, long recognized by both 
Finns and the Russian administration created increasing public pressure 
for the convocation of the Diet. Alexander II assigned the governor-
general and the Finnish Senate the task of preparing a list of those 
matters which necessitated constitutional change. With this work 
completed Finnish officials on various occasions tried to persuade the 
tsar to convoke the Diet, which he refused to do apparently because 
of prevailing conditions in the Empire. It was at this point, early in 
1861, when the Finnish Senator F. Langenskiöld, stimulated by his 
discussions with the tsar, began to form a compromise solution designed 
to solve the legislative dilemma and ease the way for the future 
summoning of the Diet. This solution took its final form in Alexander's 
April Manifesto of 1861.42  
38 Snellman 1929c, pp. 491, 500; Snellman 1894a, pp. 589-591. 
39 Protokoller ... 1862, pp. 3-6; Snellman 1895, p. 22. 4°  Ibid., pp. 3-6. 
41 Ibid., pp. 3-6. 
42  Krusius-Ahrenberg 1982, pp. 43-45. 
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It was Snellman's conclusion, with which later commentators have 
agreed, that it was specifically the political unrest and rioting in Poland 
and the repercussions of the emancipation of the Russian serfs (March 
1861) which caused the tsar to proceed so cautiously in Finnish 
matters.43 Therefore the tsar declared in the Manifesto that "higher 
interests of state" prevent him for the time being from convoking the 
Finnish Estates.44 Assertedly with the interests of Finland in mind, not 
wanting to delay the solution of the problems at hand any longer, the 
tsar proposed a compromise solution: He would allow the formation 
of a committee, to meet on 20 January 1862, composed of forty-eight 
elected representatives from the country's four Estates. Succinctly 
stated, the Committee was to take over the legislative functions of the 
Diet for an unspecified time.45 Section seven of the Manifesto was of 
particular significance: Alexander stated therein that until circum-
stances permitted the summoning of the Finnish Estates he would 
ratify the decisions of the Committee.` 
Opponents of the tsar's solution held that as such the Committee's 
work, carried out through unconstitutionally authorized legislative 
power, would have been a violation of the Finnish fundamental laws, 
placing the future of the constitution in question. Instead of placating 
the political longings of the Finns, the compromise expressed in the 
April Manifesto gave rise to shock, consternation and frustrated expec-
tations. The Manifesto was easily construed as an attempted coup 
d'etat.47 According to the historian Lobo Krusius-Ahrenberg, the 
reasons for the ambiguities of the Manifesto have yet to be fully 
explained. She is convinced, however, that it was not an intentional 
attempt to violate Finnish political rights. Alexander consulted top 
Russian officials regarding the matter and was warned that the 
Manifesto could be seen as a coup. The Russian Foreign Minister A.M. 
Gorchakov even advised the full convocation of the Diet to the tsar. 
Apparently it was the tsar's Finnish advisors who convinced him that 
the Finns would not misconstrue the intent of the Manifesto.48 It is 
not clear what the tsar's intentions were in relation to this 
miscalculation of Finnish opinion on the part of the drafters of the 
compromise. 
43  Snellman 1895, p. 21; Krusius—Ahrenberg 1982, pp. 44-45. 
44  Protokoller ._.  1862, pp. 3-6. 
45  Protokoller ...  1862, pp. 3-6. 
46 Ibid., pp. 3-6 
47 Krusius—Ahrenberg 1982, p.  43; Schauman 1925, p. 282; Nordberg 1958, p.  257, 264;  
Finska Förhållanden 1861, p. 63. 
48  Krusius-Ahrenberg 1982, p. 52. 
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In 1861 there were as yet no well defined political parties in Finland, 
only two general groups which were then called the "opposition" and 
the "government party." The border between the two was not clear 
and the opposition contained many disparate elements including a 
variety of still politically unorganized liberals and nationalists. The 
opposition could be characterized by its adherence to certain general 
principles such as freedom of speech and the press, lingual equity and 
the awakening of constitutional and national spirit. The term "govern-
ment party" generally signified conservatives, which were by no means 
unified. Both terms, reflecting the politics at the time, were extremely 
vague a9 
The April Manifesto provided the divergent groups of the opposition 
the needed concrete reason for political mobilization and the formation 
and clarification of basic principles; it was the first chance for the 
hitherto frustrated opposition to assert itself. Researcher Toivo Nord-
berg has noted that the Finnish educated class at the time was highly 
affected by the ideas of liberalism. He portrays the liberals of the 1860s 
as immature agitators prejudiced against legal government, intolerant 
and favoring radical means.50 This may be a biased (Paasikivian) view, 
but it serves to show that the Manifesto not only put the liberal opposi-
tion on the defensive, but provided it with a concrete cause to consolidate 
its ranks in assertive and anti-absolutist constitutionalism; it was a 
highly opportune "coup" for a constitutionalist offensive.51  
Finland's First Modern Popular Political Movement 
For the liberals it was clear that the Manifesto, being an infringement 
of the constitution, had to be challenged. Otherwise, if it were to meet 
only silence and indifference, Finland would forfeit its political rights 
and claims.52 Deciding that something had to be done, although not 
sure exactly what, the liberals decided to take the initiative. On 16 
April, the same day on which the Senate received the Manifesto and 
49 Ibid., p. 52. 59  Nordberg 1958, p. 260, 262. Considering Nordberg's point of view and derogatory 
style one might place his work within the same current of political culture which  
Meurman represented. 
51 It must be pointed out that the use of the terms "liberal" and "radical" in reference 
to the budding Finnish opposition is highly relative and context bound: the members 
of the Finnish opposition must not be mistaken for social or democratic radicals. 
Their anti-absolutism was of a rather elitist eonstitutionalist type. 
52  Schauman 1925, p. 271. 
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a day before it was publicly published, a group of concerned members 
of the liberal opposition met at the home of the economist and political 
reformer Henrik Borgström. The continuing meetings of the "Borg-
ström Circle," or "Sextioettan (LXI)" (the Sixty-Oners), marked the 
beginning of the liberal mobilization which was to form around 
Finland's first modern political newspaper Helsingfors Dagblad in 
1862.53 At their first meeting the question of means of action arose. 
They realized that the level of political awareness in the country was 
low and that, because of very strict censorship, the press could not be 
employed for the formation of public opinion, a task which they 
considered essentia1.54 
On the following day, the members of the Borgström Circle decided 
that the best course of action would be to draw up a national protest 
address to the tsar signed by a group of citizens representing the whole 
country. They therefore sent messengers throughout the land to 
summon influential citizens to draft and sign the address.55 In the mean 
time, the liberal minority of the Finnish Senate carried out an unprece-
dented protest. In their official stand regarding the Manifesto the 
majority of senators decided to send an address of gratitude to the 
tsar, not mentioning the Committee by name and containing only weak 
criticism of the whole proposal. 
The liberal minority on the other hand favored a more explicit 
address calling for clarification of the tasks and powers of the Commit-
tee. Moreover, they were backed in their defense of the constitution 
by the Finnish Attorney General C.P.E. Gadd. The news of this protest 
in the Senate soon spread, igniting further debate and inspiring the 
hitherto vacillating to take a clear stand.56 By 24 April the Borgström 
circle, supplemented by members of the various Estates from elsewhere 
in the country, was already in the process of gathering signatures for 
their address. Therein the authors sought to communicate their deep 
concern and unrest regarding the proposed legislative power of the 
Committee, and implored the tsar to explicitly restrict its functions to 
that of preparation for the future convocation of the Estates.57 
The April Manifesto also sparked off agitation among the university 
students, giving rise to the first modern mass political demonstration 
in Finnish history.58 Already on 17 April designs for a demonstration 
53  Törne 1935, p. 287. 
54  Schauman 1925, p. 273. 
55  Ibid., pp. 273-274. 
56  Ibid., pp. 274-275; Krusius-Ahrenberg 1982, pp. 47-48. 
57 Schauman 1925, includes a copy of the address, pp. 279-281. 
58 Hyvämäki 1961, pp. 24-25, 51. 
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were put forth, but did not receive sufficient support. As the activities 
of the Borgström circle and the opposition senators' protest became 
known, the students' enthusiasm for action and their desire to 
participate overcame their fears. Some students even had the idea, 
inspired by democratic notions, that a demonstration could serve to 
show the willingness of the common people — those not represented 
in the Borgström circle — to act 59 
On 22 April a large crowd, responding to the previous summons of 
student agitators, gathered on the Helsinki Esplanade to honor the 
opposition senators and the attorney general by marching to each of 
their homes and shouting out in Swedish "lefve Grundlagen" (long live 
the Constitution). The marchers were mainly composed of students 
along with journeymen and a wide variety of onlookers who joined in 
as the demonstration proceeded. Two of the more radical members of 
the Borgström circle, unknown to their colleagues, helped direct the 
march. Through some direct manoeuvreing the students persuaded an 
artisans' association choir to join in. The number of demonstrators 
swelled to several hundred, or maybe even to a thousand, as one 
presumably exaggerating observer claimed. At any rate, it was in size 
and quality an hitherto unseen manifestation of public political enthu-
siasm.60 
The April Manifesto controversy was the first major confrontation 
of Finnish constitutionalism — however immature — with the power of 
the tsar.61 The Borgström meetings and the street demonstration were 
allowed to proceed without intervention on the part of the authorities. 
Apparently the governor-general was prepared to use police and mili-
tary force, but was dissuaded by his advisors. Two cossacks following 
the demonstration reportedly did nothing more than comment that "it 
is a rebellion."62 The immediate reaction of Finnish officials and the 
Russian government was a soft-line policy of conciliation and, as agitati-
on continued in the coming months, a strategy of appeasement. 
Promptly after receiving news of the Finnish storm of opinion the 
tsar issued an imperial rescript, assuring the Finns that the Committee 
would not be invested with the same legislative powers as the Diet.63 
Some months later, deciding not to employ oppressive measures as in 
59 Klinge 1967, pp. 129-131. 
60 Rein 1928, pp. 333; Rein was a student eyewitness to the event; Hyvämäki 1961, 
contains an account by one of the participants in the demonstration, pp. 24-25, 51;  
Klinge 1967, pp. 131-133. 
61 Krusius-Ahrenberg 1982, p. 49. 
62  Schauman, p. 277; Rein 1928, pp. 333-334. 
63  Protokoller ... 1862, pp. 6-7. 
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Poland, the tsar made further concessions to appease his Finnish sub-
jects. The discredited Governor-General Friedrich Berg was replaced, 
in a move calculated in Petersburg for its propagandistic effect, by P.I. 
Rokassovsky, who enjoyed popularity among the Finns. Moreover, 
Rokassovsky brought with him to his new post the concrete promise 
that the long-awaited Diet would be convened when the necessary 
legislative proposals were completed and that censorship conditions 
were to be eased.64 
These concessions were doubtlessly aimed in part to disarm the 
opposition which, although having given up its address campaign, 
continued its agitation even after the tsar's reassuring rescript. The 
Committee elections provided the various groupings a concrete motive 
for organization and the formation of common stances on critical issues. 
Before the regulations were revised, an address movement began for 
the elimination of censorship. Correspondingly, an anti-censorship 
demonstration was organized among the students.65 A new demand 
for information concerning Finland's political status arose. When the 
jurist Johan Palmen published a concise analysis of Finland's 
fundamental laws in September 1861 it sold out faster than any other 
previous book in Finland, with the exception of J.L. Runeberg's 
nationalist epic Tales of Ensign Stål.  
By the time that the elected Committee representatives met for the 
first time in January 1862, Finnish public opinion had been persuaded, 
through conciliation and the eloquent defense of the official line by 
J.V. Snellman, to approve compromise. This was preceded, however, 
by the most heated and bitter public debate in Finnish history.  
Schauman was right, a new awakening had occurred: The April 
Manifesto was a great political catalyst, and the radical opposition of 
the liberal circle forced people of all political persuasions to become 
more thoroughly acquainted with political matters. 
It has been argued that there is a direct parallel between the events 
of 1861 and those of the Bobrikov period following 1898.66 1861 set 
the pattern for future Finno-Russian political confrontations. It is no 
mere coincidence that many of those who adopted the ideology and 
methods of passive resistance at the turn of the century, as well as 
those who opposed them, had their first experiences of political action 
in 1861. It is therefore not surprising to find that not only were certain 
64 Krusius-Ahrenberg 1982. pp. 62-63. 
65  Klinge 1967, pp. 139-140. 
66 Törne 1935. p. 287; Nordberg 1958. p. 310. 
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methods of passive resistance, as understood in the generic sense, 
employed, but that the given political conditions provided fertile 
ground for the specific idea of passive resistance to take root at that 
time. 
4. The Strategy of National Survival and 
Development: 
J.V. Snellman on Passive Resistance, 
Power and Cultural Defense 
In the final issue of  Litteraturblad for 1861, dealing in general with the 
current political controversy and the coming activity of the Committee, 
J.V. Snellman considered it necessary to issue some concise critical 
observations regarding passive resistance and its applicability in Fin-
land. Snellman's article is an invaluable central source for determining 
when, and in what form, the idea of passive resistance entered the 
Finnish political scene. With characteristic broad political and historical 
vision and with an equally typical haughty style he writes: 
Among the means for attaining a freer social order [samhällsskick] our 
time has given rise to "passive resistance" and "the peaceful demonstra-
tion." Anyone who reads the newspapers knows how this agitation is 
practiced. In reality, however, it has been used by weaker peoples 
against foreign domination, and more rarely by subjects against rulers 
in independent states. Nowhere has this agitation yet produced any 
results. Like revolutionary conspiracy it is brought forth by the pressure 
of circumstances, and is capable only of negating the present without 
providing any certainty as to what should follow. One can often see 
even the most noble patriots driven to this negation; unfortunately 
humanity has had occasion enough to lament the unhappy outcome of 
such endeavors. They do have their own historical intention, aiming to 
gradually prepare for the time when the sought after reform falls like 
a ripe apple from the tree. But one must lament that freedom cannot 
be attained except through the alternations between revolution and 
reaction and the misfortune following both. The so-called peaceful 
demonstration must take the same course, because by nature it aims 
at making the present situation impossible without having control of 
the future.67 
67 Snellman 1894b, p. 768. 
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Snellman pronounced a forceful, belittling, judgement on passive 
resistance. He considered it to be a ridiculous form of contention, 
entirely inappropriate for Finnish conditions. Moreover, although he 
considered the technique of the peaceful demonstration as otherwise 
harmlessly absurd in its weakness, he argued that it had to be emphati-
cally rejected because, being the work of the "rabble" and giving rise 
to perniciously exaggerated accounts of events, it would be a disaster 
for the country.68 
By deliberately placing the terms "passive resistance" and "the 
peaceful demonstration" ("det passiva motståndet" and "den fredliga 
demonstrationen ") in quotes Snellman emphasized that they indicated 
specific, clearly definable, interrelated, yet different, forms of action. 
Considering the contemporary circumstances Snellman's use of the 
word "passive resistance" is similar to the modern idea of civil disobe-
dience and can be distinguished from mere protest. He had the insight 
to realize that it was not a mere reactive or defensive technique, not 
"passive," but was also an active and assertive means of social 
transformation. Snellman's account clearly indicates that passive resis-
tance was a widely known modern form of political struggle, invented 
in the historical circumstances of nineteenth century Europe and prac-
ticed, not just by "the rabble," as he had to admit, but also by distin-
guished citizens. It was a new means for achieving redress and justice. 
What specific cases did Snellman have in mind when indicating that 
anyone who kept informed on European affairs would have plenty of 
knowledge about passive resistance? In an earlier section it has already 
been shown that passive resistance was used throughout the nineteenth 
century in Europe in a wide variety of struggles. The idea of  "passiver 
Widerstand" was particularly current in the German political cultural 
environment. Many influential educated Finns, such as Schauman and 
Snellman, had travelled and studied abroad, especially in Germany. 
As Snellman repeatedly stresses in his articles (especially in 1861) Finns 
had access to abundant material on current political ideas through the 
foreign press.69 It is therefore not implausible to conclude that 
politically aware Finns knew of a whole variety of events known as 
passive resistance. There was, however, one specific case which was 
doubtlessly of particular relevance for the Finns, namely, the Hungarian 
resistance to Austrian absolutism. 
One of the main conclusions to be drawn here, after having examined 
the events and ideas of the time, is that the European concept of 
68 Ibid., pp. 768-769. 
69  Ibid., pp. 767-768; Snellman 1929b, pp. 584-594. 
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passive resistance received its first express formulation and application 
in Finland in 1861. Meurman, as cited earlier, was correct in seeing a 
kind of practical attitude of passive resistance, as understood in a 
general sense, prevailing in Finland in the early part of the century. 
Perhaps even the specific term was used now and then as it gained 
currency in Europe.  
Meurman was not the first to specify earlier Finnish passive resist-
ance. On 27 February 1845, Snellman wrote to his close colleague 
Johan Tengström: "Our past distinctly proves that the passivity of the 
masses has effectively withstood foreign influences."70 Snellman 
expressly calls this old "passivity" "passive resistance." True, he admits, 
this old passivity was indeed successful, but the Finnish people were 
never really harshly harassed and nothing can guarantee the success 
of passive resistance in the future now that it has been "lifted from its 
old hinges.i71 Snellman's comments here show that as early as 1845 a 
new concept of passive resistance had been developed and that proof 
of its effectiveness was being sought in earlier times. He explicitly 
contrasts passive resistance to "active resistance" (violent resistance), 
and is convinced that the latter is ultimately more powerful ("har mera 
kraft").72  Clearly at that time Snellman thought that passive resistance 
in the generic sense was more characteristic of the "wild" nature of 
the greater part of the Finnish people than violent resistance. He even 
comments that the Finnish people show remarkably little "patriotism" 
or "national hate."73 Yet he also sees within these same people the 
maintenance of the capacity for violent action. 
It was the political conditions of constitutionalist struggle in 1861 
which provided the fertile meeting ground for the primal Finnish atti-
tude of resistance and the constitutionalist concept of passive resistance. 
Earlier that same year one of the major constitutional confrontations 
in the Hungarian passive resistance movement took place. It is very 
likely that one of the main sources of the term and the concept of 
passive resistance as used in Finland was the Hungarian struggle. At 
any rate the concept of passive resistance was still new in Finnish 
society and did not receive the type of mature ideological expressions 
70 Snellman 1906, pp. 160. 
71 Ibid.. p. 160. 
72 Ibid.. p. 160. 
7; By "wild" or the "state of being wild" (vildhetstillstånd) Snellman refers to the 
condition of not yet having achieved a high level of civilization. It is a condition 
which he obyiously considers to prevail among the greater part of the Finnish people. 
Moreover, apparently Snellman considers patriotism or collective national hate to 
be a sign of higher civilization; ibid., pp. 159-160. 
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that it would later. The tradition of Hungarian resistance, as will be 
seen, was to have an important effect on the development of the Finnish 
concept of passive resistance. However immature it was, it is clear that 
Snellman and his educated contemporaries had attained a certain 
familiarity with the concept of passive resistance and the methods of 
its application, both in international and domestic struggles. 
It is no mere chance that Snellman, of all Finnish statesmen, should 
be the first to deem it necessary to undertake a refutation of the 
budding idea of passive resistance, the weapon of assertive liberalism.  
Snellman was certainly the most sophisticated and influential political 
philosopher and statesman of his time in Finland. Moreover, his 
political ideas, for example through the work of J.K. Paasikivi, have 
had a fundamental influence on Finland's present day political 
culture.74 Even during his own lifetime (1806-1881) Snellman became 
one of the monuments of Finnish history. He remains a cardinal 
authority, invoked by Finns of all political persuasions for their own 
purposes (rather like the present day Paasikivi—Kekkonen line). 
Above all, Snellman was the main ideologist of Finnish nationalism 
and the most outstanding leader of the Fennomania movement. Na-
tionality was the central principle of his political thought and it has 
been argued that perhaps he, more than any other European thinker, 
can be considered the philosopher of nationality and the nation.75 
Whatever his true philosophical status may have been, Snellman was 
internationally recognized, particularly in Germany and Sweden, as an 
expert in Hegelian philosophy with a broad knowledge of French 
Enlightenment and contemporary thought.76 
Snellman's criticism of passive resistance provides a good starting 
point, by way of contrast, for the analysis of his interrelated concepts 
of cultural defense and national development. Snellman certainly took 
the challenge of the radical liberals seriously, judging from the frequen-
cy with which he was concerned with its refutation. The events of 1861 
provided him with a testing ground for the political principles which 
he had been developing for decades. 
According to Snellman the Finnish and Swedish liberals, excessively 
concerned with material profit, external political and economic free-
dom and the criticism of institutions and authorities which inhibit 
liberty, do not realize that the "people [folk] itself is responsible for 
its government and its institutions."77 Snellman did not dismiss the 
74 Paasikivi 1957a, pp. 2, 59, 68-75. 
75 Salomaa 1948, p. 274. 
76 Salomaa 1934, pp. 156-157. 
77 Snellman 1929b, p. 586. 
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importance of political freedom and material wealth; he simply rejected 
the liberals' insistent advocacy of them as perniciously misleading in 
a situation in which the foundation of national culture was not strong 
enough for their support. For Snellman, the liberals entirely 
misconceived the nature of political and cultural power. He saw history 
as the work of peoples, of nations, not of individuals. The power with 
which rulers are invested is derived from the whole nation and therefore 
the liberal demands for external reforms were seen as superficial folly, 
providing nothing to replace the rejected system.78 Snellman was 
pedantically fond of repeating in various forms, and he did so in his 
criticism of passive resistance, that the political structure of government 
is an empty shell if it does not correspond to the cultural level of the 
nation. Accordingly, the liberals, driven by the urge for individual gain, 
were blind to this truth.79 
One of the main themes of Snellman's work was national survival. 
While convinced that no nation could hope to possess an eternal form, 
he maintained that the highest goal of a nation during its period of 
existence, is to secure its preservation through the development of its 
unique forms of culture.$ Snellman held (from at least 1842 on) that 
in international conflicts national survival, the capacity of national 
defense, is proportional to cultural advancement 81 Obviously his 
concept of culture is a very broad one, signifying a society's whole 
sociopolitical and economic way of life.  
Snellman was an adherent of the common concept that might is 
right, that the right of a nation extends no further than its power. He 
qualified this proposition in a remarkable manner, insisting that it 
could by no means serve to legitimize brute force or to justify violence 82 
Successful national defense and assertion is not founded on military 
power. This is why materially weak, but culturally vigorous, nations 
can survive in the face of overwhelming force. National culture is not 
only a power in itself, but receives further support, in proportion to 
its progress, from the recognition given by other advanced European 
nations. As Snellman saw it, European powers maintain the right of 
domination of one nation by another on the basis of cultural superiority. 
Thus for Snellman national survival, the justification and recognition 
of the right to exist as a nation among nations, is to be had through 
78 Ibid., pp. 584-587. 
79 Ibid., pp. 584-587; Snellman 1894b, pp. 767-768; Snellman 1929a, p. 320. 
S0 Snellman 1929a, p. 321. 
S1 Ibid., p. 319; Snellman 1928, p. 12. 
82 Snellman 1929a, pp. 306, 310. 
102 
adopting the prevailing Euroean paradigm of cultural maturity which 
ensures national legitimacy.' 
At an early point in his career Snellman came to the conclusion that 
the Finnish nation could not free itself from lingering Swedish cultural 
hegemony, or protect itself from the looming Russian threat, through 
violence. Only the power of cultural development could provide 
salvation.84 The principle that right is power and power is proportional 
to cultural advancement provided the ideological foundation for this 
view. Thus Snellman conceived of a strategy of national defense which 
explicitly rejected both violence and the types of protest and coercion 
classified by some today as "nonviolent action." 
1n an earlier section Snellman was described as a shrewd practitioner 
of  Realpolitik or Machiavellian "nonviolence." Snellman clearly held 
that universally speaking any group or nation would find little avail in 
violence and military action without a strong foundation of cultural 
development or sociopolitical power-to. Moreover, he thought it 
pernicious to combine cultural development with violent assertion or 
agitative protest and coercion of any kind. He even went so far as to 
claim that even powerful nations in the face of overwhelming power-
over may preserve their own cultural strength and ensure survival more 
effectively through submission than through coercive resistance.85 
Nowhere in his works, however, does Snellman suggest that the type 
of cultural defense which he advocated should or could be a complete 
alternative to or replacement for the organized violence of the nation-
state. He simply meant that the reverse is not valid; organized violence 
cannot replace creative national development. In circumstances in 
which a nation does not have the basic de facto power-to necessary 
for the effective use of violence Snellman and a significant branch of 
his followers were quite explicit that passive resistance (or equivalently 
Gandhian paradigm "nonviolent action") would be ridiculously ineffec-
tive.  
Snellman represented what might be described as authoritarian 
capitalism. Already in the 1840s he saw the triumph of bourgeois 
revolution and capitalism — the dissolution of the old Estate society, 
the rise of the middle class, and the formation of the working class — 
as inevitable processes. He did not, however, deem the social and 
political freedom of individuals as a necessary condition of these 
83 Ibid., pp. 306, 310; Snellman 1929b, p. 589. 
84 Snellman 1931, Snellman to Cygnaeus, July 1840, pp. 131-135; Snellman 1906, 
Snellman to Tengström, 27 February 1845, pp. 157-161. 
85 Snellman 1930a, p. 245. 
103 
processes or of economic freedom and development. He advocated an 
authoritarian sociopolitical system combined with a liberal type of 
mixed capitalist economy based on free enterprise and private property. 
The masses were to be formed or civilized and cared for by the national 
spirit, i.e., the authoritarian leaders. This way, in a world of inevitable 
class differences the ignorant masses could be trained to feel a debt 
of gratitude toward the society which takes care of them. All forms of 
popular politics, both liberal and socialist, were to be controlled, avoi-
ded and suppressed. In the late 1870s, observing the socialist struggle 
in Germany, Snellman clearly sympathized with violent repression of 
socialist movements in case of the failure of severe, firmly enforced, 
State legislation and control.86 
A contradiction traverses Snellman's works from the 1840s onward. 
On the one hand he stresses that communities and nations develop 
civilization trough interaction, interdependence and common cultural 
roots and that they are not eternally fixed entities. On the other hand 
each nation attains maturity as a sovereign individual dependent solely 
on itself. National maturity is not attained by borrowing bits and pieces 
of civilization from here and there like the deluded liberals think. What 
this meant in practice is that Snellman was directly adopting the 
European model of ethnocentric linguistic or cultural nationalism; it 
was a model of elite domination through cultural hegemony. Snellman 
definitely thought this to be the best approach to achieving social 
cohesion and societal inviolability, i.e., he understood it to be the best 
form of national defense. It is no coincidence that Snellman developed 
a special preference for the Italian Risorgimento model of national 
unification. Snellman can be compared, and contrasted, to one of the 
main ideologists of Italian nationhood Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872). 
Both men were cultural activists par excellence through newspaper 
and educational activities. Both saw the nation as something spiritual; 
they rejected the American model of the nation which in the words 
of Mazzini — words which could just as well be Snellman's — 
is the embodiment, if compared to our own ideal, of the philosophy of 
mere rights: the collective thought is forgotten: the educational mission 
of the state is overlooked. It is the negative, individualistic materialistic 
school.' 
86 This paragraph has been written with reference to Jussi Teljo's concise study of 
Snellman's political philosophy; see Teljo 1934, passim. 
87 Mazzini quoted in, Smith 1959, p. 13. 
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But Snellman of course was no Mazzini, nor was any other Italian 
leader quite like him. The Italian Risorgimento was an elite affair, 
carried out by the literati, students, skilled craftsmen, officials, and 
professionals of many types. What Snellman most admired in the 
Risorgimento was that it was as he saw it based on a consciously 
nationalistically cultivated unified cultural heritage directed by intellec-
tuals: The Italians were "a people which has risen against foreign 
domination, united by language, literature, and religion, in other words 
by intellectual culture [genom intellektuell bildning]."89 Snellman,  
however, far surpassed his Italian counterparts in adherence to the 
kind of "passive revolution" excluding all popular mobilization and 
collective violence called for by Vincenzo Cuoco as discussed earlier. 
Compared to Mazzini and the other leaders of the Italian Risorgimento, 
however elitist they may have been, Snellman stands out, at least in 
the sphere of sociopolitical action, as an arch-conservative.  
Snellman insisted throughout his career on maintaining the strict 
irreconcilability of systems of social order based on nationality and 
nationalism on the one hand and liberalism and constitutionalism on 
the other. This included seeing cultural defense and passive resistance 
as mutually exclusive. Hegelian that he was it could be supposed that 
he could have figured out a way to bring about a reconciliation or 
more advanced synthesis out of this dialectical tension. The only 
explanation for his not having done so is that it would have weakened 
his position in the fierce power struggle with the liberals in Finnish 
internal politics. Otherwise there exists no purely logical argument 
why sociopolitical liberalism cannot exist in various relationships of 
union with nationalism. Snellman's concept of the irreconcilable 
dialectical antithesis and mutual exclusivity of liberal politics (along 
with passive resistance) and culture-based defense was taken up and 
perpetuated by his more zealous followers, such as Meurman. Perhaps 
ironically, however, for the first generation which was truly a product 
of the "national awakening," and which came to maturity in the 1880s, 
the permanence of this dichotomy was not at all clear. Although the 
extremes of both sides were long in dying out, there began to emerge 
a new synthesis of liberalism and nationalism, of culture-based defense 
and passive resistance. Before examining the emergence of the new 
liberal nationalist synthesis, however, I would like to show how the 
Fennomanian nationalists themselves helped lay the groundwork for 
88  Ibid., pp. 36. 
89 Snellman 1894a, p. 595. 
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this synthesis. I will do this by bringing to light one channel through 
which the international model of nationalist culturally-based constitu-
tional resistance was diffused to Finland. 
5. The Finns Look to Hungary: Diffusion of 
Resistance Culture 
The most often cited foreign precedent or model of constitutionalist 
passive resistance among the Finnish resisters after 1898 was the 
Hungarian struggle against Austrian absolutism which ended in 1867. 
It is not, however, the aim of this section to demonstrate any 
extraordinary causal relationship between the Hungarian and Finnish 
resistance movements. The idea is to present and analyze the example 
of one hitherto little known channel, the most prominent among 
numerous other channels, through which the currents of European 
resistance culture flowed into Finland. 
In his later criticism of passive resistance J.K. Paasikivi wrote: 
At that time, during the first part of the era of oppression, the Hungarian 
struggle for justice against Austria 1850-1867 was much discussed 
among us. The Hungarian struggle was similar to our own. The goal 
was the same: restoration of the former constitution through negotiation 
with the ruler ... the Hungarians attained victory ... the Hungarian 
struggle and its achievements were presented among us as a model9°  
This quote is taken from a context in which Paasikivi is providing an 
epilogue to the debate concerning the relevance of the Hungarian case 
for Finland. While recognizing the similarities between the two resist-
ance movements, Paasikivi is concerned here with pointing out the 
differences in order to further reveal the weaknesses of Constitution-
alist resistance policy. It is here that Paasikivi the innovative ideologist 
can be seen at work. Certainly the differences which Paasikivi specifies 
are accurate, but that is not what is of interest, since the aim here is 
not to discuss who was right, Paasikivi or the Constitutionalists. Paasi- 
kivi was not concerned with looking more deeply into why the Hun-
garian struggle was significant to Finns. He simply uses it as part of 
his ammunition against his ideological opponents. It is typical of  
Paasikivi (in the tradition of  Meurman and Snellman), and indeed of 
9° Paasikivi 1957a, p. 44-45. 
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much post Civil War (post-1918) Finnish historiography, to identify 
passive resistance with the radical Constitutionalists. A deeper look 
into Finno-Hungarian cultural relations reveals that things were not 
so simple. What Paasikivi did not admit, or perhaps did not realize, is 
that it was the Fennomanians themselves, his masters, who had 
propagated information on the Hungarian resistance in Finland from 
the 1860s onward. 
A "Fabulous Kinship" 
Initially I thought that Constitutionalist Finns turned to the Hungarian 
struggle for inspiration and practical experience simply because they 
perceived it to be similar to their own. It turns out, however, that the 
entrance of the Hungarian resistance heritage into Finland was facili-
tated by an already existing bridge of cross-cultural exchange built by 
the nationalist imagination. The Finnish nation builders came to 
propagate the idea of the Hungarian people as an elder, more mature 
and advanced, "kindred nation" (sukukansa, heimokansa) or as tribal 
brethren. The establishment in the eighteenth century of the fact that 
(certain aspects of) Finnish and Hungarian belong to the same language 
group (Finno-Ugric) provided the foundation for igniting an imagined 
special relation between the two peoples.91 From the time of the 
founding father of Finnish cultural studies, Henrik Gabriel Porthan,  
in the late 1700s educated Finns began to believe that rising Finnish 
nationalism had much to learn from the already "culturally awakened" 
Hungarian nation.92 Throughout the nineteenth century Finno-
Hungarian relations were cultivated and expanded mostly by linguists, 
ethnologists and historians from both countries.93 Throughout 
nineteenth century Europe it was people in these types of professions 
who served as the ideological carpenters of nation building. In an 
article analyzing the events of 1861 in Hungary the nationalist ideologist 
par excellence J.V. Snellman wrote prophetically: 
91 I stress imagination here since ethnieally — regarding language, genetic makeup, 
customs, politics and so forth — the Finns of the nineteenth century had very little 
uniquely in common with the Hungarians. For instance, ethnically speaking, it could 
be argued that they had much more in common with the Swedes, but this did not 
suit nationalist ideology. 
92  Numminen 1984, p. 16; Tervonen 1984, pp. 46-47,54. 
93  Numminen 1984, p. 16; "Unkarilais—suomalaisten kulttuurisuhteiden kronologiaa 
vuoteen 1983," pp. 266-268. 
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It would be no wonder if our fabulous kinship were to awaken in us 
Finns more than in others sympathy for Hungary, which is now under 
severe repression, and which through the years has been robbed of its 
age-old institutions, laws and even language and whose future has 
seemed so hopeless.' 
Before examining how Finns looked to Hungary it might be useful to 
sketch out the actual background of the Hungarian struggle. 
The Hungarian Resistance 
In spite of the prevailing social reaction and absolutism, a broad and 
vigorous national awakening began to take place in Hungary in the 
early 1800s. Statesmen such as Istvan Széchenyi, Lajos Kossuth and 
Ferenc Deåk emerged to lead the "reform generation" in the realization 
of its cultural and political aspirations.95 By March 1847 the various 
branches of reformers succeeded in forming a United Opposition Party 
to challenge the conservatives. The force of revolution throughout 
Europe in 1848, especially in Vienna, brought triumph for the 
Hungarian opposition. A new body of legislation was established, called 
the April Laws, ling the foundation for national autonomy and broad 
internal reform. This victory, however, was short lived. With the 
reestablishment of reactionary government in Vienna, forces were 
mustered for the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution. The April 
Laws were repealed and by August 1849, militarily defeated, Hungary 
was on the way to being violently integrated into a reorganized 
centralized system of absolutism.97 
Throughout the period from the defeat of revolution in 1849 to the 
compromise of 1867, the majority of the Hungarian nation, including 
the peasantry, opposed the system of neo-absolutism.98 It was generally 
recognized that armed struggle could no longer lead to victory although 
certain adherents of Kossuth sought to organize rebellion. However, 
with the failure of the widespread Mack conspiracy in 1851 Kossuth 
94  Snellman 1894a, pp. 593-594, my italics; Snellman himself, as he makes clear in this 
article, did not consider Hungary as relevant a model of national development and 
struggle as Italy. 
95 Barta 1973, pp. 224-225; I. Deak 1979, p. 34. Macartney 1974, p. 36. 
96 Barta 1973, pp. 251, 259. Macartney 1974, p. 36. 
97 Hanak 1973, p. 287. 
98 Ibid., pp. 296, 299. 
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advised his followers to refrain from violent resistance until interna-
tional conditions became more favorable.99 Throughout the 1850s, 
unable to accept submission and convinced of the futility of violence, 
Hungarians adopted an attitude of unyielding passive noncooperation, 
which was later to develop into a positive program of resistance under 
the leadership of  Ferenc Deåk.lw  
The ideological justification and basis for passive resistance as led 
by Deåk was the assertion that the Pragmatic Sanction of 1773 and 
the April Laws of 1848 were still valid. "No compromise on the 
constitution," expressed popular opinion; disobedience was justified 
since the new system was deemed illegal.101  Deåk warned against 
violence, calling for adherence to legality. He held that Law provided 
the safe ground, upon which he and his unarmed compatriots could 
withstand armed force. His own words well express the ideology of 
passive resistance: 
The nation will suffer if it has to.... It will endure without despair, as 
its ancestors patiently endured and suffered, to defend their rights; for 
whatever is lost through force may be retrieved through patience and 
good fortune, but what we surrender ourselves ... it is difficult and ever 
doubtful whether it can be regained.102 
Or, as quoted by a Finnish author in 1903: 
Law keeps violence in check.... If a nation offers no protest against the 
violation of its laws, but suffers infringement in silence allowing a new 
law to replace each violated one, it depreciates the value of its laws 
itself, because silence is the same as accepting or forgiving what has 
occurred. If in circumstances in which power transgresses the borders 
of law a nation does not raise its voice in defiance then who can bring 
about its return to the way of law?'o3  
During the eighteen years from the military defeat of the Revolution 
to the compromise of 1867 the Hungarian resistance took various forms. 
From the beginning many Hungarians boycotted the new system, and 
those who did participate were often deemed untrustworthy by the 
Austrian authorities» The majority of the gentry went the way of 
99  Macartney 1969, pp. 477, 480-481. 
100 Ibid., pp.478, 481. 101  Ibid., pp. 478, 487; Hanak 1973, p. 308; Griffith 1918, pp. 5- 6; Domanovszky 1923, 
p. 344. 
102 As quoted in Hanak 1973, p. 311; the Finnish resisters often quoted this, as well as 
many other of Deåk's statements. 
103 Quoted in Grotenfelt 1903, p. 10. 
104 Macartney 1969, pp. 449-450. 
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Deåk. They refused to take part in public life, withdrew from official 
positions and evaded the fulfillment of enemy orders. The 
representatives and military troops of the Austrian government, as 
well as the Czech officials they employed, were boycotted.105 The 
obstruction or nonpayment of taxes was a popular form of resistance, 
as was the boycott of the Austrian army by Hungarian youths.106 
The press was used to spread information abroad concerning the 
Hungarian situation and to educate the people concerning national 
culture and history.107 The arts as well as the establishment and mainte-
nance of various institutions of science, culture and higher education 
both supported and expressed the spirit of resistance.108 All social 
classes used symbolic forms of protest to express their opposition to 
Austrian domination. For example men and women used national 
clothing, forbidden colors, or seditious songs to assert their stance, and 
derided those who displayed favor for things Austrian.109 
Demonstrations were held during various key periods and frequent 
national celebrations, balls, lectures and banquets were used to 
cultivate and express resistance.11° 
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of the Hungarian people's 
united spirit of resistance was the Parliament of 1861. After its military 
defeat of 1859 in Italy, Austria was forced to seek reconciliation with 
its subjects. Absolutism was eased, the Hungarian county councils were 
restored and the Hungarian Parliament convoked. The Hungarians 
refused to be appeased by less than the restoration of constitutional 
conditions. The county councils proposed to stop paying the rate for 
the support of the Austrian army and to end the collection of taxes 
not approved of by the Hungarian Parliament.111  In its two addresses 
to the crown, written by Deåk, the Hungarian Parliament forcefully 
stated its case, emphasizing the right and duty to resist: 
... we declare that we hold fast to the Pragmatic Sanction, and to all 
the conditions contained in it without exception, and that we cannot 
regard or recognize as constitutional anything which is in contradiction 
of it....112 
105 Hanak 1973, p. 297; Domanovszky 1923, p. 344. 
106 Macartney 1969, p. 487; Griffith 1918, pp. 32-33. 
107 Domanovszky 1923, p. 344; Griffith 1918, pp. 35-36. 
108 Hanak 1973, p. 298; Griffith 1918, p. 170. 
109  Jalava 1902, pp. 126-127. 110 Domanovszky 1923, pp. 311 345; Hanak 1973, p. 303. 
111 Macartney 1974, p. 37; Griffith 1918, p. 16. 
112 As quoted in Griffith 1918, pp. 20, 27. 
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In reaction to its radical stand the emperor dissolved the Parliament. 
The Hungarians resumed passive resistance as a new version of 
absolutism was imposed.' 3 In the years to follow, however, 
international events and economic pressures forced the Austrian crown 
toward concession. On the other hand many Hungarians, doubting 
whether an independent Hungary could survive situated between 
Russia and Germany, felt it necessary to reach a compromise with 
Austria.' 14  Austria's defeat by Prussia and Hungary's refusal to provide 
military support prepared the ground for such compromise. However, 
before the Compromise was concluded one more critical confrontation 
occurred. When, in the beginning of 1867, the country was brought to 
the edge of insurrection by an imperial decree making military service 
compulsory for Hungarians, Parliament sent the Emperor an ultimatum 
known as "Hungary's Last Word" demanding, in a tone of defiance, 
the restoration of the constitution. After complicated negotiations 
Hungary's constitutional law was restored, providing the basis for the 
Ausgleich or agreement of 1867 which established the Dual Monarchy 
of Austria-Hungary.115 
Lessons of Hungarian Heroism 
In the 1860s, during the period of the Hungarian resistance, the Finnish 
view of Hungary began to go well beyond the borders of the earlier, 
primarily linguistic, cross-cultural studies between the two countries.116 
In January 1887 Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, the rising leader of the 
Fennomanian nationalist movement, stated the significance of Finno-
Hungarian relations as follows: 
I cannot refrain from expressing my joy that a considerable exchange 
of ideas has begun to build up between Finland and Hungary; at least 
we Finns feel a great longing to join other cultured peoples through 
the bonds of science and other common endeavors. It is only natural 
that our eyes turn eagerly to Hungary where the people is of our race 
and political conditions are in many ways comparable to our own. It 
is obvious that at least we share with the Magyars a common historical 
13 Hanak 1973, p 311. 
14 Macartney 1974, p. 37; Hanak 1973, pp. 312-314. 
115 Hanak 1973, pp. 317-318; Macartney 1974, p. 37; Griffith 1918, pp. 57-59. 
16 To be sure, as Tervonen has shown, men like the prominent national romantic author 
Zachris Topelius (1818-1898) had ever since the 1840s been propagating among the 
Finns the ideal of the beautiful, noble and brave Hungarian brother nation heroically 
suffering injustice; Tervonen 1984, pp. 57, 64. 
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mission, namely, the duty to prove that the Turanian race has the 
capability and strength to create an independent culture and an 
independent political existence.117  
In 1865 the well known Finnish educator, historian and linguist Oskar 
Blomstedt travelled throughout Hungary. In the years 1866-1888  
Blomstedt and his other Fennomanian colleagues (such as his close 
friend Yrjö-Koskinen) published a wide variety of articles on Hungary 
in one of the major periodicals of the Finnish movement, the Kirjallinen  
Kuukausilehti (the Literary Monthly). Blomstedt's writings brought 
home the relevance of the Hungarian situation for Finns.1 8  
Blomstedt begins, in his article of June 1866, by telling his readers 
that the Finns and the Magyars are the only peoples of the Turanian 
[Ural-Altaic] race to reach a higher level of civilization, in spite of 
harsh geographical conditions and even harsher political circumstances. 
He suggests that this success has ennobled the Turanian race, proving 
that it is not of an inferior sort.119  He goes on to describe the system 
of unconstitutional oppression to which the Hungarians had been sub-
jected ever since the defeat of the Revolution in 1849. However,  
Blomstedt writes, the "murderous designs" of the Austrians have been 
obstructed in a variety of ways by the "firm, but careful, resistance" 
of the Magyars; all the nationalities of Hungary have united behind 
the resistance policy of Deåk which thwarted the Austrian intentions 
at the Parliament of 1861. Blomstedt says that this policy consists of 
holding fast to the country's constitutional laws, the deviation from 
which would place Hungary at the Emperor's mercy. Blomstedt places 
special emphasis on the cultural resistance of the Magyars, such as the 
cultivation of their own language and the establishment of independent 
national institutions.120 
Blomstedt's work shows that as early as 1866 the literate Finnish 
public had access to a popular analysis of the events and tactics of the 
Hungarian resistance to Austrian absolutism. Without doubt the author 
considered his article to be of direct relevance to the Finns. Although 
unusually detailed, Blomstedt's article was by no means the first in-
depth description and analysis of the Hungarian situation. It was 
117 Quoted in ibid., p. 46. 
118  Ibid., pp. 65, 68; Wichman 1927, pp. 269-270. 
119  Blomstedt 1886, pp. 142-143. 
129  Ibid., pp. 143-146. 
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preceded by numerous articles in the Finnish press on events in Hun-
gary 121  
Some years after Blomstedt's analysis Yrjö-Koskinen decided to 
publish a new series of articles on Hungary. Among the various topics 
which he discusses therein is the course of events leading to the 
Compromise of 1867. He describes the firm resistance of the 
Hungarians after 1861, and emphasizes that the non-Magyar peoples 
of the country were now united with the Magyars in their policy of 
noncooperation. Yrjö-Koskinen shows how resistance and the careful 
leadership of Deåk, combined with Austria's military defeats and 
political failures, led to the Ausgleich.722 
Later Yrjö-Koskinen was to be known for his unyielding anti-
resistance or compliancy stance, and as the most extreme opponent to 
the Constitutionalists. It may therefore seem strange to find Yrjö-
Koskinen and his colleagues in earlier years displaying such an avid 
interest in nationalist resistance movements abroad. The Hungarian 
struggle provided Yrjö-Koskinen with a clear precedent case for both 
staunch resistance and careful compromise in a situation perceived as 
similar to that of Finland. Throughout his later career Yrjö-Koskinen 
was to seek a solution to the problem as to what degree of resistance 
and what degree of compromise and submission were necessary. His 
policy does not seem to have been completely set before 1898, when 
he still considered passive resistance as a possible approach for 
Finland.123  
Simultaneously with the growing interest in Hungarian politics and 
culture there arose in Finland a particular admiration for the political 
leader Ferenc Deåk. The number of articles and studies on Deåk, and 
the enthusiastic tone with which they were written, shows that his 
policies were very attractive to Finns. Apparently one of the earliest 
articles of this type was in the Fennomanian paper Suometar; it portrays 
Deåk in terms of overflowing admiration, describing how the Hun- 
121  See "Unkarilais—suomalaisten kulttuurisuhteiden kronologiaa vuoteen 1983" 1984. 
pp. 267-268; for example in the Finnish Swedish—language newspaper Papperslykran 
of 30 April 1860, there was an article "On the Moyement in Hungary," describing 
the escalation of resistance and the massive demonstrations taking place; see -0m 
rörelsen i Ungern" 1860. Snellman, as discussed earlier, also paid particular attention 
to events in Hungary. 
122  Yrjö—Koskinen 1871, pp. 289-291. 
123 Yrjö—Koskinen's dilemma is a recurrent problem in Finnish foreign policy and 
defense. It is interesting to study the development of Paasikivi's thought in this light. 
Ideologically speaking, Yrjö—Koskinen was among Paasikivi's most significant 
predecessors, as is made manifestly clear throughout Paasikivi's "memoirs" from 
the "years of oppression." 
113 
garian people adore and follow every action of this great authority.124  
Deåk, another journal stressed, opposed the violent revolutionary 
policy of Kossuth and sought the road of peaceful negotiation.125  
Article after article emphasized Deåk's insistence on careful resistance, 
for opposition on legal grounds, with strict abstention from violence.126  
Clearly Deåk was a figure with whom the Finnish nationalists could 
easily identify.  
Antti Jalava: Evangelist of Deåkean Resistance 
It was the Fennomanian Antti Jalava (1846-1909) who, during the 
later part of the nineteenth century, made the most significant 
contribution to Finno-Hungarian cross-cultural exchange. A close 
colleague of the leading Fennomanians associated with publications 
such as Uusi Suometar and Kirjallinen Kuukausilehti,  Jalava, an 
immensely energetic and many-sided man, worked for the Finnish 
nationalist movement both in the arts and politics.127  
Again it must be emphasized how important Jalava and his 
Fennomanian colleagues considered the example of highly developed 
national consciousness as expressed in Hungarian culture and history.  
Jalava stressed this importance with much more force than his 
predecessors. His works overflow with praise for the Hungarians. The 
most striking characteristic of the Hungarian, according to Jalava, is 
his fiery love of country and national spirit. One would hardly be able 
to find, he continues, another people in the world whose national spirit 
is as highly evolved as that of the Hungarians; this is a people always 
prepared for sacrifice, and which unyieldingly holds fast to its 
nationality and language:' 28  
For this reason we Finns have so much to learn from the Hungarians. 
True, we too have attended the school of misfortune, and have had to 
suffer more than enough setbacks and disasters; so we are not at all 
inexperienced in that regard. Nevertheless, we may still have much to 
learn concerning the difficult art of standing unconquerable in times 
of misfortune, particularly in regard to politics. The action of the 
Hungarians during the two decades following 1848 is always a noble 
124 "Unkarialainen Deåk" 1864. 
125 "Frans Deåk" 1876. 
126 For example, see: ibid.; "Frans Deåk" 1865; "Frans Deåk" 1889. 
127  Tervonen 1984, pp. 68, 74-82; Kalima 1930, pp. 5-7. 
128  Jalava 1883, p. 42; Jalava 1876, p. 365. 
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example for us of how political justice and freedom are to be protected 
and struggled for, however gloomy and terrible the situation may be.129  
In his popular history of Hungary (1876) Jalava described how the 
country was relegated to the status of a borderland and subjected to 
the severe Austrian "police-state"; the country was to be culturally 
and administratively Germanified.130 In connection with the Hungarian 
refusal in 1861 to take part in the Austrian Imperial Parliament Jalava 
gave the following analogy, pregnant with implications, significantly 
revealing the attitude toward resistance of a leading Fennomanian fig-
ure: 
The situation was almost the same as if we imagine the impossible 
possibility that Finland's Diet would be despotically stripped of all its 
constitutional power and transferred to some kind of parliament 
meeting in St. Petersburg ... to which the Finnish people would also be 
ordered to send its representatives. Of course the Finns could never 
participate in such a parliament, because it would mean the relin-
quishment of Finland's whole constitutional autonomy and independent 
political status.131 
The mere fact that Jalava wrote these words shows that this 
"impossibility" was all too conceivable and in such a case the Finns 
would be obliged to resist in a manner similar to the Hungarians. Jalava 
here succinctly states the principle of constitutional resistance and its 
conceivable application in Finland. There is evidence that Jalava's work 
at this time was explicitly understood as diffusion of resistance culture. 
For example in 1878 Jalava published a translation of a popular nationa-
list Hungarian novel. A review of this translation in the northern 
Finnish newspaper Kaiku described the principles and practice Hun-
garian passive resistance and cultural defense in detail. 32 
Like other Finns who wrote about the Hungarian struggle, Jalava 
quoted extensively the forceful words of resistance which Deåk put 
forth in the name of the Hungarian people in the two Addresses to 
the Emperor during the Parliament of 1861.133  As will be shown below, 
Deåk's Addresses made a significant contribution to the development 
of the Finnish concept of passive resistance. 
Jalava's biographers are strangely silent about the details of his 
politics; it is clear that he was among the avant garde of the Fennoma- 
129 Jalava 1876, p. 362. 13°  Ibid., p. 52. 
131  Ibid., pp. 54. 
132  "Käynti kirjakaupassa" 1878. 
133  Ibid., pp. 54-57. 
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nians, but it is not at all clear to which political division of the 
Fennomanians he belonged during the period of passive resistance, 
1899-1905. His writings on Hungary after the February Manifesto of 
1899, however, seem to indicate that he did not adhere to the extreme 
compliant position, although he did side with the compliants in certain 
matters.134  In a series of lectures delivered in 1898 Jalava again stressed 
how much the Finns have to learn from Hungarian history, "particularly 
in our present circumstances." Here he also presented a Deåkean form 
of cultural defense clearly applicable to Finnish conditions.135 
In 1902, in the middle of the Bobrikov period, Jalava published a 
one hundred seventy-seven page study of the life and politics of Deåk. 
The fact that the book was allowed to be published is probably because 
its author was a Fennomanian. Another possibility is that its subject 
matter was so foreign to the authorities that they did not deem 
censorship necessary. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, 
within the political context it was published, the book dealt with 
subjects which could have pleased neither the Russian authorities nor 
the extreme compliants such as Yrjö-Koskinen; the tone of the opening 
pages makes this perfectly clear. 6 Jalava expressly described Deåk's 
tactics of noncooperation and refusal as "passive resistance" at a time 
when the compliant Finns were condemning it.137 Jalava quoted page 
after page of Deåk's radical words expressing refusal to submit to 
Austrian demands. He went on to describe in detail the specific forms 
which resistance took throughout Hungary.138 Although Jalava did not 
explicitly call on the Finns to emulate the Hungarian resisters, he could 
have hardly intended anything else. The character of his earlier works 
on Hungary as a model for Finland support this interpretation. Besides, 
if he were in agreement with the extreme compliants he would have 
explicitly condemned passive resistance just as they did. 
That Jalava considered Deák the preeminent prototype of resistance 
leadership for Finland is revealed in his correspondence, which I have 
explored for references to passive resistance. As mentioned earlier, 
Jalava's work was preceded by an old tradition of cross-cultural 
exchange, much of which took place through direct personal contacts 
between members of the nationalist elites in Hungary and Finland. Of 
direct pertinence here is Jalava's cordial communication with the 
Hungarian expert on Finnish culture and language József Szinnyei 
134 Reuter 1928, p. 318. 
135 Quoted in I. Jalava 1948, pp. 375-376. 136  Jalava 1902, pp. 1-3, 7. 
137 Ibid., for example pp. 108-125. 
138  Ibid., pp. 91, 92, 126-127. 
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(1857-1943) from 1880 to Jalava's death in 1909. Already in 1880 Jalava 
had conceived of a major work dealing with the political thought and 
action of Deåk. He discussed the conception of this work with Szinnyei 
and asked him for information. In the light of what he explicitly wrote 
to Szinnyei at that time all the material he published throughout the 
years on Hungary can be seen as a kind of a preface to his book Frans 
Deåk (1902).'39  
On 13 March 1881 Tsar Alexander II was assassinated by members 
of the revolutionary People's Will. On that same day Jalava wrote to 
Szinnyei with sorrow and apprehension concerning the tsar's death. 
He relates that Finnish apprehension is heightened by the fact that it 
is not known in which direction matters will proceed in St. Petersburg: 
perhaps even revolution is coming. Moreover, 
we do not know if the Emperor will reconfirm our constitution and 
our special political status as his forerunners did. Who would even raise 
their little finger in our defense if our special status were violently 
taken from us? If only we had an army, it might produce a little 
respect."'  
Jalava admits here that the military approach would be useless, 
especially since the new system of general conscription initiated a 
couple years earlier has just got under way.141  It is worth mentioning 
here that Jalava's allusion to an army supports my hypothesis, discussed 
below, that in spite of their public propaganda against violence the 
Fennomanians looked forward to a time when Finland's own military 
power might be able to effectively serve national interests, including 
opposition to Russia. 
It was not, however, until a decade later that the Finns were given 
significant concrete cause for the apprehensions referred to by Jalava.  
On 13 September 1890 Szinnyei wrote, complaining that Jalava had 
not written to him for a long time. He observes that the times are 
changing for the Finns: 
It looks as though the Russification of Finland has begun. Very 
depressing; but what is most depressing is that it is impossible for you 
to undertake resistance and to defend your independence.142 
Whatever the future may hold, Szinnyei warns his Finnish colleague, 
the Russians will surely not remain satisfied with the degree of domina- 
'39  Jalava to Szinnyei: Correspondence 1880-1909, 24 October and 26 October 1880. 
140 Ibid., 13 March 1881. 14'  Ibid., 13 March 1881. 142  Ibid., 13 September 1890. 
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tion which they have thus far achieved.143  In his reply Jalava completely 
agrees with Szinnyei's warning, emphasizing that one should not give 
in to any illusions on this issue. He notes that the attacks against 
Finland's special political status in the Russian press are increasing, 
with the Finns being accused of separatism. Also the official plans for 
the imperial integration of Finland's presently autonomous postal, tele-
graph, customs and monetary institutions are gaining momentum. "But 
however things turn out" Jalava writes in obvious refutation of Szin-
nyei's pessimism 
we will never, in spite of everything, ever become Russians, nor will 
we succumb to hopelessness in the least degree, convinced as we are 
that in the present day and age peoples cannot be destroyed by the 
rod and the whip as long as they do not comply with their own 
destruction) 
This is a truly Deákean statement of the principle of voluntary 
servitude; and it is no surprise that at the end of this letter Jalava 
relates to his friend his present endeavors to make Deåk and "the 
Hungarian's passive resistance" known to the, Finns because of their 
special relevance to the current situation in Finland.145  Jalava's next 
letter, however, communicates the kind of resignation to which he 
claimed he and his people would never succumb. Moreover, "armed 
opposition of any kind is inconceivable, it would be forthright insanity 
... perdition; it is necessary, as always with the weak and small ... to 
suffer and await a better time."146 
As in 1881, the "Russification" feared by Finns in 1890 was not 
carried out right away. Conflict between the opponents and defenders 
of Finland's autonomy remained for the most part on a literary level 
until 1899. Correspondence between the two men shows that Jalava 
supplied Szinnyei with some of the main pamphlets and books of this 
on-going polemic. Jalava's letters to Szinnyei between November 1895 
and December 1904 are missing; nevertheless, Szinnyei's letters reveal 
that well before the February Manifesto of 1899 Jalava renewed his 
inquiries concerning the Hungarian resistance tradition. For example, 
in a seven page letter of 30 April 1898 Szinnyei expresses his delight 
that Jalava will be conducting lectures on Hungarian "national 
development," and then proceeds to provide concrete details concern-
ing a variety of aspects of the Hungarian movement to refuse to 
143 Ibid., 13  September 1890. 
144  Jalaya to Szinnyei, 29 September 1890. 
145  Ibid., 29 September 1890. 
116 Ibid. 15 Deeember 1890. 
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cooperate with the Austrians in all areas of life.147  Through the coming 
years Jalava carried on his teaching concerning Deåk and Hungarian 
resistance. In August of 1902 Szinnyei wrote, congratulating Jalava:  
"its a pleasure to hear that your lectures on Deåk have attained such 
great popularity ... such lectures are in present circumstances very 
beneficial."148 
Four months later Szinnyei was again congratulating Jalava, this 
time for his new "very successful book," Frans Deåk.149  As mentioned, 
this book was published in the midst of Finno-Russian crisis. Szinnyei 
sought to assure his friend that he agrees with him that all is not lost, 
"because the Finnish people possesses qualities which will help it 
endure days of hardship until the dawn of a brighter time."150 Here 
again Szinnyei brings up the topic of passive resistance, citing details 
from historical research as well as from his own boyhood memories. 
He explains the relative lack of primary sources on the Hungarian 
resistance by the fact that although passive resistance was practiced 
universally (even by "nationalities which were enemy to us" living in 
Hungary) people did not dare to leave remains such as diaries and 
notes concerning their activities.151  
Thanks to the investigations of men like Jalava, and Szinnyei and 
their Fennomanian predecessors the Hungarian resistance became a 
much cited and discussed example in Finland after 1898. For example, 
the model of the Hungarian women's resistance to the Germanification 
of household life and the education of the young was propagated on 
a mass scale among Finnish women in 1902 52 It was during that time 
that the conservative Fennomanians, like Meurman and his influential 
colleague Aksel August Granfelt, vigorously turned against the Hun-
garian model.153  When seen through their eyes, and through Paasikivi's 
later interpretation, the propagation of the Hungarian model appears 
as the work of misguided radicals rather than as a consequence of 
Fennomanian cultural inquiry and development. 
142 Szinnyei to Jalava, 30 April 1898. 
148  Ibid., 29 August 1902 
149  Ibid., 24 December 1902. 15°  Ibid., 24 December 1902. 
151  Ibid., 24 December 1902. 
152  Parmanen 1936-1941, yol. 1, p. 349-350. 
153  Meurman 1903, p. 4; Meurman Muistelmia,  276; Granfelt 1905. pp. 8-16. 
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6. The Political Culture of Constitutionalist 
Resistance 
The Finnish Diet was convened in 1863 and a process of Diet reform 
was initiated. The more radical attempts for constitutional assertion 
were, however, thwarted. Although the Russian authorities would not 
allow the creation of an altogether new constitution or, for example, 
the transformation of the Senate into a parliamentary government, the 
new Diet Act ratified in 1869 did represent a victory for reformers. 
The constitutional duties of the tsar and the Diet were more clearly 
defined. The tsar was now obliged to convene the Diet at regular 
intervals, which in practice came to every three years. 
Although this period of reform paved the way for unprecedented 
political activity, no wide-scale broadening of the base of representation 
through suffrage extension took place. To be sure, the structure of the 
old Estate society dissolved, undergoing transformations characteristic 
of modern society (e.g., the formation of the capitalist strata and 
correspondingly the working class). Yet the upper class of Finnish 
society remained relatively closed. In general both Fennomanian con-
servatives and liberals opposed sociopolitical democratization. That 
political participation remained the prerogative of the elite is shown 
by the fact that on the eve of the establishment of the unicameral 
parliament in 1906 only about one tenth of the adult _population was 
represented by the four Estates of the Finnish Diet?' Furthermore, 
the various political ideologies which matured during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century were confined, for the most part, to the 
upper classes. Only with the intensification of the Finno-Russian crisis 
beginning in 1899 did nationalism spread on a truly wide scale; by that 
time it could no longer be confined to the narrow limitations dictated 
by the more conservative Fennomanians. 
Liberalism Between Two Manias 
The sociopolitical activity of the educated and politically represented 
upper strata of Finnish society in the decades preceding 1899 can be 
roughly divided into three categories, Fennomania, Svecomania and 
154 Between 1881 and 1910 the population of Finland increased from 2.06L00() to 
2,656,000. 
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liberalism. The problem of the entrenchment of the Swedish language 
in Finnish administrative and cultural life became a highly controversial 
issue: the so-called "language struggle" was one of the central factors 
determining the structure of Finnish politics. The Finnish Diet became 
roughly polarized along language struggle lines, with the Estates of 
the Clergy and the Peasantry dominated by the Fennomanians and 
the Nobility and the Burghers by the Svecomanians. 
Between the very active and vocal extremists of both sides there 
existed a broad spectrum of attitudes concerning the language question 
and related issues. It was during the very period of the political 
intensification of the language struggle that the liberal current of 
political thought began to mature among people associated with both 
camps. Although initially cooperation between liberals or constitution-
alist nationalists was to be hindered almost to the point of impossibility 
by the limits dictated by the language struggle, liberalism ultimately 
paved the way for new political configurations and more multifarious 
cooperation, undermining the dominance of the language question and 
isolating the more fanatical leaders of both sides. 
Liberal and constitutionalist tendencies had been present in Finnish 
political thinking at least since the period or revolution in Europe in 
1848. As has been seen, the events of 1861 were a major stimulus for 
liberal mobilization. In November of 1880 fifty-three influential heirs 
to the events of 1861, all in positions of considerable authority, con-
sidered it necessary to issue a concise statement of the fundamental 
principles and aims of liberalism. This is a very important statement 
of constitutionalist ideology — one might even say mythology. It is a 
manifesto for the freedom and justice of a European bourgeois elite 
against absolutism. As they saw it, the liberal principles which they 
espoused had been a fundamental part of Finnish political life ever 
since 1860.155 The stated purpose of this Program of the Liberal Party 
— Finland's first party program — was to consolidate liberal ranks, attract 
new support and to dispel the mistrust and misconceptions of liberalism 
purposely aroused by its opponents. The aim, however, was not to go 
so far as to create a formal party organization.156  
The stated guiding principle of the liberal project was to further the 
development of justice within the given historical circumstances.157  
However, before presenting and elaborating their immediate concrete 
155  "Liberaalisen puolueen ohjelma" 1965, pp. 12-20. 
156  Ibid., p. 12. 
157  Ibid., p. 13. 
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proposals these liberals revealed their interpretation of the European 
constitutionalist doctrine of resistance and revolution as adapted to 
Finnish conditions: 
In those states where despotism has firmly set itself against the demands 
of the spirit of the times or where time has not left behind any suitable 
groundwork for progress, let necessity act to bring about improvements 
through sudden transformation to an entirely new foundation.... But 
Finland has already for five hundred years been part of a system of 
justice the fundamental features of which have of old been: the right 
of free trade, freedom under law, limited monarchy, recognition of the 
peoples' will in legislation and taxation.... 
The authors see these features as the core of their society's institutions 
which are pervaded by a "liberal and national spirit." Furthermore: 
The task of each generation is, in accordance with its requirements and 
ideals, to expand, strengthen and beatify that societal-structure which 
it has received as an inheritance from its forefathers.t59 
To leave such reform work undone, they claim, may lead to destruction. 
The concrete reforms proposed in this document follow the basic 
motive of the liberals to put "a constitutional system more surely and 
more perfectly into effect in our country.„16° 
The seventy-five year old J.V. Snellman reacted with a ferocious 
and abusive diatribe against the liberal program. He called it a contract 
among those who up till now have alone controlled culture, wealth 
and power; they are all good for nothing, ignorant and full of empty 
rhetoric.161 To call them "liberal" is a bad joke, it is absolutely 
ridiculous. Futhermore, he thinks them outright deceptive for claiming 
responsibility for Finland's economic and sociopolitical progress. Most 
important for this study is Snellman's perception that the program is 
a statement of aggression in relation to Russia: "... what in God's name 
is going on? Are we being threatened by an invasion, is the danger so 
close?"162  Obviously he thought the liberal demand for a clearer 
definition of Finland's status to be an extreme provocation. The liberal 
and moderate wing of the Fennomanians were open enough to speak 
of what they saw as the promising points of the liberal program. They 
also noted as a good sign that not all its signers were adherents of 
158  Ibid., p. 13 
159  Ibid., p. 13. 
16° Ibid., p. 13. 
161  Snellman 1930b, passim.  
162  Ibid., pp. 526-532. 
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Svecomania. Over all, however, they retained an aloof distrust of the 
faction behind the program, adopting a wait-and-see attitude. They 
saw the program as a poor work, full of universally acceptable vagaries. 
Furthermore, it was a dangerous provocation of Russia.163 
The faction of liberals which stood behind this program did not 
mobilize a popular following. Some of them drifted into the camp of 
what was called the "Swedish party," which was associated with Sveco-
mania, while others, for the time being, remained semi-unaligned. Sve-
comania developed in response to the radical Fennomanian challenge. 
It is not difficult to understand why a great part of the Finnish upper 
strata, integrated as they were in the Swedish-European cultural sphere, 
found the demarcation of their internal cultural geography along Fen-
nomanian lines unacceptable. The Svecomanians purposely resisted 
the Fennomanian pressure to convert to Finnish language culture and 
put forth a counter-ideology which in its extreme forms was explicitly 
racist. 
The starting point for the politics of the Swedish party's leaders was 
the notion that two nationalities inhabit Finland, forming a single 
political whole.164  They saw Swedish culture — Swedish language, litera-
ture and the Swedish constitutional heritage — as the essential condition 
for Finnish survival in the struggle between Western and Eastern civili-
zation or between the West and Russia. For them it was a matter of 
choosing between civilization and barbarism, and they thought that 
the Fennomanian language struggle and cooperation with the Russians 
would lead to the latter. 65 They envisioned themselves as the heroic 
defenders of higher civilization against the East. But it should be added 
here that this attitude of representing higher civilization was common 
to Fennomania as well and proved to be an important ideological 
bridge in resistance to Russia between those of the various factions in 
Finnish politics not adhering to the racial-ethnic views of the extremists 
of either Svecomania or Fennomania. Svecomania, in its various 
interpretations and degrees of intensity did not dominate the Swedish 
party, it was counter-balanced, modified and restricted by liberalism. 
The Swedish party became an important organization of the liberal 
trend in Finnish politics. 
The liberal party program of 1880 is just one outstanding indicator 
of the development of liberalism in Finnish political culture. There 
existed several clubs or societies and groups which consciously 
163  "Liberaalisen puolueen ohjelma" 1881, pp. 1-11. 
164 Rommi 1964, pp. 65-67. 
165  Ibid., pp. 65-67. 
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cultivated the liberal tradition. One such group was taking shape among 
the Fennomanians at this time; their activities led to the split of the 
Fennomanians into the Old Finns and the Young Finns. 
In the early 1860s, as the lines of internal political contention began 
to be drawn, some of Snellman's zealous followers, such as Y.S. Yrjö-
Koskinen and Agathon Meurman, began to shape Fennomania into a 
political platform based on language-nationalism and rigid definitions 
of nationality and the "historical mission of the nation." This platform 
explicitly ruled out pluralist politics and the possibility of cooperation 
over party lines.l In the most literal sense these men were 
authoritarian Fenno-maniacs (maniacs in the sense of zealots or 
fanatics) who believed that there should be only one party in Finland, 
the Fenno-nationalist party. 
The Finnish national movement, however, was never to be confined 
to party limits. In this sense it is revealing to note that the first 
generation of educated Finns to truly master the Finnish language from 
childhood on, in all its literary and political aspects, rejected the more 
fanatical and sociopolitically conservative restrictions of the national-
ism of their predecessors. As this new generation came to its own in 
the 1880s it combined a liberalized language-nationalism (purged of 
Hegelism) with the emerging scientific world-view and a heightened 
awareness of social issues which made a broader base for political 
cooperation and pluralism. Again it must be emphasized that these 
are changes which were taking place in the upper strata of Finnish 
society, an upper strata which on the whole remained conservative in 
regard to the majority of the people in Finland. It would not be long 
before this upper strata would be called the "bourgeoisie," a bourgeoi-
sie on the road to violent confrontation with socialist Finland. 
One of the landmarks in the formation of the Fennomanian liberal 
current is an article entitled "Reflections on the Parties of the Diet of 
1877-1878," written in 1878 by Ernst Gustav Palmén (1884-1911), a 
prominent historian and statesman. Meurman's article on Finnish 
liberalism and passive resistance discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter was a explicit attack against Palmen's article. Obviously 
Meurman saw Palmén as a dangerous new threat: here was a innovative 
writer on the political cultural stage, writing in Finnish, prophesying 
and advocating the division of Fennomania. Palmen had a keen sense 
of history. He saw that what they called the "Finnish people" was 
something entirely new: "it is just as though our national and social 
166  Ibid..  pp. 17-18. 
124 
life is yesterday's child ... a truly-national culture is just now being 
born among us";167 and even the younger participants in the recent 
Diet had virtually witnessed the making of the now de facto "political 
independence" of Finland with their own eyes.168 By calling this a 
"contradiction which seems extraordinarily odd" Palmén showed an 
unusual understanding of nationalism: The Finnish nation has its roots 
in cultural structures which reach back far into time, but what is now 
the Finnish nation, Palmén explains, is the fruit of the total restructura-
tion of Finnish sociopolitical and economic life after 1860.169 
Palmén pays great homage to the liberal activists of the 1860s, seeing 
them as both nationalist and cosmopolitan. One feels that here he is 
pointing out a precedent for his own viewpoint, because he provides 
the example of a prominent liberal from that time who simultaneously 
worked for a freer social system as the foundation of national culture 
and strongly emphasized the need for a system in which the majority 
of Finns are represented through their own language.170 Palmen then 
proceeds, however, to go into a sharp and detailed criticism the contem-
porary liberal faction, many of which would be among those to sign 
the liberal party program in 1880. He shows a sincere appreciation for 
the positive accomplishments of the liberals, but points out the many 
ways in which liberalism has hypocritically become a front for reaction 
and narrow-mindedness. Everywhere the so-called liberals fight for 
free enterprise and constitutionalism, while at the same time consistent-
ly blocking the progress of the Finnish language in administration and 
education. One of the major messages of this article is that politics 
must not be carried out on the terms of the reactionary liberals associ-
ated with the Swedish party and the Svecomanians 
Palmen's criticism of the Fennomanians is much more subtle, and 
he pays due reverence to Snellman, Meurman and Yrjö-Koskinen. But 
along with his often repeated sincere expressions of reverence he 
certainly offered the Fennomanian patriarchs strong medicine. His 
advice was that "Fennomanian liberals" and "Fennomanian conserva-
tives" must form separate parties, a move which would provide a 
stronger foundation for the Finnish nationalist cause while preventing 
extremists of any persuasion from leading nationalism.171 
Palmen's article was published in Kirjallinen Kuukausilehti, the 
167 Palmén 1878, p.  42. 
168  Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
169  Ibid., p.43. 
170  Ibid., pp. 44, 45. 
171  Ibid., pp. 265-263. 
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literary monthly of the Fennomanians. Two years later, in December 
of 1880, Palmén and his associates founded a new Finnish language 
journal, Valvoja (the Guardian), which was soon to take a central place 
in Finnish cultural life. In 1906 one of the founders reflected back on 
the "prehistory" of the Valvoja circle. He explains that it originated 
among a circle of friends at the University in Helsinki in the 1870s. 
They were inspired by the liberal spirit of the times, and their attitude 
can be characterized as one of optimism, belief in progress and rejection 
of the old. They admired John Stuart Mill, Darwin and modern science 
in general, and were out to overthrow Hegel. At an early stage they 
were conscious of synthesizing Finnish nationalism and liberalism. They 
saw the old Fennomanians as reactionary, dogmatic, anti-scientific and 
the old liberals as downright hypocrites. They set out purposely to 
undermine the prevailing cultural political configuration and provide 
a new point of departure for liberals.172 
Liberalism and assertive constitutionalism can be seen as the general 
cultural foundation of passive resistance after 1898. Before examining 
some of the more particular ideological and organizational precursors 
of the passive resistance movement it is in place to present some 
remarks on the military in Finland. 
Nationhood and the Military 
The study of resistance and contention in Finland, although focusing 
on nonmilitary cultural defense and passive resistance, would be incom-
plete without providing an understanding of the role of armed force 
in Finnish society. Futhermore, what came to be called the "military 
question" was to become one of the central points of contention in 
the clash between Finnish autonomy and Russian imperial interests. 
Before the twentieth century there were no armed rebellions, or 
even noteworthy schemes for armed struggle, against Russia in Finland. 
Throughout the century, however, Finnish statesmen agreed, with very 
few exceptions, that their country needed its own military system. The 
literary figures of the nationalist movement very effectively cultivated 
and propagated the basic myths, or narratives, of military heroism and 
values.' 3 Behind the scene of Finnish concepts of peaceful coexistence 
one finds lingering a hidden spirit of resistance which persisted in 
12  Tudeer 1906, pp. 1-9. 
123  Niemi 1980, see chapter VIII and English summary, pp. 159-169. 
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various degrees of latency throughout the entire period of Russian 
rule. In this hidden tradition peaceful cultural defense and construction 
was conceived as preparation for a time to come when open rebellion 
to "loathsomely cunning" Russian repression would be possible.174 
Finland's only chance was seen to lie in an international challenge to 
Russian power from the West and East. As Matias Aleksanteri Castren, 
the first university professor of the Finnish language, put it in a letter 
to his colleague Snellman in 1844: 
Then we from the Finnish swamps will also rise, shouting destruction 
to the Muscovites. But until that time, thus thinking, we must refrain 
from all clamor, particularly since resistance will not be tolerated, 
neither can it be carried out.175 
Castrén straightforwardly wrote that linguistic science was for him 
merely a weapon of nationalism. He set out to demonstrate to the 
Finnish people their place in world history. He is the perfect example 
of a Finnish nationalist who could not accept the Snellman, and later 
conservative Fennomanian, line maintaining the mutual exclusivity of 
the struggle for political freedom and cultural defense.176 The linguistic 
work, nationalistic mission and attitude toward resistance of M.A. 
Castrén cannot but bring to mind the work and ideas of the Fennoma- 
nian Antti Jalava many decades later.177 
In connection with European-wide armament escalation and efforts 
to more systematically mobilize human resources for military endea-
vors on behalf of nation-states, imperial Russia adopted universal con-
scription in 1874. Finnish political decision makers recognized that the 
only alternative to participation in the imperial army would be the 
formation of their own military forces. In one of those concessionary 
moves by which the Russian rulers favored Finnish autonomy, the tsar 
signed the Finnish National Conscription Act in 1878, allowing for the 
formation of a separate army. This did not, however, take place without 
the objections of important Russian officials, and was restricted to a 
ten year trial period.178 
The Conscription Act of 1878 was preceded by a series of debates 
which are highly significant in revealing the psychological role of the 
174 Castrén 1931, pp. 119-121. 
175 Ibid., pp. 119-121. 
16 Ibid., pp. 119-121. 
177 It also brings to mind other prominent Fennomanians such as the ethnologist Otto 
Donner and the historian and statistician K.F. Ignatius, both of whom were staunch 
advocates of resistance. 
178 For the history of the Finnish Conseription Act, see Seitkari 1951. 
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military in Finnish history, just as very similar debates did throughout 
Europe. On the concrete level there was no major mobilization of 
Finnish armed forces until the revolutionary period preceding 1918. 
But Finnish troops did, indeed, participate in crushing the Polish 
rebellion in the 1830s and in fighting off the British during the Crimean 
War (1854-1856). Both events contributed to the maintenance of 
martial spirit in Finland. 
Early in the century the elite of Finnish decision makers realized 
the internal benefits a more comprehensive military system would have 
for establishing social coherence and order. They sought unsuccessfully 
to convince Tsar Alexander I that a reorganized independent Finnish 
army would serve Russian interests. They saw an essential role for the 
army in developing the "national spirit," in mobilizing the masses for 
the purpose of the emerging modern nation by instilling them with a 
firm sense of obedience, order and a will-to-labor through the army 
as an instrument of national education.179 Yrjö-Koskinen expressed 
the view of the centrality of the military in nationhood in 1870 thusly: 
"We cannot be the only people in the world to stand weaponless if 
we want to retain our small place among nations";180 and in 1876 he 
put it this way: 
The Finnish people has slowly, step by step, risen to maturity; now the 
highest distinction of maturity, military capacity [aseellisuus], must be 
granted to it. The bearing of arms ... is the prime condition for the 
survival of nations.181 
Only through the attainment of military power, asserts Yrjö-Koskinen,  
do nations "become real individuals [henkilöiksi,  persons] in the perfect 
sense. >9182 
As Snellman expressed it, a country with a constitutional system 
does not enjoy its full rights unless it can defend itself against internal 
and external enemies through armed force. He, like other influential 
Finns, looked to the Swiss and Prussian military systems as models.  
Snellman put forth another argument which is strikingly similar to one 
of the central premises of today's Finnish military establishment. He 
claimed that Finland could only attain credibility and respect for its 
autonomous status in the eyes of Russia, and thus ensure its survival, 
by developing the capacity to assist in the defense of the Empire; but 
179 Danielson—Kalmari 1922, pp. 147-186. 
180 Yrjö—Koskinen 1870, p.  318. 
181  Yrjö—Koskinen 1876, p.  12. 
182  Ibid., p.  12. 
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only on Finnish soil, of course. Behind this view is the recurrent idea 
in Finnish political tradition that Finland must be able to fight for itself 
or Russia will do it.183 It also contains the seeds of one of the dilemmas 
in Finnish politics: Where is the borderline between the credibility of 
Finnish military force in harmonizing with Russian interests and, con-
trariwise, when does such armed force pose a threat to those interests, 
giving rise to mistrust regarding Finnish armament and political inten-
tions in general? 
The Legal Battle and Early Russification184 
The military question came to play an important role in triggering off 
the "era of Russian oppression" in 1899. Earlier it was observed that 
the primary motives for the Russian occupation of Finland were 
military, not colonial or imperialistic in the economic sense. The crisis 
beginning in 1899, however, was in no way confined to problems of 
military strategy. In the second half of the nineteenth century a whole 
set of unfavorable circumstances for Finnish autonomy developed. 
Among them were: increasingly fanatic Russian nationalism; awareness 
in Russian ruling circles of the growing military threat of Germany 
and her allies and; social unrest and Russian revolutionary mobilization. 
The military question became the instrument and rationale for the 
effort to assimilate or Russify Finland. As the Russian Minister of War 
A.N. Kuropatkin expressed it in 1893: 
The essential defensive and security interests of the Empire in the 
direction of Finland require that this borderland near the capital [St. 
Petersburg] be more swiftly and completely assimilated into the tsardom 
than others.'ss 
Just as Finnish leaders saw military service as a means of education 
and a way of mobilizing the masses for the aims of the nation-state, 
Kuropatkin and his colleagues saw the integration of Finnish troops 
into the Russian army as a central means for the assimilation of Finland 
into the Empire. This would organize the Finns for the cause of Russian 
nationalism. Gradually the Russian policy of dealing with the Finns 
through appeasement and concessions was abandoned. During the era 
183 Seitkari 1951, pp. 80, 83, 92-93; Rein 1928, p. 547. 
184 For the broad background of Russification, see Thaden 1981. 
1R5 Quoted in Polvinen 1984, pp. 77-78. 
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of crisis, according to the Paasikiviean view, Finland was overwhelming-
ly pressed by a combination of "realistic" Russian security interests 
and an imbroglio of irrational factors which made coexistence 
extremely difficult. This estranged and embittered the once loyal Finns.  
Paasikivi described this irrationality from the Finnish point of view in 
its hopeless extreme by quoting the words of Dostoevsky: "We hope 
peace for all people, we desire good for the whole world, but first this 
world must become Russian — yes, thoroughly Russian."186  
During the decades preceding the February Manifesto of 1899 and 
the new governor-general's program for the administrative and cultural 
Russification of Finland, the Finnish political literati met the increasing 
attacks of the "Finland eaters" through the means of the "Legal Battle." 
This can be characterized as a long drawn out propaganda struggle. It 
was waged between the ideologists of both sides — mostly historians, 
legal experts and journalists with political influence — on the pages of 
the domestic and international press and in highly polemical scholarly 
works. The principles of constitutional defense provided the foundation 
for a common Legal Battle front among the whole range of otherwise 
factional Fennomanians and liberals.18 
For the Finns the Legal Battle was the struggle to defend the 
autonomous Finnish political system as it had developed through the 
decades. It became, moreover, a struggle for "justice" with this term 
referring to far more than legal formalities.188 On the one hand there 
was Russian justice, the Russian nationalist morality with its aggressive 
assertion of despotism, autocracy, Russian language, Orthodox Christ-
ianity and Slavic ethnic superiority. On the other hand was Finnish 
upper class justice, based on its distinct national political culture. Here 
were two potentially mutually exclusive moral systems, two truths, two 
Rights, on a course of collision, perhaps ultimately with no objective 
truth or justice to referee. Both were on the offensive, and both were 
on the defensive. The legal groundwork which had hitherto provided 
a pragmatic mode of cooperation between the two was becoming 
increasingly offensive to Russian nationalists. 
In the Legal Battle, Finnish truth did not have the power to compel 
or persuade Russian truth. Yet the ideological and organizational 
heritage of the Legal Battle was later to form an essential part of the 
passive resistance movement. This relationship can be illustrated by 
186 Paasikivi 1957a, pp. 30-32. 
187 For the history of the Legal Battle, see Torvinen 1965. 
188 "Justice" as understood here in the broadest possible sense to indicate the social 
ideal or field of values upon which just resistance is based. 
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the example of the work of Leo Mechelin (1839-1914).189 Mechelin 
was the embodiment of Legal Battle and assertive elitist 
constitutionalism. During his influential career he worked as a legal 
scholar, professor of law, Diet representative, and senator and carried 
out a host of other political and cultural activities. The liberal program 
of 1880 was to a great extent his work. Already by the mid-1870s 
Mechelin began to spearhead official Finnish efforts to refute alleged 
Russian misconceptions of, and attacks against, Finnish justice. In the 
coming decades he wrote a profusion of pamphlets and articles in 
defense of Finland; many of them were published throughout Europe 
in a variety of languages. 
Mechelin was Finland's foremost pioneer in caring for the Finnish 
national image abroad and raising the Legal Battle onto the internation-
al stage, a task which he carried out in a systematic manner. His most 
famous and controversial work was Precis du droit public de la Grand-
duche de Finlande of 1886. More than any other, this work 
internationally spread the concept of Finland's separate political 
existence. It's English translation (A Precis of the Law of Finland) was 
delivered to Gladstone and even distributed in the English 
Parliament.190 This work was met with fierce counter-attacks by 
Russian nationalist ideologists. At home conservative Fennomanians 
saw Mechelin's work as recklessly bold and provocative, a danger to 
Finno-Russian relations. Nevertheless, Mechelin was joined in the Le-
gal Battle by Fennomanians and liberals alike. 
Mechelin played a key role in incorporating the international and 
domestic organization of the Legal Battle into passive resistance after 
1898. Nevertheless, like many of his colleagues who belonged to the 
older generation he apparently was not an instigator of passive 
resistance in its more active or radical forms. This is not surprising 
considering that he was clearly no advocate of the swift expansion of 
popular democracy. Nonetheless, he expressly endorsed passive 
resistance at all stages of the struggle, and was among those who were 
prepared to further radicalize the Constitutionalist, and Finnish-parti-
cularist, struggle against the Russian regime if certain necessary condi-
tions were realized. 
By the early 1880s, after a couple of decades of development, nation-
alist Panslavism and Slavophilism had become powerful influences in 
Russian official circles. During the reign of Tsar Alexander III (1881-
1894), a series of moves were taken to redefine Finland's juridic-politic- 
189 The most exhaustive biography of Mechelin is Nordenstreng 1936, 1937. 
190  Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 110-115. 
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al status within the Empire, including plans for a new Form of Govern-
ment. Yet the more comprehensive designs of the Russian nationalists 
for what Finns perceived as a coup d'etat were not entirely approved 
of by Alexander and were therefore frozen until the reign of Nicholas 
11.191 This period saw the assimilation of Finland's hitherto independent 
postal system into that of Russia, but the planned abolition of the 
Finnish customs administration, monetary system and army were left 
for the future. 
The Mass Organizational Predecessors of Post-1898 
Resistance 
As mentioned, Fennomania was never confined to formal political 
party limits: it was above all a sociopolitical cultural movement. The 
activist core of Fennomania was composed of zealous educators. In 
1874 they founded an organization called the Kansanvalistusseura or 
the Society for the Enlightenment of the People. Its aim was the 
authoritarian formation, civilization and education of the people, and 
its motto was "light to the people."192 It created a network of 350 
agents throughout the nation with the number of registered members 
remaining at about 5,000 until the end of the century. 
The Kansanvalistusseura was Finland's first independent mass ci-
tizens organization, and was surpassed in membership by other associa-
tions only in the late 1880s and mid-1890s.193  This society had a strong 
impact on Finnish cultural life through a wide variety of activities, such 
as the organization of massive festivals and the publishing and 
distribution of popular editions of fiction and nonfiction. Antti Jalava's 
work on Deåk was among them. Agathon Meurman was the director 
of the organization for twenty years, up until 1905. Along with many 
of his colleagues he explicitly, in the Snellman spirit, understood 
education of the people as a counter-revolutionary activity, the 
guarantee of social order in a world of growing class confrontation. 
The organizational secretary of the Kansanvalistusseura from 1878-
1905 was the physician and prominent leader of the temperance 
191  Torvinen 1965, pp. 34-35, 175-181; on Alexander III's policies regarding Finland 
see Schweitzer 1978, pp. 103-372. 
'`n Liikanen 1987, pp. 126-127. 
193  Ibid., p. 130; on the emergence, development and interrelation of mass organizations 
in Finland, see Alapuro et al. 1987. 
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movement, Aksel August Granfelt (1846-1919).194 Granfelt was a 
staunch enemy of passive resistance; he specifically sought to show 
that the Hungarian model was entirely invalid for Finland and was 
based on a misinterpretation of Hungarian history.195 
There are two important reasons for describing the Fennomanian 
popular enlightenment movement here. First it supplies the back-
ground on the anti-resistance or compliancy faction after 1898. Second-
ly, I would like to point out that the Fennomanian sociopolitical cultural 
movement provided a direct organizational precedent for the organiza-
tion of the resistance network throughout Finland. Perhaps ironically, 
the Kansanvalistusseura along with the later Finnish Youth League 
movement helped cultivate the ground for the adroit hierarchical 
organization of resistance. Furthermore, many of the resistance activists 
had grown up in Fennomanian circles; they consciously and effectively 
applied the techniques of kansanvalistus or enlightenment of the people 
for the resistance movement. It is no coincidence that as resistance 
spread, and other groups mobilized, the Old Finn anti-resistance  
Kansanvalistusseura lost its following. 
Three other movements should be mentioned as background to the 
era of passive resistance: the temperance movement, the youth associa-
tion movement and the socialist workers' movement. As elsewhere in 
Europe, the temperance movement played a central role in the social 
organization of workers in Finland. It was initiated by the Fennoma-
nians in 1884 with the establishment of a nationwide organization, the 
Friends of Temperance, under the directorship of A.A. Granfelt.  
Membership reached 10,000 in the early 1890s and 20,000 by 1902. Not 
surprisingly, the aims of this Fennomanian controlled movement were 
closely related to those of the Kansanvalistusseura,  namely, the 
formation of the common people according to the ideals of the 
nationalist elite. The temperance movement, however, also helped 
create the foundation for the more independent political organization 
of the workers.196  By 1900 the Finnish youth association movement 
had established 338 branches throughout Finland with over 22,000 
members. It was an ardent Finnish nationalist movement under 
Constitutionalist Young Finn leadership. Consequently, its organiza-
tional structure and activists became part of the passive resistance 
movement.197  
194  Liikanen 1987, pp. 132-137. 
195 Granfelt 1905. 
196 Sulkunen, Alapuro 1987, pp. 142-156. 
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The formation and political organization of the working class in 
Finland before 1905 was an exceptionally peaceful process. The early 
Finnish labor union activity of the 1880s was primarily under the 
patriarchal guidance of the upper educated strata of society. Gradual 
loss of faith in these leaders, however, paved the way for socialism, 
which began to take root in the early 1890s. Socialists, some of whom 
were from the educated class and had traveled extensively, gained 
power within the unions. By 1895 a group of socialist leaders began 
to rise to influence, and the newspaper Työmies (the Worker) became 
the main organ of the workers' movement's struggle for independence 
from "bourgeois" domination. 
Increasing demands throughout workers' circles for autonomous 
political organization bore fruit in July of 1899; at the national Congress 
of Labor Union Representatives the independent Workers' Party came 
into existence. Although the Workers' Party did not as yet aggressively 
assert socialism, it is clear that the majority of representatives had 
already fully adopted a socialist ideology and program. It was during 
this time that Marxism began to have a notable influence on Finnish 
socialism, especially with the growing availability in Finnish of Marxist 
literature. In 1903 the Finnish Workers' Party was renamed as the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party. It adopted a program fashioned after 
that of the Austrian Social Democrats, which remained for decades 
the foundation for working class political action.198 In spite of the 
growing bitter antipathy and ideological incompatibility existing 
between the workers' movement and the Constitutionalist front (each, 
to be sure, having their own factions as well) significant cooperation 
between the two in passive resistance was possible before 1905. 
The Affinity of Passive Resistance and Cultural Defense 
By the end of the century a complex cultural heritage of means of 
contention, which can be described as a repertoire of approaches to 
national survival, resistance and assertion in relation to Russia, had 
developed in Finland. These approaches can be found in various rela-
tions to one another, varying from mutual exclusivity to close intercon-
nection depending on the point of view from which they are studied 
and the circumstances in which they were applied. The components 
of this repertoire of contention can be enumerated as follows: 
t98 Soikkanen 1961, pp. 21, 40, 44, 47-52, 64-70; Hyvönen 1963, pp. 17, 25, 28-31, 34-
35, 38-39, 54-55, 57. 
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1. Cultural defense: the development of an inviolable society through 
cultural advancement and progress in civilization; 
2. Constitutionalist assertion: this developed into the so called Legal 
Battle of polemical literary confrontation with Russia, based on 
juridical and historical argumentation; 
3. Compliance: the policy of accommodation or submission to Russia's 
will; 
4. Passive resistance: a more intensive application of approaches 1. 
and 2. combined with a whole range of means of protest, noncoopera-
tion and struggle which excluded acts of violence against persons; 
5. Violent struggle. 
In the political thought of  Snellman constitutionalist political assertion 
was to be strictly subordinated to cultural progress as a long term 
strategy for national development and defense. Moreover, he often 
saw the two as a dichotomy, as antithetical, particularly when constitu-
tionalist assertion was given priority. Snellman associated passive 
resistance with extreme political assertion, with reckless, groundless 
revolutionary activity. He thus rejected it as contrary to Finnish cultural 
defense. When Meurman invoked Snellman's authority in 1878 in his 
attack against liberalism and passive resistance the circumstances were 
very different than in 1861. In the early 1860s Snellman could see 
passive resistance and popular demonstrations as foreign innovations 
advocated not only by domestic liberals, but also by agitators in Sweden 
who sought to stimulate strife between Finland and Russia. In the late 
1870s, however, passive resistance could no longer be associated with 
foreign agitation. With the emergence of liberal Finnish nationalism 
the way was paved for its compatibility with cultural defense. Meurman 
could not succeed in associating Palmen with pro-Swedish anti-
nationalist agitation. For his part, Palmén never became a radical 
passive resister, but like many Finns took a rather ambivalent middle 
stand between resistance and accommodation. 
This ambivalent middle position tending toward accommodation and 
even compliance is comprehensible from the perspective of Finnish 
political culture. In contrast for example to the Poles, whose will for 
freedom expressed itself in violent rebellion and conspiracy, the Finns 
learned early in the nineteenth century that their security could be 
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greatly enhanced through conservativism, loyalty and peacefulness, 
which were rewarded by the Russians. Finnish policy makers made 
good the famous advice of an early Russian governor-general in 
realizing that instead of direct confrontation it was more beneficial 
that nothing should be heard from Finland, "neither good nor bad."199 
Proof of its enduring relevance in Finnish political culture, President 
Urho K. Kekkonen (1956-1981) revived this principle: in the Paasiki-
vian style he cited the notion as expressed by Yrjö-Koskinen that it is 
at times tactically more appropriate to pursue a "policy of remaining 
invisible," a "politique d'effacement. "200 The effectiveness of the culture 
of mutual Finno-Russian accommodation is displayed by the fact that, 
in spite of serious clashes of interest, neither the Finns nor the Russians 
resorted to active armed force for the resolution of mutual conflicts 
until the revolutionary period and the intensification of international 
tension leading to the First World War. 
The Finnish policy of accommodation should not be mistaken for 
some kind of pacifism or philosophy of brotherhood toward Russia. 
Some researchers have pointed out that there was indeed a strong 
expression of the value of peace, of the longing for peace, in Finnish 
culture which even gave rise to explicit, "Kantian," philosophies of 
positive peace and, later, to a truly pacifistic movement which included 
Tolstoyan Christian resistance.2°1  Yet, overall, the purer manifestations 
of pacifism remained rather limited and uninfluential. The Finnish 
approach can perhaps best be classified under the concepts of "realism" 
or "Realpolitik" as understood in the Machiavellian and Bismarckian 
sense of the terms.202 What is remarkable here is that, perhaps in a 
way unique to all Europe, Finnish thinkers rejected — at least outwardly 
— the idea that armed force is a necessary ingredient of  Realpolitik;  
however, as will be recalled they did see it as a highly desirable ingredi-
ent. 
In tracing the genesis of the principles of passive resistance as applied 
after 1898 Finnish historians have attributed particular significance to 
a statement written by the Constitutionalist Baron Rabbe Axel Wrede 
(1851-1938) in 1891 entitled "Blick på ställningen i landet" (a glance 
at the situation in the land); his work is seen as the first formulation 
and manifesto of passive resistance.203 It is not difficult to understand 
19" Jussila 1969, pp. 162, 234. 
200  Kekkonen, 1982, p.180. 
201 Niemi 1980, passim; Käkönen 1986, pp. 72-87. 
202 This interpretation is in keeping with the Paasikivian viewpoint. 
2°3 For a few examples, among others, see Estlander 1931, pp. 228— 231; Federley 1958, 
pp. 121-122; Hyvämäki 1960, p. 78; Rommi 1964, pp. 108-109. 
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why Wrede's work is interpreted as the first statement of passive 
resistance. In October of 1900, nine years after it had spread in 
handwritten form among the whole Finnish intelligentsia, the resisters 
reprinted Wrede's work in their underground press; it was thus 
circulated in thousands of copies in both Swedish and Finnish.2°4 
Nevertheless, in the 1900 forward to Wrede's paper the resistance 
editors do not say that it is somehow monumental or unique in the 
history of the resistance tradition. They simply reprint it as a 
noteworthy statement of relevance for the present time. They are also 
careful to place it in the larger context of the constitutional conflict 
going on when it was written.205 Years later J.N. Reuter, the former 
secretary of the resistance organization and one of the main chroniclers 
of the resistance movement, gave Wrede's statement an outstanding 
place in the struggle against "violations of Finland's law [justice, rätt] 
before 1899."206 He cites and analyses the work at length, commenting 
that: "of most significance in this interesting document is, however, 
Wrede's formulation of the program for resistance conceived of on 
legal grounds, which was to be applied later during the `years of 
oppression'."207 
There is nothing inappropriate, of course, with using Wrede's paper 
as a convenient example and expression of pre-1899 constitutional 
resistance thought. Nevertheless, its significance within its own ideolog-
ical context should not be exaggerated. Nor should undue direct and 
singular causal influence be attributed to it in relation to later resistance 
thought. It was one part of broader heritage. As Wrede himself 
expressed it at that time, the principles of resistance which he advocated 
were well known (Snellman, for that matter, had already said the same 
thing in 1861).208 Moreover, fixation on Reuter's interpretation of 
Wrede's significance serves the cause of those who, following the 
Meurman tradition, seek to label passive resistance as the invention 
of the Swedish party faction, to which Wrede did indeed belong. Just 
to show how misleading it is to attribute the formulation or invention 
of passive resistance to one faction or one man, one can interpret the 
facts to show that Meurman himself was one of the outstanding 
predecessors of passive resistance. This example is no mere contrivance 
since the resistance writers themselves appealed to Meurman's ear-
lier work, just as they did to Wrede's. 
2°4  Wrede 1891.  lo5  Fria Ord/Vapaita Sanoja, 2 October 1900, p. 1. 
2°6 Reuter 1928, pp. 1-18. 
207 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
208 Wrede 1891, p. 1. 
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At the end of 1902 the resistance organization reprinted and 
distributed 25,000 copies of one of Meurman's defenses of Finnish 
legal morality which first appeared as a newspaper article and then as 
a leaflet in 1890.209 In this article Meurman appears as a forthright 
fighter in the current Legal Battle polemical confrontation with the 
Russian nationalist denigrators of the Finnish constitutional heritage. 
Against these Russian attacks Meurman seeks to protect the Finns' 
international reputation for "deep respect for the law."210 When the 
Finn comprehends what law requires he "submits without argument. 
Law is holy, that is all."211  This obedience to law is the foundation for 
the whole "societal order which is the prerequisite not only of our 
development but of our existence as well."212  Meurman maintains that 
as the bone of contention between two predominant powers Finland 
has survived solely by persevering on the indestructible foundation of 
legality and honesty: "Even in the most awful circumstances it has not 
asked what perhaps might momentarily appear expedient, but only 
what is right and what duty demands." 13  
Meurman expresses the profound indignation of the Finns toward 
the claim by anti-Finnish Russian newspapers that the tsar is not bound 
to maintain the fundamental laws of Finland holy and inviolable, but 
may change them arbitrarily at will. He sees the doctrine of the 
arbitrariness of law as a tremendous threat to social order. In forceful 
defiance he pronounces that 
we thinking Finns will at all times resist this doctrine from the depths 
of our hearts. Our doctrine is, and will remain in all confrontations: 
persevere relentlessly on the road of law and duty no matter how you 
are violated. Whatever tempests may occur, heaven will finally redeem 
him who stays on the road of justice and eternal truth. Justice will 
prevail in the end.214 
For good measure, as an epilogue to Meurman's declaration, the 
resisters included a citation from the influential university lectures of 
the Fennomanian jurist Jaakko Forsman (d. 1899). Forsman was Yrjö-
Koskinen's brother — whose name was originally Forsman — and close 
political associate. The topic of this citation is the right and duty of 
officials or lesser magistrates to disobey their superiors. It straight- 
209 Reuter 1928, p. 330; Estlander 1945, pp. 260-261. 210  Meurman 1902a. 
211  Ibid.  
212  Ibid.  
213  Ibid.  
214  Ibid.  
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forwardly emphasizes that if the measures of a superior official are 
illegal or lack legal justification then lesser officials are obliged to 
disobey. If they do not do so they are also guilty 215 
Like Forsman, Wrede was one of Finland's foremost legal scholars. 
For many years he was a leader in the Diet, working particularly on 
legislative committees, and he later made a significant contribution to 
the foundation of the legal system of independent Finland. His state-
ment of 1891 is a detailed analysis of the country's political situation. 
On the background of the recent imperial integration measures and 
the express plans of the Russian nationalists in regard to Finland,  
Wrede sees a very dismal future for his country. If these plans are put 
into effect little will remain of Finland's political institutions and 
fundamental laws: Finland will be reduced to a mere dominion, and 
its Western political culture will be destroyed.216  Wrede discusses how 
the Finnish officials, press and citizenry had thus far reacted to the 
crisis and how he thought they should act in the future. Among the 
details of this discussion is found Wrede's famous concise statement 
of the principles of such action. Wrede observes that it hardly needs 
to be mentioned that only "peaceful and legal means" are acceptable 
for the Finns; this is a self-evident fact which follows from the respect 
for law and loyalty to the ruler which have been long-time hallmarks 
of "our people":2  17 
Moreover, there exist certain means which we have not only the right, 
but also the duty to use. It has often been said that we must set ourselves 
on the sturdy foundation of legality, never on any condition departing 
from it. Thus we must always, when need be, defend our fundamental 
laws [grundlagar] in word and deed; we must always obey the law 
ourselves, even in apparently insignificant matters. We must never 
cooperate with the violation of our constitution örfattning] and never 
recognize illegal measures as legal or justified. 
These excerpts from the writings of  Meurman, Forsman and Wrede 
are expression of a common political culture. This culture provided 
the ideological foundation for radical Constitutionalist resistance 
following 1898. When the resisters invoked Meurman's words in 1902 
they were doing so as an act of agitation and propaganda. They sought 
to reveal the hypocrisy of  Meurman and the compliants in general. 
They certainly felt more affinity for Wrede. This is because (in spite 
215  Ibid.  
216  Wrede 1891, p. 1. 
217  Ibid., p. 1. 
218  Ibid., p. 1. 
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of the fact that Wrede and Meurman shared a common mental 
cosmology and both agreed that the Russian regime was violating 
Finnish law) Wrede continued to staunchly adhere to the principles 
which they both declared in 1890-1891 while Meurman yielded. 
Moreover, conservative Fennomanians like Meurman and Yrjö-
Koskinen held a deep set fanatic animosity and political rivalry for 
Wrede and his colleagues which made it difficult for them to cooperate 
on the basis of their common political-cultural heritage. It was the 
Fennomanian extremists which helped blur for posterity the fact that 
passive resistance had a broad basis in Finnish society and was not 
masterminded by the Svecomanian elite. 
Wrede's 1891 statement of the basics of Finnish legal morality was, 
then, by no means ideologically unique. As has been seen in the previ-
ous section dealing with Hungary, Fennomanians had been cultivating 
the ideological ground for resistance from the 1860s on just as much 
as their political rivals. Jalava's published and private writings and 
inquiries from the late 1870s onward are ample proof of this. Obviously 
Jalava was not working in a vacuum. Take for example an essay written 
in 1883 for an minor newspaper far away from the capital in the 
northern city of Oulu by an eighteen year old student. This young man 
explains to his readers that "we" must remain in accord with Russia 
if at all possible, since "open rebellion" and "public struggle" against 
it under present conditions is impossible.219 The language issue is no 
longer of foremost concern; the Finns must now prepare themselves 
for the worst in relation to Russia. He advises them to practice "passive 
resistance against Russianness [venäläisyyttä)" in all aspects of national 
life to awaken and strengthen national awareness and to make it clear 
to every member of "our" nation that "we are not Russia's subjects."22° 
This youth, whose name was Kaarlo Ståhlberg (1865-1952), had 
been raised in the most Fennomanian of environments. He went on 
to join the Constitutionalist front after 1898, becoming a significant 
organizer of resistance. Later he became the first president of the 
independent Republic of Finland. It is obvious that the "passive 
resistance" which he spoke of at the tender age of eighteen was an 
idea that had already been internalized by people throughout the 
nation. Ståhlberg's statement of 1883 looks like Snellmanian cultural 
defense combined with openly defiant passive resistance. For the later  
Ståhlberg passive resistance was to mean systematic noncooperation 
and organized defiance. It is, however, unclear exactly what he meant 
219 As quoted in Blomstedt 1969, pp. 26-27. 
220  Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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by the term when he was eighteen; it was probably equivocal to most 
of people who employed it as well. 
When, in 1900, Arvid Neovius wrote that the concept of passive 
resistance has its own clearly definable essence he was only partially 
correct. Obviously what he, as an ideologist, was aiming to do was to 
put forth one interpretation of passive resistance as the right one. But 
there existed other interpretations and the question of what types of 
action passive resistance was to include or exclude always remained 
controversial. For Snellman passive resistance was an internationally 
known weapon of radical constitutionalism, a revolutionary type of 
action. Snellman, however, also knew of another more passive type of 
passive resistance which he described as characteristic of the Finnish 
people at an earlier time. Meurman also knew of this distinction. He 
associated radical passive resistance with the constitutionalist activists 
of 1861 and "passive" passive resistance with the attitude of the Finns 
toward the Russians in the first decades following annexation. 
In spite of his vocal diatribes against passive resistance Meurman 
himself seems to have fluctuated between the two forms. In what was 
probably the only pre-1899 attempt in Finland to give "passive resist-
ance" a dictionary definition Meurman wrote: 
Passive resistance: resistance which does not resort to positive acts of 
opposition, but through its noncompliance creates obstructions.'-Z' 
This definition characterizes the ambiguity of the concept of passive 
resistance prior to 1899. Where is the borderline between "positive," 
"true" or "actual" acts of opposition and "taipumattomuus" (noncom-
pliance, stubbornness, unyieldingness, immovability, resoluteness, etc.) 
to be drawn? This question expresses a dilemma genuinely experienced 
by all the factions of the Finnish upper strata. 
The power of the conservative Fennomanians had long been 
supported by the Russians. Obviously they had the most to gain from 
compliancy. Compliancy was also their weapon against internal 
opposition. Hence it is easy to understand why they condemned more 
straightforward types of resistance as fruitless and dangerous. Yet, 
what they understood as "Russification" was not in their interest either. 
There existed a high degree of uncertainty among them as to the 
appropriate course of action. This uncertainty can be illustrated by a 
private letter from the archcompliant Fenno-fanatic Yrjö-Koskinen to 
his son on 10 December 1898, two months before the promulgation 
of the February Manifesto: 
221 Meurman 1883-1890, vols. 7-8, p. 630. 
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In the field of politics matters are as mixed up as possible. Perhaps the 
new governor-general would not by nature be a bad man; but he is 
nothing but a gefreiter on assignment here obeying the orders of the 
ruling gang of robbers [in Russia]. Just the same I think the situation 
is not so dangerous for us if we do not let ourselves be startled. The 
chief intrigue of the prevailing policy is to make us commit political 
suicide; perhaps they [the Russians] will not dare to begin this 
murderous work; if they finally do we can recover. In other words: 
those rights which we ourselves consent to surrender we will never get 
back, but those taken by force, yes. Passive resistance will be our 
salvation. In Russia itself we will have much support.222  
Obviously it is no coincidence that Yrjö-Koskinen's outlook in this 
letter is highly Deåkean in spirit; indeed, parts of it approach verbatim 
citation of Deåk. His colleague Jalava was preaching Deåkean resist-
ance at the time. Yrjö-Koskinen himself had a thorough knowledge 
of the Hungarian resistance ever since the 1860s. Clearly what he meant 
by "passive resistance" was a type of action at least as active as the 
resistance practiced in Hungary. Was Meurman's and Yrjö-Koskinen's 
advocacy of passive resistance and relentless refusal to surrender to 
violations of their nation's law and order simple hypocrisy? After all, 
early in 1899 they and their colleagues began to systematically comply 
with the very type of violations which they had earlier vowed should 
never be given in to. 
Perhaps a better term for describing the later Fennomanian advocacy 
of compliance is "power politics" or Realpolitik. Admittedly before 
1899 those Old Finns who were to go the way of compliance were still 
uncertain as to the best course of action and that in 1899 they became 
convinced that compliance as cultural defense was the best approach 
to national survival. However, early in 1899 it was obvious that they 
were losing their following. They could not mobilize resistance under 
their own leadership. To join the passive resistance movement would 
have required equality or even subordination to the resistance activists 
who were their political rivals. In the face of what they called the 
hopelessness of resistance, for which they provided many sophisticated 
arguments, it can thus for strong reasons be assumed that they saw 
compliance as the best route to power in the future. However, with 
the Revolution of 1905 in Russia their reasoning proved a failure. In 
fact, Yrjö-Koskinen's preceding prediction concerning passive resist-
ance turned out to hold much truth, although probably not in the way 
he expected. 
222 Yrjö—Koskinen to Yrjö—Koskinen 10 December 1898; italics added.  
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IV. Constitutionalist 
Insurgency, 1899-1905 
It is obvious that Fennomania is now tolerated from above. There may, 
and will, come a time when this will no longer happen. Tolerance is 
calculated. But politics always calculates falsely when it reckons that 
it can at will direct a nation's spirit once it has allowed that spirit to 
awaken. 
J.V. Snellman, 18451  
1. The Russification Program and Resistance 
Mobilization 
When N.I. Bobrikov arrived in Helsinki on 12 October 1898 to assume 
the office of governor-general of Finland, he came with a firm convic-
tion of what had to be done. For too long the Finns had been allowed 
to cultivate the false doctrine of Finland's statehood and special 
autonomous status. Finnish constitutionalism and separatism now had 
to be uprooted. Bobrikov, as an agent of Russian military and conserva-
tive nationalist circles, understood his mission to be the thorough 
integration of Finland into autocratic Russia. Drawing directly and 
purposefully upon the legacy of Russification throughout the Empire, 
Bobrikov, several months before taking office in Helsinki, drew up a 
detailed agenda for the assimilation of Finland. He supplemented these 
policy goals, which had been approved by the tsar in August 1898, 
with further requirements early in 1899, after a tour of Finland had 
convinced him of how extremely estranged the Grand Duchy was from 
the rest of the Empire? 
'  Snellman 1906, p.160. Snellman implied that when such toleration ended the Russians 
would not be able to destroy the fruits of the Finnish national mobilization. 
2  Polvinen 1984, pp. 91, 133-134. 
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The first point in Bobrikov's "program" was the assimilation of the 
Finnish army into that of Russia .3 The priority of this point is not 
surprising considering that Bobrikov's main supporter in the Russian 
regime was Minister of War A.N. Kuropatkin, who saw the Russifica-
tion of Finland's military institutions as the key to the assimilation of 
the country in general. More immediately, recent advances in military 
technology prompted the Russian regime to seek arms limitation 
agreements with the other European powers. Kuropatkin and the tsar 
desired to solve the Finnish military question before the negotiations 
(which took place in the Hague in May 1899) got under way.4 
The other measures which Bobrikov called for were as follows: The 
Russification, or abolition, of the Minister Secretary of State's Office, 
which served the Finns as a direct channel to the tsar in St. Petersburg;5 
the codification of local laws and the development of new procedures 
for bringing Finland under the jurisdiction of imperial legislation where 
matters of imperial concern were in question; the establishment of 
Russian as the language of the Senate, educational institutions and the 
administration of Finland as a whole; the abolishment of legal barriers 
preventing Russians from holding office in Finland; the increased 
surveillance of Finnish educational institutions and the inspection of 
the textbooks used therein; the abolition of Finland's separate customs 
and monetary institutions, to be replaced by the corresponding Russian 
ones; the foundation of an official Russian newspaper, and the facilita-
tion of Russian publishing, in Finland; simplification of the ceremonies 
of the opening session of the Diet; revision of the regulations of the 
office of governor-general and; greater control of the Finnish press. 
There was really nothing new among these, and Bobrikov's other, 
policy objectives from the time; they, like the principles they were 
based upon, had long been expressed, and published, by Russian con-
servative nationalists. Moreover, Bobrikov's program was intended as 
a preliminary step to be taken while a more thorough investigation of 
how Russification could be implemented was carried out.6 
3 Lest there be any doubt, Bobrikov used the term "program," as others did as well; 
for Bobrikov's integration scheme, see ibid., p. 134. 
4 Ibid., pp. 76-78. 
5 The former course was chosen when, in the spring of 1899, Secretary of State V.K. 
von Plehwe, former chief of the Russian police and present head of the Russian 
State Council, took over the office of Finland's Minister Secretary of State. In 1902 
the arch-conservative Plehwe also became Russia's minister of the interior. 
6 Polvinen 1984, pp. 92-93. 
144 
The February "Coup d'Etat" 
In the spring of 1898 the Russian regime let it be known that an 
extraordinary session of the Finnish Diet would be convened at the 
beginning of the following year in order to dispose of the military 
question. At the same time the Finnish Senate was given the task of 
preparing to present the reforms required by the regime to the Diet. 
It was here, however, that the Russian desire for speedy military reform 
was frustrated. Unable to accept the military bill as such, the Senate 
revised it. The senators, like the majority of their politically aware 
countrymen, were apparently of the opinion that the formulation and 
enactment of imperial legislation involving Finland required the 
participation and consent of Finland's legal governmental bodies. In 
other words, for them the tsar was a constitutional monarch, bound 
by oath to conform to Finland's legal form of government. 
Finnish constitutional assertion, as so manifestly in conflict with 
imperial interests, was now deemed intolerable by men such as 
Bobrikov and Kuropatkin; the tsar himself was angered by Finnish 
efforts to restrict his autocratic powers.' Thus the Russian government 
was motivated to temporarily turn its attention away from the military 
reform bill, in order to destroy Finnish political illusions with a 
demonstration of autocratic will. 
On 15 February 1899 the Russian regime declared its line in the 
tsar's mandate on imperial legislation, known as the February Mani-
festo. The Manifesto let it be known that in the formulation and enact-
ment of legislation of imperial concern the Russian regime was not 
constitutionally bound or liable to Finland's local governmental institu-
tions; accordingly, the Finnish administration had jurisdiction solely 
over matters of domestic concern. The Manifesto did not, however, 
attempt to clearly define the borderline between imperial and local 
legislation; it was left to be decided in each specific case. This indefi-
niteness, to the great consternation of the Finns, left the Russian regime 
extensive leeway to intervene in Finnish national life. 
The February Manifesto was widely understood, in Finland and 
abroad, as a violation of Finland's constitution, and even as a "coup 
d'etat," "the instigation of military law," and "the murder of Finland."8 
Scholars, such as Jussila, however, have shown such interpretations to  
Ibid., pp. 106. 
8  For example see Bain 1899, pp. 735, 743; Free Russia, April 1899, p. 30; Puaux with 
Aho 1901, p. 218; Berendsen 1899, p. 755. 
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be inaccurate in a strictly juridical sense: "The February Manifesto 
could not have divested the Estates of their powers in relation to 
imperial legislation — as has often been claimed in the historical 
literature — since such powers had never de jure been granted.i9 In 
fact, from 1808-1898 numerous imperial laws and acts had been 
implemented in Finland without the participation of the Diet. Legally, 
the Manifesto was simply a clarification and extension of a long-
established political order.1°  
Politically, however, as Polvinen states it, "the February Manifesto 
was understood, not only by the Finns, but by Bobrikov and his support-
ers too, as a change, and not just as any change, but as a one-sided 
dictate and show of strength: Kuropatkin and Bobrikov deliberately 
aimed for a confrontation with the Grand Duchy."11 
Resistance Organization 
Generally speaking the sociopolitical organization of Finland as such 
was, in spite of its weaknesses, an effective fortification against Russifi-
cation. This organizational foundation allowed for the quick mobiliza-
tion of a Constitutionalist front for coordinated protest and resistance, 
accompanied by a whole variety of only indirectly connected forms of 
subtle defiance. 
On 17 February 1899 about 250 (or perhaps closer to 500) Finns, 
upon the initiative of Arvid Neovius, met in Helsinki in order to decide 
how to collectively face the threat posed by the imperial Manifesto 
issued two days earlier.12 Their first move was to petition the Senate, 
in a statement signed by 500 citizens, not to enter the February 
Manifesto into Finland's Statute Book, which would thus prevent its 
validation. Although the senators unanimously considered the Mani-
festo unconstitutional, many of them had qualms about carrying out 
such a defiant demonstration; the Senate decided in favor of promulga-
tion, although its initial vote on the issue was split, ten to ten. The 
Estates, however, refused to recognize the validity of the Manifesto. 
Among the symbolic means which the inhabitants of Helsinki used to 
9 Jussila 1979, p. 33; for the background of Finland's legal status in the Russian Empire 
in 1899, see Schweitzer 1978, passim. '°  Jussila 1979, pp. 33,37. 
"  Polvinen 1984, p. 111. 
12 Reuter 1928, p. 22; Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 1, p. 88; Blomstedt 1969, pp. 94-95.  
Blomstedt writes that the meeting was attended by 500 people. 
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demonstrate their great disappointment with the Manifesto and its 
publication was to each day decorate the prominent statue of Alexander 
II in the city center with flowers. This activity culminated on 13 March, 
the anniversary of Alexander II's death, when the people flooded into 
the square around the statue to cover it in a profusion of flowers.13 
Following the Manifesto's promulgation, the Helsinki citizen 
meeting's next move was to launch a mass protest. The result was 
unprecedented. In little over a week 523,000 signatures, representing 
almost half the adult population, were collected for what came to be 
called Finland's "Great National Address" to the tsar. Much of the 
collection work was carried out by university students who were swiftly 
mobilized through their already existing provincially organized, and 
highly nationalistic, unions. 
The address organizers were relatively successful in keeping their 
project secret from the Russian authorities. Although Bobrikov got 
wind of what was occurring through gendarme reports, he was truly 
shocked by the scale of the protest. The governor-general was further 
enraged when a delegation of five hundred citizens from throughout 
Finland set out, deliberately without informing him, for St. Petersburg 
to deliver the twenty-six volume address to the tsar. Bobrikov saw the 
whole address movement as a organized conspiracy of criminal 
agitators, aided everywhere by Finnish officialdom, including Diet 
representatives, governors and senators, who had thus proven their 
utter untrustworthiness. The tsar, for his part, refused to receive the 
delegation. 
One of the first means of opposing Bobrikov's offensive implemented 
by those who had long participated in the "Legal Battle" propaganda 
conflict with the Russian nationalists was to try to rally European 
public opinion to their cause. They did this by writing constitutionalist 
articles in defense of Finland for publications throughout Europe and 
by encouraging their European colleagues to do the same. Inspired by 
the Great Address, several of these men got the idea of requesting 
well known European cultural figures to protest en masse against the 
tsarist regime's injustice toward Finland. Their success was impressive: 
twelve "Pro Finlandia" addresses to the tsar were produced "signed 
by 1,050 of the most qualified representatives of literature, science, 
politics, and art in France, England, Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Hungary, Holland, and Belgium."14 Among the 
signers were Theodor Mommsen, Max Weber, Herbert Spencer, 
13 Parmanen 1936-1941, pp. 92-94. 
14 Pro Finlandia 1899, pp. 112-113. 
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Henrik Ibsen, Anatole France, Emile Zola, Florence Nightingale and 
Thomas Hardy.15 The Pro Finlandia movement was seen both in 
Finland and abroad as an historically unique "activation" of the "public 
opinion of the civilized world.s16 Nevertheless, the international Pro  
Finlandia deputation, which arrived in St. Petersburg on 26 June 1899 
headed by France's former Minister of Justice J.L.V. Trarieux, was 
not granted an audience with the tsar.17 
At a meeting of seventy Constitutionalists in September 1900 it was 
decided to unite already established protest and resistance activity into 
a organization of committees — called the "Mechelin Committees" — 
to direct the various sectors of passive resistance such as finances, 
foreign propaganda and contacts, popular enlightenment and the 
distribution of resistance literature. This organization was named after 
one of its central coordinators, Leo Mechelin, whom Bobrikov later 
called "the chief leader of the revolutionary movement in Finland."18 
On 1 August 1901 the Finnish Senate promulgated the new 
Conscription Act, which was issued by imperial decree on 12 July. Of 
all the offensive tsarist mandates issued during the Bobrikov period 
this, alongside of the February Manifesto, gave rise to the most 
controversy and confrontation. Finland's military establishment was 
thereby abolished and Finnish troops were to be conscripted as part 
of the imperial army. Once again mass protest was the first response. 
On 3 August a citizens' meeting led by members of the 1900 Diet, 
representing all major political groups, convened at Turholm (near 
Helsinki) to decide what to do. A protest address, drafted by Mechelin, 
was revised and circulated throughout Finland. With 475,000 signa-
tures, it was delivered to the Senate on 30 September. A Turholm 
Commission formed at the time served as an organization for passive 
resistance until January 1903. 
Kagal 
It was in September of 1901 that a clique of radical Constitutionalists, 
formed a resistance organization which, having risen out of the others, 
15  Ibid. pp. 123-130. 
16 Leclercq 1900, pp. 93-94, as Leclercq saw it: "Les événements de Finlande ont 
provoqué une manifestation ou, pour la premiére lois, l'élite européenne, s'attribuant 
le role actif qui lui conyient, s'est placée au-dessus des diplomatien timides pour 
affirmer la solidarité des peuples." 
17 Pro Finlandia 1899, pp. IV—V, 112-115. 
18 Bobrikoy's 1903 statement on Mechelin quoted in Feodorov 1911, p. 7. 
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was soon to surpass, and in many ways incorporate them.19 These 
resisters, who had already earlier begun concrete agitation for less 
protest and more direct action, adopted the name "Kagal." This term 
had been used derisively by the Russians to designate separatist groups 
in Poland and Finland; it was derived from the Hebrew name of an 
organization of persecuted Russian Jews. 
From its headquarters in Helsinki, called "Helsinki-Central," Kagal 
succeeded in establishing forty-five departments throughout Finland 
and was able to work through other long-established organizational 
channels as well. Moreover, a number of other specialized branch 
Kagals were formed such as the priests' Kagal, the women's Kagal, 
the physicians' Kagal and Kagal-supported student and worker resist-
ance groups. Such sub-groups were formed because of the key role 
they could play in hindering the new Conscription Act from being 
implemented; resistance on this front was considered by Kagal to be 
of the utmost importance. For example, priests could refuse to fulfill 
their duty to promulgate the imperial decree from the pulpits of the 
local parishes and cultivate a general spirit of disobedience; doctors 
could refuse to carry out the mandatory examination of conscripts; the 
women's Kagal specialized in, among other things, smuggling resistance 
literature. Other groups, such as temperance societies, farmers' and 
teachers' associations, women's societies, and cooperative business 
enterprises had a wider variety of special resistance functions. 
From the outset the Finnish protest and resistance movement was 
financed by funds gathered through mass collections and donations by 
well-to-do individuals. Personnel costs were always minimal, since most 
of the people who participated in the multifarious resistance activities 
did so on a voluntary basis. The first collection was undertaken to 
finance the Great Address, which involved sending a delegation of 500 
to St. Petersburg. The fund-raisers were surprised by the success of 
their efforts, which even yielded a surplus. In 1899 a "compensation 
fund" was established to help support resisters — especially civil servants 
— ousted from their jobs by the Russian regime. This fund was mainly 
supplied by wealthy individuals. The male directors of Kagal obtained 
money for the wide variety of insurgent operations from financiers, 
industrialists and other affluent people. In contrast, the women's-Kagal 
gathered considerable sums mainly through mass collection campaigns 
among the less affluent people.20 
19 Reuter 1928, pp. 132-135. 
20 For resistance finances see Reuter 1928, pp. 138-146; Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 1, 
pp. 98, 354-355, 359. 
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The Resistance Press 
Today passive resistance is most often identified with Kagal and the 
conscription boycott. These were, however, preceded by a radical and 
highly effective mode of insurgency: the underground resistance press, 
composed of newspapers, pamphlets and all sorts of leaflets which 
were often distributed by the thousands, and even tens of thousands.21  
It must be emphasized that the underground press was no mere 
auxiliary part of the resistance. It was a major form of struggle which, 
moreover, necessarily involved other forms of serious defiance, such 
as smuggling. Furthermore, it was the medium through which the 
conceptual or theoretical work on passive resistance was carried out. 
The resistance press was unequivocally insurgent not only in regard 
to its content, but also in that it was clearly violating Finno-Russian 
press and censorship regulations. In his crackdown on the Finnish press 
Bobrikov made only minor changes in regulations; in shutting down 
twenty-two newspapers between 1899 and 1901, and tightening control 
over those remaining, Bobrikov was legally wielding the long-estab-
lished power over the press accorded to him as governor-general22 
For decades Finns had been struggling through legal channels for 
freedom of the press; now, in confrontation with Bobrikov, they turned 
to more radical means. 
The most important underground newspapers were Fria Ord [Free 
Words], in Swedish, and Vapaita Lehtisiä [Free Leaflets], in Finnish 23 
Both were printed in Sweden after their production was forced out of 
Finland. The former was distributed in a Finnish translation, called 
Vapaita Sanoja [Free Words], from September 1900 to September 1901. 
It was then replaced by Vapaita Lehtisiä,  which was independent of, 
yet closely associated with, Fria Ord. Fria Ord appeared, usually once 
a week in editions of around 2,500 copies, from September 1900 until 
the time of the Great Strike of 1905. 4 Fria Ord was founded by the 
staff of Finland's major Swedish-language newspaper Nya Pressen,  
which was shut down in the summer of 1900. 
During its first year Fria Ord was run by the revolutionary Konni 
21  The majority of the Constitutionalist tracts cited hereafter and composing most of 
the Primary Sources section of the Bibliography were written anonymously. The 
authorship of most of these works is well established; for the definitive bibliography 
of literature from the "years of oppression," see Estlander 1945. 
22  Leino-Kaukiainen 1984, pp. 48, 51-52, 54, 158. 
23  Cf. Copeland's account of the "Emergence of the Underground Press in Finland"; 
Copeland 1973, pp. 41-46. 
24 Fria Ord: Innehållsförteckning och sakregister till alla fem årgångarna 1909. 
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Zilliacus who was then replaced by the staunch advocate of passive 
resistance Arvid Neovius. Vapaita Lehtisiä was founded by the staff 
of  Päivälehti,  the main newspaper of the Young Finns, when persecu-
tion by Bobrikov drove them underground. Among Vapaita Lehtisiä's 
directors was Päivälehti's ex-editor-in-chief, Eero Erkko. The paper 
was produced until the time of the Great Strike, with editions of 
probably more than 3,000 copies 25 As continuations of  Nya Pressen  
and Päivälehti,  and as the main organs of the resistance, Fria Ord and 
Vapaita Lehtisiä,  represented the whole of upper strata Finland, exclud-
ing the compliant Old Finns. 
The Social Status of the Resistance 
What was the status of the constitutional resistance front in Finnish 
society? To begin with, Kagal was, as Reuter emphasizes, a self-ap-
pointed rather than popularly elected organization;26 although it had 
hundreds of agents, thirty to fifty of which ran Helsinki-Central, Kagal, 
because of the necessity for secrecy, never sought mass membership. 
It is thus not possible to precisely measure its popular representative-
ness. Moreover, Kagal's formation marked a mild power struggle and 
a division between older and younger and moderate and radical 
elements within the Constitutionalist front. Such divisions were, 
however, by no means unambiguous and for the most part represented 
friction rather than fissure. 
On 12 November 1902 the various Constitutionalist factions held a 
mass citizens' meeting for the consolidation of resistance. It was then 
that Kagal's status as the executive branch of the Constitutionalist 
front was confirmed through a special resolution.27 Thus, from that 
time on Kagal can be seen as representing Constitutionalist Finland. 
There is no doubt that the Constitutionalist front represented most of 
the upper strata of Finnish society, i.e., that part of the population 
either eligible to vote in Diet elections or allowed automatic 
representation due to noble status; in fact, within this section of the 
population Constitutionalist popularity only increased during the 
Bobrikov years. This was confirmed in the Diet election at the end of 
25 On the Finnish underground press within the general context of the Finnish press 
under the Russian regime, 1891-1905, see Leino-Kaukiainen 1984, passim, especially 
pp. 201-217. 
26 Reuter 1928, p. 146. 
27 Ibid., pp. 147, 363. 
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1904 when the Constitutionalists won a landslide victory, with many 
Kagal executives and associates among those elected. 
The Conditions for Resistance 
As mentioned, Finnish society as such was a barrier to Russification, 
a fact which Bobrikov well recognized. Already in 1891 resistance-
minded Finns estimated that the conditions for the Finnish administra-
tion to stand up to Russification were favorable. Their basic argument 
was similar to Machiavelli's principle that in moving from constitutional 
to absolute government the noncooperation of officialdom can create 
a decisive impediment to obtaining control over the population 28  At 
that time, Wrede's colleague V.M. von Born argued that even if 
Russians were to be installed in the higher levels of Finland's domestic 
government, without the cooperation of Finns they would not be able 
to implement their illicit designs.29 The viability of this principle was 
based on the fact that on both the higher and local levels the administra-
tion of Finland was de facto firmly in Finnish hands. Although this 
principle was maintained throughout the Bobrikov period, there was 
not complete agreement concerning its ultimate power, especially when 
faced with disunity among the Finns themselves. Some held, citing the 
Hungarian case, that passive resistance could be maintained for decades 
if necessary. Others held that no body of officials in the world could 
maintain unfailing noncooperation for long. 
Moderate resisters emphasized that "we do not dare claim that our 
passive resistance might force the mighty tsar of Russia to abandon 
the measures which he considers beneficial to the Empire."30 They 
held that the function of resistance was to convince the Russian regime 
of the rightness of the Finnish cause and to hinder the implementation 
of illicit measures. Nevertheless, writing against the moderate 
compliants (as led by J.R. Danielson-Kalmari), for whom resistance 
was to be subordinated to accommodation, they argued emphatically 
that passive resistance should not be given up. Although many of the 
resisters did not take nearly so modest a stand, this statement reflects 
the general understanding that the Finnish resistance alone was not 
28 Machiavelli 1961, p. 70. 
29 Born 1891; for the published version see Fria Ord!Vapaita Lehtisiä,  2 October 1900, 
p. 6. 3°  Vapaita Lehtisiä (VL), 27 May 1902, p. 1; this was signed by "Finnish-minded 
Constitutionalists." 
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enough to defeat Russification. What many Finnish resisters believed 
was that passive resistance was their most pragmatic alternative, 
allowing them to successfully hinder the implementation of 
Russification in Finland and participate in their own particular way in 
an overall Empire-wide process (which some saw as becoming 
increasingly revolutionary) which would inevitably transform the 
Russian regime.31  
The Finnish resistance writers maintained that in order to analyze 
the conditions for the success of resistance it was necessary to have a 
comprehensive understanding of current conditions and events 
throughout the Empire. A basic argument which they faced in advocat-
ing resistance was that Finland was so tiny in relation to the immense 
and mighty Russian Empire and that therefore it should submit in 
order to survive. Their response was that, yes indeed Finland is 
relatively tiny, but it certainly is not faced by the Russian Empire as 
a whole. The Great Russians by themselves, at over fifty-five and a 
half million were of course numerically overwhelming in relation to 
the Finns. But they made up only forty-four percent of the Empire's 
population and were by no means single-minded adversaries of the 
Finns; of the nationalities bound to Russia Finland was not alone in 
practicing the "separatism" so irksome to Russian nationalism. The 
deep social strife and administrative disunity and incompetence which 
plagued the Empire certainly was a major factor in favor of Finnish 
resistance. 
In fact, a considerable discrepancy between the will to Russify the 
minority nationalities and the capacity to do so was one of the out-
standing features of the tsarist regime. The Russian regime's ministries, 
for example, were not coordinated and there was continual disagree-
ment and competition between them.32 The government could not 
invest a great deal of energy into Russifying the Finns and as with 
Russification earlier and elsewhere there was a certain inefficiency of 
implementation. For example, the policies of Bobrikov and Minister 
of War Kuropatkin in regard to Finland met with the aversion and 
active opposition of Finance Minister S. Witte. Witte saw Bobrikov as 
a fomenter of rebellion, who was only adding to the grave problems 
faced by Russia.33 Moreover, Witte thought that the Bobrikov program 
was wasting energy on relatively insignificant matters; for him it would 
31 See section 8. below. 
32  Polvinen 1984, pp. 23, 335-336, 339. 
33  Ibid., p. 85. 
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have been more important to focus on the economic incorporation of 
Finland into the Empire. 
Perceptive Finnish resisters increasingly began to see that their "great 
enemy" was in a weak state and was, through its reaction, instigating 
radical change and even revolution. Consequently, they thought that 
one of the major conditions to be taken into consideration for the 
success of local Finnish resistance lay in the Empire-wide process of 
change which was threatening transform, and even sweep away, the 
old regime.34 
This, to be sure, did not mean that they advocated direct participation 
in the revolutionary movement; most of them manifestly desired to 
remain separate and they placed their hope in constitutionalist transfor-
mation.35 What it did mean, however, was that in order to judge the 
possibilities for Finnish success, and determine the most realistic course 
of action, these men thought it necessary to transcend constricted local 
vision. Neovius considered the inability to do this to be a major 
weakness of the Finnish resistance. Consequently, unable to see the 
radical conditions which the near future held in store many Finns 
displayed a groundless faith that all would turn out for the better 
without having to resort to more intensified forms of passive resistance. 
He considered this attitude, which probably arose from decades of 
Finno-Russian peace, to be a factor of aid to the Russians and that 
perhaps "this wavering heedlessness helps explain the aggressor's 
growing appetite."36 
In regard to the domestic level, popular support was recognized as 
one of the most fundamental conditions for resistance. The Russian-
backed compliants were strongly entrenched within certain key sectors 
of Finland's higher administration as evinced by the so-called compliant 
Senate with its significant supporters within lower and higher 
officialdom, the church and the courts. Given compliant power within 
the establishment, the resisters concluded that it was necessary to 
supplement their struggle on that front through popular mobilization.37 
Thus the support of what was called the people or the rank and file 
of the nation came to be seen as an essential factor for success. The 
34 Neoyius 1900b, pp. 1-2. 
35 Neovius, for example, was convinced that the tsarist regime's policies were only 
increasing the "cancer" of unpredictable revolution; the solution which he and like-
minded resisters adyocated was the implementation in Russia of a western type of 
constitutionalism; Ibid.  
36  Ibid., p. 3. 
37 VL, 14 October 1901, p. 2. 
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resisters knew only too well that this was a difficult condition to fulfill.38 
As will be seen below (section 7.), their faith in the people and convic-
tion that their social order was stronger than that of other societies 
began to collapse as they discovered that a great part of the people 
did not yet possess national consciousness and did not understand the 
grave significance of the Russian onslaught. For example, Bobrikov's 
agitation campaign among the rural working population, including 
crofters and landless laborers, helped reveal the weaknesses of the 
social conditions for Finnish resistance. This part of the population 
was definitely estranged from the political culture of the upper strata 
of society. Some resisters began to realize that in order to channel the 
crofters and the landless, as well as the workers, into the resistance 
movement the immediate reform of the status of these people and 
moreover, the broader restructuring of Finnish society, had to be 
undertaken 39 
The geographical conditions for resistance were judged favorable. 
For example, well before the actual implementation, on 1 August 1901, 
of the new system for conscripting Finns into the imperial army, 
suggestions were being put forth concerning how it could be resisted. 
It was pointed out that if any country was geographically suitable for 
hiding the twenty thousand youths reaching conscription-age each year 
it was Finland: The Russians would need "ten, even twenty, times more 
men" to apprehend the draft dodgers hiding out in the formidable 
Finnish wilderness.40 Thus the Russians would not be capable of 
crushing a nationally united conscription boycott. The conditions 
necessary for national unity, however, were far more precarious than 
those provided by nature. Hence the natural conditions for success 
were purely secondary in comparison to the sociopolitical ones. 
Nevertheless, in regard to the smuggling of resistance literature into 
Finland, and through Finland into Russia, geographical conditions 
proved highly advantageous.41  
In spite of its serious weaknesses Finnish society proved relatively 
resilient to Russification as is proved, significantly enough, by Bobri-
kov's own observations. During his tour of Finland at the end of 1898 
Bobrikov was struck above all by what he saw as Finland's isolation 
from Russia. He found that the Russian language was hardly spoken. 
He saw Finnish schools, and in general the whole Finnish administrative 
38 VL, 21 October 1901, pp. 3-4. 
39 Fria Ord/Vapaita Sanoja (FO/VS), 18 January 1901, pp. 1-2; Gripenberg 1901. 
4° FO/VS, 20 February 1901, pp. 4. 
41  On Finnish smuggling of insurgent writings see Copeland 1973, pp. 47-51 and passim. 
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apparatus, as continuously estranging Finland from Russia. Every-
where Bobrikov turned to implement the Russification program he 
found himself obstructed by the fact that Russians had almost nowhere 
succeeded in penetrating the deeper levels of Finnish society. For 
example, Russians were not able to gain complete control of the forces 
of law and order. Even after reinforcement, the Russian gendarme in 
Finland remained inefficient, obstructed as it was by Finnish non-
cooperation and its own incapacity. Furthermore, the Russian regime 
could not meet Bobrikov's troop requests; he had to rest content with 
the 15,000 ceiling reached in 1902.42 In fact, the police-state powers 
implemented in Russia in 1881 were introduced into force in Finland 
only with the dictatorship decree of 9 April 1903.43  
Bobrikov clearly acknowledged, as revealed by his written reports 
on Finland, the favorable broad organizational conditions for resistance 
in Finland. Local community administration was almost entirely free 
of Russian officials. He observed that the high degree of local self-
government facilitated the formation of centers of resistance. He saw 
Finland as the "promised land of associations," which served as net-
works for resistance propaganda and deeds. He also complained of 
the separatist nature of the press, the economy and the university. 
Upon arrival Bobrikov took special notice of the broad distribution 
of newspapers and high level of literacy in Finland. He saw the whole 
Finnish press as perpetuating the rebel doctrine.'" The relatively strong 
foundation of the press ante-Bobrikov was definitely a favorable factor 
for resistance, especially since talented journalists went into service of 
underground press. 
2. The Struggle for Justice 
At the outset it was stated that the purpose of this study was not to 
elaborate upon the de jure status of Finland within the Russian Empire. 
Accordingly the aim was not to examine the legal argumentation of 
both sides to determine which was right, or even to merely describe 
such abstract argumentation. Instead the Finno-Russian conflict was 
to be examined as a power struggle between Finnish statemaking and 
42 Polvinen 1984, pp. 302-303. 
43  Jussila 1979, p. 48. 
44  Polvinen 1984, pp. 98-99, 243, 249, 297. 
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nationalism and Russian autocracy and nationalism. Consequently, the 
Legal Battle was seen as signifying not just a formal juridical disagree-
ment, but a clash between two potentially mutually exclusive moral 
systems or two concepts of what is right and just. 
This approach was chosen because the main object of study, passive 
resistance, was the primary weapon of a militant constitutionalism 
which, being above all geared for practice, drew very little directly 
upon scholastic legal arguments. Accordingly it is maintained that to 
explain what passive resistance was within its political cultural context 
is to simultaneously give a fully satisfactory definition of Finnish consti-
tutionalism. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that such an approach neglects the 
more abstract and metaphysical ideas which were essential to Finnish 
resistance thought. It is therefore necessary to explicitly define the 
Finnish Constitutionalist creed. 
Today in Finland the term "constitutionalism," when used in refer-
ence to the period 1899-1905, is often associated with "legalism" 
(legalismi). This is an apt association, even though, it should be stressed, 
the Finns of that time did not use the terms "legalism" or "legalist." 
Today "legalism" signifies strict conformity to the law or to a religious 
or moral code; as thus defined it is highly synonymous with Finnish 
constitutionalism, which required unwavering adherence to Finnish 
law as understood not merely in a narrow juridical sense, but also as 
the social order (including metaphysical and religious aspects) in 
general. It is most important to emphasize that as such Finnish 
constitutionalism was very inclusive; it provided its adherents with a 
common creed for action while at the same time giving each individual 
significant leeway concerning personal motives or beliefs. This means 
that Finns could fight together regardless of whether they based their 
action on secular political grounds or on appeals to metaphysical justice 
and religion or on various combinations of both. 
Following this argument, it is important to draw a distinction between 
the formal or theoretical constitutional thought preceding the Bobrikov 
period and the Constitutionalist creed which fueled the mass movement 
against Russification beginning in 1899. The latter was necessarily 
geared for the practical defense of the earlier concrete achievements 
of Finnish national development and assertive constitutional statemak-
ing. The creed was often pronounced with practical simplicity: "Accord-
ing to our Magna Charta," that is, according to those rights which, by 
ceremonial oath, Alexander I ratified for the Finns and bound himself 
and his descendants to adhere to, "the ruler (and thus officials as well) 
must rule the country exclusively within the limits of the power 
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permitted the ruler by law. All which exceeds the boundaries of the 
law is violence...."45 
An exceptionally broadly representative, and therefore relatively 
moderate, statement of the Constitutionalist position and demands is 
found in the Finnish Estates' "Great Petition" to the tsar of December 
1904. The Great Petition was a manifestation of Deåkean-like defiance, 
demanding the restoration of the legal order, as the Finns conceived 
it, through the dismantling of the "destructive" administrative system 
implemented under Bobrikov. The Estates employed the Magna 
Charta-style argument which had been appealed to innumerable times 
during the previous years. It was maintained that according to the 
Finnish "constitution" (valtiosääntö) as ratified by Alexander I before 
"Finland's State-Estates" (Suomen Valtiosäädyt), and according to the 
Diet Act of 1869, legislation cannot, with some very specific exceptions, 
be created for Finland without the approval of the Finnish "State-
Estates."46 
It should be mentioned that in 1809 Alexander I could not have 
ratified Finland's valtiosääntö before Finland's Valtiosäädyt, because 
the word "valtio" or "state" came into use only toward the end of the 
century.47 This supports the idea that, in the guise of defending ancient 
guaranteed rights, what the Constitutionalists were doing was defend-
ing the de facto achievements (which for the Russians were legally 
questionable) of statemaking. From this viewpoint it is understandable 
why, in resisting the Russian regime's interpretation of Finnish constitu-
tional law, the Great Petition states that it is necessary to appeal both 
to the letter of the law and to "higher truths," both of which the Finns 
believed to be on their side 48 In other words, even here in this very 
formal petition it is admitted that what is in question is not just a 
matter of interpreting clearly definable political agreements but that: 
"The Finnish nation, like every other nation which has received a place 
in history, is obliged to maintain law and justice and the kind of legal 
order which in the given circumstances guarantees that the nation and 
its individual members can act to achieve their own goals."49 Thus in 
demanding the restoration of the legal order the Estates were demand-
ing that the right of internal independence and self-determination be 
45  FO/VL, 27 September 1900, p. 1. 4v  Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 3, pp. 394-395; Parmanen's work includes the whole Great 
Petition, pp. 394-411. 
47 On the etymology of  "valtio" in its political context see Jussila 1987, pp. 88-89. 
48 Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 3, pp. 395-396. 
49  Ibid., p. 396. 
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guaranteed for Finland. They claimed that this was not in violation of 
Russian interests. 
One of the results of the compliants' broad anti-resistance campaign 
was that the resisters found themselves forever branded as dreamers 
and romantic sentimentalists always fanatically ready to defend what 
is right and to die with honor even in the face of insurmountable odds. 
They were accused of an incapacity for realistic political action and 
were depicted as naive good guys whose unswerving faith in the maxim 
"justice will inevitably prevail in the end" could lead only to misfor-
tune.50 A good example of how this portrait has been cultivated and 
carried on into present-day Finnish political culture is found in Paasiki-
vi's memoirs. Paasikivi synthesized the Old Finn/compliant line making 
Snellman, Yrjö-Koskinen, J.R. Danielson-Kalman and, implicitly, him-
self, stand out, in spite of acknowledged faults, as paragons of practical 
or realistic political wisdom. In contrast Paasikivi condescendingly says 
of the Constitutionalist resistance approach: 
What a fine principle and rule of life! I have always ... envied the lucky 
ones who have been able to take such a forthright and idealistic stand. 
It makes issues and solutions so simple, clear and easy. But we Old 
Finns unfortunately found no support in the facts and course of history 
for these forthright and bright ideas and arguments.51  
Paasikivi's interpretation of constitutional resistance doctrine deserves 
to be taken seriously not only because of its wide influence and the 
fact that it represents a certain paradigmatic viewpoint, but also because 
it is presented as based on scholarly research. Paasikivi emphasizes 
that his analysis is grounded on a broad rereading of the controversial 
political literature from the "years of oppression."52 Nevertheless, he 
does not bother to relate that the literature of resistance was very 
multifaceted and that in addition to, and often alongside of, the rhetoric 
of justice there were detailed arguments for the pragmatism of 
resistance and efforts to show that it worked in practice. Moreover,  
Paasikivi fails to present the arguments against compliancy which aimed 
to go behind the veil of the raison d'etat discourse which the compliants 
had learned to use so well. The anti-compliancy case was also grounded 
on appeals to what is practical. 
The discourse of constitutional resistance was, however, in some 
50 The resisters' references to these accusations are plentiful; for one example see 
Gripenberg 1904. 
51 Paasikivi 1957a, p. 35 
52 Ibid., p. 33. 
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respects a conspicuous sitting-duck for the Paasikivian type of  Realpoli-
tik criticism. The resisters' writings overflow with appeals to abstract 
right, to a justice which will ultimately triumph, which are expressed 
through seemingly incessant secular moral sermons. It is not surprising 
that many have seen the discourse of justice as the most outstanding 
characteristic of the resistance literature. The fact is, however, that 
many have thus been blinded to the other significant aspects of 
resistance thought and action. Moreover, the function of appeals to 
justice as an effective practical weapon in the repertoire of passive 
resistance should not be overlooked. 
The Finnish resisters were participants in the general European 
culture of justice or Recht, a culture which was much more than legal 
statutes and practices; it was a common moral world. Proof of this 
trans-national European concept of justice is the fact that the Finns 
were so effectively able to mobilize European opinion. As the 1,050 
signers of the Pro Finlandia addresses saw it: 
Being interpreters of the principle of justice and concord, our endeavors 
have exclusively aimed at the use of every means in our power to lay 
before His Imperial Majesty the expressions of the ideas of brotherly 
fellow-feeling which, in different nations, unite all who consider the 
securing of the permanence of peace to rest on the respect of the 
fundamental laws of right and righteousness, no matter what the 
political forms of government of the respective states may be.53  
One of the influential representatives of this heritage of justice was a 
work, entitled Der Kampf  um's Recht, by the German legal scholar 
Rudolf von Ihering (1818-1892). From the time it was first published 
in 1872 until it was translated into Finnish in 1902 this book had gone 
through fourteen German editions and had been translated into over 
fifteen languages. A Swedish version was available in 1879. In his 1891 
preface Ihering emphasizes that the motive of the book is "ethical-
practical" rather than theoretical; the aim is to further the state of 
mind and way of action from which justice must draw its strength.54 
The point of the work is that only through struggle can the individual 
or group attain justice and freedom or, in Kant's words: "he who makes 
himself a worm cannot later complain if he is trampled underfoot."55  
Ihering thus sought to expound a principle that has been expressed 
innumerable times and "is written into the hearts of all strong 
53 Pro Finlandia 1899, pp. 112-113. 
54 Ihering 1902, p. 1. 
55  Ibid., p. II. 
160 
individuals and peoples."56 Alongside of Deåk's writings Ihering's book 
took on the status of a kind of a textbook, distributed in order to 
spread and cultivate the mentality of struggle 57 
Although this mentality of resistance was primarily action oriented 
it was sometimes expressed in lofty idealistic terms. For example  
Paasikivi quotes a speech by R.A. Wrede delivered on the First of 
May, 1899: 
We can enter this struggle boldly and with confidence because it is in 
fact the struggle for truth and justice. These idealistic forces are 
ultimately stronger than all exterior power. When I say this I am not 
stating any empty phrases, but the truth, which is confirmed by reality, 
namely world history. 58  
It must be noted that Wrede, as was indicated earlier, represented only 
one wing of the resistance, the most idealistic one. Although many of 
the resisters tended to indulge in high-minded flights about justice, 
freedom and truth in history, such sermons, when examined in context, 
were generally clearly linked to more restricted concrete practical 
concerns. The resisters' abstract and virtually deified concept of justice 
represented their whole society and culture. Justice was therefore 
manifested in the whole constitution of society. To violate justice on 
Wrede's view was to initiate the deterioration of civilization itself.59 
They believed that their institutions, such as religion and law, had 
through centuries of work and struggle become spiritual forces deeply 
rooted in the whole people (a view which was by no means confined 
to the resisters). Since Russification was an attack against society the 
resisters sought to mobilize the forces of western civilization through 
adamant constitutionalism, European struggle for justice and passive 
resistance. 
Even the most utopian of the resisters rarely argued that justice 
must be defended solely for justice's sake. They always maintained 
that against what they called the violent injustice of the Russian regime 
their best and most practical form of national self-defense had to be 
based on adherence to law and the avoidance of violence. It was seen 
as the most suitable alternative in the given circumstances. At first the 
Constitutionalists contented themselves with articulating the case and 
general morality for protest in a style similar to Wrede's work of 1891 
56  Ibid.. p. I. 
57 Estlander 1945, p. 261; Reuter 1928, p. 75. 
58  Paasikivi 1957a, p. 34. 
59 See Wrede 1902a,b; Wrede 1903. 
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cited earlier.60 It must be emphasized, however, that Wrede's articula-
tion of the metaphysics of justice is an extreme case. Prominent leaders, 
such as Mechelin, had been advocating the Finnish cause in purely 
secular political terms for decades. Moreover, Mechelin's popularity 
as a great authority and symbol of the Finnish national cause far 
outstripped Wrede's, and for that matter anybody else's at the time. 
Soon, however, the need was felt to go beyond the words of the 
Wredes and Mechelins, to radicalize protest and to launch resistance 
in practice. At this point a group of men set to work whose aims could 
no longer be confined solely to the articulation of "Legal Battle" 
arguments and talk of justice. One of their first major deeds was the 
establishment of the resistance press which was a fundamental form 
of passive resistance "warfare." 
3. "A New Way of Waging Warfare" 
As discussed at the beginning of this study, in August 1900 Arvid 
Neovius described passive resistance as a powerful defensive weapon 
with its own definite essence requiring special preparation and know-
how for application. The insurgent nature of Neovius' pamphlet was 
immediately obvious to the Russian authorities. 
In the coming months resistance writers were to follow Neovius in 
redefining, radicalizing and refining the technique of passive resistance 
in theory and practice. They transformed it into what they considered 
to be "a new way of waging warfare."61  
The first issue of Fria Ord/Vapaita Sanoja in the beginning of 
September 1900 is testimony to the radicalization of resistance in 
practice; it is a document of defiance to censorship and to Russification 
in general. Although initially the paper was managed by Konni Zillia-
cus, it was not merely a reflection of his own views. Zilliacus was one 
of the radical adherents of passive resistance, but within a few years 
he broke with the mainstream Constitutionalists to pursue a 
revolutionary line which was unacceptable to them. In 1900, however, 
the content of Fria Ord shows that he was still firmly within the 
Constitutionalist camp. Those various authors who wrote for the first 
issues of the newspaper were by no means writing within an intellectual 
6° For example see Cirkulär-Bref 1, 10 April 1899; this was the first in a series of 
mimeographed communiques which were the precursors of the resistance press. 
61 FO/VS, 9 January 1901, pp. 1-3. 
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vacuum. On the contrary, the themes on which they wrote show that 
they were taking part in, and developing, an already well established 
discourse in Finnish politics 62 The opening article of the newspaper 
calls on the people to strive to make the new repressive system 
ineffective through all available means. The purpose of Fria Ord is 
stated as the carrying on of the positive cultural defense and cultivation 
of national self-consciousness which is the basis of passive resistance. 
Passivity is now unacceptable. The writers call for action, putting forth 
Fria Ord as one main implement and promising to defy censorship by 
reporting the intentions and deeds of Russification.63 
Fria Ord's first article on "Our Passive Resistance" begins with a 
glance backward. Thus far the struggle against the violations of Finnish 
law has been defined as the defense of the justice of legality (laglig-
hetensrätt), perhaps better understood as the rightness of the Finnish 
legal heritage64 It has been understood that the fight cannot be waged 
with "material means of power."65 The Finns' program so far has been 
to demonstrate what "our" inherited rights are, and to protest each 
time they are violated. The author thinks that this approach has thus 
far attained impressive results. One example he gives is the successful 
mobilization of the support of the civilized opinion of Europe in a 
"manner which is hitherto unique in world history."66 He asks, but is 
this all that can be done? Up until now "we" have all been agreed 
that those political rights which are voluntarily surrendered cannot be 
regained; but there is a chance to retrieve those which have been seized 
through the "right of violence."67 
This, as the author sees it, generally accepted principle — so 
reminiscent of Deákean political thought — is not compatible with 
passivity: the Finns can no longer rest content in the false comfort of 
having protested, Russification is too serious for that. The author then 
claims that some people having once understood the true meaning of 
passive resistance are now trying to tone it down and take the word 
62  The radical tone of this discourse was already manifested, for example, in the writings 
of Born and Wrede of 1891. Moreover, the practice of Constitutionalist defiance 
expressed in Fria Ord was, as the reader might recall, familiar in Fennomanian 
circles through the Hungarian case. 
63  FO/VS, 1&2, 1900, pp. 1-2; this first issue, unlike all the following, did not indicate 
the day of issuance. It had to be before 8 September, since that was the date of the 
next issue. Judging by the frequency of the following issues it was probably published 
at the beginning of September. For all Fria Ord issuance dates see Fria Ord:  
Innehållsförteckning ... 1909. 
64  FO/VS, 1&2, 1900, p. 2. 
65  Ibid., p. 2. 
66  Ibid., p. 2. 
67 Ibid., p. 2. 
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"passive" literally. He emphasizes that passive resistance is not passive 
and that the mere proclamation of what is right and just, will not 
automatically bring justice. 
The writer of this article does not hesitate to point out the potential 
severe implications of his reasoning. He maintains, in the classic 
European constitutionalist spirit, that when legality is to be defended 
through passive resistance not even fear of the "destruction of the 
prevailing bonds of society" should prevent everyone, from the highest 
officials to the most lowly citizen, from disobeying illegal orders and 
decrees. The consequences will be severe, loss of jobs, punishment, 
replacement by Russians, but finally the Russian system of oppression 
will fail "through its own impossibility"; the suffering of the whole 
people will lead to victory.69 
Thus from the very outset of the resistance press the "suffering" 
required for resistance was clearly not confined to passive martyrdom 
and protest; suffering was seen rather as a mechanism of making unjust 
Russian rule fail through noncooperation and disobedience. The first 
issue of Fria Ord, within the context of other resistance writings from 
the period, is proof that the resisters were well aware of the conse-
quences their program might lead to in the circumstances of the poten-
tially revolutionary process which the Russian regime had set in motion. 
The first issue of Fria Ord also initiated discussion of the concrete 
methods of passive resistance in an article entitled "Defense Mea-
sures." Its author straightforwardly asserts that "we are in a state of 
war," a state which he claims had been forced upon them7°  
Consequently the time is irretrievably past when "verbal protest" could 
be seen as a means of influence or, as another writer put it, it is 
becoming increasingly impossible to continue the "great babble" and 
the "practice of humbug in the name of resistance";71  
Now we must act if we do not want to be destroyed; we must defend 
ourselves ... with all available weapons. One such weapon is the greatest 
possible boycott of all things Russian.72 
Of the four defense measures introduced by the author three are 
applications of the boycott (boykott, boikottaus) weapon. The first 
measure, however, is more an "expression of opposition" which was 
68 Ibid., p. 2. 
69  Ibid. pp. 2-3; cf. Born 1891. 
70 Ibid., 3-4. 
71 FONS,  19 November 1900, p. 3. 
72  FONS,  1&2. 1900, p. 4. 
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apparently intended to somehow develop into a boycott type of action 73  
As a continuation of the effort, initiated in 1890, to integrate the Finnish 
postal system into that of Russia the Bobrikov administration's 
legislation forbidding the use of Finnish stamps, both in the Empire 
and abroad, had recently come into force. Fria Ord called on its readers 
to place protest stamps, which had already been specially designed, 
alongside the newly required Russian stamps. This measure, which was 
actually carried out en masse, was meant to show the world that the 
Finns had no intention of "silently submitting to the destruction 
approaching from the East."74 Furthermore, the author hinted that 
this protest would develop into action which would somehow prevent 
this Russification measure from being effective in the future. However, 
he does not explain how this could be done. At the end of this edition 
of Fria Ord, in conjunction with news that the Russians intend to forbid 
the Finnish protest stamps, the editors state that "perhaps we will soon 
have the chance to present some other, even more effective, means 
against Russian stamps."75 The nature of such means remained unclear. 
The second measure was prompted by the Russian "Language 
Manifesto" of June 1900 which initiated the lingual Russification of 
Finland's administration.The author's suggestions for combating this 
decree, however, are indirect. First he says that the hitherto friendly 
attitude of the Finns towards Russians must end. Secondly he suggests 
that all public expressions of the Russian language, such as signs, must 
be eliminated. He then requires that the use of Russian goods and 
trade with Russians must be stopped. The only exception to the latter 
is when the Russian in question "can prove that he considers himself 
one of us."76 The general reiterated lesson is that everything that is 
Russian in Finland must be "systematically and vigorously 
boycotted."77 
It is important to note here that the author is obviously addressing 
individual Finns, not major industrial or agricultural trading 
organizations. This is a striking characteristic of the resistance press 
as a whole; from 1900 to 1905 there is a conspicuous absence of 
references to many of the most important aspects of the economic 
sector of society. For example neither Fria Ord nor Vapaita Lehtisiä 
ever mention the possibility of a concerted effort on the part of the 
Finnish paper industry to refuse to do business with Russian concerns. 
73 Ibid., p. 4. 
74  Ibid.,  pp.  3-4. 
75 Ibid., p. 8. 
76  Ibid., p. 4. 
77  Ibid., p. 4. 
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The target of measure three was the new limitations on the right of 
public assembly as put forth in the decree of 2 June 1900. The author 
suggests that the way to get around this is to alternate meetings from 
private premises to private premises. Moreover, he invites the readers 
to invent their own ways of defying violations of their right of 
assembly 78 
The purpose of the final measure was to counter what the author 
saw as an organized effort by Russian travelling peddlers to undermine 
the Lutheran religion, education and Finnish culture in general by, 
among other things, spreading rumors of impending agricultural 
reform. Again the remedy here is boycott. The Russian peddlers should 
not even be allowed access to food and other supplies. The author, 
however, admits that at present there is no unified plan for containing 
the peddlers, so each citizen must do his best.79 
The most comprehensive statement of the practical principles of 
passive resistance is to be found in an essay published in September 
1900 by the prominent resistance activist Viktor Theodor Homén 
(1858-1923). Like Arvid Neovius, Homen was an accomplished natural 
scientist. At the age of thirty, already with a series of well-known 
studies behind him, he was appointed Professor of applied physics in 
Helsinki.80 He did pioneering work in Finnish meteorology and 
hydrography. His activities as a Kagal organizer and resistance 
journalist led, after a year of banishment in Novgorod in 1904-1905, 
to a sixteen year political career as, among a variety of other functions, 
a parliamentarian. Homén's 1900 pamphlet, entitled simply Passive 
Resistance, remained for posterity one of the most well known 
statements on the subject. The reason for this is not only that the work 
is clear and concise, but also that Homén was the only resistance leader 
to later publish his collected political writings from the years 1899-
1904.81  
While the Finns could not meet the Russians with military force 
Homén believed that passive resistance provides a weapon by which 
a weaker people can defend itself against a stronger oppressor. It is, 
as he defined it, a method which requires just as much perseverance, 
manliness and love as armed struggle and it cannot be equated with 
either mild or radical protests which end in compliance with the 
78  Ibid., p. 5. 
79 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
80 Coincidentally, Homén's doctoral dissertation, Undersökning om elektriska 
motståndet hos förtunnad luft (1883), dealt with electrical resistance. 
81 Hornén 1906. 
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oppressor's demands S2 Succinctly stated passive resistance consists of 
three basic principles: 
1. consistent refusal to cooperate with any illegal or violent act 
committed by a stronger party; 2. that these violent commands not be 
obeyed, followed or advanced in any degree; on the contrary, the 
realization of the schemes against which passive resistance is aimed 
must be hindered through all legitimate means; 3. that the enforced 
system of violence never be recognized. Thus in short: noncooperation, 
disobedience, nonrecognition.83 
With point 1. Homén means in particular that when the Russians seek 
to introduce new decrees in violation of the Finnish constitution then 
no one is to assist in their promulgation, legitimization and enforce-
ment. The Russians' violent acts must not be allowed to acquire the 
appearance of legality. The first point is therefore the key implement 
in the "equipment" of resistance .84 He emphasizes, however, that of 
the three points 2. is the most difficult and extensive. This is because 
it requires action, and not just the action of the higher officials but 
that of the whole people. The officials are indeed in a key position, 
but only when the whole nation acts together can the mechanism of 
passive resistance have the effect of nullifying the destructive charac-
teristics of the Russian attack.85 
But how does this mechanism work? Homén explains that "violence" 
— a term used by the Finns to include injustice and all forms of violations 
against their society — must at every stage of its endeavor be "forced" 
to display itself as violence. He claims that this is because "in the 
course of time nothing exhausts the ravaging of violence more than 
when it is incessantly forced to show itself in its true form."86 Homen 
believed that in this way the violator, if left completely unassisted, 
would foment such great resistance that further penetration would not 
be possible. 
Following Homen other resistance writers reiterated this point in 
various ways. For example in October 1900 rumors of impending 
searches of homes and deportations of resisters apparently gave rise 
to doubt concerning the capacity of passive resistance to endure in the 
face of escalating "violence.i87 The resisters' answer to this problem 
82 Homén 1900, pp. 8-9. 
83  Ibid., p. 9. 
84  Ibid., pp. 9,13. 
85  Ibid., pp. 9,11. 
86  Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
87 FO/VS, 30 October 1900, p. 1. 
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was that if individuals are attacked and prevented from functioning 
then this would only increase Finnish resistance. They thus saw violence 
as having a backfiring effect on its originator. Moreover, it was claimed 
that although limited numbers of individuals can be banished, hundreds 
and thousands cannot. The idea of justice was viewed as so strong that 
"new defenders arise en masse when one has been squashed."88  When 
confronted by passive resistance "the effect of acts of violence is 
completely opposite of what was intended; therefore ... the cause is 
furthered by those who meant to damage it."89 As one writer put it, 
the mechanism or "great strength of passive resistance" is that by 
adhering to the law — which meant disobedience to Russian authority 
— it "eliminates any chance for the oppressor to use violence, thus 
snatching from his hand that which makes him strong, i.e. brute 
force."9° This mechanism is what Neovius called the "flexible armor" 
of passive resistance which causes the exhaustion of the enemy by 
making his attack rebound on him.91 Thus the resisters saw passive 
resistance as a way to "maintain a conflict situation in which the ruler 
will finally be forced to change his policy," as Mechelin summed it up 
at the Constitutionalists' National Congress in November 1902.92 
The statements by Hornéll and his colleagues on the mechanism of 
resistance make it clear why the extreme — and, it should be stressed, 
primarily sincere — rhetoric of justice was necessary for the Finns' 
struggle. Raw disobedience, noncooperation and defiance were foreign 
to Finnish culture. Therefore in taking up these weapons the Constitu-
tionalists sought to legitimize their use and convert the masses through 
an innovative ideology of justice which, however, could draw on Finnish 
tradition. Such an ideology also served as propaganda against the 
Russians who had to be portrayed as immoral destroyers of civilization. 
It must be emphasized that noncooperation, disobedience and 
nonrecognition were the basic practical principles of passive resistance. 
But to be effective in practice they had to be combined with incessant 
moral warfare. In fact the manipulation of the moral and ideological 
environment is a central part of a great many conflicts throughout 
history. Admittedly Homén's declarations that now the "principle of 
justice" will overcome the "principle of violence" and that "our strength 
is founded not on power but on justice" may seem confusing to some.93 
HN  Ibid., p. 1. 
89  Ibid., p. 1. 
9° VL, 30 April 1902, p. 8. 
91 Neovius 1902, p. 1. 
92 Mechelin 1902. 
93  Hornén 1900, pp. 10,18. 
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But it should be obvious by now that what Homen means by "power" 
here is unjust violence and what he means by "justice" is the legitimized 
social force of Finnish society, which in the particular circumstances 
of the struggle at hand makes no recourse to physical or military 
violence. Homen, like his colleagues, emphasized that the mere "verbal 
and written preaching" of justice and truth is vain if it is not matched 
with deeds, or if it is followed by compliancy.94 
In his essay Homén offers only two concrete applications for 
resistance, both of which are familiar from the first issue of Fria Ord. 
In the case of restrictions on the right of public assembly he says that 
they should either be ignored outright or, if direct confrontation must 
be avoided, defied by holding private meetings. In this way it will be 
impossible for the Russians to enforce the constraints.95 
Homen's second application for resistance principles was aimed 
against the Russian peddlers and in particular against the Russian 
government's decree of 2 July 1900 giving native Russian peddlers and 
other tradesmen the right to work in Finland in violation of Finnish 
legislative restrictions on foreigners. Here Homen also calls for a 
"radical and extensive boycott"; the peddlers are not to be given food 
or shelter, no business is to be done with any Russian person and the 
movement of Russian tradesmen and workers is to hindered throughout 
the country.96 In this context Homen suggests that the Finnish people 
must begin to use only domestic products. He does not, however, go 
into any detail concerning how this activity could be carried out on a 
large scale or what its consequences would be.97 
Many of the resistance writings from the latter part of 1900 reveal 
a more or less fanatical concern with the Russian peddlers. Apparently 
the travelling salesmen provided the resisters with a convenient target 
for escalating passive resistance from protest to a kind of warfare. 
Homen saw the peddlers as a deadly poison within the living organism 
of Finnish society; if they were not expelled the consequences for the 
organism could be detrimental.98 His concern was not with the damage 
these "merchants, inciters and stooges" could do to the Finnish econ-
omy but rather with how their religion and language could undermine 
Finnish culture.99 A impassioned circular by a well known resistance 
94 Ibid., p. 18. 
95 Ibid., p. 11. 
96  Ibid., p. 12. 
97 Ibid., p. 13. 
98 Ibid., p. 12. 
99 Ibid., p. 12. 
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writer is testimony of the desire to spread xenophobia as a weapon 
against Russification: 
Not one citizen can indifferently watch how the native inhabitants of 
a foreign country rove in gangs throughout the country spreading 
worthless trinkets, devastatin diseases and dangerous doctrines causing the disintegration of society. 
The author calls upon all the people, both collectively and individually, 
to have nothing whatsoever to do with the "above mentioned aliens."1 1 
The aliens are not to be treated violently unless they initiate violence. 
Instead they are to be subject to complete ostracism through the 
"pressure of general patriotic opinion."1 2 
That passive resistance was understood as a form of social warfare 
best suited to current circumstances is demonstrated in a leaflet exhort-
ing the people to defend their fatherland.103  The leaflet combines 
passionate patriotic spirit with calculated strategic argumentation. It 
is an exemplary work of propaganda and its anonymous author was 
surely one of Finland's outstanding writers. 
The author sets out by invoking the ancient martial spirit of the 
Finns. In spite of defeat it was the armed resistance of the completely 
united Finnish people which forced the Russian invader to leave the 
structure of Finnish society intact at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Now, however, the "ancient enemy" has taken up a new form 
of warfare, a kind of bloodless invasion which does not involve military 
confrontation.104 The "ancient oppressor" does not now come 
murdering, or burning our peaceful dwellings. Insidiously he slinks in 
from the East, weaponless and without expressing his sly designs; he 
befriends the unsuspecting and credulous Finn, working treacherously 
and slowly to attain his aim. And this main goal for which he strives 
is nothing less than the destruction of all which the Finnish people has 
from time immemorial considered sacred: our religion our language 
and the social system inherited from our forefathers.10' 
How is this invasion being carried out? The author claims that it is 
the Russian peddlers who are the forces of the destruction of which 
he speaks. He reports that at the beginning of 1899 the amount of 
100 Born 1900, pp. 1-2. 101  Ibid., pp. 1-2. 1°2  Ibid., pp. 1-2.  los Kehoitus isänmaan puolustukseen 1900. 
104 Ibid., pp. 1-2.  
los Ibid., p. 2. 
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Russian-born peddlers increased considerably and that following 
encounters with local officials part of them had disappeared. After 
these events "no one doubts any longer that all Russian peddlers in 
Finland are in the service of a certain secret power."106 The author 
sought to propagate the idea that all the Russian peddlers were under 
the central command of Bobrikov and the Ober-Procurator of the Holy 
Synod, K.P. Pobedonostsev.107 The approach to combatting the 
Russian forces is passive resistance, merciless and complete boycott 
without physical violence, thus making the peddlers' lives impossible.108  
Even in the context of this one text the author's claim that "all" the 
Russian merchants were part of a controlled force appears exaggerated. 
He himself paints a lively and touching portrait of the times when the 
peddler, who appeared to everyone as "decent," "good-natured" and 
"playful," roamed the countryside;109 the peddler was welcomed every-
where with his "beautiful scarves" and assorted goods and when the 
local police "persecuted him we had mercy, giving him shelter when 
he was tired and food when he was hungry." 1° It seems highly implausi-
ble that almost overnight all the "harmless" merchants were to be 
transformed into "stooges of Russian masters" and "dangerous spies 
preparing the way for a greater enemy" who cheat the poor with their 
"riffraff," "spread their infectious diseases" and "persuade the stupid 
people that the land will be redistributed, _goods shared equally and 
that Russian law is better than Finnish."111 In support of his severe 
claims, however, the author gives the examples of the Baltic provinces 
Estonia, Livonia, Kurland and Ingria in the Russification of which he 
asserts Russian peddlers played a central part.112 
Tuomo Polvinen's thorough research into the Russian sources con-
cerning Russian policy in Finland at the time has revealed no evidence 
of a coordinated mass peddler force under the command of higher 
Russian officials.113  On the other hand Finnish researchers have 
pointed out that given the discontented state of the country's landless 
rural laborers it is no wonder that in 1899, with the coming of "Russian 
law," rumors of the redistribution of land spread rapidly. No doubt in 
order to spread the good news and thus gain favor many peddlers told 
1°6  Ibid., p. 3 
107 Ibid., p. 6. 
108 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 1°9  Ibid., p. 2-3. 11°  Ibid., p. 3. 
111  Ibid., p. 6. 
112  Ibid., p. 6. 
13 Polvinen 1984, p. 215. 
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the common landless people of the possible redistribution.114 Whereas 
earlier local officials had been tolerant of the formally illegal migrant 
salesmen they now began to arrest and expel them. 
At the time when the anti-peddler resistance tracts cited above were 
written the amount of these travelling salesmen in Finland had already 
greatly diminished. Of course Bobrikov's legislative defense of the 
peddlers' right to trade in Finland, enforced in the decree of 7 July 
1900, gave rise to genuine concern. But the threat of a massive influx 
of Russians who would be the vehicles of large-scale Russification was 
used as a tool of anti-Russian propaganda with the aim of winning 
"the people" over to the Constitutionalist cause. The migrant salesmen 
provided the resisters with a very convenient target for action at a 
time when they considered it of the utmost necessity to go beyond 
words to deeds. No doubt many an innocent peddler became the victim 
of the competition of the Constitutionalists and the Russian regime 
for the souls of the landless folk in Finland. As one observer com-
mented: "The question of the travelling salesmen is not in itself very 
important; but the way by which the Finns have dealt with these 
enemies is the same which they intend to follow as the current struggle 
proceeds...115 
In addition to Russian stamps, peddlers, language, imported products 
and restrictions on the right of assembly and the freedom of the press 
the resisters cited the Russian gendarme as an object for defiance. In 
a circular distributed anonymously late in 1900 Arvid Neovius expresses 
the resisters' concern about the increasing surveillance of Finnish 
citizens and officials by the gendarme. He emphasizes that under 
Finnish constitutional law the gendarme have no jurisdiction in the 
sphere of Finland's internal law and order. Neovius' aim is to make 
people aware of this, which he does by making a series of points: in 
relation to Finns the Russian gendarme have the status of private 
persons; no Finn is obliged to answer to, or enter into discussion with, 
a gendarme; no one is obliged to obey the commands of a gendarme 
but rather, on the contrary, it is their duty to disobey; no one is to do 
violence to a Russian gendarme and violent confrontation with them 
is to be avoided; however, in an emergency the right of self defense 
may be invoked according to Criminal Law, chapter three, articles six 
and seven; no Finn is under the obligation to show a gendarme his 
passport within Finnish territory. Finally Neovius calls upon all Finnish 
116 Ibid., p. 215; Rasila 1961, pp. 182-186. 
115 FO/VS, 2 November 1900, p. 4. 
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citizens, each within his own capacity, to make sure that the gendarme 
remains in practice just as insignificant as it is de jure."o 
The principle that Russians and all things Russian were to be met 
with extreme boycott seems to have been generally accepted by the 
resistance thinkers. How to relate to Finnish compliants was a more 
controversial issue. Clearly they all agreed that compliancy had to be 
submitted to rigorous criticism and protest. Boycott of compliant 
newspapers also gained general acceptance in principle. But the idea 
of extreme personal social boycott against compliants sometimes met 
with uncertainty and opposition. This idea is found expressed in two 
popular works published in 1902. 
The first of these, The Finnish National Catechism, is couched in the 
style a preacher would use in instructing the masses. Given that Finns 
were educated by means of Luther's catechism this style was no doubt 
chosen for its probable psychological impact. Intermingled with talk 
of God and the holiness of law, the author describes to the Finnish 
citizen what "good politics" are."' He insists that all who comply with 
Russification are criminals, slaves of fear, motivated only by self-inter-
est; they are worse than murderers and thieves and must be punished 
more severely than ordinary criminals. In the current circumstances 
such punishment was to be implemented through a merciless program 
of social boycott by aid of which the compliant "traitors" and their 
"stooges" were to be ostracized from society.118  
The second of these two works, called The Black Book, provided 
the resisters with a list of those higher compliant officials who were 
to be the targets of social boycott. Each chapter included a photograph 
of the condemned man; each section ended with an illustration of a 
hangman's noose or some other threatening symbol. The whole tone 
of the book was set by the etching on the first page: a white skull on 
a background of black above the white title, in special script, The Black 
Book. /9 The actual program of social boycott — "instructions on how 
to deal with traitors and their stooges" — put forth in the National 
Catechism consists of a series of "do nots" in the style of biblical 
commands: The `traitors" are to be absolutely ignored. All citizens 
are to demand the exclusion of compliants from public places and from 
all business relationships. Conveniences must be denied them and no 
food sold to them. The compliants must be treated as socially dead 
16 Neovius 1900d, pp. 1-3. 
117 Fraser 1902a, pp. 1-9. 
118  Ibid., pp. 9-11, 16-19, 20,22. 
119 Lindqvist 1902. 
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and all traitors must be carefully watched. Those citizens who do not 
openly take sides are to be pressured into doing so. To these instructions 
plenty of advice as to how to be a good citizen was added. 
The activities advocated in these works were clearly consistent with 
the principles of passive resistance. But the terms with which they were 
presented went beyond the standards of decency to which the main-
stream resistance press adhered in relation to Finns: "We condemn 
the writing and distribution of pamphlets such as the National Catech-
ism. "120  The resisters particularly deplored any effort to identify such 
extreme, "reckless and unsuccessful," works with mainstream 
resistance;121  "every nest has its rotten egg, every litter its unsuccessful 
individual," whose actions must not be allowed to disgrace the 
movement.122 
As Homén's account indicates, the compliants seem to have been 
effectively using the "the famous National Catechism" to defame the 
resistance press, accusing it of spreading "lies, slander and false ru-
mors."123  Homén simultaneously stresses that the Catechism was pub-
lished by an individual without cooperation from the leading resisters 
and that his own criticism of compliancy is certainly more penetrating 
than the Catechism's. This indicates that the Kagal-circle resisters did 
not approve of the Catechism's encroachment on their own domain. 
The possible distribution of the Black Book by Kagal was debated by 
the organization's directors. While its merits were recognized, its tone 
was unacceptable and it was decided that its distribution would only 
damage the cause of passive resistance. The proposed further editions 
of the Black Book were never produced.124  
From the beginning of the radicalization of resistance in the latter 
part of 1900 it was emphasized that passive resistance is not passive. 
This of course appears to be a contradiction in terms. Although the 
Finnish resisters understood the word "passive" in the term "passive 
resistance" to signify all forms of just resistance short of violence they 
did have trouble with the term, and sometimes expressed dissatisfaction 
with it, realizing that it was an inadequate way of describing their way 
of struggle. For example in calling the people to action they were 
forced to use clumsy phrases like "passive active resistance," which 
meant that resistance was to be carried out actively, but without 
120 "Mätämunia," VL, 2 February 1903, p. 4. 
12I  Ibid., p. 4. 
122  Ibid., p. 4. 
123 Homén 1903b, pp. 150, 153, 154; Homén's citation of the compliants is from Uusi 
Suometar.  
124 Reuter 1928, pp. 388-393. 
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violence.125  Reviewing the literature of resistance on the whole the 
field of action in relation to Russification can be seen as having been 
conceptually divided into four categories: 1. compliancy, 2. passive 
passive resistance, 3. active passive resistance and 4. active resistance. 
The borders between these categories were not always distinct. Number 
two primarily signified the realm of protest while number three referred 
to direct noncooperation, disobedience and defiance and number four 
to violent struggle. 
The innovation of the radical Constitutionalists was to shift emphasis 
to the realm of action lying between passive passive resistance and 
violent struggle. Why, however, did this shift not bring about a corre-
sponding innovation in terminology as occurred in the change from 
"passive resistance" to "nonviolent resistance" among M.K. Gandhi 
and his colleagues in southern Africa? This question cannot be 
answered with complete certainty since the Constitutionalists did not 
address it in writing. One definite reason was that the word "passive 
resistance" was so common and entrenched in Finnish political 
discourse. 
Perhaps this terminological fixation, to offer one possible explana-
tion, symbolizes the dead end the Constitutionalists were heading for 
in relation to the mobilization of the Finnish masses. After all, as Marx 
and other early nineteenth century observers noted, passive resistance 
was primarily a form of elite constitutionalist-led collective action. 
Although they certainly radicalized the resistance tradition, maybe the 
Finnish Constitutionalists' retention of "passive" and their zealous 
adherence to the upper class rhetoric of justice indicated their 
unwillingness to go beyond a certain border, not merely in relation to 
Russia but, perhaps more importantly, in relation to the Finnish people. 
Active passive resistance was primarily depicted as a defensive 
weapon. This is understandable since it was the Constitutionalists' goal 
to keep Finland from being Russified; moreover, it was necessary for 
resistance strategy that the Finns be seen as the innocent victims of 
barbarian aggression. However, in their effort to develop the activeness 
of passive resistance certain thinkers maintained it also had the capacity 
for offensive tactics within the overall framework of defense strategy. 
A good example of this way of thinking is an article, entitled "A 
Word on Attack as a Means of Defense," by Neovius published on 2 
November 1900 under his pseudonym A. Verner. "In military science 
and in tactics," begins Neovius, "an important rule is that a straight- 
125 FO/VS, 18 October 1900, p. 1. 
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forward defensive position carries within itself the seed of reversal."126 
Pure defense can lead neither to advances nor to victory, and it almost 
inevitably ends in retreat or defeat. Neovius argues that there are two 
main reasons for this, the "mathematical" and the "psychological." 
With the former he means that even in a firmly defended position 
what is lost cannot be regained; accumulated defeats, however small, 
will necessarily lead to the position's deterioration. Secondly, psycholo-
gically speaking pure defense is unendurable. This is because "nothing 
affects man's bravery and perseverance so depressingly as inertia and 
the feeling of inaction and helplessness which arises from it."127 
Furthermore, he who is exclusively on the defensive lacks the important 
source of psychological strength found in the forward movement of 
offense. 
Neovius cites the Boer War as the freshest case for illustrating his 
point. If, instead of staying on the defensive, the Boers would have 
taken to systematic offensive action they probably could have mobilized 
the whole Dutch populace of Cape Colony thus decisively dividing the 
British. In referring to the Boer case, however, Neovius did not imply 
that the Finns should undertake military offensives. As one of his 
colleagues put it, "we cannot think of beginning to defend ourselves, 
weapon in hand, in the same manner as the Boers."128 
Instead Neovius depicts a kind of nonmilitary guerilla warfare, a 
kind of struggle carried out in between conventional politics and con-
ventional warfare, which excludes blind and rash offensive for selective 
attacks on the enemy's weak points. Moreover, thorough knowledge 
of the "aggressor's position, forces and characteristics" is an essential 
condition for this "offensive defense."129  Neovius emphasizes the free 
resistance press as one of the most important weapons of this type of 
struggle. This is because in a struggle which does not employ "military 
weapons or violence general opinion ... is the only power under which 
the strong are forced to yield." 3° In other words the mass mobilization 
of opinion, of the way people channel their consent, is the basis of a 
powerful offensive potential which can be carried out through disobedi-
ence and noncooperation. 
By the time the new Russian Conscription Act was imposed on 
Finland in July 1901 innovative thought concerning the theory or 
126 Neovius 1900c, p. 1. 
127  Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
128 FO/VS, 9 January 1901, pp. 1-3. 
129 Neovius 1900c, pp. 1-2. 
130 Ibid., p. 2. 
176 
practical principles of passive resistance had reached maturity. The 
Finnish model for a "new way of waging warfare" was to a large extent 
set, and its most outstanding applications, as in the conscription strikes 
of 1902 and 1903, were still to come.131 
4. Tolstoyan Resistance in Finland 
The mainstream line of resistance taken during the era of Russification 
was strictly Constitutionalist, with strong roots in Finnish nationalist 
political culture. A zealous effort, however, was also made to define 
and advocate a type of passive resistance, called here Tolstoyan resist-
ance, which differed fundamentally from that of the Constitutionalists. 
Like Constitutionalist resistance, the Tolstoyan resistance of the 
Bobrikov period had its cultural roots in earlier decades. These roots, 
however, were relatively shallow; Tolstoyan resistance did not gain 
mass support and remained confined to small, primarily literary, circles. 
In spite of this confinement there are several important reasons for 
exploring Finnish Tolstoyan resistance here. Firstly, it is an entirely 
unknown episode in the history of attempts to devise and implement 
nonmilitary ways of struggle.132 Simply as such it is worthy of analysis. 
Secondly, Tolstoyan resistance existed in such close relationship to 
Constitutionalist resistance that one might, if ignorant of the European 
history of passive resistance, be inclined to think that the latter was 
somehow derived from, or significantly influenced by, the former. It 
is therefore necessary to clarify their relationship. Finally, by contrast-
ing these two forms of resistance their respective characteristics are 
made more distinct. 
Tolstoyism in Finland133 
Count Leo Tolstoy's ideas concerning religion, interpersonal relations 
(with emphasis on sexual morality) and politics, all based upon his 
11  On the further development of passive resistance see section 9. below. 
132 For the most detailed study of Tolstoyism in Finland see Nokkala 1958. As such 
Finnish Tolstoyan resistance has reeeived little attention in Finland and it has not 
been studied at all in comparison to other forms of European resistanee and 
contention. It has not been studied by non-Finns because of the relative inaccessibility 
of sources and, perhaps more significantly, because of the lack of a releyant heuristic 
perspective. 
'" See ibid. for a full treatment of this topic; Nokkala's work includes an English 
summary entitled "Tolstoyism in Finland," pp. 422-429. 
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Christian anarchism and strong criticism of irreligious rationalism, 
began to become known in Finland in the 1880s. At that time many 
members of the Finnish educated strata became thoroughly acquainted 
with Tolstoy's works.134  Furthermore, Tolstoy had a significant 
influence on many Finnish writers whose works were widely read at 
the time and figure prominently today in the Finnish canon of national 
classics. 
During that same period Tolstoy's writings became a central influ-
ence in the intellectual development of many of the men who were to 
become leaders of the Finnish socialist movement. Some of them 
combined Tolstoyism with European pacifism; others rejected many 
of Tolstoy's fundamental ideas while making use of his sociopolitical 
criticism. At any rate, the illustrious Russian author probably received 
more attention among the members of the Finnish workers' movement 
than any other author.135  Even this movement's main pre-1918 
theoretician and founder of the Finnish Communist Party, Yrjö Sirola,  
was deeply affected by Tolstoy's thought. Tolstoyism was also very 
influential within the Finnish Youth Society movement through its 
famous leader Santeri Alkio.  
Of the truly anarchistic Tolstoyans in Finland Akseli Isohiisi was no 
doubt the most legendarily impressive. It has been observed that 
Isohiisi was more successful in actually living a Tolstoyan lifestyle than 
Tolstoy himself; his home became a center of pilgrimage for Finnish 
followers of the renowned Russian master's ideas and for people of a 
similar leaning. He and his brother were executed for refusing to bear 
arms in the Civil War of 1918. 
The most famous of Finland's Tolstoyans was, however, the literary 
artist Arvid Järnefelt who became known as "Finland's Tolstoy." It 
was he who was the main ideologist of Tolstoyan passive resistance.  
Järnefelt grew up in an upper class Finnish nationalist environment 
among the cream of society. He went through a Tolstoyan spiritual 
awakening after exposure to the Russian master's religious thought by 
his mother. He therefore gave up his literary and legal studies to 
attempt to lead a genuine Christian life as a craftsman and a farmer. 
Järnefelt's many novels and other works are full of ideas typical of 
Tolstoy. After many years of study and translation of Tolstoy's works  
Järnefelt was completely immersed in the Tolstoyan way of thinking 
134 Tolstoy's name figured prominently on the Russian regime's list of works banned 
in Finland; see Uppgift ...  periodiska tryckalster,  1891-1901. 
135  Soikkanen 1961, p. 138. 
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and his views rarely differed from those of his master. The two men 
maintained a correspondence which lasted from 1895 until Tolstoy's 
death in 1809. 
Tolstoy's Paradoxical Doctrine of Resistance 
Tolstoy's doctrine of resistance was based upon his interpretation of 
the New Testament Gospels. He expounded the elementary principles 
for this doctrine in his book My Religion, published in the early 1880s. 
In this work Tolstoy asserts that the Sermon on the Mount is the most 
essential part of Christ's teachings and that in it, as well as throughout 
the Gospels, he found affirmation of the same basic imperative, ex-
pressed by Jesus as: "Resist not evil." Tolstoy claims that Jesus' mean-
ing here is 
you have thought you were acting in a reasonable manner in defending 
yourself by violence against evil, in tearing out an eye for an eye, ... 
but I say unto you, renounce violence; have nothing to do with violence. 
`Resist not evil' means, never resist, never oppose violence; or in other 
words never do anything contrary to the law of love.136  
At first thought it may seem a blatant contradiction to call this the 
foundation for a doctrine of resistance. After all the idea cannot be 
clearer: "never resist." Being the recalcitrant fiery critic that he was, 
however, Tolstoy, like the rebellious early modern Christians, must 
have found the unequivocal absolute submission required by the 
imperative "never resist" impossible to adhere to. He found his way 
out of this dilemma, as he further developed his doctrine in The 
Kingdom of God is Within You (1893), by dropping the "never resist," 
modifying Jesus' "resist not evil" and retaining the renunciation of 
violence. This led him to formulate his doctrine in the phrase "non-
resistance to evil by violence." This formula avoided the inaction of 
"never resist" while allowing for a kind of resistance conceived of as 
violence-free.137 Tolstoy's formula was called for short "non-
resistance," a term which has doubtlessly mislead many into seeing it 
as a doctrine of inaction. The book The Kingdom of God, pervaded 
'36 Leo Tolstoy 1885, pp. 5, 10-11, 13, 38. 
137 It is not difficult to see how the phrase "non-resistance to eyil by violence" could 
have been modified, perhaps unconsciously, by Gandhi and his associates into 
"nonviolence." Gandhi read more works by Tolstoy than by any other single author 
and was particularly impressed by The Kingdom of God in Within You; see Gandhi 
1959, p. 48-49 and, Gandhi 1947, p. 79. 
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as it is with an explicit spirit of noncompliance and defiance, is proof 
enough that such a view is indisputably mistaken. 
Tolstoy believed that "from the very beginning of Christianity the 
doctrine of not resisting evil by violence has been professed ... by a 
minority."138 The centuries-old Quaker defiance to church and state 
provided Tolstoy with the most important historical prototype for his 
doctrine of resistance without violence.139  Another, more contem-
porary and direct, essential influence on Tolstoy's doctrine was that 
of American abolitionist and anti-militarist Christian radicals such as 
William Lloyd Garrison and Adin Ballou. In a nutshell, what Tolstoy 
learned from these men was, in Ballou's words, that "evil is to be 
resisted by all just means, but never with evil."14° 
Tolstoy understood resistance without violence to be a powerful 
means by which people who have the will not to submit can use in any 
struggle against oppression and evil. He tried to show that those in 
control of state and church power have always opposed and feared 
"non-resistance," ever maintaining a conspiracy of silence concerning 
it. He believed that this was because resistance without violence 
threatens the very foundation of the violent system of repression and 
submission which the church and state are founded upon. Thus 
Tolstoy's "non-resistance" is not to be understood merely as an abstract 
moral principle, but as a potent practical weapon against everything 
which causes people to submit to evil. In other words, resistance without 
violence "is a most terrible and most dangerous doctrine for every 
despotism"; violent revolution is only counter-productive and "every 
[violent] conflict merely strengthens the means of oppression in the 
hands of those who for the time being are in power." 41  
Although the basic principles of Tolstoy's resistance doctrine were 
clear, he never discussed with much detail the variety of ways and 
means, or methodology, by which they could be effectively practiced. 
Therefore the practical scope and limits of resistance devoid of violence 
or evil, as Tolstoy conceived it, remained ambiguous. In his discussions 
with the Finns concerning the subject of resistance he added nothing 
138 Tolstoy 1960, pp. 2-11. 
139 Ibid., pp. 2-11. 
140  Ibid., pp. 11-15, 22: these Americans' doctrine of resistance was called "non-
resistance." Garrison even founded a "Society for Non-Resistance." Tolstoy also 
cites the work of Daniel Musser, On Non-resistance (1864). Hence the origin of the 
term Tolstoy used. For some Christians, resistance is intertwined with evil, which 
explains why they were willing to use such seemingly resistance negating and 
contradictory terms as "non-resistance" and "passive resistance" for their own 
doctrines of resistance. 
141  Ibid., pp. 1, 22, 36, 55, 199, 217, 233, 235. 
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new to the fundamentals of his doctrine. Again he emphasized that 
successful resistance must be based on the teachings of Christ, which 
contain the solutions to all problems.142  Tolstoy did, however, elaborate 
on some of his basic ideas in his advice to the Finns. Here he explicitly 
did not confine himself to a negative interpretation of "non-resistance." 
He stressed the need for action, saying that when an external force 
seeks to deprive one of the sources of life and freedom then one has 
not only the right, but also the moral duty to defend oneself without 
violence because it is never right not to disobey an unrighteous 
command.143  Resistance was thus imperative. Furthermore, Tolstoy 
reiterated to the Finns that resistance should not be based upon faith 
in a system of jurisprudence, since the legal order is always slave to 
state structural violence. Likewise patriotism had to be rejected as a 
motive for action. These principles were central to Järnefelt's teaching 
in Finland. 
Heroism Without Weapons 
When Finnish resistance culture encountered Tolstoy's doctrine of 
defiance in the mind of Arvid Järnefelt an inspired, almost messianic, 
and characteristically naive, vision was born. Järnefelt exclaimed that 
A new kind of heroism has come.... Before its advance nothing can vie 
with it in greatness. Like a tidal wave it lays low everything in its path.... 
It has not come like the clatter of arms, nor like a raging storm, but 
unperceived like the wafting wind of a spring morning: Do not obey 
an unrighteous command! ... This new heroism is the heroism of 
weaponlessness. It unites all people....1" 
During the era of Russification Järnefelt wrote a number of works in 
which his understanding of Tolstoyan resistance was adapted to Finnish 
conditions. The first of these was the play Samuel Cröell, performed 
in the Finnish National Theatre in 1899. The protagonist of this drama, 
Samuel Cröell, a highly intelligent and capable man, cared nothing for 
the nobility, for their so-called heroic deeds, their high positions or 
their use of violent weapons. Instead he extolled the virtues of rural 
life and the peasants. Putting conscience before national duty, Cröell 
142 For example, in April 1899 Järnefelt promised Tolstoy that he would spread this 
primary tenet, among the Finns; see Järnefelt 1957, p. 15. 
143  Järnefelt 1899b, pp. 71-72, 103. 
144 Ibid., p. 107. 
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helped many youths to avoid conscription by the Swedish Crown. 
Condemned by the nobles, Cröell set out in the name of justice to 
reveal all the criminal deeds of his accusers who dominated the land 
in a violent and unjust manner. He believed that such a struggle against 
law breaking enemies could be waged without weapons and that justice 
or right, as guaranteed by the law, could not be overthrown. Initially 
he believed that the Crown, the seat of law and order, would punish 
the evil doers once their misdeeds were revealed. In the end, however, 
Cröell realized that the whole legal system is based on violence and 
that the honest man will not achieve justice through appeal to it.145  
Thus Järnefelt's message to the Finnish people was that resistance 
should not be grounded in faith in, or allegiance to, the secular political-
legal heritage embodied in the prevailing state structure. 
Soon after the performance of this play some Constitutionalists 
requested Järnefelt to visit Tolstoy in order to ask advice concerning 
what the Finns should do in the current situation.146 In a letter of 22 
April 1899 Järnefelt told Tolstoy of his intention to publish and 
distribute throughout Finland the ideas which he received during that 
visit.147 Decades later (1930) Järnefelt was to describe the effects of 
that visit with "the prophet of our time" in grandiose terms, claiming 
that in the depths of that dark period a new, perhaps hitherto unknown 
light, began to shine: "it was as if a new spirituality was soaring in 
time; one could have almost called it a religion. Its essence was a 
conviction that conscience and God's will were to be blindly 
followed."148  
Järnefelt began his elaboration of the idea of passive resistance by 
calling for a new interpretation of the history of Finland and the 
world.149  He strongly criticized the inclination of historians to confine 
themselves to the narration of political and military events, to the 
doings of kings and soldiers. Because historical writing has been 
dominated by this perspective he thought that the history of the ancient 
and significant history of passive resistance had not been written. Thus,  
Järnefelt claimed, the true history of Finland was still unwritten because 
that history is the history of passive resistance. He felt sure that a new 
understanding of life was emerging which would stimulate a 
145 Järnefelt 1899a, pp. 34, 49, 111, 112, 113, 167, 168. 
146 Järnefelt to Tolstoy, 7 March 1899, in Järnefelt 1957, pp. 3-13. 
147 Järnefelt to Tolstoy, 22 April 1899, in Järnefelt 1957, p. 15. 
148 Järnefelt 1976, p. 497. 
149 Järnefelt used the term "passiivinen vastarinta," i.e., "passive resistance," not 
Tolstoy's "non-resistance," a term which was not used in Finnish. 
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reinterpretation of history and reveal the deep roots of passive 
resistance.15° 
However justified Järnefelt's criticism of current historiography may 
have been he failed to provide the material needed for the reinterpreta-
tion which he called for. He only cited one example from early 
nineteenth century Finnish history when peasants reacted with passive 
resistance when their property rights were challenged.151  Järnefelt was 
a hopeless historian; obviously he would never be able to substantiate 
his theory concerning the centrality of passive resistance in Finnish, 
little less world, history with such skimpy evidence. "Finland's Tolstoy" 
seems to have realized this himself, since it was not long before he 
was singing another tune. 
In a long article entitled "Forward!", published in 1901, Järnefelt 
asserted that confidence in the power of passive resistance is based on 
a new kind of faith rather than upon historical experience. In fact he 
now admitted that history was full of cases of peoples overthrown 
unjustly and of examples of how passive resistance was not followed. 
Nevertheless, "in spite of the contrary evidence of history" Järnefelt 
believed that someday the oppressed peoples of the world would see 
the dawn of their day of freedom because "all that is grounded on 
violence ultimately cannot endure."152  Furthermore, he explained that 
the reason why there are so few examples of consistent and victorious 
passive resistance movements is the lack of belief in this basic principle. 
He was convinced that the faith which could make such resistance 
unbeatable was presently arising in Finland, and the world.153 
Thus for Järnefelt the deep truth or divine mechanism of passive 
resistance was that violence, like everything built upon it, was bound 
to fail in the end. In order to act in accordance with this principle 
resistance had to be implemented in a twofold manner. Firstly, all 
unrighteous commands had to be disobeyed without compromise. 
Secondly, in accordance with "the religious sense," violence had to be 
renounced unconditionally. The criteria for deciding what an 
unrighteous command is cannot be found in secular law but rather in 
the conscience of the individual. Järnefelt asserted that by obeying his 
own conscience the resister comes under the special protection of 
providence. Moreover, he believed that resistance based solely on 
150 Järnefelt discussed these matters in an article entitled "Does Finland haye a 
History?"; see Järnefelt, 1900, pp. 7-15. 
151  Ibid., pp. 11-14. 
152  Ibid., pp. 209-211. 
153  Ibid., pp. 210-211. 
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Realpolitik motives is self defeating; the success of resistance depends 
solely on the degree to which it is motivated by conscience, by the 
religious, not secular, sense of justice.154  
Constitutionalist Nationalism Versus Tolstoyan 
Universalism 
Was the Constitutionalists' version of passive resistance influenced in 
any essential way by Tolstoyism? At first thought it might seem likely 
that it was. Tolstoy's works My Religion and The Kingdom of God 
were available in Finland soon after publication both in Russian and 
Swedish. Considering the broad popularity of Tolstoy's writings within 
the Finnish educated class it can be assumed that most of the 
Constitutionalist leaders were familiar with the Russian master's ideas 
well before the Bobrikov era began. One can indeed find traces within 
the works of the Constitutionalist resisters which seem to indicate 
Tolstoyan influence. For example there are numerous articles in the 
underground resistance press concerning Tolstoy.155 The Constitution-
alists also took considerable effort, at least several well documented 
times, to make direct contact with Tolstoy concerning the Finnish 
situation. Furthermore, not surprisingly, some articles in the resistance 
press display certain Tolstoyan qualities. Finally, in 1901 a pamphlet 
containing selections from Tolstoy's Kingdom of God was published 
as part of the resistance effort.156  
In spite of these apparent traces of Tolstoy's influence the Russian 
author's doctrine of resistance had no essential effect on the de-
velopment of the idea or practice of Constitutionalist resistance. In 
fact the two doctrines, although they shared the name "passive 
resistance," were to a large extent incompatible. If some of the 
Constitutionalist writings do bear a certain Tolstoyan flavor they 
certainly do not do so in an undiluted manner, full as they are of 
downright anti-Tolstoyan elements such as patriotism and worship of 
the legal heritage. The prominence of Tolstoy's name within the 
154  Ibid., pp. 210-213. 
155 For examples see FONS, 12 January 1901, 9 April 1901, 15 April 1901, 30 April 
1901; VL, 11 November 1901, 25 Noyember 1901, 13 February 1902, 26 February 
1902, 30 September 1902, 8 October 1903, 18 January 1905. 
156 The pamphlet was entitled Ur Leo Tolstoys "Frälsningen finnes hos dig själf '; see 
Tolstoy 1901; the fact that years later this work was included in the Estlander 
bibliography of resistance literature (entry no. 121) indicates that it was considered 
to be part of the resistance effort. 
184 
resistance press can be explained by the fact that the resister's used it 
mainly for propagandistic purposes. For example in the articles dealing 
with Tolstoy, only minimal reference is made to his ideas and no 
mention is made of his doctrine of resistance. Instead, these articles 
focus on Tolstoy's many confrontations with Russian authorities; thus 
the Constitutionalists used the name of the world-renowned author to 
cultivate anti-Russian government sentiment in Finland. The Kingdom 
of God pamphlet, when its universalistic aspects were overlooked, was 
also well suited to this purpose since, for example, it provided 
justification for the Finns' resistance to Russian military conscription. 
In their direct contacts with Tolstoy, beginning early in 1899, the 
Constitutionalists were no doubt genuinely interested in a more 
detailed account of his views on resistance. Järnefelt later exaggerated 
the Constitutionalists' degree of interest in this regard. He added, 
however, that in addition to being primarily interested in Tolstoy's 
doctrine they were also seeking, "of course," to gain international 
sympathy for their movement by taking advantage of Tolstoy's world-
renown. 57 Järnefelt's order of importance here must be reversed. After 
Järnefelt prepared the way for communication by, perhaps guilelessly, 
convincing Tolstoy of the universalistic Christian nature of Finnish 
resistance the extremist Constitutionalist Georg Fraser took advantage 
of the situation, persuading Tolstoy to write an "Open Letter" to the 
tsar containing an appeal in favor of the Finns. The world-wide publicity 
such a letter would receive and the attention which Tolstoy's fame 
would bring in general were doubtlessly the primar motives for the 
Constitutionalists' contact with the Russian master. 58 
Maintaining that "the nature of passive resistance is revealed most 
clearly when it is used directly for idealistic purposes" Järnefelt saw 
the classical type of peaceful Christian resistance offered by the 
Doukhobors to the Russian state as the ideal model of passive 
resistance.159  In contrast the Constitutionalists' long held ideal of 
resistance was exemplified in the patriotic struggle led by Deåk in 
Hungary. Obviously they never could have identified with the Järnefelt/ 
Tolstoyan vision. Therefore one cannot but conclude that the literary 
artist Järnefelt was possessed by an imagination run wild when he 
sought to convince Tolstoy that the Finnish will to resist Russification 
157  Järnefelt 1976, pp. 497-498. 
158 Fraser himself was definitely not one to accept Tolstoy's basic principles. He was a 
staunch Finnish nationalist and outspoken advocate of a type of passive resistance 
which was incompatible with Tolstoy's doctrine of resistance; see Fraser 1902a and 
1902b. 
159  Järnefelt 1901, p. 212. 
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was not based on the type of patriotism which they both condemned.1Ci°  
Even latter he was still captivated by his misguided vision when he 
explained for posterity in 1908 that the Finnish struggle started in the 
"pure" Tolstoyan manner and gradually became corrupted by national-
ism, localism, mere utilitarian motives and, later, by the advent of 
violent resistance. He condemned the resistance as a failure.'61  
Järnefelt's "pure" passive resistance was, of course, never imple-
mented in Finland and the Finnish people were plainly never anywhere 
near being ready to carry out a Tolstoyan revolution. In fact the 
Constitutionalist antipathy for Järnefelt's ideas was explicitly expressed 
as early as 1899. For example at that time the prominent resistance 
agitator Zachris Castrén, attacking Järnefelt's play Samuel Cröell, 
totally rejected the character Cröell's conviction that resistance must 
be based on Christian love and forgiveness. Instead, the justification 
of resistance, the determination of what is right and just, was to be 
derived from the "national sense of justice," of which the judicial 
system and the legal heritage in general were manifestations.162  For 
the Constitutionalists faith in the national sense of justice was expressly 
superior to Järnefelt's faith in individual Christian conscience. 63 
5. Resistance or Submission? The Finnish 
Existential Dilemma 
For the Finnish Constitutionalists resistance was right. Argumentation 
concerning the rightness of resistance was of utmost practical necessity 
for the resisters, since the call for disobedience posed a acute secular 
and religious dilemma for Finns. This argumentation followed classical 
western European constitutionalist lines. As Homén put it, the authori-
ties may, and do, make mistakes and such mistakes must generally be 
born with patience until corrected through legal procedures. When, 
however, the mistakes of authority become systematic injustices then 
such authority has stepped out of the sphere of legality into irrationality 
and can no longer demand obedience; it ceases to be authority.' 
160 Järnefelt 1957, pp. 3-14. 
161  Järnefelt 1908, pp. 229-230. 
162 Castrén, 1899, p. 632. 
163 Castrén reiterated these views in 1908 in a rebuttal of Järnefelt's interpretation of 
resistance during the Bobrikov era; Castrén 1908, pp. 222-229. 
164 Homen 1901a, p. 2. 
186 
To support and illustrate his point Homén draws on Snellman's 
fundamental book on political theory from 1842. In this work Snellman 
extensively cites the early seventeenth century thinker Hugo Grotius 
— who Homén points out was no liberal on matters of state — on the 
cases in which subjects are justified in implementing staunch resistance 
against higher authority. Homen mentions two of these cases. First is 
when the ruler treats a whole people as an enemy; second, and most 
significant, is when a constitutional ruler breaks the laws which bind 
him. In the latter case, as Snellman writes, the ruler forfeits ruling 
power and rulership itself.165 The advocates of compliancy claimed 
that this type of argumentation was to take Snellman, and the tradition 
of political thought which he spawned, out of context. As they put it 
over and over again, the question was not one of what is right and 
just, but of what is realistic. 
The compliants' dichotomy between what is right and what is 
practical was unacceptable to the resisters. It was through this 
dichotomy, as has been seen earlier, that the compliants perpetuated 
a biased view of the resisters' arguments and veiled their own truth in 
the guise of realism. Just as the Constitutionalists did not merely preach 
right and justice but put resistance into action, most of their argumenta-
tion was practically oriented, just as Finnish Constitutionalism was 
above all a movement and not merely a philosophy. The right to resist 
tyranny was indeed derived from abstract legal thinking and the 
morality of justice. But hand in hand with the right to rebel the resisters 
emphasized the duty to do so.t66  For its part the duty to resist was not 
derived merely from abstract principles, but from practical considera-
tions; in fact in Finnish resistance principle and practice were inter-
linked and they cannot be properly understood in isolation from one 
another. "The Great Question" for the resisters was that of survival 
or defeat and resistance or submission;167  the question of rightness and 
justice was therefore highly pragmatic. 
Well before the beginning of the passive resistance movement what 
might be called the Deåkean pragmatic principle had become one of 
the basic maxims of Finnish political culture. Thus it is not surprising 
to find the first issue of the resistance organ Fria Ord/Vapaita Sanoja  
stating: 
165  Ibid., p. 2. 
166 Ibid., p. 2; in this article Homén also goes from right to duty; for another example 
of the argument from abstract right to practical duty see FO/VS, 27 September 1900, 
pp. 1-2. 
167 The works of the resistance writers are abundantly entitled with rhetorical existential 
questions; "The Great Question" is from Toppola 1903. 
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we have all been in agreement that those of our political rights which 
we voluntarily allow to be taken from us cannot be retrieved, but that 
those which are seized from us by the right of violence can be 
redeemed.168 
In other words the duty to resist is derived from the fact that only 
through "submission does power politics acquire life force."169  The 
resisters found this principle stated in yet another manner in Leo 
Tolstoy's interpretation of voluntary servitude holding that if a people 
do not make their sense of justice known in a firm and vigorous manner, 
if they do not refuse to submit, then they have only themselves to 
blame for the oppression which they suffer.170 As one writer, clearly 
under the influence of Tolstoy, wrote in the resistance press: "The 
world is governed through us. The power of the world could be in our 
hands, but we play the slave to power. Oh brothers this is base."171 
Again and again it was emphasized that compliancy will poison the 
nation through moral degradation and destroy the fabric of society. 
One way the resisters sought to illustrate the detrimental consequences 
of complicity with injustice was by citing the recent Dreyfus affair 
"which poisoned the great French people and threw it off its track."172 
Compliancy, as one resistance writer put it, was seen by its advocates 
as being derived from a time honored "policy of caution based on old 
traditions."173  Actually the resisters were willing to agree — at least for 
argument's sake — with the past wisdom of that famous "axiom" of 
Finnish "foreign policy" holding that Finnish security is best maintained 
by diverting world, and particularly Russian, attention away from Fin-
nish affairs.174  The Russians had now, however, destroyed the ground-
work for this old policy, and the resisters accused the compliants of 
unwillingness to acknowledge this. The Constitutionalists and the com-
pliants both believed in the rightness of the Finnish cause. The former, 
however, were not willing to compromise with their minimum demand 
for the restoration of the Finnish legal order. They believed that to 
do so in the given circumstances would lead to devastation. Many of 
them, moreover, believed a multitude of pressures would force the 
168 FO/VS, 1-2 [undated] 1900, p. 2. 
169 FO/VS, 27 September 1900, p. 1. 
170 VL, 8 October 1903, p. 2. 
t71 VL, 1 November 1902, pp. 3-5. 
172 FO/VS, 1 August 1901, p. 3; in his tract on passive resistance of September 1900 
Homén explained that the Finnish compliant government is like the criminals behind 
the Dreyfus affair in that in the name of national interest it required the yiolation 
of the country's laws; see Homén 1900, p. 17. 
173 VL, 30 September 1901, p. 3. 
174 VL, 25 November 1901, p. 1. 
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tsarist regime to retreat and even that the situation was ripe for the 
constitutional modification of autocracy, possibly even on an Empire-
wide scale. The compliants believed in the triumph of tsarism (but not 
that it necessarily signified the destruction of Finnish autonomy) and 
therefore in the ultimate futility of persistent resistance, because it 
would destroy the basis for accord. 
Neither side could convince the other of the validity of their respec-
tive arguments. The debate became increasingly bitter and polarized, 
so much so that the situation was seen as a kind of nonmilitary "civil 
war" which, at least on the level of propaganda and agitation, it indeed 
was.175 
Between the extreme points of compliance and resistance, as indi-
cated earlier, there existed a whole range of attitudes.176 It can be said 
that many considered both resistance and accommodation necessary; 
but because they did so in very different ways, this statement may 
obscure the fact that in the mid-area between the two extremes there 
were also sharp divisions. For present purposes a distinction between 
main-line compliance and main-line resistance is made. The main-line 
compliants, unlike their extreme colleague Yrjö-Koskinen, did indeed 
consider protest and, briefly, limited resistance necessary. But particu-
larly in the course of 1902 disagreement between the mainstream com-
pliants, such as the "triumvirate" Danielson-Kalmari, Meurman and 
Palm, and the Constitutionalist resisters became increasingly sharp. 
The followers of the politics of mainstream compliancy sought, while 
clearly expressing their opposition to the unjust imperial decrees, to 
avoid any action which might worsen relations between the sovereign 
and the Finnish people. They sternly warned their countrymen, in the 
words of Danielson-Kalman (in the Snellman/Yrjö-Koskinen spirit), 
that it must not be forgotten 
that the merciless hand of history sweeps aside all formal rights which 
no longer suit existing conditions. Therefore our relations with Russia 
do not ultimately depend upon the contents of ancient declarations, 
but upon the extent to which our special status in association with the 
Tsardom furthers not only our own interests, but those of the Empire 
as a whole.'" 
Danielson-Kalmari firmly disagreed with the main-line Constitutional-
ist claim that, under certain circumstances, Finnish officials had the 
175 Hence "Civil War?" was the title of one of Meurman's anti-resistance tracts; see  
Meurman 1902b. 
176 See above chapter I, section 1. 
In Danielson-Kalmari 1901, pp. 14-15; cf. Yrjö-Koskinen 1901, p. 4. 
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constitutional right to not to implement the tsar's rulings; he claimed 
that strictly speaking according to law officials either had to comply 
or retire into private life.178 Moreover, he thought it necessary to stress 
that the idea of a Finland unbound to "Russian world-power" is 
unthinkable.179  Accordingly the Finns had to try not to give their rulers 
the impression "that Russia's interests and the prestige of the Sovereign 
require the thorough eradication" of their country's guaranteed special 
political status.180 The main-line compliants came to agree with Yrjö-
Koskinen's view of passive resistance as a vain endeavor which could 
only lead to destruction, and that the Finns had to realistically face 
the historical position in which they found themselves by submitting 
to conciliation.181 In a famous speech, Agathon Meurman described 
this historical situation, which he called a "revolution," as what might 
today be called a zero-sum game. In revolution, he said, there are only 
two roads, victory or defeat and "thus presently the sole option is that 
either the ruler submits or the people submits."182 
Meurman urgently advised the Finnish people to surrender to the 
tsar's will, since there was no hope for victory. Meurman's speech 
proves most explicitly that he had whole-heartedly set out to aid the 
tsarist regime in the destruction of passive resistance.183 Meurman 
scoffed at the resisters' idea that the refusal to consent to injustice 
could generate power enough to force the tsar to acquiesce and he 
indignantly accused them of being "active," in the sense of using active 
force, and not properly "passive."184  Just as Snellman castigated the 
passive resisters of 1861 for revolutionary activity, so Meurman now 
denounced contemporary Constitutionalists as "Girondins"; he even 
went so far as to call the followers of these Girondins "terrorists": "In 
contradiction to the intentions of the Girondins," Meurman wrote with 
the Helsinki riot of Februars
y 1901 in mind, "the terrorists took passive 
resistance to the streets."' 5 Passive resistance had initiated a "full- 
178 Danielson-Kalmani 1901, p. 40. 
179 Ibid., p. 37. 
180 Ibid., p. 37. 
181  Yrjö-Koskinen 1901, pp. 2-3, 4-5. In spite of the practical differences between them, 
the mainstream compliants held many basic views in common with Yrjö-Koskinen.  
182 Citation from Meurman's speech at the Old Finn Congress held on 27 April 1902; 
see "Lausunto Suomalaisessa Nuijassa," in Meurman, Muistelmia II (unpublished 
memoir manuscript), pp. 246-247. 
183  Ibid., pp. 248, 249, 253. 
184 See "Passiivinen vastarinta," in Meurman, Muistelmia II (unpublished memoir 
manuscript), pp. 273, 287, 288. 
185 See Meurman's notes from this period under the heading "Routavuodet" in 
Meurman, Muistelmia II (unpublished diary/memoir manuscript), p. 231c. 
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scale revolution" which caused Meurman to lament what he considered 
the incredible blindness of the resisters.'86 
The so-called political realism of the compliants sometimes gave 
way to scathingly expressed factionalism. Yrjö-Koskinen asserted that 
the call for the unity of all Finns, regardless of language, against 
Russification was a plot by the Swedish speaking minority to regain 
the position of power it had been gradually losing since the Russian 
takeover of Finland.187 Danielson-Kalmari, although less coarsely than  
Meurman and Yrjö-Koskinen, constantly emphasized the problem the 
Swedish speakers posed, and stressed that cooperation was beset by 
obstacles. 88  Perhaps at this time Danielson-Kalmari did not realize 
just how broadly-based the Constitutionalist front was. In his 1907 
condemnation of Bobrikov period passive resistance he shifted focus 
away from the Swedish faction to the Young Finns and the Constitu-
tionalist front as a whole.189 The claim that certain factions of the 
Swedish party consistently hindered social reform and the cause of 
Finnish-speakers was certainly correct. But the compliants used this 
fact to obscure the significance of the Finnish speaking members of 
the passive resistance movement with superficial criticism; for example  
Yrjö-Koskinen called them the "wagging tail" of the Swedish speaking 
Constitutionalists.' 9° 
The Constitutionalist front, to be sure, had in its ranks some of the 
country's most prominent Finnish-language and bilingual journalists, 
writers of fiction and cultural figures in general. Juhani Aho, perhaps 
the era's most outstanding writer of Finnish-language fiction, called 
the Danielson-Kalman compliant program short-sighted, unclear and 
contradictory, a "soft potato which oozed between our fingers as we 
took hold of it"; it offered no options for concrete action but only 
passive obedience.191  The Finnish speaking editors of the Finnish 
language resistance press wrote of compliancy: 
186  Ibid., p. 231c. 
187  Yrjö-Koskinen 1900. 
188 Danielson-Kalmari 1901, pp. 32-33, 45-48, 73, 83. 
189 Danielson-Kalman 1907. 
190 Yrjö-Koskinen 1900; later Yrjö-Koskinen and his compliant colleagues sought to 
portray the November 1902 congress of the Constitutionalist front as a party 
conference dominated by the Swedish-minded. In the context of a general defense 
of passive resistance Leo Mechelin rebuffed this yiew, saying that it was not a party 
conference, but rather a joint congress of citizens from a wide variety of groupings, 
ranging from Old Finns to members of the Workers' Party, interested in defending 
the constitutional system. He added that "extremely few of the speeches there were 
given in Swedish"; see (in Finnish) Mechelin 1903a, pp. 3-4. 
19'  Aho 1902a, pp. 1-2. 
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A more pernicious, unpatriotic, contemptible and servile doctrine has 
yet to be preached in Finland; a more wretched, cowardly and stupid 
policy has yet to be thrust upon us here.192 
The resistance was broadly based on Finnish nationalism. Moreover, 
there were many among the Old Finns and compliants for whom Fin-
nish was a second language such as figures no less than Yrjö-Koskinen 
and Meurman themselves, whose mother-tongue was Swedish. Auto-
cratic tsardom was the support of the old world of the Old Finns. Thus 
it is not surprising that some compliants came to see passive resistance 
as a great revolutionary threat. It is no mere chance that Meurman's 
criticisms of passive resistance are interspersed with condemnations of 
the moral depravities of contemporary society in general. 
In his article "Yield or Resist?" Homén expressed the resisters' view 
that "to preach submission at this time is to lull the nation into the 
sleep of death."193  The compliants had urged that instead of polarizing 
the conflict a "bridge" (Danielson-Kalmari's metaphor) be left between 
the tsar and the Finnish people. Homen pointed out in reply that in 
practice such a bridge can be nothing else than law (meaning, of course, 
formal mutually-binding agreement, or constitutional government, as 
opposed to one-sided arbitrary dictates) and that b% violating the law 
the ruler destroys the bridgework for cooperation.19 As another writer 
put it more simply, the building of a bridge by ruler and people spanning 
the divide between them can begin on the Finns' side only when the 
other side visibly begins work.19 The compliants were convinced by 
their personal contacts with Russian officials that if the Finnish 
disobedience movement were overcome then a satisfactory peace could 
be obtained and Russification would be limited. The resisters' answer 
to this was: "0 sancta simplicitas! Oh holy stupidity!"196 For them the 
analysis of the tsarist regime's policies throughout the Empire, and in 
particular its deeds in Finland since 1899, provided incontrovertible 
proof that submission would only hasten Russification.197  
The idea that submission would convince the tsar to have mercy on 
Finland and bring about the recovery of Finland's autonomy was seen, 
as Homén for example put it, as an extremely naive hope, and nothing 
192  "Ei Suomen kansan nimessä," VL, 8 November 1902. p. 1. 
193 Homan 1902b, p. 53. 
194  Ibid., p. 43. 
195 VL, 7 May 1902, pp. 2. 
196 Homan 1903b, p. 127. 
197 For example ibid., pp. 125-130; this view is also argued in relation to compliant 
claims in an analysis of "Our Enemy's Final Plan of Conquest," VL, 13 February 
1902, pp. 1-2. 
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more than a hope. Those that believed the reassuring words of the 
Russian rulers were seen as gullible dupes, "just asking to be hood-
winked."198 Those that exploited such words for the domestic power 
struggle were seen as criminals, like the criminals behind the Dreyfus 
affair. 
In a way it was fitting for Meurman to liken the radical resisters to 
the Girondin wing of French revolutionaries which maintained that 
the success of revolution at home had to be secured through interna-
tional revolution. The Finnish main-line resisters were not, of course, 
Girondins in a strict sense, because they certainly were not advocating 
active Finnish participation in Empire-wide revolution. But, as will be 
seen below, at an early stage the resisters began to see that radical 
change, if not revolution itself, was in store for Russian autocracy. The 
compliants criticized them for destroying the Finns' bridge to the tsarist 
regime. For their part, however, the resisters could chide the compliants 
for not having the political insight to see the significance of Empire-
wide opposition and to build new bridges to the forces for change 
which were mobilizing in Russia. The tsarist regime's capacity to 
withstand opposition and revolution was already highly questionable. 
6. Is Compliancy the Will of God? 
In August 1903, after years of constitutionalist polemics, Theodor 
Homén stated, with a hint of exasperation, that it would be better to 
keep the Bible out of political affairs "since the doctrine of Christianity 
is not applicable to the fields of society and politics."199  He knew, 
however, that this was impossible and that he would once more have 
to examine what the Bible has to say concerning authority, and obedi-
ence to it.200 Finnish Constitutionalists such as Mechelin and Homen 
and certain thinkers in Young Finn circles, like their predecessors 
elsewhere in secularized Christendom, had long since succeeded in 
divorcing their political thought from the realm of religion 201 For men 
like these argumentation for constitutionalist resistance was primarily 
devoid of any appeals to religion; simply stated, the grand duke, consti-
tutional ruler of Finland and tsar of Russia, had broken his pledge to 
uphold Finland's constitutional laws and society and therefore must 
198 VL, 21 October 1903, p. 2. 
199 Homén 1903b, p. 114. 
200 Ibid., p. 114 
201 Which is obviously not to say that they were not personally religious. 
193 
be resisted. There were, to be sure, constitutional thinkers in Finland 
who explicitly brought a religious attitude into their political thought, 
believing as they did that the manifest order of society was an 
expression of a higher divine world-order. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century purely secular social and 
political thought was still something practiced by the few in Finland. 
When the Constitutionalists set out to mobilize the entire educated 
strata, as well as the mass, of Finnish society for active disobedience 
of authority they were confronted by a profound dilemma. Mass radical 
resistance, and in some respects even the secular politics accompanying 
it, were innovations in Finnish society. In order for Finns to approve 
of radical disobedience en masse there had to be an equally radical 
reevaluation of the deep-set attitude of passive obedience to authority 
maintained through the Lutheran religion. Furthermore, such a process 
was necessary since the priesthood was still directly involved in Finnish 
politics, not only through the Diet Estate of the Clergy but in that 
legislative decrees had to be proclaimed in the churches by the priests 
throughout the land in order to come into force. 
In mobilizing for the defiance of authority in Finland modern 
constitutionalism collided with a still deeply entrenched early-modern 
primitive Lutheran sociopolitical order and cosmology; the deep-set 
dilemma concerning the relationship of resistance and obedience to 
authority was part of Finland's Lutheran inheritance. This state of 
affairs goes a long way in explaining why the political argumentation 
of the era of Finnish passive resistance reminds one more of the early-
modern constitutional polemics in continental Europe and England 
than of the discourse of universal right and reason which emerged 
during the late eighteenth century revolutionary struggles of America 
and France. Finnish constitutionalism remained bound to its primitive 
Lutheran base, which had been bolstered by Fennomania and re-
vivalism. Thus the discourse of western democracy was stunted. 
The most significant instrument of elementary education at the time 
was Luther's catechism and the lessons and texts based upon it 2°2 
They literally pervaded the whole society. Thus in 1902, in his vigorous 
anti-resistance campaign, the Finnish Archbishop could argue that as 
a child everyone had learned in their catechism that God requires 
202 Luther's catechism was introduced into Swedish and Finnish mass education through 
the editorship of the seventeenth century Swedish Archbishop Olof  Svebilius. The 
work has gone through innumerable editions. It was first translated into Finnish in 
1746. For the edition consulted here see Lutheruksen vähän katekismuksen  
yksinkertainen selitys kysymysten ja vastausten kautta 1901. 
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absolute obedience to authority and that God does not accept passive 
resistance.2°3  
Through their catechism the Finns were saturated with the maxim 
that after God, and for fear and love of Him, absolute obedience was 
due to the established authorities. These authorities were parents, 
officials or all representatives of the prevailing political state and all 
socioeconomic superiors such as landlords, bosses and people of higher 
rank in general. Disobedience would be met with the wrath and punish-
ment of God. It is not surprising that the Pauline doctrine, a main 
pillar of Luther's catechism, became the most pervasive argument for 
the conservative interpretation of absolute obedience in Finland, just 
as it had elsewhere in Europe. Passive resistance was the first concrete 
radical challenge to the Pauline doctrine. Thus passive resistance was 
not merely a defensive weapon against external aggression. It became 
an offensive weapon against the old domestic conservative Lutheran 
regime which had bound itself to decaying tsarism. During the years 
of passive resistance the conflict which had been going on for decades 
between the liberal view of law and society and the conservative 
Lutheran interpretation of the social order intended by God escalated 
into open battle. 
In reaction to the promulgation of the new Conscription Act in July 
1901 the most active members of Kagal set out with firm determination 
to convert the priesthood to the cause of resistance. The priesthood 
was in a strategically key position; the Kagalites held that if Finland's 
priests were to systematically decline to proclaim the new decree and 
refuse to collect and submit the lists of conscription-age youths to the 
authorities, which was their job, then Russification in this field could 
be decisively hindered.204 The priesthood became bitterly divided over 
the fundamental question of obedience to the tsar and a significant 
number of influential priests, and their flocks, joined the resistance as 
a religious duty. 
The leadership of the Finnish church, however, went the way of 
compliancy and gradually succeeded through threat and punishment 
in suppressing resistance among their colleagues. By April of 1903 
Kagal lost hope in trying to achieve wide and effective active support 
from among the priesthood 205 The church leadership's repressive 
action at this time, however, had fatal repercussions. With the Constitu-
tionalist and socialist victory of 1905 the religiopolitical role of the 
los  Johansson 1902b. 
2°4 On the formation of the "Priest-Kagal" see Murtorinne 1964, pp. 112-119. 
205 Ibid., pp. 219-225. 
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church as led by the Pauline compliants was broadly discredited.2°6 
The resistance/obedience controversy gave rise to an unprecedented 
wave of discussion throughout Finland concerning themes which had 
been basic to European political discourse for hundreds of years. The 
best representative of the conservative Lutheran compliant viewpoint 
is doubtlessly Gustaf  Johansson, who became Archbishop of Finland 
in 1899. In the 1880s this professor of dogmatics and moral philosophy 
became the most influential spiritual and political authority in the 
Finnish church; he served as a model for the priesthood to follow.207 
Already in 1890 his religiopolitical platform was expressly grounded 
on the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, which 
he interpreted as meaning that absolute obedience was due to the 
powers that be, even if they are pagan. Moreover, he emphasized that 
submission is due to those secular authorities who abuse their power, 
since tyranny is a punishment for the sins of the subject population. 
Thus, as opposition to the February Manifesto of 1899 began to emerge, 
Johansson's colleagues explained Russification as God's chastisement 
of the sinful Finnish people; resistance was seen as an atrocious viola-
tion of God's will and world-order.208  
Johansson's approach to the Russification problem was a combina-
tion of the Pauline doctrine and main-line compliant arguments. This 
means that while arguing that resistance is a sin he also asserted that 
it was politically unrealistic, which obviously meant that it was not 
compatible with the sociopolitical interests which he represented. 
Meetings with Russian Minister of the Interior (also Minister Secretary 
of State for Finland) V.K. von Plehwe and Ober-Procurator of the 
Holy Synod K.P. Pobedonostsev in April 1900 and the tsar in February 
1901 convinced Johansson that the Russian leadership was not out to 
totally Russify Finland or to destroy its constitution.209 It was this 
conviction which gave rise to Johansson's reputation of being an 
unscrupulous opportunist. 
Johansson's approach is clearly and concisely expressed in two 
definitive pastoral letters which were circulated among the priesthood 
in 1901. He stresses that the Finnish people will be delivered only by 
206  Ibid., pp. 316-322. 
207 Ibid., pp. 18, 62. 
208 Ibid., pp. 18-19, 68-71. 
209 While Plehwe and Pobedonostsev were certainly not sympathetic to the Finnish 
cause, they both were critics of Bobrikov's way of handling Finnish affairs. The tsar, 
however, committed himself more firmly to the Bobrikov line, and Plehwe ceased 
advocating compromise with the Finns; Polvinen 1984, pp. 83, 143, 307-309, 342, 
346; on Johansson's meetings see Murtorinne 1964, pp., 81-84, 89-91. 
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adhering to the will of God. It is the duty of the priest to proclaim 
governmental decrees and it is not any of his business to question the 
legality or rightness of them. According to Johansson a priest may 
disobey the government only when it is perfectly certain that God wills 
resistance. He is emphatic that this is certainly not the case at present, 
stating categorically that "God's will is not on the side of this kind of 
resistance." 10 Moreover Johansson adds that passive resistance has 
no chance for success any way. In his second letter he re-emphasizes 
that to offend the ruler is to violate God's will; and besides "the ruler 
has promised to preserve the constitution and I myself have heard 
from the ruler's mouth that he does not want to change the internal 
conditions of the nation."211 For many Finns, as displayed in the 
resistance press, the ludicrousness of these words was striking. 
When the compliant line was resurrected for posterity in the Paasikivi 
paradigm it was conveniently purged of association with religiopolitical 
argumentation even though a primary determinant of Fennomanian 
cosmology was conservative fundamentalist Lutheranism. The resist-
ance thinkers considered this combination of pseudo-realism and reli-
giopolitical argumentation hypocritical, ironic and opportunistic. 
As one writer put it: So far compliancy has appeared as "true political 
wisdom," that is "up until now it has pretended to be the national 
policy of caution based on old traditions. Now it has been exalted to 
the politics of God's will."212  "Is it God's will," the author asks  
Johansson, "that the Finnish people forfeit their sense of justice," and 
that the priesthood acknowledge the conscription decree, thus 
committing the Finnish people to obey it?21' "Is it God's will that our 
sons be sent to misery and death in a foreign land and that they be 
deprived of the protection of their law and the comfort of their 
religion?"214  Does God will that vows, promises, justice and truth be 
trampled underfoot and that the Finnish people stand inactively by as 
the enemy marches in to destroy their society? According to the 
Archbishop, the author concludes, the answer to all this is "yes."215  
Elsewhere another resister again asks rhetorically, is it only in 
submission that God is on our side, is He never by our side in struggle: 
"No. Because master Gustav Johansson's God is only the God of the 
270 Johansson 1901, p. 6. 
211  Johansson 1902a. p. 3. 
212  "Jumalanko tahto?" VL,  30 September 1901. p. 3. 
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powerful, the God of the great, not the God of the weak and the 
oppressed."216 
While Homen found religious arguments for political compliance 
primitive it did not prevent him from addressing them seriously. His 
first effort in religiopolitical exegesis was an article entitled "The Bible 
and Obedience to Authority" published in the resistance press at the 
end of 1901. Homen observes that in the debate concerning whether 
or not it is the duty of the priests to proclaim the conscription decree 
from their pulpits certain parts of the Bible have been quoted over 
and over again as proof that God requires "absolute obedience in all 
circumstances to those in power."21 Homén quotes three of these 
passages (Romans 13: 1-2, 1 Peter 2:13 and Titus 3:1) pointing out 
that they have been interpreted by the compliants grossly out of 
context. He argues that when read within their Biblical framework it 
is impossible to derive a justification of submission to injustice and 
tyranny from them. To show this he analyses each passage in light of 
the surrounding text. Homen's main point can perhaps be best summed 
up in the assertion that "Render unto Caesar the things which are 
Caesar's," by no means signifies "give Caesar everything."218 In fact 
he thinks the cited texts specifically focus on social relations of justice 
and love between authority and those bound to it and between all 
people in general. 
Furthermore, Homén accuses the church leadership of perpetuating 
a blatant misconception by arguing that Christ and the Apostles never 
opposed authority concerning affairs outside of religion. For example, 
instead of meekly submitting when officials sought to unjustly punish 
him, St. Paul appealed to his rights as a Roman citizen and Christ 
himself cast out the merchants whom the authorities allowed to carry 
on business in the temple.219  Indeed for many the image of a weak 
and submissive Christ propagated by the compliants was repulsive and 
morally degrading. 
For the novelist and Finland's first woman journalist and newspaper 
editor-in-chief Anna Edelheim, as expressed in her forceful counter-
attack on the conservative interpreters of Romans 13, Christ is the 
paragon of defiance to injustice; there is no better example for 
resistance to authority than Jesus and the Apostles 220 They never 
ceased to preach when threatened by officials. Edelheim offers St. 
216 VL, 14 May 1902, p. 4. 
217 Homén 1901b, p. 1. 
218  Ibid., p. 1. 
218  Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
220 Edelheim 1902, pp. 1-4. 
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Luke 13:32 as an example, because when the Pharisees told Jesus either 
to get out or be slain by Herod, he refused with defiant words. Edelheim 
also points out that if Luther had truly been the figure portrayed by 
the compliants, then the Protestant Reformation would not have been 
carried out.221  That Kagal certainly considered the political-religious 
debate highly significant for their struggle is witnessed by the fact that 
it distributed two Finnish editions, of 5,000 copies each, of Edelheim's 
tract, along with a Swedish edition of 3,000.2 
Homan clearly outstripped the compliant exegetes in biblical 
argumentation. When Johansson and his colleagues defended and 
vigorously propagated obedience even to evil rulers on grounds that 
Romans 13 was written in reference to Nero, Homen found them wide 
open for attack. Johansson had written that it was "under Nero's 
bloodthirsty scepter and with cruel persecution and a martyr's death 
before him" that St. Paul gave the "commands" in Romans 13:1-2.223 
Homen asserts that this is a serious historical mistake, since, he says, 
Romans was written in A.D. 57 or 58 when Nero's government was 
still a model of justice and mildness. Sparing no effort, Homen then 
goes on, with detailed Biblical citations and references to theological 
scholarship, to attack the idea that St. Paul acted in the service of 
tyranny. For example, he cites Luther in order to show that St. Paul, 
and thus Luther himself, considered the function of authority to be 
the maintenance of the outer security necessary for a holy life; although 
Luther and other scholars have interpreted Romans 13 as a warning 
against rebellion Homan strongly emphasizes that this text contains 
no command to carry out criminal or illegal actions at rulers' demand.224 
He also cites the famous nineteenth century Swiss Protestant Biblical 
hermeneutist Frederic Louis Godot. On Godot's interpretation 
Romans 13 does not require cooperation with evil or with illicit 
commands by those in power. On the contrary, it allows for passive 
resistance or noncooperation accompanied by willingness to suffer the 
consequences.225  Godot's view that such resistance is the mechanism 
whereby tyranny is spiritually overcome and progress advanced was a 
confirmation of Homén's own standpoint. With no little irony Homén 
exposed how the Finnish religious leaders had debased themselves by 
221  Ibid., PP. 1-4. 
222  Estlander 1945, pp. 157-158. 
223 Homén 1901b, p. 1; it was only in a later article that Homén revealed, upon request, 
that the source of his quote was no other than the archbishop himself; see Hornén 
1902a, p. 2. 
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225 Homén 1903b, pp. 114-115. 
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insinuating that Christ could compromise with what is right. Thus they 
associated themselves with the "doctrine of the Jesuits and Machiavelli" 
which could ruin the nation.226 
Homen was the only one of the main passive resistance writers who 
addressed the religiopolitical dilemma of resistance and obedience in 
detail. There were, however, many more writings against the 
theological argument for compliancy, many of which were doubtlessly 
more genuinely religious than those of the secular-minded Homén. A 
penetrating example is an essay on authority and obedience in 
Christianity signed by "a teacher of religion," and distributed by Kagal 
in an Finnish edition of 5,000 copies 227 This religious instructor seems 
to have little sympathy for either the compliants' or Homén's approach. 
While agreeing with Homen that Biblical passages must be understood 
in context, he criticizes both sides for reading the Bible like a law book 
or a handbook of morality, throwing Biblical statements at one 
another228 The Bible does indeed give guiding principles for Christian 
life, but for the interpretation and implementation of such principles 
the mediation of conscience is necessary.229 
With this in mind the author goes on to point out that nowhere does 
Paul say what authority actually is. What Paul does say is that authority 
is of God. Since God is absolute truth, good and justice then what is 
contrary to these cannot be authority. To violate these virtues or to 
carry out unconstitutional political change is to violate God's world-
order; it is a "criminal revolution."230 Authority is not an individual, 
but a quality; when this quality is relinquished then the state of being 
in authority ceases. Another writer explained this by distinguishing 
between "domination" and authority; domination or superior power 
is not always the same as authority which is legitimate and holy 
power231 He illustrates this with a point which even the compliants 
would certainly not be able to reject: 
If, for example, a violent upheaval, a revolution, were to occur within 
the state then God would absolutely forbid the Christian from taking 
part in such an insurrection; on the contrary, He would demand it be 
prevented.232 
226  Ibid., pp. 116-117. 
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The logic here is clear, if a revolutionary group were to take over the 
country then the prevailing religiopolitical morality would certainly 
not prevent it from being opposed with violence; the revolutionaries 
and their supporters could invoke the Pauline doctrine in argument 
against opposition. This may seem ridiculous but the author had the 
insight to see that if the compliants invoked the Pauline doctrine in 
relation to Russification then in principle they would also have to 
accept it in the case of a successful revolution. Obviously they would 
never have done this in practice.233  Thus the author was able to reveal 
the compliants' bias. 
In cultivating the ideological ground for active resistance in the 
sixteenth century the spiritual leader of insurgent Protestantism, 
Theodore Beza, went as far back in history as ancient Israel to prove 
that rulers are created by the people and for the welfare of the 
people.234 Given the status of Lutheranism in Finland it is not surprising 
to find that the Finnish resistance clergy turned to the same type of 
argumentation as their spiritual forefathers from the Reformation. 
At a meeting of Constitutionalist leaders on 3 August 1901 an 
argument was put forth for the divine origin of constitutional 
government in a speech called "Is Compliancy the Will of God?" The 
listeners were apparently impressed by the relevance of the work and 
requested that it be published for distribution throughout Finland 235 
According to its priest-author God has only one state, Israel, which is 
the divine model for all other states. As their nation expanded the 
Mothers and Fathers of Israel created a higher government. The 
government and its aides were divinely sanctioned but only in so far 
as they were chosen by the Israeli people and remained the servants 
of the people. This is the foundation of the Christian State. Any power 
which violates the divine constitutional order sets itself against God's 
will. To ask whether one should willingly submit to injustice is to ask 
whether one should willingly go against God's will. It is therefore a 
sin to surrender, a sin to give up the divine or constitutional form of 
state: "passive resistance is not only permissable, it is a holy obliga-
tion." 
233 When in 1918 the Finnish Reds took over half of Finland, including its industrial 
centers and capital, then there was not even a mummer by the Whites about the 
duty to submit. 
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7. The Enigmatic Rank and File 
Time and time again the resistance writers reiterated that the vast 
majority of the people, the rank and file of the nation, supported the 
passive resistance movement 237 Nonetheless, for the Consti-
tutionalists, as for the whole upper strata of Finnish society, the so-
called rank and file of the nation was a relatively unknown and 
ultimately unreliable mass. In the early stages of the struggle, however, 
the Constitutionalists believed that they understood this mass. It was 
seen as something which, when awakened and properly guided, would 
ensure victory. 
In May 1899 the internationally known Finnish anthropologist 
Edvard Westermarck conveyed to the British reading public the image 
of Finland being a "democratic nation" whose classes are pervaded 
with "a strong national spirit," indissolubly uniting them 238 This unity 
was the result of centuries of "breathing the invigorating air of 
freedom."239  This image, with its exaggeration of the degree of 
democracy, freedom and social unity in Finland, represents the upper 
strata's ideal of Finnish society. 
Although this ideal was certainly often embellished for propaganda 
purposes, there can be no doubt that it was widely and sincerely held 
within Finland's upper strata. This is at least partially explicable by 
the fact that the superiority of Scandinavian civilization and the 
freedom of the Finnish masses was conceived in relation to what was 
known of the life of the people in Russia. It was observed, for example, 
that the Finnish peasant had never been subject to serfdom and that 
therefore the people was not now composed of ex-serfs and exploitative 
landowners2 The resisters interpreted this, and more generally the 
apparently less extreme degree of social inequality as compared to 
Russia, as a major impediment to Russification. 
The role which the Finnish elite, including most of the resistance 
leaders, envisioned for the masses was still, however, mostly a passive 
one. Thus after writing of Finnish freedom and democracy Wester-
marck promises his British readers that "we shall endeavour to make 
our people ever more enlightened, law-abiding and patriotic."241  For 
237 See for example, VL, 23 June 1902, p. 1, 11 October 1902, p. 2, 8 November 1902, 
p. 1, 22 November 1902, p. 1. 
238  Westermarck 1899, p. 659. 
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the resistance leaders the people were something to be awakened, 
molded and disciplined. Any efforts to grant them equal democratic 
political rights or the allow them to act as self-determining subjects 
was to a significant extent avoided. 
The Finnish educated class had great faith in, even a secular-religious 
zeal for, what they called popular enlightenment. In response to the 
Russian attack they increasingly emphasized that this enlightenment 
required genuine personal contact between educated and uneducated; 
only thus could the former help advance the latter.242  Popular enlight- 
enment, or mass education, as one writer put it, 
has put forces into motion which otherwise would have remained 
unused, and it has raised obstacles in the path of the practitioners of 
violence which they did not take into account because of their deficient 
understanding of the nature of the Finnish people. You see, it is the 
nature of our national movement that it is very difficult to awaken, but 
once awakened it displays a vitality and endurance which could trouble 
an even more skillful regime 243 
Views of this type demonstrate that the upper class advocates of 
popular mobilization thought they had, by virtue of their own Finnish-
ness, special understanding of the people; they believed that they could 
creatively direct mass force. They romantically proclaimed that 
national "defense is shifting more and more to the profound rank and 
file of the nation where the power which is on the decline among the 
upper classes is now to be found."2' At first they did not realize just 
how true this statement (which must be understood as part of the 
campaign against their compliant compatriots) was or what it held in 
store for them. Soon, however, they began to realize that they were 
flirting with unknown masses, awakening a monster from the "pro-
found" depths of the rank and file. 
Thus there was a profound contradiction in the resistance writers' 
propaganda concerning the people. On the one hand they claimed that 
the people was infused with an understanding of the necessity of 
resistance. On the other hand they claimed that the national awakening 
had just begun. In other words they contradictorily held that "all which 
is sacred to the people" such as free institutions, laws and local self 
government are not so well understood by the people; hence the empha- 
sis they placed on popular education and "personal contact" with the 
masses.245 
242 vs, 19 November 1900, p. 4; Aho 1902b, p. 13; VL, 28 December 1903, p. 2. 
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Contradiction, perhaps sometimes even hypocrisy, was a 
fundamental element of Finnish Constitutionalism. The upper strata 
fought for decades for national justice through the Legal Battle. With 
the dictatorship decree of 9 April 1903 the Constitutionalists could 
complain that the Finnish people had been striped of their "personal 
freedom" and "human rights." 46  It is ironic that they had never before 
spoken of universal "human rights.i247 The right or justice which they 
spoke of earlier was always that of the upper strata. When they spoke 
of "our conviction that justice and truth will defeat injustice and false-
hood," they did not quite realize, or refused to admit, that the great 
majority of the people had all the right and reason to hold such a 
conviction in relation to the Finnish upper strata and thus to carry out 
a struggle for justice against it.248  
Late in 1903, when prospects for the victory of resistance looked 
dark, resistance writers became disillusioned with the masses. The 
national unity which they had extolled and preached proved nonexis-
tent. They had over-estimated the people's degree of political maturity. 
Moreover, the people apparently did not even know that they were a 
people. 
The transformation of the resisters thought concerning the people 
can be clearly seen, for example, in the works of Homén. In 1900 he 
wrote that even if the compliant statesmen, in their heights and with 
their pretentious political wisdom, forget what is right and noble they 
must take into their calculations the fact that the people's sense of 
justice will remain firm.249  In 1903 he asserted that "real democratic 
reform work is ... the core of passive resistance," emphasizing that now 
"above all it is important for us to strengthen the national spirit, 
enlighten the people and further its independent development and 
participation in the determination of the fatherland's fate:"25o 
But by March of 1903 Hornéll, in an article entitled "Our Weakness", 
was already asking, along with many of his colleagues: "Is it worthwhile 
any longer to work for the redemption of our people if the people 
itself strives for ruin...."251  He then wonders if there is a basic "flaw 
in our national race," since how else could one explain the fact that 
prominent figures from the Finnish elite along with a significant part 
246 VL, 15 June 1903, p. 1. 
247 The article here cited was signed by K.Z., the initials of the maverick Constitutionalist 
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of the masses had gone the way of compliancy.252  He came to the 
painful realization that the great words with which he and his colleagues 
had spoken about their own righteousness and their people's 
unswerving obedience to law were to a startling extent empty and that 
a sense of justice and love for freedom were almost non-existent.253 
Therefore many resistance writers concluded that popular enlighten-
ment had to start again at the at the beginning with the very ABC's 
of political life; this instruction had to begin by explaining that "the 
Finnish nation is the Finnish nation ... and what duties a people has 
toward itself so that it does not in its ignorance and stupidity trade its 
birthright for gruel."254  The resisters came to the bitter awareness that 
they had been "living in illusions imagined about our own people."255  
After decades of what they described as hard honest work among the 
people the people had now betrayed them and shown its true degraded 
and slavish nature.256  The most disillusioned described officialdom, 
the educated class and its young as having sacrificed everything for 
truth and justice while the rank and file of the nation yielded to 
enslavement.257 
What the educated class did not realize, however, was that the true 
problem was not simply that the Finnish people did not know it was 
a nation but that it really was not a nation. National consciousness had 
not yet spread to all the people of the diverse communities living within 
the borders of what the Finnish upper strata and the Russian authorities 
called Finland. Constitutionalists and compliants alike now realized 
that the only way to make the nation something more than an idea in 
the minds of the upper strata was to go beyond the earlier achievements 
of the patriarchal national movement and to truly extend political 
rights, and broad social reforms, to what they called the rank and file.258 
As resistance weakened the Constitutionalists began to emphasize 
the importance of attaining the confidence of the "working class" in 
particular through reforms and making it feel itself to "belong in the 
252 Ibid., p. 80. 
253  Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
254 VL, 18 August 1903, pp. 1-4. 
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did not become a practical part of their programs until 1905 and thereafter, when 
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sphere of this social system."259  But even when they suggested sociopo-
litical reforms they did so hesitantly and the word "democracy" was 
not a frequently used component of their vocabulary. 
The exiled Constitutionalists asserted that the two hundred Finnish 
citizens who attended the congress which they convened on 6 March 
1904 in Stockholm came from the depths of the rank and file of the 
Finnish nation. One of the aims of the congress was to contradict the 
propaganda of the Russian government holding that the present Finnish 
Senate, composed as it was of compliants, represented the Finnish 
people.260 These Constitutionalists, although certainly having all right 
to question the representativeness of the Senate, could have, using 
their own arguments, just as well seriously challenged their own 
representativeness, and that of their class and the Diet, in relation to 
what they so often called the common people or the rank and file of 
the nation. 
For almost one hundred years the upper strata of Finnish society 
had been living within the shelter, restrictive though it was, of Russian 
power. Together the Finnish elite and the Russian administration kept 
the great majority of the people living in Finland outside of political 
life. With Russification this system broke down. Now for the first time 
part of the Finnish elite felt the need to activate the masses in an open 
fight with the Russian regime. What the elite found, however, was a 
great divide which could not be bridged in an instant by popular 
enlightenment and the much spoken of personal contact between the 
educated and uneducated classes. Moreover, the people itself was not, 
of course, a unified mass to be swayed hither and thither as a unit. 
This was a period of competition for the souls of those people, called 
the rank and file, living in Finland who were not part of the so-called 
civilized class.261  By far the most important sociopolitical organ-
izational force among the rank and file at this time was the budding 
workers' movement. Thus it is no wonder that the Constitutionalists 
made a significant effort to direct that force for their own ends. 
The attitude of the Constitutionalists toward the workers' movement 
259  Eri osista maata 1903; VL, 28 December 1903, quote from p. 2. 
26° VL, 20 March 1904, pp. 2-3. 
261 The Constitutionalists' popular enlightenment campaigns were often seen specifically 
as part of the struggle with Bobrikov for the allegiance of the Finnish people. When 
Bobrikov designed a plan to help the landless Finnish people the resisters saw it as 
a sign that a new attack was to be launched against Finnish society; see FONS 18 
January 1901, p. 2. For his part Bobrikoy well understood that the relationship 
between the Finnish upper strata and the masses was a weak one; he sought to take 
advantage of this to undermine the Constitutionalists. 
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is well illustrated by a controversy which took place soon after the 
publication of the February Manifesto. When Finnish bourgeois leaders 
gathered to plan the Great National Address representatives of the 
workers' movement were not invited. Certain socialists were outraged 
by this, since the bourgeoisie expected the workers to sign the petition. 
Matti Kurikka, one of the most prominent socialists (although not an 
orthodox Marxist), wrote in the newspaper Työmies on 3 March 1899 
that this type of treatment should not be accepted by the working class 
and that cooperation with the bourgeoisie should be rejected as long 
as the representatives of the workers' movement were not allowed to 
participate in political decision making. Kurikka condemned the 
Constitutionalists' motive for passive resistance by saying that the 
rotting political structure which allowed so much injustice should not 
be defended for preservation but rather a new structure should be 
built 262 
From early 1899 onward Työmies included many articles criticizing 
the Constitutionalist position.263 Basically the socialists saw the existing 
legal system as created by and for the bourgeoisie. They challenged 
and rejected the Constitutionalists' concept of the sacredness of the 
legal system which the working class had no hand in fashioning.264 The 
Constitutionalists' claim that the existing legal system was an expression 
of the Finnish peoples' sense of justice was spurned as ludicrous in 
light of the fact that the voice of the people was unheeded in the 
nation's representative institutions and that basic social reforms were 
avoided.26 The members of the workers' movement could not adopt 
the ideology of Constitutionalist resistance when it was so clear that 
Finnish law was mainly serving the interests of those in power or the 
upper classes 266 
Although fundamentally the ideology of the workers' movement 
was incompatible with that of the Constitutionalists and the upper 
strata as a whole there were significant areas where those belonging 
to these two groups actually joined together in practice. Later this 
cooperation, especially where resistance to Russification was con-
cerned, was underrated and even ignored by both socialist and 
bourgeois writers. This is doubtlessly because of the tragic polarization 
of the two groups beginning after 1905 and culminating in the Civil 
262 Kurikka 1899. 
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War of 1918. An investigator of the intricacies of pre-1905 bourgeois-
worker cooperation, Antti Kujala, believes that the workers and the 
Constitutionalists were actually natural allies in the common endeavor 
to prevent Russification; the Finnish Social Democrats had a 
functioning mass organization and the Constitutionalists had mastery 
of essential resources such as political experience, international 
connections and money.267 
Bourgeois-worker cooperation, however, was no simple matter even 
though in July of 1901 the Workers' Party, after much debate, officially 
decided that work with other parties (often thought of as class enemies) 
was allowable as long as no activity was undertaken in contradiction 
of the Party program. 68 Just as the bourgeois or upper strata of Finnish 
society was divided into various factions, mostly in relation to the 
resistance/compliancy dichotomy, so the workers' movement was 
divided into at least five different orientations whose relation to one 
another depended on the issue at hand.269  Concerning the issue of 
resistance to Russification the workers' movement was divided 
primarily into two branches, the compliants and the resisters. 
There are several reasons why the compliant line was seen as the 
lesser of evils for those who adhered to it.270 Pre-1905 worker 
compliancy was primarily a tactic for securing the survival of the Finnish 
workers' movement which, with its legal organization and press, had 
hitherto been allowed to function less restrictedly than similar 
organizations elsewhere in the Empire; after all, in Russia the workers' 
movement was forced to operate underground. It is thus 
understandable that there were many who did not want through provo-
cation of the Russian government to jeopardize the status of the move-
ment and the possibility of initiating peaceful reform. 
Furthermore, worker animosity toward the Constitutionalists was 
reinforced by the Bobrikov regime which saw the Finns as a basically 
loyal mass being led astray by the resisters in the upper class whom it 
considered to be its main enemies. Worker compliancy should not, 
however, be understood in the sense of a close alliance with the Russian 
government; toleration of the Finnish workers' movement was not 
wholely a tactical procedure but was also the result of the Russians' 
sheer incapacity to control everything and the fact that Finnish worker 
activity in itself was not considered to be of much significance.271 The 
267 Kujala 1978, p. 176. 
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workers' compliancy approach became increasingly ineffective in the 
course of 1904 and intensified Russian pressure gave rise to a broader 
radicalization of the workers' movement. 
In numerous parts of Finland passive resistance had wide support 
among the working people and many socialist leaders worked directly 
for Kagal. Kagal financed and helped direct worker anti-government 
activity. Alongside of students workers did a great deal of the agitation 
work for passive resistance at the local level, especially in connection 
with the annual conscription boycotts of 1902-1904.27 
8. Resistance and Revolution: The Scope of 
Constitutionalist Insurgency 
The years 1899-1905 witnessed a hitherto unprecedented radicalization 
of the Finnish culture of contention. From the Great Address of 1899 
to the Great Strike of 1905 more Finns than ever engaged in nonroutine 
intensified conflicts and learned new, more militant, techniques for 
doing so. Before 1905 the Constitutionalist front was the most 
significant agent of radical change among the Finns. This may seem 
paradoxical given the front's immediate conservative goals. But in the 
critical circumstances of 1899-1905 it was the Constitutionalist front 
which led the unique mass defiance to the long-established Russian 
regime and thus cultivated the ground — by effectively disseminating 
the idea and practice of the right and duty of rebellion against authority 
— for future insurgency. Moreover, by deliberately adhering to an 
articulated and distinct doctrine and technique of struggle — passive 
resistance — involving mass organized disobedience they became, will-
ingly or not, active participants in a broader potentially revolutionary 
process. 
It is generally recognized that the outburst of revolution throughout 
the Russian Empire in 1905 extended to Finland too. But because the 
Social Democratic movement is usually focused on as Finland's main 
revolutionary agent, and given that the Great Strike was this 
movement's first major independent revolutionary campaign, some of 
the major domestic antecedents of the 1905 revolutionary situation in 
Finland have perhaps been overlooked. Thus, using Tilly's concept of 
a revolutionary situation, Alapuro is able to write of 1905 in Finland: 
272 Kujala 1978, pp. 76, 82, 133-147, 177-179, 223-224. 
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"During a short but decisive period, the government, which had 
previously been under the control of a single polity, became the object 
of effective, competing and mutually exclusive claims by two distinct 
polities."273 Tilly's definition of revolutionary circumstances, as 
Alapuro applies it to 1905, and especially to the situation in Finland 
in 1917-1918, is also useful in the analysis of the period preceding the 
Great Strike 274 This, to be sure, is not to say that the period preceding 
the Great Strike was a revolution or a revolutionary situation in a 
strict sense, but that comparison and contrast is otherwise illuminating. 
Beginning in 1899 the implementation of imperial integration in 
Finland was confronted by a truly multifaceted insurgency. The existing 
polity became fragmented: As the Russian regime sought to infuse 
itself more deeply into the local structure of politics and society the 
Finnish upper class became sharply divided. Competition between the 
compliant Old Finns, the Constitutionalist front and the Russian regime 
began for the souls of the majority of the people who were excluded 
from estate society. Tilly's generalization that polity "fragmentation 
frequently involves the emergence of coalitions between established 
members of the polity and mobilizing nonmembers" is applicable 
here.275 The rising workers' movement — the most significant 
"nonmember" — was itself divided in its coalitions with the various 
blocs from the old polity, but emerged after 1905 as the single most 
successful competitor for the political support of the masses. 
Throughout the nation and at all levels of government the Constitu-
tionalist front, along with all those whose diffuse resistance indirectly 
supported it, was able to defy the long-established Russian 
governmental authority. When forced increasingly out of national and 
local institutions the Constitutionalists formed a de facto nation-wide 
popular insurgent administration underground which played a key part 
in preventing the Bobrikov regime from attaining its goals and prepared 
the way for their own rise to power, first in the Diet in 1904 and then 
in the government following the Great Strike. 
Furthermore, it was Finnish Constitutionalists and not, as might be 
supposed, the socialists who had the most knowledge of, and contacts 
within, the Russia opposition and revolutionary movement prior to 
1905.276  It is striking that most of the socialist leaders, not to speak of 
the rank and file, had no contacts or cooperation with Russian socialists 
273 Alapuro 1988, p. 115. 
274  Ibid., pp. 115, 143-145. 
275 Tilly 1978, p. 192. 
276 Copeland 1973, passim. 
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at that time.277 In fact from 1899 to 1905, in order to protect their own 
status, the Finnish socialists intentionally sought to isolate themselves 
from the Russian revolutionaries and workers' movement in general; 
individual members caught helping Russian revolutionaries were even 
suspended from Party functions. Kujala concludes that in the whole 
Russian Empire no other socialist party was as insular as that in Finland. 
This insularity continued until the Great Strike of 1905, when relations 
between the Finnish Constitutionalists and the Russian revolutionaries 
ceased, and the Finnish Social Democrats began to cultivate coopera-
tion with their Russian comrades.278 
Having said this, however, elucidation of the Constitutionalists' asso-
ciation with radicalism and revolution remains problematic. After all 
the resistance thinkers and propagandists, especially in the beginning 
of the struggle, often employed a distinctly anti-revolutionary type of 
discourse.219 Indeed, their major express goal was the restoration of 
the legal order ante Bobrikov. For example, in 1899 Edward 
Westermarck sought to convince the English public that "of a rebellion 
no one even dreams in Finland. We shall offer peaceful resistance.... 
We have no connection with the disaffected elements in Russia.... Their 
cause and ours are not the same ... we only stand up for our guaranteed 
rights."280 At that time Leo Mechelin also stressed, as shown in a letter 
to J.N. Reuter, that in their writings abroad the Finns had to strongly 
emphasize the loyal nature of the Finnish opposition 281  Another 
excellent example is provided by a rhetorically eloquent anonymous 
writer's article from the summer of 1901. His aim is to counter charges 
that passive resistance is a violent and dangerous policy. "It is in fact 
a logical impossibility," he explains, "to call a policy violent which 
requires noncooperation with all illegal or violent measures. Quite the 
contrary, it is a conservative policy in the strictest sense of the term."282 
In 1903, in a pamphlet originally meant for Russian readers as a 
rejoinder against charges that Finns were separatist in a revolutionary 
sense, Mechelin asserted that "now a true change of regime is 
necessary"; he stressed, however, that in defending Finland's "self-
administration," "fundamental laws" and "internal independence," ie. 
its "`separaattinen' (separate) status within the Russian Empire-group," 
the Finnish demand for a change of regime simply meant "an honest 
277 Kujala 1985, p. 182. 
278 Ibid., pp. 184, 185, 187. 
279 Again, this is not to imply that they were simply insincere. 280  Westermarck 1899, p. 658. 
281 Mechelin to Reuter, 21 February 1900. 
282 Fria Ord!Vapaita Sanoja (FO/VS), 1 August 1901, p. 2. 
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return to a legal mode of government in accordance with the country's 
constitution. "283 
Since a certain conservativism was a prominent feature of Finnish 
constitutional resistance thought, it is pertinent to consider Perez 
Zagorin's observation that the connection between conservative 
ideologies and innovation is more intricate than is commonly thought: 
to revolutionary actors, the manifest function of the beliefs they profess 
may be preservation or restoration; their latent function, however, even 
if the actors are unaware of it, may be innovation.2" 
A common characteristic of many European insurgent and 
revolutionary movements from early-modern times onward was the 
adherence by rebels to an "ideology of the normative past" appealing 
to "to antiquity, custom, and rudimentary contractual traditions as a 
source of authority and a limit upon absolutism and royal power."285 
In the case of Finland almost the whole upper strata of society had 
been cultivating such an ideology, or mythology, of the normative past 
since the 1860s; it was a basic element of assertive Finnish nationalism. 
What Westermarck and his colleagues were in effect saying is: we 
shall rebel without rebelling, i.e. revolt without being associated with 
the stigma of subversion. Cannot Homén's observation that "violence 
always aspires to cloth itself in the cloak of justice and will suffer great 
trouble to do so even a little" be applied to the Finnish resistance 
too?286 The Finns went to an extreme in cloaking their defiance in all 
the rhetorical finery of the European civic religion of justice. True to 
the classical constitutionalist tradition they held that it was the tyrant 
who was the true rebel and revolutionary. Putatively they were not 
aiming for a new order, but merely defending an old well-established 
one. 
With the Russian offensive of the Bobrikov period the Constitution-
alist front invoked this ideology, combining it with radicalized insurgen-
cy. What the Finnish resisters in fact did — through the discourse of 
passiveness, the normative past and legalism — was to tell the Russian 
authorities that either a constitutional system must be guaranteed or 
they will revolt, i.e. withdraw all cooperation. The Russians understood 
Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency as separatist and revolutionary. 
Indeed, Finnish passive resistance can be seen as an attempt at what 
283  Mechelin 1903b, pp. 12, 153. 
284  Ibid., p.  23. 
285  Ibid., p.  115. 
286  Homén 1902c, p.  72. 
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can be classified as a regional or borderland constitutionalist rebellion 
against its absolutist monarchical state center. Furthermore, it was a 
distinct yet dependent part of an Empire-wide revolutionary process 287 
Nonetheless, if the Russians meant that the Finns were revolutionary 
in a strict sense of the term then they were mistaken, since passive 
resistance was understood as a way to struggle without resorting to 
revolutionary violence. 
The Bobrikov regime's offensive against Finland's de facto degree 
of autonomy was undeniably one of the essential factors making for 
revolutionary conditions in that country prior to 1906. Obviously much 
can be said for the simple assertion that it was Bobrikov who radicalized 
Finnish society.288  But, as will be recognized by anyone familiar with 
studies of insurgence and revolution, this is to say nothing more than 
that it is never solely insurgents who create such situations. Finland's 
assertive nationalism and constitutional state ideology, with its 
interminable striving for increased autonomy in relation to Russian 
government, was bound for collision with Russian nationalism. In the 
later part of the nineteenth century the Finnish national mobilization 
could not help but cultivate the seed of a more radical insurgency. 
Passive resistance was conceived of as an extreme weapon of this 
insurgency long before the Bobrikov period. 
The "passive" part of "passive resistance" by indicating the exclusion 
of armed violence did not thus mean the exclusion of force. The word 
"passive" did, however, serve to help rhetorically cover up force by 
indicating pure defense without rebellion or subversion; it meant good 
and just resistance. When referring propagandistically to resistance 
without resistance or insurgency without insurgency the term passive 
resistance cannot but be recognized as a contradiction in terms, as the 
socialist Ferdinand Lassalle pointed out in 1849.289  The Finnish resisters 
found that they could not long hide behind the rhetorical facade of 
passivity as they were pressured by their opponents to adhere to the 
literal meaning of "passive." Insurgent as they were, they could not 
287 To reiterate, this is not to say that the passiye resistance moyement in itself was a 
revolution or that the resisters were violent reyolutionaries. 
288 As neovius put it in 1902, the unwillingness of the blind Russian regime to give up 
its illegal policy of overthrowing the Finnish system has naturally forced the Finnish 
people to implement passive resistance; see Neovius 1902; for one of the most forceful 
and impassioned formulations of this argument which, among other things, blames 
Bobrikov for completing destroying the basis for mutual Finno-Russian trust and 
for reyiving the Finns' deep-seated "racial hatred" for the Russian people see VL, 
29 September 1903, pp. 5-7. 
289 Ladendorf 1968, pp. 236-237. 
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of course be passive and were forced to be explicit concerning how 
active passive resistance really was intended to be. 
For the most part the Constitutionalists were manifestly insurgent 
in both word and deed. They clearly adhered to the international 
constitutionalist doctrine of the right and duty of rebellion against 
tyranny. Accordingly, they explicitly held that when tyranny becomes 
systematic in its violation of constitutional law, then subjects have not 
only the right, but are also obliged, to revolt. In fact, as was shown 
earlier, one of the outstanding features of the resistance press is its 
express attitude of defiance to Bobrikov, that "vulgar personification 
of the politics of despotism and illegality," and the Russian regime in 
genera1.29°  
As the Finno-Russian conflict escalated, and with the increasing 
awareness of the Empire-wide pressure for change, some Finns openly 
dared to express their innovative constitutionalist goals in relation to 
Russia. They were convinced that "Anglo-Saxon-Scandinavian" consti-
tutionalism represented the superior solution for replacing the current 
regime. Finland was accordingly seen as a bridge for the spread of 
western constitutionalism into Eastern Europe and North Asia. There 
was even a vision of Finland playing an important part in a possible 
Empire-wide constitutionalist transformation.291  
A review in English of the situation in Finland at the end of 1904 
by the journalist and politician Axel Lille clearly expresses the special 
innovative nature of the Finnish resistance. After reviewing the history 
of the Finno-Russian conflict Lille writes: 
The period of conflict had set in all over Finland. It was and it is not 
only a conflict between the monarch, who oversteps the constitutional 
limits of his powers, and the people and its representatives, who 
endeavor to defend the law. It is a conflict between the Russian power, 
that illegally and destructively intervenes in the political life of Finland, 
and the Finnish nation in its entirety fighting for its existence. It is, 
moreover, a conflict between Eastern despotism and Western principles 
of justice and love for law abiding freedom.i292 
After relating in detail the principles and practice of Finnish passive 
resistance Lille concludes: 
Since it has become known in Finland, during these last years, of what 
nature the forces are which, under the aegis of autocracy, drive the 
290 FONS, 17 May 1901, pp. 1-2. 
291 Neovius 1900b, pp. 1-3. 
292 Lille 1904, p. 920. 
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political machinery in St. Petersburg, we cannot hope for a satisfactory 
solution of the conflict until an entire change of system has been carried 
out in Russia.293  
Lille's view provides an excellent example of a common belief among 
Finns that the success of their own struggle depended on change in 
Russia. But their dependence on such change and the question as to 
how much they should actively become involved in it were complex 
issues. What then was their relation to change and revolution in Russia? 
The Coming Transformation of Russia 
As privately expressed in the 1898 letter to his son cited earlier, Yrjö-
Koskinen thought that a combination of passive resistance and support 
within Russia itself against "the ruling gang of robbers" would 
ultimately prevent the Russification of Finland.2 4 What Yrjö-Koskinen 
meant by "much support" in Russia for the Finnish cause is unclear. 
It is probably safe to say that he was not referring to the radical 
opposition, but he had to have in mind the possibility of some kind of 
effective opposition to the regime's current policies. Although Yrjö-
Koskinen soon abandoned this approach, the formula resistance plus 
support or change in Russia was quickly adopted and cultivated by 
Constitutionalists. 
The resistance press, especially in its early phase, did indeed tend 
to focus on the technique of passive resistance and the domestic 
prerequisites for it. Yet from the very outset of their endeavor the 
resisters realized that the course of events in Russia would have a 
significant, if not decisive, influence on the outcome of their resistance 
movement. One of the most marked characteristics of the resistance 
press is the profusion of articles dealing with events in Russia. With 
the intensification of revolutionary action and the approach of war in 
the Far East, the frequency of these articles only increased. Not 
surprisingly these articles, referring to a great variety of events and 
citing both Russian and western European sources, concentrated on 
news which put the Russian government in a bad light or revealed its 
weaknesses. 
Initially the Finnish Constitutionalists seem to have understood the 
idea of backing in Russia in terms of the support they would receive 
293  Ibid., p. 924. 
294  Yrjö Koskinen to Yrjö-Koskinen, 10 December 1898. 
215 
in official Russian circles against Russification in general and in 
particular against the conscription of Finns into the imperial army. In 
spite of the fact that there was indeed hope in this regard, the editors 
of the resistance press emphatically warned their readers that they 
should not be overly optimistic about the potential efficacy of support 
for their cause in St. Petersburg governmental circles. They pointed 
out, for instance, that the tsar need not heed pro-Finnish opinion even 
when, as at present, some members of the Imperial Council were in 
favor of the Finns on the conscription issue 295  It was not long, however, 
before the Finnish Constitutionalists came to identify support in Russia 
with the activities of the various opposition groups and the general 
revolutionary process. The success of the passive resistance movement 
in Finland thus came to be understood as bound to that of the 
opposition, and even revolutionary, movements in Russia and the 
Empire in general. 
It is important to stress here that the meaning of support and 
dependence on change in Russia was continually ambiguous to the 
Finns, and these concepts should not be understood as necessarily 
implying direct involvement with Russians. Likewise, the meaning of 
the terms signifying the transformation of Russia, such as "revolution" 
were also equivocal. Politically aware Finns certainly had some 
understanding of the difference between the parties and factions of 
the extreme left and the opposition groups to their right. But such 
distinctions were by no means clear, and all these groups were 
understood as being part of a revolutionary process. It is true that men 
like Neovius deplored the fact that the Russian regime was giving rise 
to "the unpredictable cancer of revolution" in the Empire.296 But it 
was not long before they began to believe that the Russian regime was 
doomed to death, a death which could very well bring the initiation 
of a constitutional form of government in Russia297 
How this death and reformation was to occur was unclear; was it 
"complete change," "overthrow of the system" or "revolution"? Precise 
distinctions between these kinds of concepts were not often made. 
There can be no doubt that many Finns began to believe in a 
constitutional transformation in Russia, and that such an event should 
295 FONS, 1 February 1901, p. 1. 
296 Neovius 1900b, p. 1. 
297 In 1900, for example, Neovius predicted that the repressiye Russian regime was 
doomed to death, because people throughout the Empire would no longer support 
it, and it would fall, cursed by a hundred million. His point was that this fall had to 
be taken into consideration when thinking about the future: Neovius 1900e, pp. 3-4. 
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be prepared for. Moreover, many came to understand that such a 
change could even happen through the forcible change or overthrow 
of the current system. One need not look to the extreme Russian left 
to find people prepared for forced political change; even the most 
moderate Russian opposition groups contained those who were willing 
to contribute to the overthrow of autocracy, as Finnish resisters were 
well aware298  Finns of the "loyal opposition" began maneuvering to 
establish good relations with those who might take power in Russia. 
Several of the leading members of the Constitutionalist front were 
among Finland's foremost experts on Russian affairs. Under the 
pressure of Russification these men became dismayed by the general 
highly deficient knowledge in Finland of the current transformation 
of Russian society. For example, the arrival of the accomplished 
geographer and internationally renowned anarchist Prince P.A. 
Kropotkin's Memoirs of a Revolutionist in Finland incited the resisters 
to call for a change in this state of affairs299 They were clearly impressed 
by Kropotkin's profound insight into nineteenth century Russian life.300 
In a review of Kropotkin's work they come to the conclusion that 
knowledge is power, meaning that an essential condition for self-
preservation is knowledge of the phenomena which threaten. They 
assert that what is presently known in Finland of Russian politics and 
the social currents which are effecting developments there is so vague 
and superficial that it can hardly be called knowledge. Finally they call 
on their countrymen to be more critical toward sources on Russia, 
which are presently undependable, and to take advantage of all 
opportunities to increase their knowledge of the subject 301 
Some of the resisters began inquiries into the details of the effort 
to transform Russia. For example, in an article of 23 July 1901 Neovius 
presented the Russian Social Democratic analysis, as voiced by the 
Geneva emigres, of current conditions.302 The Social Democrats 
believed that recent events in Russia were unprecedented in 
298 Copeland 1973, p. 165; Galai 1973. 
299 Kropotkin's memoirs were first published in serial form in the American journal 
The Atlantic Monthly (September, 1898 to September, 1899). The first book edition, 
published in 1899, includes a forward by Georg Brandes which the Finns cited; see 
Kropotkin 1971. In 1899 Kropotkin defended the Finnish cause from London and 
had contact with Finnish resisters such as J. Reuter; see Copeland 1973, pp. 58-59. 
300 Kropotkin was one of the authorities whose observations, as published in the 
European press, on changing conditions in Russia were later cited by the resisters; 
for instance, one such observation was that the present conditions in Russia were 
strikingly similar to those in France before the Revolution of 1789; see VL, 7 April 
1903, p. 4. 301 FO/VS, 18 October 1900, p. 3. 
302 Neoyius 1901b, pp. 2-4. 
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revolutionary magnitude, observing that many revolutions in western 
Europe had been ignited by less. Even if the time of revolution in the 
full sense of the word had not yet come the Social Democrats held, 
as quoted by Neovius, that revolutionary forces were now gathering 
strength for the final confrontation with autocracy. 
Neovius knew that the Finns' knowledge of the revolutionary 
movement was incomplete. Furthermore, he did not seem to believe 
in the validity of the revolutionaries' economic theory, he had his 
doubts about their methods and was puzzled by the Party's, or its 
factions', relationship to "revolutionary Red terrorism."303 However, 
in spite of all the uncertainties concerning the escalating Revolution, 
Neovius was prophetically certain that the Russian Social Democratic 
movement would "play a central role in the political growth and the 
formation of the fate of the Russian people in the near future."304 The 
Constitutionalists' correspondent in St. Petersburg, V.M. Smirnov 
(writing under the pseudonym Observator),  went a step further, writing 
that in its fight for the freedom of Russia the "Russian revolutionary 
party" was simultaneously fighting for "the independence of Finland"; 
furthermore, it is the revolutionary party, with its clearly expressed 
genuine sympathy for the Finnish cause, which is Finland's best ally 
in Russia. 05 
Smimov, who was half Finnish, was the Russian Social Democratic 
Party's most important contact-man with Finland in the early part of 
the century. One of his tasks was to write articles on Finland for Iskra, 
one of the chief editors of which was V.I. Lenin. As was typical of 
Finno-Russian opposition relations at the time, Smirnov's contacts with 
the Finnish Constitutionalists were more significant than with Finnish 
socialists; Kujala has observed that what Smirnov wrote for the Finnish 
underground press mostly suited the Constitutionalist line.306 But it is 
instructive here to contrast Neovius' approach to Smirnov's. Neovius 
presents the Russian Social Democratic position and estimates the 
Party's significance, but does not openly suggest involvement with 
them.307 Smirnov, in contrast, openly claims that the revolutionary 
party is the Finns' best ally, a claim which many within the Finnish 
3°3  Ibid., p. 4. 304  Ibid., p. 4. 3°5 VL, 14 May 1902, pp. 7-8; on Smirnov see Kujala 1989, pp. 46-47 (and sources cited) 
and; Copeland 1973, pp. 65-69, 72-77. 
306 Kujala 1989, p. 46. 
307 Neovius was, however, involved with Russians in the smuggling of subversive printed 
materials through Finland; he was, for example, among Smimov's most important 
contacts; Copeland 1973, pp. 47-51, 63-77. 
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opposition certainly would not have desired to acknowledge, little less 
actively advocate. The great aversion felt toward involvement with 
Russian revolutionaries is well illustrated through the case of Konni 
Zilliacus.  
It was about this time that Zilliacus, who would later establish a 
violent resistance faction, began advocating direct cooperation with 
Russian revolutionaries. In October 1902 Zilliacus published a book 
which for the first time made the story of the revolutionary movement 
in Russia available to Finns in broader detail. The work was very 
influential in changing Finnish perceptions of what was occurring in 
the Empire.308 Nevertheless, Zilliacus' open proposals, as expressed 
in Fria Ord in September, for collaboration with the Russian opposition 
for the destruction of autocracy met with significant dissent within 
resistance circles.309 For example, in a Fria Ord article from 30 
September signed by "Fria Ord subscribers," the main author of which 
(as Copeland shows) was apparently Wrede, it is claimed that the aims 
of the Finnish resistance and the Russian revolutionaries are totally 
incompatible and that collaboration between them, and involvement 
in Russian internal affairs, would lead to the destruction of the separate 
political existence of Finland 31° 
Although Wrede was an adamant passive resister, he was among 
the most socially conservative of Finns; his views cannot therefore be 
taken as characterizing the mainstream of the Constitutionalist front. 
The resistance leaders did, however, agree with Wrede that Zilliacus'  
proposals should not be publicly discussed and that his way of 
proceeding was not compatible with the strategy of passive 
resistance. 1l Under Neovius' guidance, Fria Ord adhered to the passive 
resistance line and Zillicus' role in the paper decreased 312 
Nevertheless, already at this early stage there were those among the 
Constitutionalists who were, among other subversive activities, 
clandestinely exploring the nature of the Russian opposition and 
carefully weighing the potential consequences and conditions of 
cooperation.3 3 This led them to adopt a different line than Zilliacus.  
Whatever line was advocated it is obvious that by 1901 the concept 
308 Copeland 1973, pp. 113-114. 
3°9  Parmanen 1936-1941, yol. 1, pp. 395-396, 431, yol. 2, pp. 675-676; Copeland 1973, 
pp. 113-114. 
310  Parmanen 1936-1941, yol. 2, pp. 675-676; Copeland 1973, pp. 113-114. 
311 In 1905 Neovius referred back to this controversy, reiterating that the pursuance of 
the Zilliacus line of direct participation in the Russian reyolution would result in 
the destruction of Finnish independence; Neovius 1905a, p. 2. 
312 Kujala 1987a, p. 60. 
313 See Copeland 1973, particularly Parts III and IV. 
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of "the Revolution in Russia" was becoming common.374 That is to 
say that by this time the peasant, student, worker, intelligentsia, 
religious and national minority confrontations with the government, 
and sociopolitical turmoil in general, in Russia which they had been 
reporting and commenting on, and which had reached an un-
precedented scale of intensity, now came to be seen, rather indefinitely, 
as part of a Russian Revolution which was coming or which was even 
now underway. The concept of a Russian Revolution now became an 
ambiguous and inclusive category under which events in Russia were 
classified and understood.315 Moreover, although they did not follow 
Zilliacus' leadership, resistance thinkers such as Neovius and Homen 
came to understand the Finnish struggle as contributing to the Russian 
Revolution.316  Again, this is not to say that these men, little less their 
conservative colleagues, were revolutionaries in a strict sense; but 
revolution in a general sense was a real occurrence with which they 
knew they had to reckon. 
Obviously for the Finnish opposition in general work toward a 
Constitutionalist victory in the Empire was to be preferred to 
dependence on the revolutionary left. It became common within the 
Finnish resistance movement to believe that the triumph of liberal 
forces in Russia could very likely be the guarantee of the success of 
the Finnish struggle 317 Accordingly, as expressed on the front page 
of  Vapaita Lehtisiä in 1901, that the kind of transformation which 
"liberal and radical elements" are struggling for everywhere "will occur 
in Russia there can be no doubt"; throughout the Russian Empire 
there are dissatisfied nationalities, social classes and individuals for 
whom the civil and military powers supporting autocracy are the 
• common enemy.318 This writer's conclusion is that the Finns' most 
314 For example see FO/VS, 4 April 1901, p. 1-4; this edition is bursting with news of 
"the Revolution in Russia," dealing with a wide variety of occurrences from riots 
and bloodbaths to the excommunication of Leo Tolstoy. 
315 For the writers of the Finnish resistance press one of the significant sub-categories 
of the Russian Revolution was the Russian Social Democratic movement; they 
published a serious exploratory noncommittal study of it in a series of articles 
beginning in July, 1901. 
316 Homén did not write of the Revolution in his printed works, but in a private letter 
from 1903 he shows a certain enthusiasm for the "Russian Revolution" and the 
radicalization of the Finnish struggle. Moreover, he clearly credits Zilliacus for 
spreading the idea of the Russian Revolution; see Homen to Mannerheim, 5 June 
1903 (thanks to Antti Kujala for this source); Neovius believed in contributing to 
the Russian Revolution without becoming directly involved in it; Neovius 1905b, p. 
4. 
317 In his memoirs, Paasikivi says that this was a "very common claim" used "against 
us Old Finns"; Paasikivi 1957a, p. 42 
318 VL, 25 November 1901, p. 1. 
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important source of support in Russia will be the Russian liberals or 
Constitutionalists who, he emphasizes, must thus be given a good im-
pression of the Finnish resistance movement 319  He hastens to add, 
however, that this does not mean that the Finns must undertake direct 
cooperation with Russians; rather they must redouble their own 
domestic resistance efforts, which are under the close scrutiny of the 
Russian opposition, and only thus secure support and sympathy and 
ensure that the Finns will be remembered in the future for their staunch 
struggle 320 
This line was not merely held by radical Constitutionalists, as is 
indicated by a resistance tract written by two influential Old Finns. 
They argued, against the compliants, that those presently in power in 
Russia are opposed by a great and influential party. Therefore by 
continuing resistance the Finns would help discredit and weaken the 
regime, thus contributing to the liberal victory.321  
Thus by 1901 it was well understood among resisters that the tsarist 
regime was being seriously challenged from a variety of positions and 
that therefore their own strategy had to take into account all the forces 
for change in Russia. Their own Realpolitik sense would not allow 
them to count on, like the compliants, the continued dominance of the 
autocratic system without major changes; futhermore, they thought "it 
would be stupid" to believe that if a revolution did break out, or change 
occur in some other manner, it would necessarily be defeated by the 
tsar's forces.322  As the Finnish resisters saw it, the present Empire-
wide unrest could no longer be understood simply as the typical type 
of extremism which had long been a characteristic feature of Russian 
life. Much of the Russian population was now on the brink of rebellion 
and people from every class were in a revolutionary mood. However 
it would happen, whether through peaceful change or violent revolution 
ending in a constitution or not, the forthcoming overthrow of the 
prevailing "system" and the present rulers of Russia could now be 
predicted with "almost mathematical certainty."323 
The Russo-Japanese conflict only bolstered convictions of the 
probability of radical change in Russia. In January of 1904, one month 
before the war broke out, the head article of  Vapaita Lehtisiä 
maintained that all signs indicate that the bloody and unjust Russian 
319 Homén also emphasized the need to impress the Russian liberals by maintaining 
staunch resistance; see Homén 1902b, p. 56. 
320 VL, 25 November 1901. p. 1. 
321 Ignatius, Donner, pp. 5-6. 
322 VL, 21 December 1903, p. 2. 
323  Ibid., p. 2. 
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regime cannot long withstand the liberation movement of the Russian 
people.324  The editors, in support of their own conclusions, quoted the 
St. Petersburg correspondent of the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet.  
After observing that "everyone intuitively feels that Russia has come 
to the decisive point in its development," he concludes that this time 
of reckoning will only be hastened if war, which the Russians will 
surely lose, breaks out.325  Furthermore, "those Russian patriots who 
are leading the Liberation Movement have long been completely 
prepared to take over at the right moment."326 
Thus the Finnish resistance writers increasingly identified with the 
members of the Liberation Movement who, like the Constitutionalists 
in Finland, represented the broad spectrum of constitutionalist and 
liberal resistance and revolutionary attitudes within Russian educated 
society, who were seen as now teaming up with the whole of Russian 
society for the overthrow of autocracy; ultimately this movement would 
"without doubt sweep the Romanov dynasty from the stage."327 The 
Liberation Movement now provided the main perspective from which 
the escalation of revolutionary events in Russia were written about by 
the Finnish resisters.328 
The escalation of revolutionary events in Russia was clearly reflected 
in the Finnish resistance press. There increasingly appeared articles 
not merely describing revolutionary events, but also allowing the 
advocates of violent revolution to express their views. Their message 
was: "Open your eyes! ... Deeds of bloody political violence cannot 
324 VL, 14 January 1904, p. 1. 
325  Ibid., p. 2 (Aftonbladet,  10 January 1904). Leo Mechelin was conyinced that even if 
Russia did win the war economic crisis and other difficulties would force revolutionary 
change and bring yictory for the Finns; Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 2, p. 617. 
326 VL, 14 January 1904, p. 2. Copeland sees the summer of 1903 as a landmark in the 
development of Finnish attitudes toward the Liberation Moyement. At that time 
the Liberationists made direct contact with Finns in Helsinki and moderate elements 
of the Finnish resistance began to consider them a force worth dealing with. Copeland 
also quotes one of Neovius' letters from that time (July 1903) saying that Finnish 
interest in the Russian liberation and Constitutionalist movements had swiftly 
increased in the preceding year; Copeland 1973, pp. 165-167. 
327 For the role of the Liberation Movement, as distinct from the Russian Social 
Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, in the events leading to the First 
Russian Revolution (1905) see Galai 1973, passim. The Finnish resisters understood 
the Liberation Movement as representing the great majority of the disaffected middle 
and upper classes as composed of Zemstvo activists, city councilors, medical doctors, 
lawyers, university officials, writers and artists and, "in a word, all those who can 
be counted as belonging to educated Russia"; see VL, 31 December 1904, pp. 1-3 
(quote in main text from p. 2). 
328 For example see VL, 30 November 1904, pp. 1, 3; 6 December 1904, pp. 1-2; 31 
December 1904, pp. 1-3. 
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be averted unless the legal system is restored. They are — as we have 
tried to show — the immediate consequence of illegality and will 
continue until ... the policy of violent oppression has been 
abandoned."329  One of the most extreme examples was a series of 
open letters written by the popular revolutionary leader Father G.A. 
Gapon, reprinted in Vapaita Lehtisiä after "Bloody Sunday" in St. 
Petersburg, 22 January 1905. Gapon preaches that the January violence 
throughout Russia has initiated the Great Russian Revolution";330 
therefore now is the time to rise without delay in violent revolution. 
He urges his readers to use dynamite and bombs. 
One of the very last articles in Vapaita Lehtisiä,  written during the 
Great Strike, was entitled: "On the Threshold of Revolution!"331  This 
title very well expresses what had been a dominant theme in the 
resistance press for at least two years. In fact the message of this article 
is: "Now it has finally happened! ... In recent days the Finnish people 
has finally broken its chains! It has brought the whole machinery of 
government and business to a standstill," i.e., it has stepped over the 
threshold into revolution; "Long live the Revolution, long live Fin-
land! ! "332 
But even now, with the enthusiasm of insurgency at its height, this 
step over the threshold did not signify for the mainstream Constitution-
alists a merger with the Russian Revolution. Up until its end, the 
Finnish resistance movement remained primarily a separate and par-
ticularistic affair; it was a separate part of an Empire-wide revolutionary 
process and the resistance leaders aimed to keep it that way. This is 
one of the main reasons why the Finnish Constitutionalist front stuck 
to its strategy of passive resistance. 
In 1901 Danielson-Kalmari had stressed that no reasonable person 
could think of Finland politically disassociated from Russia. Perhaps 
the fact that he felt it necessary to exclaim this principle indicates that 
some such thinking was indeed going on. Nonetheless, in general the 
mainstreams of compliance and Constitutionalism alike continued to 
adhere in practice to the idea that Finland would remain in some kind 
of political association with Russia, but they did so in very different 
ways. 
At the beginning of 1905, when the Empire-wide crisis was clearly 
escalating, the Finnish Constitutionalist-dominated Diet presented its 
329 VL, 17 August 1905, p. 1. 330 VL, 9 February 1905, p. 2; 6 March 1905, p. 4. 
331 VL, 4 November 1905, p. 1. 
332  Ibid., p. 1. 
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Great Petition to the tsar. The Petition was, as mentioned earlier, 
broadly representative of moderate resistance sentiment 333 In that 
defiant condemnation of the Russian regime's policy in Finland, it was 
claimed that the Finnish nation had never pursued interests at the 
expense of Russia or put forth demands which would weaken the 
political bond between the Grand Duchy and the Empire.334 Accord-
ingly, in the Great Petition one cannot find even a hint of a demand 
for direct total independence from Russia. In a word, the aim was 
restoration of the legal order. 
The terms of the Petition's discourse, however, should not allow one 
to underestimate the extent of the Finns' demands. By no means could 
there simply be a return to a previously well-defined static political 
state of affairs or status quo ante Bobrikov. Such a state of affairs 
never existed. For the Finnish opposition the call for restoration of 
the legal order was a way of demanding that Finno-Russian relations 
be set up on Finnish terms. For many this meant the attainment of 
guarantees for the inviolability of the Finnish political and legal system 
and the right for self-determined development 335  To be sure, the 
Petition made it clear that the Russian regime would still have 
considerable power in regard to Finland, but it had to be exercised in 
accordance with the Finnish legal system. 
The Great Petition was an official document aimed at coming to an 
agreement with the tsarist regime. In many ways, however, it also 
reflected the demands which the Constitutionalist front had come to 
consider realistic in case of a liberal transformation, or overthrow, of 
the Russian government. 
The implementation of Russification had brought about an un-
precedented deterioration of Finnish loyalty toward, and trust in, the 
tsarist regime. It is not surprising then that many Finns began to 
consider how their relation to Russia might be best reorganized to 
secure their own interests, some began to consider the possibilities for 
radical, or even revolutionary, remedies. Nevertheless, in the course 
of 1904, after a good deal of inquiry concerning, and direct contact 
with, the Russian opposition, both the moderate and radical leaders 
of the Finnish resistance front came to view the basic platform of 
restoration of the legal order as the most realistic alternative. 
It is true that the more forthright Constitutionalists, including 
Mechelin and his fellow exiles in Stockholm, had made it clear to the 
333 Section 2. of the present chapter; also see section 9. below. 
334  Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 3, p. 407. 
335 Mechelin 1913, p. 103. 
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Russian liberals in January 1904 that a return to the pre-Bobrikov 
state of affairs with additional specific guarantees for political freedom 
was their minimum demand and that the possibility, as Mechelin put 
it, for the formation of "a completely independent state" was under 
consideration 336  In their dealings with the Russian opposition the 
resistance leaders in Helsinki took a much more cautious line. 
Indeed as the crisis became more acute even the radical Constitution-
alists were usually very discreet with their visions for expanded political 
freedom for Finland. This can be illustrated through the example of 
Jonas Castrén. Castrén had a definite enthusiasm for revolution in 
Russia. As early as 1903 he advocated going beyond demands for mere 
restoration, and in case of the overthrow of autocracy he said that 
Finland should "become a neutral, independent state like Switzer-
land."337 At what was considered a critical point for the Finnish 
struggle, a Constitutionalist meeting was held on 15 March 1904 in  
Boden, northern Sweden, to determine how resistance was to be carried 
on and intensified. Castrén's speech there emphasized the central 
importance of understanding current events in Russia and their 
implications for the Finnish struggle. He exclaimed that now was the 
time for Finns to rise up in mass struggle. But he advocated neither 
involvement in the Russian Revolution, nor of a struggle for direct 
independence. In fact his call for radical struggle was entirely within 
the bounds of Constitutionalist passive resistance.338 
Castrén, like his colleagues, believed that the primary campaign at 
that point should be for the Constitutionalists to take over the Diet 
and then defiantly demand the restoration of the legal order. It was a 
Deåkean strategy, and the result was the Great Petition at the end of 
the year. But it must be emphasized that however cautious they were 
in practice, many of the Constitutionalists were progressive in attitude, 
holding, as Neovius put it, that events of the last several years had 
taught them that the restoration of the old order was to be considered 
the minimum goal and the first step toward legally "replacing it with 
a new, freer and more modern form of government."3 
Up until the dissolution of the organization of resistance following 
the victory of the Great Strike in 1905, Constitutionalist insurgency 
remained within the bounds of disobedience and noncooperation 
336 Copeland 1973, pp. 176-179, Mechelin quoted on p. 178. 
337 Castrén quoted in Copeland 1973, p. 168. 
338 Castrén 1904; Castren's speech was recorded by the Old Finn Mauno Rosendal, the 
reviyalist leader and religious scholar who often functioned as secretary and organizer 
of Finnish-minded resistance meetings. 
339 Neovius 1905c, p. 1. 
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without violence. Moreover, even for the most radical of those who 
stayed within the Constitutionalist bloc, passive resistance remained 
the primary strategy for struggle. On numerous occasions between 
1903 and 1905 the Constitutionalists both individually and collective 
reconfirmed their steadfast primary adherence to passive resistance .34"  
Likewise, Vapaita Lehtisiä and Fria Ord remained, until they were 
terminated in 1905, specifically organs of passive resistance;341 those 
who openly advocated the use of violence were forced to turn elsewhere 
to propagate their views. 
Violent Schemes 
On 26 June 1900 the well-known poet J.H. Erkko complained to his 
younger brother, Eero Erkko, that the depreciation of the Russian 
revolutionaries' activities in the Young Finn newspaper Päivälehti two 
days earlier was unwise. The younger Erkko was the paper's editor-
in-chief, soon to be forced underground, whence, along with other 
resistance activities, he ran Vapaita Lehtisiä.  The elder Erkko thought 
it foolish for Finns to disparage Russian "nihilists" (revolutionaries) 
in order to bolster their own righteousness. The nihilists, he said, belong 
to the Russian educated class and they are not the enemies of the 
Finns. He pointed out that Russification could very well give rise to 
nihilist-type phenomena in Finland too 342 
In a similar vein an anonymous writer for the resistance press 
observed, in October 1902, that only a few years ago the mere mention 
of the terms "nihilism and terrorism" aroused aversion and fright 
among the Finns 343  Before, his article states, the Finns would do 
everything to immediately apprehend, and hand over to the authorities, 
340 For example at the "Stockholm Diet" conference, 3-5 September 1903, the Finnish 
Constitutionalists reaffirmed their adherence to passive resistance; VL, 21 November 
1903, pp. 2-3, includes an article signed by twenty-eight prominent Constitutionalists 
making it clear that passive resistance was still their primary strategy and the best 
means available. One of the main resolutions of the massive (one thousand-
participant) Constitutionalist meeting in Helsinki on 13 September 1905 was to 
maintain passive resistance against the Russian regime; the whole meeting was a 
mass confirmation of adherence to passive resistance. 
341 See VL, 18 April 1905, p. 4 (Neovius 1905b), in which Neovius, whose articles figured 
prominently in both papers, explicitly, in the context of a major debate on the 
comparative merits and faults of violent and passive resistance, reasserts the 
superiority of passive resistance on pragmatic grounds; he expressly recognizes that 
the Finns certainly have the right to violent self-defense. 
342 Erkko to Erkko, 26 June 1900. 
343  Vapaita Lehtisiä (VL), 18 October 1902, pp. 5-6. 
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any Russian nihilists straying into Finnish territory. However, the 
treachery and unscrupulousness with which Pobedonostsev, von 
Plehwe and Bobrikov have so swiftly destroyed Finnish law and justice, 
replacing it with arbitrariness and Russian bureaucracy, has now given 
every Finn an understanding of why nihilism and terrorism arose in 
Russia; it has thus aroused within them a certain sympathy for the 
Russian revolutionary parties. The article concludes that absolutism 
and military domination give rise to revolutionary violence, the seeds 
of which Bobrikov has now sown among the Finnish people.3W This 
writer did not claim that Finns had already at that time turned to 
"nihilism and terrorism," but he predicted, like J.H. Erkko, that if the 
Bobrikov regime's oppression was to continue unabated then they 
would most likely be driven to it in desperation. Perhaps he was among 
those who were already investigating the possibilities for armed 
rebellion or who, not long thereafter, began planning the assassination 
of key Russian figures such as Bobrikov. 
Thus, as Erkko anticipated, Russification did indeed give rise to a 
certain sympathy for violent action. To more fully understand the 
extreme scope of Constitutionalist insurgency it is necessary to examine 
not merely the published words and manifest passive resistance practice 
of the insurgents, but also their more clandestine schemes. 
Constitutionalists proceeded very carefully in regard to involvement 
with Russian revolutionaries. Before the latter part of 1904 direct 
Finno-Russian cooperation in resistance, in contrast to mere contact, 
was limited almost exclusively to the smuggling of revolutionary under-
ground literature through Finland to Russia. Only a few Finns were 
involved in its organization. Of them Konni Zilliacus apparently hoped 
that this work might lead to more significant cooperation. His aim was 
to help unify the opposition movements throughout the Empire. But 
Kagal did not want to commit the Finns to such work.345  
Zilliacus was part of a small fraction of men driven by an increasing 
dissatisfaction with the approach of their Constitutionalist colleagues. 
Their own program was based on a vehement criticism of passive 
resistance as a main strategy and the advocacy of terrorist violence 
and working cooperation with Russian revolutionaries. At the 
Stockholm conference of exiled Constitutionalist leaders and Kagal 
344  Ibid. pp. 5-6; in its 10 September 1904 (p. 1) issue Vapaita Lehtisiä cited a "satirical" 
comment by a Russian liberal observer, made shortly after the assassination of 
Bobrikov on 16 June 1904, saying that the assassination was the surest sign so far 
that Russification was succeeding in Finland; succeeding that is in giving rise to the 
same ways of thinking and rebellious action as in Russia itself. 
345 Kujala 1987b, pp. 88-89. 
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representatives in September 1903 this platform was firmly rejected. 
The Constitutionalist majority reconfirmed adherence to passive 
resistance and expressed a preference for increased contact, but not 
an alliance, with the Russian liberals, not with the Social Democrat or 
Socialist Revolutionary groups. One year later Zilliacus organized a 
conference of opposition and revolutionary parties from throughout 
the Russian Empire. The Finnish Constitutionalists refused to commit 
themselves to the conference's resolutions, thus marking Zilliacus' final 
failure to persuade the Finns to join in a united Empire-wide resistance 
effort on his terms. The result was that Zilliacus and company broke 
away and formed the Finnish Active Resistance Party 346 
One of the outstanding features of activist propaganda was the 
criticism of passive resistance; the very name "Active Resistance Party" 
signifies a dramatic break with passive resistance. The members of this 
party were convinced that passive resistance, however important and 
promising it had been in the past, was now a complete failure and 
entirely unrealistic. They advocated all-out violence against the Russian 
regime347 It was not, however, the activists' argument against passive 
resistance in abstract which chiefly alarmed the Constitutionalists, but 
rather the concrete alternative to it which they offered. For example 
Neovius, in open debate with the activists, rebukes them for not 
elaborating on the consequences of their schemes: the activists' 
approach of direct cooperation with Russian revolutionaries is a danger 
to Finnish autonomy, it is harmful to the particular interests of 
Finland.348  
Neovius elaborates his view in response to an activist rejoinder as 
follows: the activists urge Finns to take part in the Russian Revolution. 
A sharp distinction between taking part in, and helping, the Revolution 
must be made. The Finns "should and can help the Revolution," 
especially the liberal Liberation Movement: "But we cannot take part 
as long as we want to preserve our special status; Finland is not, and 
does not desire to become, part of Russia."349 
Next, although explicitly his main purpose is not to challenge the 
principles of violent struggle in abstract, Neovius rejects the activist 
principle that violence is superior to passive resistance in general. He 
considers the assertion "that violence is the only secure foundation for 
justice" is a false doctrine and is astonished that anyone can nowadays 
346  Ibid., pp. 90-92, and; for the broader background see Kujala, 1988b. 
347 Gummerus 1935, 60-70, 81; Mörne 1903; Zilliacus. 1904a, 1904b. 
348 Neovius 1905a, pp. 2-3. 
349 Neoyius 1905b, p. 4, my emphasis. 
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adhere to it: if it were true then small states would have no justice. 
He then reiterates the often cited case of the Hungarians achieving 
through passive resistance what they failed to attain through violent 
resistance. In other words, Neovius does not adhere to the principle 
of violence being the ultima ratio regum or, in more modern terms, 
the ultimate means of the people or state. He, like his counterparts in 
the Russian Liberation Movement, believed that the other revolution-
ary groups were disastrously confusing armed might with political 
power.35 
Adherence to these principles did not, to be sure, rule out the use 
of armed force under appropriate conditions. Although the Constitu-
tionalist front and Kagal leaders rejected the Russian revolutionary 
connection as pernicious to their cause, some of them did, beginning 
in 1902, secretly explore a variety of possible ways to supplement 
passive resistance if need be. Their policy was that inquiries into the 
prerequisites for armed struggle should be carried out, and that such 
struggle should be implemented only if certain stringent qualifications 
were met. For example, at the beginning of 1902 Finnish military 
officers considered joining the British army, and Kagal leaders 
negotiated with British military officials. In 1901 and 1902 plans were 
made in Kagal circles for the formation of a secret voluntary militia 
of citizens for self-defense, but the Kagal directors refused, at this time, 
to support such a venture. Furthermore, inquires were undertaken 
concerning the procurement of weapons from abroad 351 
As the Russo-Japanese conflict escalated toward war, the Japanese 
began to explore ways to foment rebellion and revolution in the Russian 
Empire. Thus, it is not surprising to find that contact between Finns 
and Japanese had been made by February 1904. Essentially there were 
two possible, apparently mutually exclusive, schemes for the Japanese 
to follow with the small group of Finns with whom they were plotting. 
First there was the Finno-particularist scheme of the radical Constitu-
tionalists and second there was the Empire-wide line of their estranged 
comrade Konni Zilliacus. The proponents of the former sought to 
manipulate the international situation for the exclusive benefit of 
Finland. They would accept Japanese aid for armed rebellion if they 
could be sure of support from Sweden, England and other European 
powers in conjunction with the rebellion of national minorities in the 
Russian Empire. In the event that Britain did join the war against 
35° The Russian debate on this subject, from the Liberation Movement's point of view, 
is presented in VL, 2 August 1905, pp. 3-5. 
351 Kujala 1988a, p. 5. 
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Russia they hoped that these conditions might include the British navy's 
outright support of a possible Finnish armed uprising. 
Furthermore, the radical Constitutionalists tried to persuade the 
Japanese to commit themselves to securing the full independence, or 
at least to the internationally guaranteed complete autonomy, of 
Finland after the war; they wanted this commitment to be binding 
regardless of whether or not the Finns actually did join the armed 
struggle. 
Apparently the Constitutionalists' communication with the Japanese 
was poor, and the two parties never did come to any practical agreement 
concerning the funding and equipping of a Finnish armed rebellion.352 
Instead, the Japanese turned to Zilliacus, approving his scheme in the 
summer of 1904. In the summer of 1905, after months of planning, he 
launched on an adventure which was intended to ignite the Russian 
Revolution. The idea was to provide arms to all the revolutionary 
parties, but by May 1905 it seems that Zilliacus and his Japanese contact 
considered it plausible only to arm the Socialist Revolutionaries and 
the Finnish activists. Father George Gapon was to assist them in 
mobilizing the masses. Soon, however, both Kagal and the Russian 
Bolsheviks caught wind of the scheme and wanted in on it 353 
Kagal, with its characteristic Realpolitik sense, knew that in the 
current circumstances the unfolding revolutionary plot could have 
significant repercussions. It therefore sought a way to steer the scheme 
for the benefit of the Finnish Constitutionalist front. For practical 
reasons only, the Kagal directors decided that the best tactic was to 
support the Russian Bolsheviks. Through contacts such as that between 
Kagal director Adolf  Törngren and N.E. Burenin, who belonged to 
the Bolshevik's technical combat group, the two parties had a practical 
working relationship. For his part V.L. Lenin personally arranged with 
Father Gapon in Geneva for the Bolsheviks to be in on the plot and 
to take part in the planned reception of weapons in St. Petersburg. 
This revolutionary enterprise was taken very seriously in Kagal circles. 
Prominent leaders took part in the planning and even Mechelin knew 
about this major attempt to launch the Revolution.354 
This whole endeavor to initiate armed insurrection miscarried. The 
various parties concerned failed to effectively coordinate their action. 
The Bolsheviks were obviously best prepared to control the distribution 
of the arms if the shipment would have reached St. Petersburg. The 
352  Ibid., pp. 6-20. 
353 Kujala 1980, pp. 261-262. 
354  Ibid., pp. 264-268. 
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Finnish activists therefore planned to unload in Finland so that they 
could direct the distribution into Russia. Nevertheless, the actual 
struggle for control of the weaponry never took place, because the 
main shipment of 15,560 rifles, 2,500 revolvers and three tons of 
explosives ran aground off the coast of Finland and was blown up on 
8 September. Three days earlier Japan and Russia came to a final 
peace agreement which resulted in the termination of Japanese aid to 
the revolutionaries.355 
In September the changes which were to bring the Finnish 
Constitutionalists to power, and their plotting for violent rebellion to 
an end, in November were still unforeseeable. When, on 13 September, 
Russian troops disbanded a national convention of the Constitutionalist 
front Kagal decided to initiate the training of citizens for armed struggle 
against the tsarist regime. To avoid repetition of the recent failure, 
weapons were to be smuggled into the country in small quantities.356 
This was Kagal's last known effort for armed struggle. 
9. Failure in Success: The Outcome of 
Resistance 
Given the previously examined fundamental ideological and 
sociopolitical conditions for Finnish struggle it can now be asked what 
the accomplishments, failures and outcome of passive resistance were. 
Of the Constitutionalist front's achievements it is most appropriate 
to first mention the resistance press, because it was both a major battle 
field in itself and, from start to finish, a basic part of all other resistance 
operations. Moreover, the smuggling of resistance literature was a 
highly successful operation. The resistance writers proudly, with mani-
fest insolence, reported official Russian anxiety concerning the distribu-
tion of Finnish anti-Russian printed matter.357 Although Bobrikov 
succeeded in stifling the Finnish press on one level, his enterprise failed 
when the Finns went underground. As part of his attack Bobrikov 
pushed through the establishment of a Russian paper, the Finliandskaia 
Gazeta,  in January 1900. At first it appeared three times a week then, 
beginning in 1901, four times a week; a selection of articles from it 
appeared weekly in Finnish. It was subject to boycott by the Finns and 
ass Ibid., pp. 269-273. 
356  Ibid., p.  271. 
357  FO/VS, 2 November 1900, p. 3. 
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Bobrikov's effort to offset the Finnish "separatist" press with regular 
imperial integration propaganda failed.358 
In 1901 the Russian Major General M.N. Kaigorodov, acting gov-
ernor of the province of  Uusimaa (including the capital Helsinki), 
concluded that of all the current means of opposition it is the under-
ground resistance press which is most detrimental to the Russian cause. 
He reported that the dangerous resistance writings were smuggled into, 
and distributed throughout, the country in enormous amounts. He then 
listed some of what he considered to be the most pernicious resistance 
publications from 1900, all dealing with the ideology and technique of 
passive resistance 359  He characterized the main resistance organ, Fria 
Ord/Vapaita Sanoja,  as a "despotic paper," which foments "merciless 
persecution" of Russians and their friends.360 Kaigorodov's 
observations are concrete evidence in support of the conclusion of the 
famous Finnish novelist and journalist Juhani Aho:  
The suppression of free expression has succeeded so poorly that, 
although press conditions are more difficult than ever, and although 
efforts have been made to restrict the freedom of assembly, written 
and oral public discussion of the most urgent current issues is more 
vigorous and freer than ever.361  
Likewise, the combination of Finnish noncooperation and Russian 
incapacity prevented cultural Russification in other spheres of Finnish 
society; for example, the replacement and surveillance of school 
textbooks and the infiltration of the Russian language was largely 
unsuccessful.362 
The first outstanding successful initial manifestations of Finnish 
resistance were the Great Address and the international Pro Finlandia 
project of 1899. Both operations, however, were marked by a certain 
degree of failure. Neither persuaded the tsar to reverse his policy. 
Moreover, the Pro Finlandia,  although extraordinarily successful as a 
show of support by the cream of European culture, did not, as with 
other broad efforts to mobilize international public opinion, lead to 
any official practical intervention or symbolic support from European 
governments. Nevertheless, the Russian regime was impressed and 
358  Polvinen 1984, pp. 251-252. 
359 VL, 26 March 1902, pp. 1-2; Guvernörens årsberattelse. The works Kaigorodov 
mentions by name, like Homén's definition of the idea and practice of passive 
resistance, belong to the class of resistance works cited throughout the present 
chapter. 
366  Ibid.  
361  Aho 1902b. 
362  Polvinen, pp. 199-205. 
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disturbed by the grand scale of both the Finnish National Address and 
the Pro Finlandia.  These protests composed significant obstacles for 
the Finland-eaters, causing them to proceed more slowly. Furthermore, 
the importance of these two campaigns in advancing mass political 
action, fostering popular national consciousness and fomenting an anti-
Russian regime spirit should not be underemphasized. 
The response evoked by the Finnish cause among foreign scholars 
and reporters was considered a success for the resistance. The resistance 
writers were gratified by the amount of "scientific" works on the Finnish 
situation. They listed them for their readers, claiming that, in spite of 
the differences between them, the final conclusion of them all was the 
same: "Finland is right, Russia wrong."363  As with the Pro Finlandia 
the weakness of this success was that, apart from promoting 
international sympathy and domestic morale, it did not lead to concrete 
action on the part of governments. 
One of the first operations portrayed within resistance circles as a 
success was that carried out against the Russian travelling salesmen. 
In November of 1900 Fria Ord/Vapaita Sanoja,  repeating the 
observations — with a clear pro-Finnish bias — of a reporter from the 
English paper the Morning Post, concluded that the Finns' manner of 
dealing with the peddlers "offers perhaps the best proof of the strength 
of Finnish passive resistance while demonstrating the difficulties the 
representatives of Russian authority will have to overcome in order 
to implement their will in the Grand Duchy."3M In direct defiance to 
the Russian government "local officials used their power" to deport 
"tens and hundreds of Bobrikov's wandering agents."365  Thus, 
according to this account, in his powerlessness to protect the peddlers, 
the governor general could do little more than express rage. 
Furthermore, the reporter claimed here that throughout Finland the 
Finns had successfully implemented the total boycott of Russian 
salesmen.366 
The Finnish resisters carefully watched Russian responses for signs 
of their own success. For example, Neovius saw Bobrikov's suggestion 
that Finnish troops be transferred to Russia as a kind of confession of 
the success of resistance. Bobrikov had complained that the spirit of 
the resistance press had infested the whole Finnish people, including 
363 FO/VS, 2 October 1900, pp. 7-8; this issue contains a list of forty-five titles, in 
German, English, French and Russian, concerning the Finno-Russian conflict. 
364 FONL, 2 November 1900, p. 3. The article was entitled "Statements by Foreign 
Papers: Reports to the Morning Post." 
365  Ibid., p. 3. 
366  Ibid., p. 3. 
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the military. The only way he saw for purging the troops of subversive 
contamination was to send them to Russia. Neovius saw this reaction 
as proof of the Finns' imperviousness to Russification.367 
The underground press cites Governor Kaigorodov's inspection of 
the province of  Uusimaa as a success for passive resistance. While 
Kaigorodov's own account paints Russian success, the evidence 
indicates otherwise, claim the resistance editors. Their article reports 
that almost nowhere on the governor's trip did anyone come to 
welcome him, nowhere was he the object of celebration.368  
One matter which Kaigorodov seems to have been particularly 
concerned about on this trip was, as revealed to him by Russian 
gendarme reports, (in the article's words) the "prevailing temperament 
in various localities, agitation work among the people, the spread of 
uncensored literature, etc."369 Throughout the article it is stressed that 
everywhere Kaigorodov went he met a spirit of stubborn and subdued 
defiance among the local officials. On the basis of secret denunciations 
made to the Russians, the governor accused certain officials, including 
Finnish police, of "political agitation" and threatened them with 
dismissal.370 
The Finns he interrogated denied the veracity of the reports of the 
gendarme's informers. The article claims that Kaigorodov finally 
concluded that his interrogations were in vain. The mayor of  Hanko  
recalcitrantly engaged Kaigorodov in a debate, countering the Russian 
official's accusations that, as proved by their inefficiency in quelling 
resistance, the local police were not effective enough. For his part, 
Kaigorodov claimed that agitation and the distribution of forbidden 
literature was being practiced throughout the region. Furthermore, he 
said that he knew that the distribution of the underground publication 
Fria Ord/Vapaita Sanoja had spread throughout all of Finland. The 
mayor openly sided with that paper's view that the appointment (on 
5 March 1901) of Kaigorodov as governor was illegal. 1 
Governor Kaigorodov's official report on the situation in the 
province of  Uusimaa at the end of 1901 provides an official Russian 
view regarding the hitherto effectiveness of Finnish resistance372 
36' Neovius 1901a, p. 1. 368 VL, 30 September 1901, pp. 5-6. 
369  Ibid., pp. 5-6. 379  Ibid.,  pp. 5-6. 371  Ibid., pp. 5-6. 372 The governor's report was published in Finnish in VL, 26 March 1902, pp. 1-2. 
Kaigorodov's report, as signed in Helsinki on 31 December 1901, was to be published 
in Hufvudstadsbladet,  but the Russian Censorship Board forbid it; see Guvernörens 
årsberättelse.  
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Kaigorodov reports that recent events in the area under his jurisdiction 
have shown that there prevails a widespread misunderstanding, 
proliferated by the Finnish educated class, of the Russian policy of 
imperial integration. Considerable effort will still be necessary, he 
appraises, to counter the Finnish opposition, to help those friendly to 
the Russian cause and to protect Russians residing here from the 
boycott implemented against them 373 
To illustrate the problem Kaigorodov describes some of the events 
in question. When the Russian Language Manifesto was promulgated 
what he calls the Finnish "separatists" and "intelligentsia party" 
members undertook agitation against it.374 This included a declaration 
of protest addressed to the minister secretary of state by seventy-nine 
members of the Finnish Diet in which, says Kaigorodov, the Manifesto 
was denounced as illegal. Moreover, with the implementation of the 
Manifesto everything Russian was immediately subject to boycott 
including the removal of Russian street and shop signs, the avoidance 
of places keeping such signs, the refusal to buy Russian goods, etc. 
Continuing his list of complaints, the governor reports that the 
Russian administration's efforts to restrict the Finns' right of assembly 
and the collection of funds for political purposes were being effectively 
evaded by a whole variety of means. Other aspects of the current 
resistance movement the governor gripes about are the campaign 
against Russian travelling salesmen and the extensive use of all kinds 
of symbolic objects of protest such as anti-Russian signs, drawings, 
medals, badges, emblems, bottles, etc. Furthermore, he observes that 
the "doctrine of resistance" has become deeply entrenched within the 
Finnish school system and that the teachers have been taking an active 
part in resistance activities 375 
The Russian governor concludes that the struggle against the 
underground press and other aspects of the resistance movement is 
very difficult because 
the majority of the provincial administration's officials have taken a 
hostile attitude toward all of the forementioned [Russian] governmental 
measures and toward all Russians; moreover, they are obviously in 
solidarity with the most zealous of local agitators.3 6 
Kaigorodov was convinced that during 1900 the resistance had spread 
throughout the whole province under his care and that the resistance 
373 VL, 26 March 1902, pp., 1-2. 
374  Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
375  Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
376  Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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agitators were succeeding in producing a widespread attitude of 
hostility and disobedience toward the Russian government. He felt 
himself to be helpless in the face of the current agitation and advised 
his superiors that only through swift and firm action could the upheaval 
be suppressed 377 
Another way the Finnish resisters gaged their own effectiveness as 
perceived by their enemies was by monitoring the Russian press. For 
example, in March of 1901 the resistance press noted that the Moscow 
paper Moskovskiia Vedomosti had admitted that the "Russian cause" 
was not proceeding well in Finland due to resistance.378 The Finnish 
resisters saw this as a sign of success, but agreed with the Russian 
paper's observation that the disunity among the Finns was a weakness 
which the Russians could take advantage of. Therefore they were able 
to conclude that resistance had so far saved Finnish freedom and that 
compliancy is a crime against the fatherland leading to national 
disaster37 
Was the detrimental effect of compliancy really as clear-cut as the 
resistance writers made it out to be? Perhaps not: certain concessions 
combined with moderate or indirect forms of opposition may have 
actually contributed to the overall success of resistance. This is, among 
others, Polvinen's view. In fact he even goes so far as to claim that 
the probable harmful consequences of forthright resistance were 
counterbalanced by Old Finn compromises. For example, the Senate's 
promulgation of the February Manifesto and the Conscription Act can 
be seen as helping preserve the Senate in Finnish hands; it is accordingly 
believed that complete noncooperation on the part of that body would 
only have hastened Russification. Moreover, by staying in office 
through compromise Finnish bureaucrats were in certain cases able to 
stall Russification. Hence follows the argument that both compliancy 
and resistance were necessary in defense of Finnish autonomy; Polvinen 
concludes that "totally radical noncooperation" on the part of the Finns 
would have led to all-out confrontation, the logical consequences of 
which, he implies, would have been the defeat of the Finnish cause380 
Evidently some compliants were able to contribute to the hindrance 
of Russification in certain cases. It does not, however, follow that 
compliancy decisively offset the supposedly probable harmful, or even 
fatal, effects of radical passive resistance. Such a view is purely 
377  Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
378 FO/VS, 5 March 1901, p. 1. 
379  Ibid., p. 1. 
389  Polvinen, pp. 186-187, 345. 
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speculative.381 It is impossible to say what the result of a totally 
noncooperative Senate and higher administration joined by a 
unanimously resisting nation would have been. Admittedly, it could 
have led to a severe crackdown by the Russians. But, given the disunity 
within, and incapacity of, the Russian regime along with the other 
favorable conditions for resistance, it could equally have led to the 
defeat of the Bobrikov order before 1905. Furthermore, if there had 
been no significant compliancy it does not mean that the resisters 
would have acted rashly. Their attitude toward violent struggle factually 
shows how careful they were in choosing how to proceed. Moreover, 
they were certainly prepared for negotiation once certain minimum 
demands were attained. 
Polvinen's empirical research, on the other hand, does show that 
the success of Old Finn concessions was only a matter of gaining 
time.382 Bobrikov had no sympathy for the Finnish compliants; he 
manipulated them for his own purposes and had no intention of 
fulfilling their final hopes. His aim was the integration of Finland into 
the Empire and the compliants too obstructed his path 383 
Just as Bobrikov's reports on his governor-generalship from 1898 
to 1904 aid in understanding the conditions for opposition to Russifica-
tion, they also prove that the Finnish resistance was a matter of primary 
concern to him, that it succeeded in directly obstructing his plans, and 
that it caused him to proceed with caution in the implementation of 
Russification. From the beginning of his governor-generalship Bobri-
kov clearly understood how deeply entrenched passive resistance was 
in the sociopolitical structure of Finland. Therefore from that time on 
he maneuvered to obtain the extraordinary dictatorial powers 
necessary to destroy the foundation of resistance and to implement 
Russification. Bobrikov's resort to dictatorial powers can be 
interpreted as a reaction to the hitherto success of resistance. His 
reports support the conclusion that he needed greater power to combat 
it. The dictatorship decree's power to banish provided Bobrikov with 
a weapon with which he was able to inflict a serious wound on the 
resistance leadership 384 
The most well-known campaign of the passive resistance movement 
in the eyes of posterity, and certainly a major threat to Bobrikov's 
381 Moreover, it is a view which perhaps has more to do with today's political consensus 
in Finland than with understanding the past. 
382  Ibid., p. 186. 
383  Ibid., pp. 317-318. 
384 For the background of the dictatorship decree, see Polvinen, pp. 301-318. 
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schemes, was the mass boycott of Russian conscription. Preparations 
for this campaign got under way following the Conscription Act of 
1901. The resisters placed high hopes in the boycott, since it would 
necessarily involve many sectors of Finnish society. 
First, it involved the clergy and parish communities, because new 
public ordinances had to be promulgated from the pulpits of the 
churches of the land. Kagal agitation on this front bore fruit, with a 
significant number of priests refusing to proclaim the enactment of the 
Conscription Act. Where priests did comply, whole congregations 
reacted with shouting or singing, and by walking out of church 
altogether 385 Next, the struggle shifted to the secular municipalities, 
where the draft boards were to be set up composed of local officials 
and physicians. There was bitter competition between resister, compli-
ant and Russian regime factions for influence over these boards. This 
competition, supplemented by student, worker and other organizations, 
then extended into the fierce agitation carried on amidst the thousands 
of conscription-age youths who were ordered to register for the draft. 
A governmental statement issued on 20 April 1902 helped the 
resisters to measure the effectiveness of the first conscription boycott 
campaign. The statement, reports Vapaita Lehtisiä,  is a response to 
the Finnish Senate's announcement that the draft for the current year 
cannot be completed by its prescribed deadline.386  It includes a warning 
that the continued boycott of Russian conscription will force the regime 
to restructure local administration. This, as the resistance press portrays 
it, is, in spite its threatening appearance, a clear admission by the 
Russian regime and its Finnish helpers that the resistance movement 
has successfully postponed the implementation of the draft: it provides 
further evidence of the illicit regime's "forced retreat and powerless-
ness."387 As for the threat of administrative change, the editors point 
out that that would have taken place all the more swiftly without 
resistance and, as they usually stressed, that it certainly cannot be 
prevented in the future through compliancy. The article concludes that 
the goal of the anti-draft campaign — to prove that it is impossible to 
implement the new conscription regulations — has now been half-way 
achieved 388 
In 1902 the resisters had good reason for optimism, since 58 % 
385 For priests' accounts of these protests see VL, 18 November 1901, pp. 2-3. 
386 VL, 30 April 1902, pp. 1-2. 
387  Ibid., p. 2. 
388  Ibid., p. 2. 
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(14,587) of the draftees evaded conscription 389 The Russian reaction, 
however, was effective. Officials participating in the resistance were 
dismissed. For example, the directors of the Finnish health administra-
tion were replaced with compliants for refusing to name physicians to 
the draft boards, and the members of the Court of Appeals were fired 
for cooperating with the resistance. Draft resisters were ordered to be 
called up directly for duty. Many conscription-age youths then con-
sidered it better to leave the country; the resistance press saw the 
considerable increase in emigration as a cowardly response. With the 
weakening of resistance only 32 % of the draftees joined the conscrip-
tion boycott in 1903, and in 1904 the number fell to 22 % 390 
Although participation in the boycott diminished in time, its success 
was considerable. Because of the boycott Finnish youths were not 
inducted into the Russian army and the Russian government finally 
abandoned its efforts to do so. Finns therefore did not, for example, 
have to fight in the Russo-Japanese war. It cannot be doubted that on 
this front the conscription boycott successfully stifled one of the major 
goals of Russification. 
Success, with its serious limitations, did not, however, go to the 
resisters' heads. Nor did they deem it necessary to cover up failures. 
From the early stages of the struggle on it was not at all unusual for 
the resisters to openly write of their perceptions of the weakening of 
resistance and the lethargy of the population. They harshly criticized 
Finns' cowardice and unwillingness to sacrifice their own comfort for 
the cause. They berated the meager results of resistance391 For 
example, the campaign against Russian stamps was seen as a failure: 
By November of 1900 it was observed that Russian stamps were now 
generally in use, and that apparently the stamp protest was considered 
too inconvenient by the Finns, who, "finally considering it best to 
submit," had now given up the campaign 392 
Another type of failure, from the resistance leadership's point of 
view, was the occasional riotous behavior of people in the streets 
against compliants and Russians. Such behavior was considered perni-
cious for the overall strategy of passive resistance and was duly con-
demned while, nevertheless, the Russians were blamed for fomenting 
389 Due to the capitulation of evaders under pressure the final figure was 45%. Reuter 
1928, p. 237; Parmanen 1936-1941, yol. 2, pp. 531-532. 
39° In the capital province of  Uusimaa in 1903, 42.5% of the draftees eyaded, and the 
corresponding figure for the province of Vaasa was 53.5%. Reuter 1930, p. 82;  
Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 2, pp. 466-467. 
39I FO/VS, 19 November 1900, p. 2. 
392 FO/VS, 19 November 1900, p. 2. 
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it.393 Again it should be pointed out that this was not an absolute 
condemnation of violence; but random violence was not seen as 
beneficial to the overall cause. Since systematic and broadly based 
armed struggle were not possible at the time, the resisters emphatically 
denounced the use of violence. Violent confrontations were, however, 
relatively rare during the Bobrikov period. Perhaps the most 
outstanding one was the so-called Cossack Riot of April 1902. This 
violent clash between cossacks and riotous anti-Russian and anti-
compliant demonstrators did not involve the use of firearms or result 
in any deaths. 
The main failure of passive resistance, aside from the numerous 
setbacks and tactical errors, lay, however, in the incapacity of the 
Constitutionalists to gain a sufficiently large active permanent mass 
following. As shown, the Constitutionalists were initially optimistic 
that the rank and file of the nation would stand firmly behind them. 
But already the anti-peddler campaign, commonly viewed as a success, 
helped reveal to some grounds for an even greater failure: At that 
time they realized that the rural laboring population could not be 
mobilized en masse simply through resistance agitation;394 
sociopolitical reform was needed first. 
The Shift to Deåkean Parliamentary Defiance 
By 1903 at the latest the writers of the resistance press openly 
recognized that the broad unity which they considered a precondition 
for resistance was not forthcoming. In fact, the pessimists among them 
considered Finnish national solidarity to be in a state of swift decay. 
The initial compliancy of the domestic government, the Senate, was 
seen to have given rise to ever expanding national moral degradation.395 
Indeed, 1903 gave rise to a whole series of articles characterized by a 
bitter loss of faith in the people, a recognition of the achievements of 
compliancy and Russification and a striking attitude of hopelessness 
and failure as resistance was paralyzed and key Constitutionalist leaders 
were banished with the implementation of Bobrikov's dictatorial 
393 FO/VS, 28 March 1901, pp. 3-4. 
394 FO/VS, 18 January 1901, p. 2.  
avs  VL, 7 April 1903, p. 3. 
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powers.396  By mid-1903, states an article summing up the general state 
of mind, 
complete disunity and general confusion arose throughout the whole 
land. Honored citizens were driven into exile. More peaceful citizens 
were taken to jail in irons. Bribed men were dispersed as informants 
throughout the whole country. Nowadays the most despicable citizens 
strut about as officials in many places. Complete depression has 
overcome the whole people, and the once brave youth has been driven 
off course 397 
The circumstances now required innovation in resistance. During the 
main period of the conscription boycott the doctrine and technique of 
passive resistance seem to have remained relatively fixed. A Fria Ord/  
Vapaita Sanoja article from late August 1901 taking a look at "The 
Future in the Light of the Last Years" exemplifies this fixity. The 
author declares that now there can be no doubt about it, Finland's 
ruler, the tsar, has declared war against her. He then briefly summarizes 
almost all that has been said about the nature of passive resistance 
such as that it is the only suitable means, it is a kind of warfare which 
is not merely defensive, and that besides "social boycott" it involves 
total noncooperation with the enemy. What is new here does not 
concern what passive resistance is or how it works but rather where 
it is aimed. This article represents a shift of focus from targets such as 
the migrant Russian merchants to the much more significant field of 
mass mobilization for resistance to Russian conscription.398 
Apparently during this time of fixity not even Arvid Neovius had 
anything new to offer on the theory of passive resistance. For example, 
in an article late in 1902 Neovius sums up the principles of passive 
resistance — that "tremendous weapon in the hands of the weak against 
material predominance" — in a way which suggests that it had become 
for him a fixed doctrine.399 The general fixity of passive resistance is 
further evinced by the National Congress of the Constitutionalist front 
held in Helsinki on 12 November 1902. One of the main collective 
decisions made at the Congress was to continue unwavering passive 
resistance against all unconstitutional measures, ceasing only with the 
restoration of Finland's legal order. Nothing new concerning the idea 
or practice of passive resistance was expressed and apparently the 
396 See for example VL,15 June, pp. 1-2,18 August, pp. 1-4, 8 October, p. 2, 28 October, 
pp. 1-3, 1903. 
397 VL, 15 June 1903, pp. 1-2. 
398 FO/VS, 24 August 1901, pp. 1-3. 
399 Neoyius 1902, p. 1. 
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congress did not give rise to any innovative thinking on the subject.400 
This problem is illustrated on the local level in a letter from the youth 
association leader and agrarian political organizer Santeri Alkio to  
Mauno Rosendal in September 1902. The Oulu-based revivalist leader 
Rosendal was an energetic grassroots resistance organizer who worked 
closely with Eero Erkko and other Finnish-minded resisters. Alkio  
responded positively to these men's idea of holding resistance meetings 
in southern Ostrobothnia; but, he emphasized, given the generally 
rather weak spirit of resistance there it would be good to know if any 
new applicable concrete forms of action have been devised.401  
The lack of theoretical and practical innovation for struggle along 
with the moral depression among the resisters could be seen as 
indication of the final failure of passive resistance. But such a simple 
view would, at least partially, be mistaken. Certainly resistance did 
reach a low-point, especially during the course of 1903 until late 1904. 
After that, however, new conditions advantageous to Constitutionalist 
success arose. The focus and tactics of struggle shifted. In the latter 
part of 1903, with the increasing failure of the conscription boycott, 
the dictatorial implementation of Russification and the other events 
which contributed to their discouragement, the resisters began to seek 
new ways to rejuvenate and develop passive resistance. It was at this 
time that the resisters began to focus on the implications of the 
opposition and revolutionary movement in Russia and significant 
contacts with the Liberationists were made. At this time Homén, for 
example, suggested that there should be a shift of emphasis from the 
struggle for justice, which was not well understood, to the popular 
struggle for freedom.402 Similarly the resisters increasingly realized the 
necessity of democratic reform and collaboration with working people. 
The discussions at the Boden conference in March 1904 show that 
already at that time plans were being made to focus resistance on 
taking over the Diet. On 16 June 1904 Bobrikov, the chief executor 
of Russification in Finland, was shot. Some weeks later, on 28 July, 
the Socialist Revolutionaries murdered Russia's Minister of the Interior 
von Plehwe. Thus within a brief time-span insurgent Finland's two 
400 "Kansalaiskokous: 12/11 1902," VL, 29 November 1902, p. 1; this point is exemplified 
by Mechelin's speech for the Congress and by a leaflet discussing the decision made 
by the Congress to continue passive resistance and defend the fixed model of it; see 
Mechelin 1902, and Perustuslaille uskolliselta kannalta 1903; one year later twenty 
exiled resistance actiyists expressed the same fixed idea in a collective letter "To 
Those at Home"; see Kotona oleville,  November 1903. 
401 Alkio to Rosendal, 24 September 1902. 
402 Homén to Mannerheim, 5 June 1901 
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main Russian enemies were eliminated. The timing of these assassina-
tions was excellent for the Finns. The crisis in the Far East and internal 
unrest led the Russians to ease up on Finland. Under the new governor-
general, Prince I.M. Obolensky, the Finnish Diet was soon allowed to 
re-convene and the exiles elected to it were allowed to return home. 
The elections provided the Constitutionalist front a chance to surface 
from the underground of passive resistance, and shift the struggle into 
a legitimate institutional framework. This new tactic is clearly 
articulated in an article from September of 1904, by the well-known 
statesman and resistance writer Lennart Gripenberg, re-evaluating in 
detail the significance of the Hungarian resistance in light of current 
events 403 Gripenberg now envisions the possibility for the Finns to 
use the Diet, like their Hungarian forerunners, to spearhead the 
national struggle. He points out that while the Finns have all but given 
up after several years of struggle, the Hungarians carried on passive 
resistance for thirteen years before attaining victory. Gripenberg's 
innovation here was to try to persuade the Finns to broaden their 
perspective to that of possible long-term institutional-level passive 
resistance. 
Gripenberg's vision was indeed implemented: After a landslide 
electoral victory the Constitutionalists prepared for Deåkean insurgen-
cy as the Estates were set to convene on 6 December. In the Noble 
Estate probably no more than ten of the 203 members could be 
classified as compliants;404 in the Estate of the clergy it was a tie, with 
the Old Finns and the Constitutionalists receiving twenty-four seats 
each; in the Burgher Estate the Constitutionalists received sixty-seven 
seats, the socialists — in alliance with the resistance front — three, and 
the Old Finns three; finally, even in the Peasant Estate, known as a 
bastion of Old Finn 
p
ower, the Constitutionalists triumphed, thirty-
seven to twenty-five. '5 The resistance organization Kagal played a 
central part in the election campaign with the result that many of its 
leaders and active members passed directly from this underground 
organization into the Diet. 
The Russian regime was taken aback by the Constitutionalists' 
4°3  Gripenberg 1904, pp. 1-5; Gripenberg relies almost entirely on Jalava for his 
information on the Hungarian case. 
404 Tuominen 1964, p. 142. Representatives to the Noble Estate were not elected. Each 
noble family had the privilege of sending a representative to the Diet. Blomstedt 
writes that thirty of the Noble representatives were of the compliant faction;  
Blomstedt 1969, p. 171. 405  Ibid., p. 142. It should be remembered here that to be an Old Finn was not necessarily 
synonymous with being a compliant. 
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election victory, for it was believed that the resistance front had been 
dissipated. The return of the banished resistance leaders and other 
refugees throughout December 1904 and January 1905 met with 
popular enthusiasm, brilliant celebrations and mass demonstrations of 
support 406 
In the spirit of the well-known Hungarian resistance Parliament of 
1861, with its two defiant addresses to the crown drafted by Deåk, the 
Finnish Estates refused to proceed with Diet business without first 
laying down the terms for Finno-Russian relations. The core demand 
of the Estates' Great Petition, as mentioned earlier, was the restoration 
of the legal order through the rescission of all of what the Finns 
considered to be the illegally implemented acts and decrees of the 
Bobrikov administration. '7 This meant that, among other things, the 
draft according to the Conscription Act of 1901 had to be terminated, 
the governor-general's dictatorial powers had to be revoked and the 
February Manifesto had to be nullified. Moreover, it was made clear 
that Finland had to be purged of all the ill effects of Russification, 
necessitating a "sweeping transformation of the regime."408 The 
Petition made it clear that unless this was done, and unless Russian 
efforts to "suppress and destroy Finnish national existence" ceased, 
resistance would continue and "even worse and more grievous 
confrontations" would inevitably occur.4°9  
At the beginning of the Diet term the tsar made it clear that he 
intended to leave the February Manifesto, and the acts and decrees 
which followed it, in full force. Nevertheless, following the Great 
Petition he compromised by revoking the Conscription Act on 29 
March 1905. 
Directly after the close of the Diet term on 17 April 1905, a forty-
man delegation, with members from each Estate, was formed to 
monitor events. Furthermore, this Diet delegation, with over half its 
members coming directly from Kagal, to a great extent superceded the 
resistance organization. 1° 
The 1904 elections provided an avenue for the best organized and 
4°6  Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 3, pp. 363-378, 389-390. 4°7  Parmanen, whose book includes the whole Petition, notes that although the Petition 
as issued was "yery radical and to the point." and a "severe indictment" its original 
wording was toned down in order to attain Diet unity through support from among 
the Old Finns; ibid., p. 393, 411. 408  Ibid., pp. 403,406; as an appendix to the Petition the Estates compiled a detailed 
list of all the acts, decrees and related directives which they demanded be repealed. 
419  Ibid. pp. 394-397. 
410 Reuter 1930, pp. 345-346. 
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most broadly based political force of Estate Finland into the existing 
legitimate political machinery. It was the achievements of the resistance 
organization combined with the election victory which, in the context 
of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Finnish Great Strike, put 
the Constitutionalists in a position to take over the Senate (December 
1905), i.e. the domestic government, from the discredited Old Finns. 
The Great Strike: Labor takes the Initiative 
Already in early 1905 the rank and file began to challenge the legitimacy 
of the Constitutionalist Diet and its leadership of the struggle against 
Russia. At that time massive demonstrations, with up to 35,000 
participants, were held in favor of universal suffrage. Popular 
discontent was heightened when it became clear that the Diet would 
not solve the issue before the end of its current term. It was widely 
recognized at that time, as R.A. Wrede pointed out in 1913, that the 
fundamental democratization of Finnish representative institutions was 
inevitable. This was acknowledged by the Constitutionalists not just 
because of building socialist pressure, but because they knew that 
future national unity against Russia necessitated sweeping electoral 
reform.41  Nevertheless, preoccupation with the "restoration of the 
legal order" combined no doubt with the unwillingness of men like 
Wrede to initiate the necessary changes too quickly (which could 
undermine their own power) kept the Diet from resolving the suffrage 
question. It was probably at this point that the Constitutionalists lost 
their final chance to lead a truly broad-based national coalition. 
In the last half of October 1905 revolutionary activity in Russia 
culminated in what has been seen as the most extensive and effective 
general strike in history. Paralysed by the strike, the tsarist regime was 
forced to capitulate. During the course of the Russian strike the Finnish 
Constitutionalist statesmen began maneuvering in St. Petersburg to 
achieve their demands. Given such favorable circumstances they did 
not desire to initiate a general strike in Finland. But now Finnish 
organized labor took the initiative. On 30 October, the day the strike 
ended in Russia, workers shut down Finland's railway system. Soon 
the whole nation, including the Constitutionalists, joined what soon 
411 Wrede 1913, p. 25. 
17 Studia Historica 38 
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became known as the Great Strike against Russian autocracy.412 In 
Finland too the general strike overwhelmed the Russian administra-
tion, isolating and paralysing it. The police were disarmed and some 
joined the strike while others were ousted from the force. Members 
of the Russian gendarme fled, as did many other people from the 
Bobrikov administration. With the railways closed, the Russian military 
garrisons were isolated from one another. A Finnish national Civil 
Guard was formed to maintain law and order. 
At its outset the Great Strike was characterized by extensive 
solidarity; labor and management, bourgeois and proletarian, stood 
together against Russian oppression. The Constitutionalists and the 
Social Democrats arrived at a common platform. Their demands, as 
expressed in the Constitutionalist convention's manifesto (which 
promised that the present "liberation movement" would not cease until 
they were all fulfilled) were: that the present governor-general resign 
immediately; that the "prevailing dictatorial regime of violence, 
including all illegal ordinances, be abolished immediately" and all 
illegally installed Russian officials be expelled; that the higher and 
lower administration of Finland be purged and re-manned by 
trustworthy citizens; that the country henceforth be administered by 
a parliament elected through universal and equal suffrage; that the 
first task of the new parliament be the implementation of a new form 
of government, subordinating the higher administration to parliament 
and securing the basic freedoms and personal inviolability of citizens.413  
These requirements were in essence the same as those of the Great 
Petition with the added demand for the implementation of universal 
suffrage and parliamentary reform. 
In spite of initial solidarity, however, serious civil strife emerged 
before the strike was called off on 6 November. A significant faction 
of socialists wanted to immediately dispense with the old Diet, calling, 
in their Red Declaration, for a revolutionary national constituent 
assembly to be elected by universal suffrage. Moreover, the national 
Civil Guard soon became divided by differences between the Red 
Guard and the rest of the Guard. As the strike drew to a close the 
two factions were on the verge of armed confrontation. 
In the face of socialist insurgency, and with the Old Finns reduced 
to political insignificance, the Russian regime turned to the Constitu- 
412 For what still remains the most detailed account of the Great Strike, see Roos 1906, 
passim; see also: Jussila 1979, pp. 65-86; Parmanen 1936-1941, vol. 4, passim;  
Soikkanen 1960, pp. 171-190. 
413  Perustuslaillisten vaatimukset 1905. 
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tionalists, whose demands were implemented. By the tsar's proclama-
tion of 4 November, known as the November Manifesto, the February 
Manifesto and related decrees were revoked. The Constitutionalists, 
with Mechelin at their head, took over the domestic government. The 
passive resistance leadership, strongly represented in the new Senate, 
then set about dismantling the Bobrikov regime. Moreover, the 
Mechelin Senate, drafted a Parliament Act and an election law, passed 
by Diet on 29 May 1906 and confirmed by the tsar on 20 July 1906, 
thus abolishing the fundamental political organ and relic of the old 
status society, the Diet of four Estates. 
With the Constitutionalist successes of 1904 and 1905, Kagal and 
the resistance press, and in general the underground resistance 
movement associated with them, became defunct. They were not 
resurrected in 1908 when a new Russification campaign was initiated 414 
One of primary reasons why the organization of resistance was not 
revived and no innovative works on passive resistance were written 
was that the political situation had changed completely by 1908. The 
Constitutionalist front was an amorphous constellation of interests held 
together by the will to oppose Russification. The front was not a 
political party and with the victory of 1905 its components naturally 
set off to pursue their own goals. 
Now, with the tenfold increase in voters following the implementa-
tion of universal suffrage, the Constitutionalist front was defunct and 
scattered and the Social Democrats, with strong support among the 
rural workers, became a major political force. The parliamentary 
elections of 15-16 March 1907 gave the Young Finns twenty-six seats, 
the Swedish Party twenty-four, the Agrarian Union nine, the Old Finns, 
who after their recent failures had adopted a platform of radical reform, 
fifty-nine, the Christian Workers' Party two and the Social Democrats 
eighty. The enigmatic rank and file, which had hitherto been confined 
to the political muzzle of sub-Estate society, had now spoken its mind. 
With the political configuration of Finland thus changed it is 
understandable why passive resistance, as conceived of before 1904, 
could not be implemented in response to the Russification which was 
gradually re-initiated after 1908. Already by 1903 the Constitutionalists 
realized that they were not going be able to harness the majority of 
the masses to their cause. The Great Strike only confirmed that urban 
workers were not to be organized en masse under the banner of 
Constitutionalist passive resistance. It may very well be that in the 
414  Ibid., pp. 345, 371, 374. 
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situation following 1905 there was no solid social foundation for 
bourgeois-led passive resistance and the cross-class solidarity it would 
necessitate. At least the upper strata, whose position of political 
dominance was significantly weakened, could no longer harbor the 
illusions it once had concerning the rank and file. 
But there is a further reason why the Finnish political factions were 
not willing to commence mass nonmilitary, or even armed, struggle 
against the Russians before 1914: During this so-called second period 
of oppression Russification was never really very efficient. In fact in 
the very significant sphere of economic matters, as the conservative 
banker-politician Paasikivi affirmed, the Finnish elite was very free 415 
There is no doubt that certain groups were satisfied with the block 
which Russian power set up against the legal efforts of the Social 
Democrat's bid for power, leaving them room for economic and cultural 
domination in Finland. Anthony F. Upton's explanation makes it clear 
why mass resistance was not revived at this time: 
The cutting edge of Russian oppression affected too narrow a section 
of society.... On the whole, the Russian presence was restrained.... The 
bourgeoisie would continue to shout about oppression, just as the 
socialists shouted about revolution, but neither was really going to 
sacrifice present amenities for a problematic future. The truth was that 
Finland was prospering in 1914: The industrial revolution was gathering 
speed.... Misery and poverty and stark social injustice did exist.... But 
Finland in 1914 was a stable society; the Russian imperial presence, 
though an irritant in some ways, was the ultimate guarantee of the 
stability and prosperity.416 
The passive resistance tradition was by no means entirely neglected 
during the so-called second era of oppression. For example, in 1910 
the Finnish Parliament refused to select representatives for the Russian 
Duma and Imperial Council, and was therefore dispersed by the 
Russian regime.417 But Constitutionalist insurgency through organized 
militant passive resistance was not revived at that time. In fact very 
soon after 1905 commentators, as reflected in writings well into the 
inter-war years, came to see the era of passive resistance as a clearly 
415  Paasikivi 1957b, pp. 190-191. 
416 Upton 1980, p. 15. For a study in English of the Russian administration of Finland 
from 1905-1917 see Luntinen 1985. 
417  Blomstedt 1969, p. 287. 
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defined period which had come to an end by 1905 418 Organized passive 
resistance was, however, actually revived and effectively implemented 
during the Civil War in 1918. Nevertheless, in this war, unlike during 
the Bobrikov period, passive resistance was not the main strategy, but 
was distinctly subordinate to armed struggle. 
Nonmilitary Resistance in the Civil War 
Post-1914 economic and sociopolitical crises left Finland in a highly 
unstable position with the collapse of Russian absolutism in the 
February Revolution of 1917. The massive socialist-engineered 
national general strike of 14-17 November 1917, including organized 
violence and extremist terrorism, completed the polarization of Finnish 
society. Upton concludes that the only way out of the political deadlock 
thus produced was civil war or foreign intervention 419  Indeed, only 
several months after the Bolshevik take-over in Russia in October 
1917 a destructive civil war broke out among the Finns. 
The war divided Finland between two Finnish forces, called the 
Whites and the Reds. Both launched their respective offensives on 28 
January 1918, a date which, to be sure, was preceded by significant 
violent confrontation. The Whites began what they conceived of as a 
"war of liberation" with an attack to disarm the Russian troops in 
southern Ostrobothnia.42° Soon, however, their military efforts were 
to be occupied in combating the Finnish Reds. The Finnish Red attack 
began with what is variously called a rebellion, a socialist revolution 
or a coup d'etat in Helsinki. The extremist socialists, who had gained 
sway with the breakdown of relations between the Social Democrats 
and the bourgeois parties, initiated action which led to the relatively 
easy Finnish Red take-over of southern Finland. This area contained 
about half the Finnish population and the country's most significant 
political, cultural and industrial centers, including the country's capital. 
The passive resistance tradition was revived when, in the wake of 
418 Two very early examples of this conception are Homén 1906 (entitled "Our Passive 
Resistance: Political Writings 1899-1904." The chronological list of events therein 
ends with the murder of Bobrikov in June 1904) and Danielson-Kalman 1907. Both 
Reuter 1928, 1930 and Parmanen 1936-1941 clearly adhere to this periodization. 
419  Ibid., p. 166. 
420 At the outset of the war there were about 40,000 Russian troops in Finland. They 
were, however, highly ill-equipped, demoralized and disorganized. Moreover, only 
a minority of them were Bolsheviks. After January 1918 their numbers decreased 
as they returned to Russia. 
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the Bolshevik Revolution, fears of a Red coup began to grow. Broad 
umbrella organizations of agricultural producers (Maataloustuottajain 
Keskusliitto) and civil servants (Virkamiesyhdistysten Keskusliitto) were 
formed to, among other things, carry out systematic noncooperation 
in case of a coup. Thus when the Red takeover did occur the Central 
Federation of Civil Servant Associations was ready to immediately 
issue a directive calling for passive resistance to the usurpers in all 
sectors and on all levels of government 421 It is not surprising that the 
directive was signed by a former Kagal organizer and staunch resister 
from the Bobrikov period, Per Evind Svinhuvud, now the political 
leader of White Finland, and later president of the Republic of Finland. 
Faced with the challenge of socialist revolution the traditional 
technique of passive resistance was implemented both spontaneously 
and with pre-planning. An underground news-sheet in Finnish and 
Swedish, called Vapaa Sanaa/Fria Ord after its Bobrikov era predeces-
sor, was even founded. Much of the machinery of state, and many 
other sectors of society, were paralysed, or at least obstructed, by the 
noncooperation movement which had the financial backing of an 
association of Finland's most influential economic power holders.422 
In 1917-1918, in strong contrast to the Bobrikov period, passive 
resistance was not conceived of as the main strategy for defeating the 
Finnish Reds or for the "war of liberation" against Russia. No tracts 
were produced on the nature of passive resistance and the underground 
press, unlike before 1905, was only minimally concerned with it as a 
subject in itself. Passive resistance was now a mere technique whose 
principles were taken for granted and was in need of little ideological 
justification and innovation. 
From 1899 to 1905 Finnish resistance thinkers vocally emphasized 
that organized armed violence is not the ultima ratio in extreme 
confrontations. To support this claim they cited the Hungarian example 
which Finns had been using as a model already for decades. This does 
not mean that they claimed that nonmilitary means were ultimately 
superior to military ones, but rather that the reverse is not always true. 
In contrast, the potential applicability of passive resistance as the main 
form of battle was not a prominent topic of discussion during the Civil 
War. 
421 Soikkanen 1969, p. 75. 
422 The most detailed account of the civilian resistance to the Red take-oyer in English 
is Upton 1980, Chapter 13; the subject is given distinct treatment in Piilonen 1982, 
pp. 114-119. 
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The reason for this is not as obvious as it may seem. Initially there 
were many on both sides for whom violent civil war did not appear 
to be the inevitable course of action. Moreover, both sides had a strong 
social foundation for nonmilitary struggle. The socialists had already 
proved, through their massive strikes, that they could wield great 
nonmilitary power. The Whites too, as demonstrated by their passive 
resistance movement after the coup, had significant potential for 
exercising nonmilitary power. Moreover, it is not at all clear that 
military action on the scale of a "war of liberation" turned against 
one's own countrymen was the only solution for ridding Finland of 
the already disintegrating Russian forces. Technically speaking, the 
Whites could have, to cite only one possibility, adopted nonmilitary 
warfare against the Reds, who were obviously incompetent in taking 
over the administration of the nation, and carried out limited military 
excursions against the Russians where necessary. Of course, following 
this scenario, in significant sectors where the socialists did hold sway 
the Whites would have been forced to negotiate and to recognize the 
legitimate interests of the workers' movement, which had hitherto been 
repressed with the support of the Russian regime. 
To explore the role nonmilitary struggle could have taken in the 
Civil War is, of course, mere speculation. The usefulness of such 
speculation, however, is that it helps display the balance of power 
between, and the motives of, the two opposing groups. Nonmilitary 
struggle alone would have left both parties in defensive positions they 
were unable to accept, perhaps resulting in deadlock or a nonmilitary 
war of attrition. Significant groups among the Whites and Reds had 
long been on the offensive and came to hold that the power struggle 
necessitated violence. Both created military forces through which they 
contended for dominance and both believed in the centrality of military 
force for political power. 
The Red-White military engagement proceeded indecisively until 
April 1918 when Red control over the industrial center Tampere was 
overthrown and Germany entered the war on the side of the Whites. 
16 May marks the final defeat of the Reds by the combined German 
and White Finn offensive. The Whites then carried out harsh, often 
arbitrary and illegal, repression, including executions, prison camp 
deaths, police control and purges, which reduced the power of the left, 
not only in quantity but in quality, to a fraction of what it had become 
in the preceding years. 
Reflection on the status of nonmilitary struggle in the Civil War also 
helps underscore just how different passive resistance was during the 
Bobrikov era. Before 1905 passive resistance was not a mere technique, 
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but also a grand vision and strategy for struggle against Russia and 
for the defense of assertive constitutionalism as well as for the 
nationalist mobilization of the Finnish people and the destruction of 
old patterns of obedience. 
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V. Passive Resistance and 
Nonmilitary Struggle 
In this study the Finnish struggle against Russification has been 
examined as a case of European passive resistance, constitutionalist 
insurgency and nonmilitary contention and, in a restricted sense, war-
fare. Consequently, in addition to seeking to determine and portray 
the particulars of Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency, this work was 
geared to generating a variety of general observations concerning the 
conceptualization, historical study and empirical nature of nonmilitary 
struggle. Instead of simply recapitulating the main points of the work, 
which were outlined in the Preface and elucidated in the appropriate 
sections, one outstanding generalization will be used here as a point 
of departure for elaborating upon what an understanding of the Finnish 
case has to offer for the comprehension of nonmilitary struggle in 
general. The generalization is as follows: Around the turn of the 
twentieth century, the Finnish Constitutionalists developed one of the 
most ideologically and technically sophisticated and successful versions 
of European passive resistance and nonmilitary struggle. 
The method used here for substantiating, and exploring the implica-
tions of, this assertion is to inquire into how the Finnish case meets 
the criteria employed by researchers to judge the feasibility of "non-
violent" nonmilitary or social defense. The criteria, which represent 
the state of thinking on the subject, were critically compiled and con-
cisely formulated by Alex P. Schmid in his examination of social defense 
and Soviet domination published in 1985. Schmid makes sure to point 
out that, due to the lack of theoretical consensus in the field, the 
conditions for social defense which he lists "serve more as an analytical 
touchstone to discuss pertinent themes than as formal yardsticks."1  
Such an analytical tool is very useful, despite its limits, for estimating 
1  Schmid 1985, pp. 30, 371-372, 401; Schmid, however, fails to note that this is 
doubtlessly a general problem in the formulation of the criteria for analyzing 
collective action. Similarly, many of the noted conditions and limitations of social 
defense are common to other forms of action, such as armed struggle. 
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the comparative status of a case without having to cite details from 
other cases. Of course such a list excludes many significant themes 
regarding resistance and contention, and the reader is asked to turn 
to the appropriate sections of this study for discussion of them. 
Likewise, the material used in examining the following points is drawn 
from the preceding chapters, where it is naturally dealt with in greater 
detail and within a broader context.2 
1. 	There must be a social carrier who is acquainted with the basic principles 
of nonviolent resistance and is prepared to apply them. Whether his 
resistance is nonviolent out of principle or out of pragmatic 
considerations (absence of weapons, imbalance of armed force, etc.) is 
less important than discipline, training, preparation and organization. 
What Europeans called "passive resistance" was a secular way of 
struggle, the principles and techniques of which became known 
throughout Europe at the time of the Revolution of 1848. It is not to 
be identified with pacifist or Christian "resist not evil" types of 
opposition, as is proved by contrasting Finnish Constitutionalist and 
Tolstoyan resistance with one another. As Snellman pointed out in 
1861, educated readers had access to plenty of information on how 
this form of struggle was used throughout Europe. During the Finno-
Russian constitutional conflict of 1899-1905 the Finnish resistance 
tradition was redefined and radicalized. Passive resistance came to 
include a variety of means ranging from the Legal Battle tactics of 
juridical argumentation and the mobilization of European opinion to 
mass organization for "a new way of waging warfare," including the 
systematic noncooperation with, disobedience to and nonrecognition 
of all things Russian. Passive resistance was not understood merely as 
defense, but also as a kind of nonmilitary guerilla warfare carried out 
with discerning offensive tactics. Although Finnish resistance was 
highly organized, there was no training comparable to the type used 
in preparation for mass military struggle and the use of an army-like 
model of organization for civilian passive resistance was not advocated. 
The Finnish case perhaps indicates that the pre-crisis organization of 
society was of more fundamental importance than immediate "train-
ing." 
The distinction which many researchers make between principled 
and pragmatic passive or "nonviolent" resistance is inapplicable to the 
Finnish and doubtlessly many other cases of such struggle. The evolu-
tion of European constitutionalism involved the complex interaction 
2 The following indented ten points are quoted from ibid., pp. 27-29. 
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of concrete conditions and political ideals. Likewise, Finnish passive 
resistance cannot without misconception be analyzed merely as 
technique, since Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency was inseparably 
both a way of acting and a way of thinking. Thus highly principled 
Constitutionalist argumentation had highly practical intentions and 
consequences. For example, one of the most curious aspects of 1899-
1905 era in Finland was the early-modern form of discourse on 
resistance and rebellion. In their struggle against Russia, the Finnish 
Constitutionalists invoked neither the acts nor the ideologies of the 
American and French Revolutions. It is well known that the French 
revolutionaries drew very little directly from the American precedent, 
but that both Revolutions drew upon a common revolutionary heritage. 
The Finns too drew upon the common European heritage of 
constitutionalist resistance in their own unique way. Well before the 
Bobrikov era Finnish political leaders had internalized the current 
European political morality of the struggle for Justice and the duty of 
rebellion. For them the preeminent precedent was the Hungarian 
struggle as led by Ferenc Deåk. But when the Constitutionalists set 
out to propagate their doctrine of struggle they found themselves faced 
with the entrenched cosmology of evangelical Lutheran Finland. They 
thus had to go back to the roots of the European constitutionalist 
insurgency tradition in order to overcome the deep-set patterns of 
absolute Lutheran obedience to authority. 
Thus the deliberate avoidance of violence required by Finnish passive 
resistance cannot be classified exclusively as either a matter of principle 
or of pragmatism. If, however, by "principled nonviolence" is meant 
the absolute renunciation of violence, then the Finnish resisters did 
not adhere to it. But this distinction would be misleading, since the 
Finns' development of a technique of struggle excluding violence was 
inextricably intertwined with their constitutionalist principles. Never-
theless, the constitutionalist principle of avoiding violence does not 
exclude the principled use of violence in certain circumstances. Accord-
ingly the choice of means involves the interaction of principle and 
practical considerations. 
The Finnish resisters knew that to use military struggle against 
Russification would be counterproductive; they often emphasized the 
practical necessity of passive resistance. Nevertheless, they were 
seriously, and with great care, exploring how armed struggle might in 
changing circumstances be fruitfully applied. Likewise, the Russian 
regime did not consider it suitable to implement Russification through 
direct armed force, but the possible use of such force was never 
excluded and the military threat was ever present. Thus both Finnish 
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passive resistance and Russification can be seen as practical alternatives 
to the application of armed and military warfare against nonmilitary 
struggle and warfare. From this, however, it does not follow that either 
of these two forms of contention can been seen as "functional 
equivalents" to warfare for use against all-out military warfare, and 
neither side really saw them as such. 
It is indeed true that Finnish political thinkers and activists such as  
Snellman and Neovius emphatically argued against the age-old maxim 
that armed violent struggle is the ultima ratio and the most essential 
component or tool of political and state power. Moreover, both were 
able to muster significant evidence in support of their claims. Neverthe-
less, paradoxically enough neither of these men ever completely denied 
the belief that the military and other institutions of organized violence 
ultimately play a vital role in the maintenance of national existence. 
Both in fact, each in their own time, were in the forefront of those 
who fought for autonomous Finnish military institutions. Although the 
Finno-Russian conflict was primarily nonmilitary, the control of 
military institutions was always a central bone of contention. One of 
the primary ways Russification aimed at uprooting the pernicious idea 
of a Finnish state was to disintegrate the Finnish military and integrate 
Finns into the Russian army. Following their victory in 1905 the 
Constitutionalists immediately began investigating how the Finnish 
army might be reestablished, and they set about purging the forces of 
law and order of Bobrikovian and compliant elements. Moreover, 
Constitutionalists began to consider how armed and military force 
could be used against radical socialists. In the war against the Reds in 
1918 the pragmatic renunciation of violence through the use of passive 
resistance as the main strategy was not even seriously advocated. 
These considerations no doubt bolster the interpretation that the 
implementation of passive resistance from 1899 to 1904 was a matter 
of  Realpolitik. It seems then that only from a position of weakness 
did ruling-class Finns ever speak about the dispensability of organized 
violence for the control of state power and the defense of the nation. 
2. The social unit to be defended must have a certain independence with 
regard to resources and skills necessary for a defense effort. 
Chapter III. shows how Finland met this requirement to a remarkable 
degree. 
3. The social unit to be defended must have, and be able to maintain, an 
adequate ability to communicate within its own ranks (3.1), with third 
parties (3.2) and with the social basis of the attacker. 
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Like social defense theoreticians, the Finnish resisters strongly empha-
sized communication. The underground resistance press was certainly 
one of the most essential components of passive resistance. Likewise, 
a serious well-organized effort was made to carry out propaganda 
abroad and to mobilize European opinion. Although consensus con-
cerning what constitutes success is difficult to achieve, it is undeniable 
that, comparatively speaking, the Finns were highly successful in these 
endeavors. Sub-point 3.2. was not one of the resisters' goals if it is 
taken to refer to the Russian population at large. Nevertheless, the 
Constitutionalists had behind them a long tradition of propagating 
their ideas and seeking support among educated and influential Rus-
sians. This no doubt facilitated their rise to power in 1905 and contri-
buted to Russian disunity concerning imperial policies. 
4. 	A tradition of free democratic activity with spread political power and 
an informed and politically conscious population will add to the general 
will and ability to offer resistance. 
This is a condition which was certainly considered necessary 
(increasingly so as the struggle proceeded) among the Consti-
tutionalists, although the scope of what was meant by democratic 
activity was restricted by their membership in the upper class of the 
decaying status society. Zealous popular enlightenment, including the 
cultivation of mass national-political consciousness, was seen as 
fundamental to passive resistance. Intuitively this view seems quite 
plausible and the manifest attitudes of certain working-class groups 
indicate that it was a necessary condition. But, as the example of the 
highly educated and nationalistic compliant leaders indicates, advanced 
political consciousness may result in the will not to resist and thus 
significantly decrease the ability of insurgent action. Therefore social 
defense theorists must take into consideration the possibility that even 
in advanced societies, enjoying widespread political consciousness and 
consensus and other favorable conditions for resistance, significant 
groups may for a whole variety of motives opt for collaboration and 
submission. 
Thus while point 4. may be a necessary condition for social defense, 
it is not sufficient. Moreover, although the structure of Finland's 
administration and society in general was seen by Russians and Finns 
alike as a power-base of resistance, it is not at all clear what this might 
imply concerning the relationship of "nonviolent" or social defense 
and democracy. Moreover, "democratic activity" and "political con-
sciousness" may in some cases be mutually exclusive. Thus this study 
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of the Finnish case and European passive resistance indicates that 
researchers should pay more attention to the role of domination in 
past cases and what this implies for social defense theorizing. It is 
conceivable that even under a constitutional government with formal 
distribution of power and a relatively high degree of municipal 
administrative autonomy it might be more effective according to the 
interests of actors involved to implement some kind of elite-led and 
even authoritarian "nonviolent" struggle. As discussed in chapter I., 
the history of the manipulation of "people power" and opinion under 
constitutional democratic, as well as communistic, types of government 
shows only too clearly how possible this is. 
5. The social unit to be defended has to have (had) a political system 
whose perceived legitimacy is greater to the majority of the population 
than the one imported by the attacker. 
In regard to the upper strata of Finnish society, including the compli-
ants, this condition was completely fulfilled. This was probably also 
true for the majority of the population, although in a weaker sense. 
As with point 4., the compliants' line shows that the fulfillment of this 
condition does not necessarily give rise to the will or ability to resist; 
in fact it can even be used to justify submission. 
The question of legitimacy was a central theme in the Finno-Russian 
conflict. The Constitutionalists put a great deal of effort into doing 
propaganda concerning the superiority of the Finnish political system, 
promising that reforms could be initiated if only the constitutional 
order was restored. For their part, the Russians perceived the Finnish 
upper strata's political legitimacy crisis in relation to the rank and file; 
they sought to further discredit the Constitutionalists and to convert, 
with little success, urban and rural laborers to the Russian cause. The 
Constitutionalist front took this threat very seriously, as witnessed by 
their campaign against the Russian peddlers. A major weakness of the 
elite-led resistance cause was the growing awareness among the rank 
and file that Constitutionalist propaganda concerning the righteousness 
of the Finnish law and social order was not credible. 
6. The social unit to be defended must be able to maintain (or obtain) a 
high degree of social cohesion in relation to the attacker. 
The initial broad unity in protest achieved by the Finns was dissipated 
as Russification continued and the rifts underlying Finnish society 
became pronounced. Nevertheless, in spite of serious social strife the 
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Constitutionalist front was able to achieve the cohesion necessary to 
attain significant success. 
7. A situation of dependence of the attacker on the defending social unit 
must (be made) exist. Where such an economic, political-administrative 
or social-dependence is lacking, such a dependence must at least exist 
with an ally on whom the social defence unit can count. 
The crisis triggered by Bobrikov's confrontation with assertive Finnish 
constitutionalism and state-making was preceded by a long period of 
relatively peaceful Finno-Russian relations within the context of 
Russian domination. Thus although the Finns and the Russians (and 
the various sub-groups involved) found serious faults in the relation-
ship, neither initially wanted to introduce chaos into it through armed 
political violence. It was not the immediate goal of Russification to 
physically destroy Finnish society, but rather to "nonviolently" 
integrate it more thoroughly into Russia and make sure it remained 
an effective territorial buffer. This is probably why it was not in Russia's 
interest at this point to wage severe economic warfare against Finland. 
Thus in the implementation of its concrete integration goals the Russian 
regime was dependent first of all on Finland's upper strata, which 
controlled the political and cultural administration of the country, and 
secondly on the broader population. Herein lay the power of the 
Constitutionalist front. Finnish resisters did, however, clearly realize 
the limits of their power and came to see that the success of their 
struggle was dependent on the broader process of opposition and 
rebellion in the Empire; this process was the passive resisters' essential 
ally. 
8. The social unit to be defended must have (or create) opportunities for 
interactions (also informal ones) with the adversary on the level of 
individuals. 
Finnish passive resistance did not include the tactic of fraternizing with 
enemy Russians. On the contrary, resistance propagandists advocated 
the extreme social boycott of them and their Finnish collaborators. 
Informal interactions probably did exist, but it is difficult to judge their 
repercussions because they were not an explicit form of resistance. If, 
however, "interaction" is taken to signify the effort to persuade the 
adversary through arguments of the rightness of their cause, then the 
resisters took every opportunity to try to do so. Nevertheless, it was 
the compliants who believed in personal interaction with the advocates 
of Russification. This was an approach which the resisters came to 
believe was futile. 
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9. The defending social unit must have some legitimate status in either 
public opinion (9.1), with foreign governments (9.2) or with the attacker 
(9.3). 
Finnish political thought from the first half of the nineteenth century 
on strongly emphasized the necessity of the international recognition 
of Finland's nationhood and, later, its distinct political or state-like 
existence. Such recognition, understood as based on the country's level 
of civilization, was seen to be more essential for national survival than 
the organization of armed force. The ideologists of Finnish nation and 
state building sought to achieve de jure legitimacy for their de facto 
achievements. In response to the Russian challenge to their political 
assertion Finns became adept at doing national propaganda in those 
European nations whose recognition was deemed most advantageous. 
Thus with the initiation of Russification in 1899 Finnish political 
activists already had a strong foundation for the mobilization of both 
domestic and international opinion. Finland was understood to have 
suffered a coup d'etat at the hands of Bobrikov. Even if the exact 
nature of Finnish statehood remained controversial the Finns' right to 
a distinct, constitutionally defined and guaranteed, political existence 
received broad support among educated Europeans. The struggle for 
recognized legitimacy was one of the fundamental elements of passive 
resistance. As for the Finns' adversary, the Russian regime, its goal 
was to reduce the Finns' de facto degree of statehood, an effort which 
involved the vigorous denial of Constitutionalist claims concerning 
Finland's de jure status. 
10. The chief adversary of the nonviolent resistance — or at least those in 
his surroundings capable of influencing him — must be rational and not 
permanently fanatical or crazy. 
In the specific sense of "rationality" used here (but certainly not by 
Finnish Constitutionalist standards) Bobrikov and Tsar Nicholas II 
were rational in the implementation of their imperial integration policy 
for Finland. This means that in disintegrating the degree of statehood 
attained by the Grand Duchy the Russifiers were not willing to proceed 
at all costs or induce chaos — at least not immediately. Already in the 
1890s resistance-minded Finns thought that systematic noncooperation 
could make the cost of Russification too high. Moreover, Bobrikov 
was constrained both by a long tradition of not using extreme violence 
on the Finns and by those of his colleagues who agreed with his cause 
but not with his methods. Hence he had to do a good deal of 
manoeuvreing to obtain extraordinary powers. 
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The Finnish struggle against Russification has long been cited as 
somehow relevant to the further development of emancipatory 
nonmilitary forms of nonroutine struggle and defense, since without 
arms the Finnish resisters defied a great power. A basic element of 
Finnish Constitutionalist insurgency, moreover, was the European 
principle of voluntary servitude, holding that the first step in liberation 
is subjects' realization that power-over them is derived from them and 
that through united action people can reclaim and mobilize the power 
which inherently depends on them; if they do not do so they have only 
themselves to blame for their servitude. This voluntaristic concept of 
power combined with the secular religion and rhetoric of Justice makes 
the Finnish struggle against Russia highly amenable to study through 
emancipatory power perspectives, such as the Gandhian paradigm.3  
Furthermore, the analysis of the preceding ten points shows that in 
comparison to the cases commonly studied as "nonviolent" or nonmilit-
ary struggle, the Finnish case fulfilled to an extraordinary degree the 
conditions considered necessary by theorists for making such struggle 
both possible and viable. These considerations give concrete reason 
to believe that it is indeed worthwhile to ask if the Finnish case of 
passive resistance actually provides any valuable lessons for those 
exploring the potential uses of a technique, or repertoire of instruments, 
for coercing, fighting and defeating an enemy without recourse to 
conventional military means or direct physical violence. 
In addressing this question it must first of all be emphasized that in 
general throughout Europe passive resistance was usually developed 
and employed in circumstances of long-term interrelation and various 
degrees of mutual dependence between antagonists in the context of 
domination by one of them. This is true as well of twentieth century 
struggles considered as "nonviolent" and nonmilitary. Apparently 
passive resistance was never used by an independent state as a 
substitute for military defense against invading armed forces. This is 
an important point, since social defense theorists have sought to 
extrapolate from past cases, especially inter-polity ones like the Finno-
Russian, a type of "nonviolent" defense system which, when sufficiently 
3 To reiterate, it is perhaps equally appropriate to study it from the perspective of 
domination. For example, critics such as Marx and Lassalle saw the constitutionalist 
passive resistance of 1848, with its legalist rhetoric, as a great deception and an 
effort to control the Reyolution and manipulate the masses. This early view of 
passive resistance is certainly of relevance in analyzing the Finnish case. The study 
of passive resistance could thus be a contribution to Foucault's effort to show how 
Right "puts into motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but of 
domination." Foucault 1980, pp. 95-96. 
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developed, could serve as a "functional equivalent" of, and superior 
alternative to, military defense and war for defeating a military 
aggressor. Reflection on the Finnish case, within the context of western 
resistance history, suggests that the logical jump from such extrapola-
tion to a "nonviolent" functional replacement for war is at best shaky 
and perhaps unfounded. 
The reader will recall from the earlier discussion that European 
history presents no rigid dichotomy between violent and "nonviolent" 
action. This is not to imply that people did not understand the 
differences between various forms of contention between peaceful 
politics and extreme violence. But, before the twentieth century, in 
neither thought nor deed did Europeans (or their colonial subjects) 
develop a type of secular violence-excluding struggle which can be 
seen as (potentially) functionally superior to violent struggle in all 
conditions; passive resistance was the closest thing to it. 
This may seem obvious, but it has been suggested that the American 
colonists developed a "nonviolent" weapons system which proved to 
be at least as "effective" as military warfare. The examination of the 
American case in chapter II., however, brings over the necessity of 
realizing that in the modern western culture of contention physical 
violence has often been rejected as a replacement for, or the main tool 
of, creative mobilization in conjunction with a process of liberation 
from a long standing relation of subjection to a superior military power.4 
Common to this type of struggle is that the opponent or enemy does 
not (yet) turn to systematically applied extremely destructive measures 
like full-scale military war against the building of national (or, in 
general, group) autonomy and the employment of the weapons of 
economic and cultural noncooperation which have been directed 
against him. These are not (yet) extremely polarized conflicts. How-
ever, when it is a question of defending the creative achievements of 
mobilization and development from destruction or extremely damaging 
setbacks it is has been almost universally held that the "weapons" 
of economic and sociopolitical protest and noncooperation can-
not be made to serve as a functional equivalent to defensive mili-
tary war. 
These observations indicate how important the course of action 
chosen by the enemy is in determining the feasibility of nonmilitary 
° Contrastingly, in the case of imperialism domestic creative mobilization may go 
hand in hand with exploitation and violence abroad. 
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struggle.5 This point can be elucidated by considering the significance 
of the exceptionally extensive fulfillment of the conditions for social 
defense in the Finnish case. To put it bluntly, even if all the necessary 
internal conditions for social defense are sufficiently met, the power 
this gives the defender can be nullified if the aggressor resorts to highly 
destructive means such as large-scale mass deportation, genocide and 
systematic material devastation. 
It is thus appropriate to reiterate that from the long-term perspective, 
one of the most favorable conditions for the effectiveness of Finnish 
passive resistance (and of the Snellmanian approach too) was the 
special nature of the Finno-Russian relationship as established in the 
nineteenth century. Russification itself was a nonmilitary form of 
struggle, based on legitimized military domination, attempting not to 
physically destroy Finns and Finnish institutions, but rather to more 
thoroughly dominate them and take over and transform the system 
from within (which for many Finns meant the destruction of their 
society). It is this fact that gave the Finnish national resistance front, 
within the given circumstances, its power: Russification could be 
effectively hindered and even prevented through systematic non-
cooperation. 
This, to be sure, is not to depreciate the significance of passive 
resistance or related types of violence-avoiding struggle which can 
certainly make a decisive difference in conflicts. The aim here is, 
however, to emphasize that such types of struggle as applied in inter-
polity conflicts have taken place in highly specific and limited 
circumstances, and are therefore likely to do so in the future. To put 
it simply, judging from the past, organized passive or "nonviolent" 
resistance will only take place where the attacked polity meets the 
internal conditions (as enumerated above) for struggle within the 
context of long-term, or at least already established, domination with 
the dominator being sufficiently dependent on the dominated. 
The relevance of these conclusions can perhaps be made clearer by 
briefly considering them in relation to post-World War II and present 
day Eastern Europe. Schmid and his colleagues carried out, within the 
context of a broad study of Soviet postwar military actions, a detailed 
examination of four popular resistance struggles which have often been 
5 Schmid notes that social defense theorists have paid disproportionate attention to 
the internal conditions for struggle rather than to conditions determined by the 
opponent; this weakness has been ayoided in the present study by appropriately 
emphasizing the Russian regime's intentions and the limits on its power to implement 
them; Schmid 1985, p. 27. 
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considered, at least partially, as cases of "nonviolent" action .6 They 
discovered that in none of the cases were the crucial conditions 
necessary for social defense to be viable decisively fulfilled. This led 
to the conclusion, from the perspective of 1985, that the sanctions 
involved in the use of "nonviolent" nonmilitary or social defense cannot 
effectively dissuade, repulse or defeat the Soviet Union.' Of course 
the possibility of a new perspective on the postwar era has arisen 
following the "Revolution of 1989," but it still can be said that the 
Soviet regime, through means such as military intervention, secret 
police and communist party coercion, purges, imprisonment, torture, 
execution, mass population transfer and the restructuration of society, 
was able to decisively control the conditions for outright organized 
resistance and rebellion against it. 
Now, in the light of its failures, it is clear that the price of Soviet 
repression was tremendous and from the post-1989 perspective the 
various uprisings against it do not appear as futile as they once may 
have. Outright mass challenges to Soviet power, as in Czechoslovakia 
1968, doubtlessly contributed significantly to the long-term decay and 
break down of that power. Nevertheless, ultimately what was of far 
greater importance in diminishing Soviet control were the multifarious 
forms of everyday resistance which never reached the level of collective 
defiance and rebellion. This era clearly shows how the resources and 
conditions for outright organized struggle can be controlled and how 
masses of people can be coerced and manipulated, but how in the 
long-term such a system cannot maintain the social cohesion, and thus 
the economic power, to sustain domination. 
To be sure, one should not underrate, in the words of Timothy 
Garton Ash, "that large-scale, sustained, yet supremely peaceful and 
self-disciplined manifestation of social unity, the gentle crowd against 
the Party-state, which was both the hallmark and the essential domestic 
catalyst of change in 1989, in every country except Romania...."8 The 
mass movements of 1989 (and their seminal predecessors, like 
Solidarity in Poland) had a decisive effect on the outcome of the 
struggles. But, as Ash indicates, people power movements were not 
the foremost condition of change. Why did "nonviolent" mass 
movements catalyze sudden change in 1989 and not earlier? Because 
now, even though severe repression and violent confrontation would 
6 The cases are the Lithuanian resistance to Soviet re-occupation 1944-1952 (one 
component of which was called "passive resistance"), the East German uprising of 
1953, the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and Czechoslovakia 1968. 
7 Ibid., pp. 220,401-402. 
8 Ash 1990, p. 17. 
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have been possible, the ruling powers, on the background of economic 
crisis and the otherwise general unworkability of the communist system, 
were unwilling to destroy the "revolution." 
On the one hand, in the wake of the on-going radical transformation 
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the conditions for self-
determined collective action throughout these areas are improving. 
One of the implications of this is that the conditions for the effective 
application of violence-avoiding (as well as violent) forms of struggle 
both within and between communities are more favorable than before 
because the previous level of repression cannot be maintained. 
On the other hand, however, neither historical cases of passive 
resistance and "nonviolent" action, nor recent European events lend 
themselves to the postulation of a kind of social or civilian-based 
"nonviolent" defense system which could functionally replace organ-
ized violence. On the contrary, given its historical nature as primarily 
a form of struggle for liberation and justice, often in the context of 
established domination, and viable only in very specific conditions, 
passive or "nonviolent" resistance seems to have little to offer as a 
way of reducing ultimate dependence on military defense against ex-
treme violence. 
Apparently it is an entirely vain endeavour to try to extrapolate 
from historical cases or derive from theoretical construction a form of 
defensive power politics which if adopted by a community which has 
renounced the use of organized violence would render it inviolable or 
even less violable than military defense.1 ' This is because there is no 
mechanical way to say what kind of struggle is objectively most 
"effective" or "superior" in general, contrary to what many working 
in the Gandhian paradigm claim or imply." One must always ask: 
Ash points out that Soviet troops were no longer available to Eastern European 
ruling elites which, for their part, were no longer willing to use their own "still-
formidable police and security forces" to the extent necessary to destroy the popular 
movements; he thinks that "perhaps the ultimately decisive factor," making the 
transformation of 1989 possible was "that characteristic of revolutionary situations 
described by Tocqueyille more than a century ago: the ruling elite's loss of belief 
in its own right to rule." Ibid., p. 19. 
By "defensive power politics" I mean any defensive technique of wielding power-
over an adversary the effectiveness of which is independent of communication (such 
as negotiation on the basis of shared yalues and interests) with the adversary. 
Summing up the claims of the members of the "tough" or "pragmatic" school of 
nonyiolence two of the most sophisticated authors in the field write: "They maintain 
that nonviolence is (or can be made to be) more effective than military means, even 
when it comes to `deciding' a conflict by defeating or expelling an occupant at 
minimum cost. They argue that eyen within its own narrow framework military 
defense is simply less effective than the alternative they propose. If this is so then 
there is no argument at all to be made for military defense...": Boserup, Mack 1974, 
pp. 12, 13, 21. 
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effective for what, for what type of struggle and for what values and 
objectives? What research concerning violence-avoiding types of 
defensive struggle may hope to achieve is to indicate how groups 
seeking to defend their spheres of liberty and creative attainments in 
a world of power politics, where justice and cooperation are adhered 
to only to the minimum degree necessary, may more effectively cope 
with violations against them in various specific conditions. 
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